Skip to main content

Full text of "The manuscripts of J.B. Fortescue, Esq., preserved at Dropmore"

See other formats


Founded by 



GOLD-WIN SMITH 
H ARRI£Lt'^S>1ITH[ 



OU . jywv,^ 



M0« J 

« Hi TTTClm/^T 



HISTOKICAL MANUSCRIPTS COMMISSION. 



(|epokt 

(on the ) 

MANUSCRIPTS 



OF 



J. B. FORTESCUE, ESQ., 



PRESERVED AT 

DROPMORE 

VOL. V. — ^ 

3 ''/Ol> Ua 1.. 



frestntti) lo f axlinm^nt bn Commnnb ot gis ^aiestB^ 





LONDON : 

PRINTED FOR HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE 

BY MACKIE & CO. LD.. 59, Fleet Street, E.G. 



And to be purchased, either directly or through any Bookseller, from 

WYMAN AND SONS, Ld , Pkttkr Lane, E.G., and 

32, Abingdon Strkkt, Westminstkr, S.W.; or 

OLIVER & BOYD, Edinburgh; or 
E. PONSONBY, 116, Grafton Street, Dublin. 



1906. 
[Cd. 2811.] Price 2s. 4J. 



V- 



,v.\.| 



CONTENTS. 



Page. 
Introduction v 

PiEPORT ,...----- 1 

Index . - 530 



INTKODUCTION. 



The papers contained in this volume relate almost exclusively 
to the campaigns of 1799 between the forces of the 
European Powers forming the Third or, as it is sometimes 
called, the Second Coalition, and those of Republican 
France. They are a frank revelation of the policy of the 
British Cabinet, its hopes, fears, projects, efforts and 
failures, in connexion with the important events crowded 
into seven months, from the end of March to the end of 
October, of that year. But as the volume closes while the 
war was still in progress, and its issue still doubtful, it 
has seemed better to restrict the Preface to a brief indica- 
tion of its contents. Another volume bringing the course 
of affairs down to the peace of Luneville, the Legislative 
Union of Great Britain and Ireland, and the fall of Pitt's 
first ministry, will afford a fitting opportunity of reviewing 
in their entirety the momentous changes that marked the 
two last years of the 18th century, and of Lord Grenville's 
official connexion with Mr. Pitt. 

As has been already told in the Introduction to Volume 
IV., Lord Grenville, early in the year of 1799, sent his 
brother Thomas as Envoy Extraordinary to Berlin to act 
as " his other self " in forming an offensive league between 
Great Britain and the leading monarchies of the Continent, 
to crush the subverting power of revolution which had its 
seat at Paris, and restore the systems and landmarks its 
victories had swept away. Negotiations with these objects 
in view had already begun. The British Government had 
made repeated overtures to the Tzar ; Austria sought aid 
against French aggression at St. Petersburgh and London. 
Paul I., Tzar of Russia, had no material interests to serve 
by waging war against France. But coveting the glory of 
being everywhere acclaimed as the champion of conservative 
principles and the saviour of Europe, he yielded to appeals 



VI 

from the Emperor Francis II. and George III. ; and spared 
no effort not only to bring the King of Prussia into the 
Coalition, but to strengthen it by reconciling the estranged 
Governments of Austria and Great Britain. Frederick 
William III., however, clung tenaciously to the neutral policy 
adopted by his father in 1795. And Lord Grenville, with 
Pitt's support, refused to subsidize or enter into concert 
with Austria, until a financial convention signed in London 
in 1797 had been ratified at Vienna. The matter in dis- 
pute was apparently of little real importance. Austria 
acknowledged her debt ; Great Britain did not ask for 
immediate repayment. But angry reproaches, wounded pride, 
mutual resentment and suspicion aroused by diplomatic 
methods, had magnified what seems to have been little 
more than a formality into a point of national honour on 
which neither party would give way. The consequence was 
that, at the breaking out of war, France found herself 
confronted by a coalition so loosely constructed as to afford 
little promise of long life. It was a triple league, of 
which the Tzar was centre, and connecting link : his allies, 
the Governments of Austria and Great Britain, forming 
plans in concert with him but without communication with 
each other ; each intent on pursuing a line of action 
against the common enemy according most with its 
particular views and interests. 

Lord Grenville, partly in deference to his brother's com- 
plaints from Berlin, sent Lord Minto to replace Sir Morton 
Eden at Vienna, with some expectation of being able to 
influence Austrian counsels through a stronger minister. 
But he seems to have much under-rated the danger to 
the Coalition likely to result from his own antagonism to 
the Imperial Chancellor Baron Thugut, on whose position 
and character foreign letters included in the correspondence 
throw considerable light. Thugut having acquired complete 
ascendency over the mind of the Emperor Francis II., 
exercised absolute control over the armies, as well as the 
policy of the Austrian Monarchy. Even Archduke Charles 
the Emperor's brother, and already reputed the ablest 
Austrian commander since Prince Eugene, seems to have 
been during this campaign, however unwillingly, a mere 



Vll 

puppet in his hands. And he pursued his plans with a 
silent and stubborn tenacity which all remonstrance of an 
unfriendly or interested character only served to harden. 

From the very beginning of the war, and even before 
Kussian succours reached the scene of hostilities, the Austrian 
generals and armies showed decisive superiority over those 
of France. Archduke Charles defeated General Jourdan at 
Stockach and drove his army in headlong confusion across 
the Ehine. Then passing into Switzerland he dislodged 
Massena from fortified positions which seemed to defy 
attack. In Italy the Austrian General Kray opened the 
campaign by a brilliant victory over General Scherer at 
Magnano. Immediately afterwards Marshal Souvarow 
entered the field with a body of Russians and assumed 
supreme command of the allied troops. Marching from 
triumph to triumph he routed in succession the three 
French armies of Moreau, McDonald and Joubert, captured 
the fortresses of Alessandria and Turin, and expelled the 
French from the entire peninsula with the exception of 
the city of Genoa and a few positions on the Maritime 
Alps. These splendid successes changed the face of the political 
situation, and stimulated the hopes and efforts of all the enemies 
of France. Even the King of Prussia allowed Count Haugwitz 
to resume the discussion of a project, proposed earlier in the 
year by Mr. Granville, of joint intervention in Holland for 
the restoration of the House of Orange. But the British 
Government distrusting the king's timidity — and justly, for 
soon after he suffered the French Directory to entangle him in 
an elusive negotiation — now framed bolder plans, embracing 
the same object, but based mainly on the co-operation 
of the Emperor Paul. These, as unfolded and discussed 
in Lord Grenville's correspondence with his brother, resolved 
themselves into three distinct series of military operations : 
(I.) A joint expedition of British troops and Russians in 
British pay, to recover Holland and Belgium from France, 
and restore the Prince of Orange as ruler of the whole 
Netherlands, or of the Dutch Republic only, as riper know- 
ledge and experience might determine, but on terms 
exceedingly advantageous to Great Britain. (II.) The 
assembling in Switzerland of a larger army composed of 



Vlll 

Russians, Swiss, Wirtembergers, and Conde's corps of 
Smigres, also in the pay of Great Britain, but under 
the command of Marshal Souvarow, who had nearly 
finished his work in Italy. It was proposed that this force, 
operating in concert with the Austrians under Archduke 
Charles, should expel Massena from Swiss territory, pene- 
trate into France, and take up winter quarters at Lyons, 
to serve as a rallying point and support for royalist dis- 
affection, in the eastern and southern Departments. (III.) 
Later in the year when the Netherlands had been con- 
quered, the landing of a strong body of British and Russian 
troops in Brittany, to capture and destroy Brest, and aid a 
Chouan revolt which Georges Cadondal was organizing with 
funds supplied from the British Treasury. 

The first of these enterprises, requiring the co-operation 
of the Russian Emperor only, moved smoothly forward 
through all its preparatory stages. Paul granted a con- 
tingent of 18,000 troops, and procured from the King of 
Sweden an offer of 6,000 more, which the British Govern- 
ment declined. The Hereditary Prince of Orange, who had 
been living at Berlin in constant communication with the 
adherents of his House in the Dutch Republic, repaired to 
Lingon. With full powers from his father at Hampton Court, 
and money furnished by Mr. Grenville, he despatched trust- 
worthy agents to all parts of the Netherlands to rally and 
organize the Orange party, collect information, and arrange 
for simultaneous risings when the time for action should 
have come. Their reports left no doubt of a general desire 
among people of every shade of opinion to rid themselves 
of the oppressive yoke of France ; of disaffection in the 
Dutch army and navy ; of the reduction of the French 
garrison to a mere handful of troops; of the hopeful 
activity of the Orange party, and the discord and deep 
discouragement of the party in power. To muster the 
troops, and provide means of transport for them would re- 
quire many weeks. But neither Lord Grenville nor his 
brother seems to have entertained a doubt that, should 
existing conditions hold good for that period, the occupa- 
tion of the entire Netherlands by a powerful Anglo-Russian 
force, boldly led, would be rather a triumphal march than 
an arduous military operation. 



IX 

The Tzar also readily adopted the British plan of cam- 
paign in Switerland, pressed its acceptance at Vienna, and 
sent a body of Russian troops numbering, at least on 
paper, 45,000, to Zurich, under the command of General 
Korsakow. In this plan Austrian co-operation was an 
essential ingredient. Baron Thugut at first raised no diffi- 
culty. Souvarow's victories in Italy had excited to a very 
high pitch the jealous anger of the Austrian generals 
under his command. The Marshal, finding his orders dis- 
obeyed, his plans thwarted, and his Russian troops, which 
had borne the brunt of the fighting, reduced to a mere 
remnant, complained to his sovereign of the slights put on 
him, and asked to be recalled. His letter and a disposition 
already shown by the Austrian Government to aggrandize 
itself in Italy at the expense of the Pope and the King of 
Sardinia, whom the Russian autocrat had taken under his pro- 
tection, incensed Paul. Sharp remonstrances from the Russian 
Chancellor Rostopchin to Count Cobentzl greatly perturbed 
the Court of Vienna. And in his anxiety, as it would 
appear, to remove Souvarow from Italy, without any rupture 
of friendly relations with an imperious ally, Thugut acquiesced 
in the British plan of campaign. Assured, as he thought, 
on this point, Lord Grenville sent back Mr. Wickham 
as British Minister in Switzerland to re-open com- 
munications with the Royalists of eastern France, and 
hasten the enrolment, already begun, of 20,000 Swiss. 
Later on, he despatched Lord Mulgrave as military com- 
missioner to the Russian head-quarters at Zurich, to bring 
Suvarow or Korsakow, as the case might be, into concert 
with the Archduke, and to take command of the Swiss 
levies ; and he held Count d'Artois in readiness to join 
Souvarow at the opportune moment. Hardly, however, had the 
Russian Field-marshal been ordered to march into Switzerland, 
when Baron Thugut began to show his hand. Having been 
refused a subsidy, and even concert, by the British 
Cabinet, he seems to have resolved to reserve Austrian 
armies as much as possible for the accomplishing of 
Austrian aims, and, where these were not involved, to 
allow armies subsidized by Great Britain to bear the brunt 
of the war with France. With this view he had checked 



the Archduke's advance in Switzerland, and kept him 
inactive for two months. On several important points 
Austrian policy clashed with that of Great Britain. The 
Court of Vienna had lost all sympathy for the Royalist 
cause in France. It disliked the French princes, and 
would not risk a man or a florin to make the Count of 
Provence Louis XVIII. Neither was it willing to abandon 
Belgium, which had been for so long a period a possession of 
the Emperor, and where he still had powerful partizans, to be 
disposed of as the British Cabinet might determine. Under 
the pretext that Souvarow's army alone would be strong 
enough to expel the French from Switzerland, Baron Thugut 
suddenly announced the intention of withdrawing the Arch- 
duke's army to protect Germany against a French attack, 
recover the fortress of Mayence, and, as Lord Grenville 
surmised, open the way for an Austrian occupation of the 
Netherlands. It was in this manner, he declared, that the 
Emperor could give most effectual support to the movements 
of his allies. Even if all the other conditions of the British 
plan had been fully satisfied, this decision must have 
proved fatal to it, Massena's army having been largely 
reinforced. But the Swiss recruiting had failed. Owing in 
a great measure, as Wickham reported, to the faults of 
British officers employed as commissaries, 2,000 men only out 
of 20,000 had been enrolled. The Wirtembergers had not 
arrived. The effective strength of Korsakow^'s Russian army 
did not exceed 40,000 men. Lord Mulgrave on reaching 
Zurich found that military rivalries had already spread from 
Italy to Switzerland, Austrian and Russian generals being on 
terms that almost forbad any hope of cordial co-operation. 
While he laboured to improve their relations, the Arch- 
duke, in obedience to orders from the Austrian War Office, 
moved off to Mayence, leaving General Hotze with an 
Austrian division in the Grisons, as a link of connexion 
between Souvarow and Korsakow. Massena, seizing his 
opportunity, fell with superior force on the armies of 
Korsakow and Hotze, routed them completely, and sent 
them flying in wild confusion into Germany. The Arch- 
duke hastened back to repair these disasters only to find 
them irreparable. Souvarow crossed the St. Gothard by 



XI 



forced marches only to find the Austrian positions and 
magazines, on which he counted for support, in the hands 
of the French. He extricated himself from the trap into 
which he had fallen unawares, by a wonderful retreat over 
frightful passes, amidst almost incredible hardships and 
privations, to Coire ; and skirting Lake Constance, joined 
the wreck of Korsakow's army. A letter from Mr. Wickham, 
dated September 30, describes the earlier incidents of the 
battle of Zurich, of which he was an eye-witness. Other 
letters from him of later date, most of which, having been 
published by his literary executors, are not included in 
this volume, give accounts of Marshal Souvarow. The 
eccentricities and occasional roughness of the famous old 
warrior seem to have shocked Mr. Wickham' s sense of 
propriety, and clouded his judgment. 

While reverses thus tarnished the arms of the Coalition 
in Switzerland the Anglo-Russian expedition made little 
way in Holland. Sir Ralph Abercromby, with the leading 
British divisions, after tossing about for a fortnight on 
the North Sea, beaten off by contrary winds from more 
eligible points of the Dutch coast, had effected a landing 
at the Helder towards the end of August. A lieet of 
Dutch warships in the Texel, on being summoned by 
Admirall Mitchell, hoisted the Orange flag and surrendered. 
Dutch soldiers deserted in bands growing larger every day 
after the arrival of the Hereditary Prince at the Helder. 
General Brune, the Republican Commander-in-Chief, had 
as yet under his orders only a small body of French 
soldiers, the only troops on whom he could count with any 
confidence. But contrary to the intention of the English 
ministry Abercromby, although reinforced by 10,000 Russians, 
remained strictly on the defensive for another fortnight, 
until the arrival of the Duke of York with other divisions 
brought up the strength of the invading army to a total 
of 48,000 men. It had been decided in England that four 
or five thousand of these should be detached from the 
main body to aid insurrections in Groningen and Friesland. 
But this design was not carried out. Nor were six thousand 
Dutch deserters, who joined the Hereditary Prince, turned 
to any use, no vessels being available to transport them 



Xll 



across the Zuyder Zee. After the Duke of York's arrival 
there was another considerable pause for preparation, 
during which Brune's army continued to grow in strength 
and in power of vigorous resistance. Then followed nearly 
three weeks of alternate advance and retreat along a narrow 
neck of land, resulting in a convention which allowed the 
Duke to return with the allied troops to England, on con- 
ditions which gave it, in Lord Grenville's view at least, 
too much the character of a capitulation. 

Thomas Grenville had left Berlin in the beginning of 
September to aid the Hereditary Prince of Orange in 
organizing revolt in the provinces of Groningen and Fries- 
land ; and thence proceed to Holland as British Ambassador 
Extraordinary to take charge of the political objects of the 
Anglo-Eussian expedition. The sudden departure of the 
Hereditary Prince from Lingen to the Helder partly upset 
his plans. Want of certain intelligence from England or 
Holland, owing partly to adverse gales, kept him for many 
weeks in painful suspense at Hamburg. And contrary winds 
delayed his passage for some weeks more from Emden to 
Holland. His letters during this trying period betray the 
feelings of astonishment and dismay which the dilatory tactics 
of the British generals seem to have excited in all well- 
wishers of the expedition. The staunchest friends of the 
House of Orange in the two provinces most faithful to it, 
Friesland and Groningen, refused to run any risk so long as 
the armed aid they had been taught to look for was with- 
held. Other letters contain passing references to General 
Brune's activity and decision in turning to account every 
available means of defence. His resolute energy saved a 
situation which, in the beginning, had seemed to men of 
all parties desperate. Mr. Grenville only reached the 
Helder to learn that the Anglo-Kussian army was about to 
evacuate Holland, and he returned at once to England. In 
a letter to Mr. Dundas dated October 28, Lord Grenville 
protested against the ratification of an article of the con- 
vention signed in Holland by which the Duke of York 
conceded the release of some thousands of French prisoners 
whom he had not taken, as exceeding the powers of a 
general-in-chief. Dundas, however, as Minister for War, 



xm 

assumed the responsibility for giving more palatable 
advice to the King. 

When active hostilities ceased at the end of October, 
1799, France had lost Italy, but remained mistress of all 
the Netherlands, and of Switzerland. Internal discord had 
already brought the Coalition to the verge of disruption. 
On the other hand, it was very doubtful whether the 
French Directory, incapable, divided against itself, bankrupt, 
and representing only a small minority of the French 
nation, could continue to wage a most unpopular war. 
The determining fact of the situation, Bonaparte's return 
to France, was still unknown in England; and for a long 
time after it became known there, was very imperfectly 
appreciated. 



The Appendix to this volume contains two confidential 
reports from Mr. Liston, British Minister at Stockholm, of 
considerable historical interest. They relate to the assas- 
sination of Gustavus III., King of Sweden, and the regency 
of his brother the Duke of Sudermania ; and came to light 
after the publication of the volume to which they belong 
chronologically. 



The present volume, like its predecessors, has been 
prepared, and the introduction written, by Mr. Walter 
Fitzpatrick. The Index has been compiled by Mr. A. E. 
Bland, B.A., of the Public Kecord Office. 



THE MANUSCRIPTS OF 

J. B. FORTESCUE, ESQUIRE, 

PRESERVED AT DROPMORE. 



VOL. V. 



Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville. 

1799, April 5. Cleveland Row. — "I am vexed to see how long 
you have remained without hearing from us. You will, however, 
since have had your table and boxes full of my letters, and I will 
not add to them to-day except only to say how happy I feel that 
our ideas have so much agreed, notwithstanding the interruption 
of plan and time. 

"I have perhaps gone one step further than you would have done 
in the communication made to Vienna of the march of the 
Russians, but I could not in conscience delay the step ; and when 
taken, I knew Thugut would learn it through Woronzow and Pan in, 
so I thought we might as well take the merit of the 
communication . ' ' 

Copy. 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, April 8. Berlin. — " I had originally intended to have 
deferred the expedition of this messenger a day or two longer, 
but the important account of the progressive success of the 
Austrians, and the very judicious proclamation of the Archduke 
upon his entering the Swiss territory, together with the authentic 
account, which I am told is taken from the Vienna Gazette, of the 
defeat of the French at Legnano, have determined me to send to 
you without delay, and to persuade myself that you will easily 
spare my political reasonings when I sacrifice them to the more 
speedy communication of such substantial intelligence. You will 
easily see in all my latter despatches how partial I still continue 
to be to the plan of the Russian subsidiar}^ army being employed 
on the Bas-tthin ; and I must honestly confess that I still con- 
tinue to be so, even after reading, in your despatch of the 15th 

Wt. G802 A 



2 

ultimo to Petersburg, what were the sort of precautions to be recom- 
mended, in the case of the Russians acting in Swisserland, to pre- 
serve the necessary co-operation, secure the independence of that 
force, and guard against the chance of its telling in lieu of other force 
for the benefit of Austria. I own I think that, for objects of 
military co-operation, such precautions are more likely to create 
jealousy and embarrassment than to secure the reasonable objects 
which you wish to obtain by them. In truth I have so much 
apprehension of this limited co-operation, and of the bad effects 
it would produce that, though I am, as little as anybody can be, 
inclined to suffer Austria to profit by her treachery to us, yet if 
we are to pursue the great object of the war in joint military 
operations of any description, I should recommend the ex- 
pediency, nay the absolute necessity, of pursuing that co- 
operation in the most frank and cordial manner, because no other 
can be adopted with success ; and if their past behaviour makes 
that cordial and liberal concert impracticable, it is a reason for 
having nothing to do with them ; but I should think limitations 
and restrictions could never cure that difficulty or do other than 
defeat the wishes and the efforts of both parties. 

' ' I see by the despatches which were brought to me from joxx 
by the last two messengers that you had almost considered 
my journey to Vienna as being fixed ; you know that I will 
do whatever is thought likely to be useful, but I have 
considerable doubts, in the first place, whether we had better enter 
into any detailed concert with Austria; and in the second place, 
whether more advantage might not be had by my continuing 
here, at least until all idea of military arrangements respecting 
Holland should be put aside. Count Panin teaches me to fancy 
that I might be of more use by keeping up the communications 
with Petersburg and Austria from hence than I could be in going 
to either of those places ; and he is pleased to suppose that the 
confidential terms upon which I am put by our Government 
might enable me to act with more general advantage from hence 
than from any other spot. I do not, however, see how this could 
be done without my putting myself more forward than it becomes 
me to do, and I suspect his opinion upon this subject is founded 
rather upon his partiality to me and his desire to retain me as long 
as he can, than from any practicable benefit which any such measure 
would be likely to produce. For myself, I have no fancy to gratify ; 
I am here because it was thought that I could do good here, and 
I have no suggestion to make that has any other reference. 

"I hope soon to be able to obtain some intelligence from Flanders, 
and have applied for that purpose to the H [ereditary] P [rince] 
of Orange and to Baron Lynden who have sent a trusty and 
intelligent person into the country. I have likewise accepted the 
offer of General Stamford to pursue the same object by means of 
a M. de la Palue, son-in-law to M. Riviere, ancien envoye de Sa,re, 
by whose means, I am told, much may be done with no consider- 
able expense. I have not as yet received from General Stamford 
any decided recommendation of an officer to command in 
Portugal, but he is disposed to think that M. de Schwerin might 



J 



3 ' 

answer this purpose, and his enquiries are directed towards this 
object, upon which I shall soon be al)le to write to you. I do not 
know that any can ])e found of talents as good as those which he 
possesses ; he desires you will make what use you please of his 
pen, and I send you a very good translation of his of a pamphlet 
on Prussian neutrality, whicli has had great effect in this part of 
Germany." 

The Hereditary Prince of Orange to the Prince of Orange. 

1799, April 9. Berlin. — " Je ne crois pas que le s6jour de 
M. de Lynden ici se prolongera, puisqu'il y est superflu dans 
les circonstances actuelles. 

" Mr. Grenville cependant ne paroissoit pas etre sans esper- 
ances de reussir en derniere analyse a determiner cette Cour a 
prendre part a la coalition, mais ne lui ayant pas parl6 de 
quelque temps, je ne puis dire ce qui en est dans ce moment, 
mais m'en instruirai un de ces jours. Au reste on travaille 
maintenant a un plan pour operer la revolution chez nous sans 
la Prusse, s'il n'y a pas moyen de faire decider celle-ci a la 
guerre ; et je fais rassembler des materiaux pour cet objet, aiin 
de pouvoir donner toutes les informations possibles quand le 
moment sera venu. L'objet de la Belgique ne tient pas moins 
a coeur a Mr. Grenville que celui de la Hollande, et il m' a pri6 
de lui procurer, a cet egard, tous les renseignemens possibles. 
C'est aussi pour cela que Ragay s'est rendu de ces cot6s pour 
tacher de procurer des notions justes. Je crois pouvoir pre- 
sumer que le propos de Haugwitz, savoir, qu'il ne falloit parler 
que de la delivrance de la Hollande sans nommer la maison 
d'Orange, a rapport aux declarations a faire sur cette matiere 
vis-a-vis des Fran9ois ; savoir, dans le temps ou, devant de leur 
declarer la guerre, on leur dicteroit les conditions de la paix; 
jusqu'a present je ne crois pas que les Bataves ayent fait des 
d-marches directes pour etre reconnus, et les liaisons avec la 
France etant rompues, ce ne pent non plus etre par cette 
mission. 

" Mais Ton parle de I'arrivee de Deputes qui viennent pour 
etre reconnus, ou pour demander le consentement a la reunion 
avec la France ; je parlerai au premier jour sur cette matiere 
avec Haugwitz, qui, au reste, n'a plus a beaucoup pres le credit 
qu'il a eu, et il paroit que Kockeritz, Beyme, et Mencke sont de 
plus en plus tout puissants : tous les trois sont pour le systeme 
pacifique, mais on assure cependant qu'il y auroit moyen de 
gagner quelqu'influence sur eux, du moins sur celui qui a le plus 
d'influence, savoir Beyme. Les dispositions de Mylord Grenville 
pour notre maison me font un tres-grand plaisir, et assurent que 
le cabinet Britannique travaille tou jours en notre faveur." 

April 16. Berlin. — "Lynden est reparti, sa presence ici etant 
superflue. Avant de partir il a parle avec Haugwitz, qui lui a 
donne les assurances generales de bonnes dispositions pour la 
R^publique, mais soumettant la conduite de sa Cour a cet egard 
aux combinations g^n^rales ; dans la conversation Lynden lui 



demanda si Ton pouvoit se flatter qu'au cas que les evenemens 
permissent de r^tablir les choses en Hollande, ou qu'un desespoir 
general provoquat une revolution, il seroit possible de compter 
sur I'assistance du Eoi, pour empecher que les Fran9ois ne 
s'emjDarent de nouveau du pays. La r^ponse fut affirmative 
dans le cas ou une revolution seroit faite, mais Hau^witz recom- 
menda, en meme temps, la plus grande prudence pour ne pas 
exposer tant de fortunes et de vies. Je crois, an reste, que si les 
succes de I'Arcliiduc continuent, il sera probable que nous nous 
aidions nous-memes, et d'ailleurs Ton s'occupe d'un projet pour 
parvenir a delivrer la Republiquequandmeme leroiresteroit neutre 
en derniere analyse ; et je doute qu'on determine la Prusse a agir, 
puisque les puissances exigent une cooperation directement 
offensive, tandis qu'on ne veut s'y decider que d'apres les circon- 
stances ; et, en attendant, on veut etre en etat de pouvoir agir a 
tout moment. On en etoit du moins encore la il y a peu de 
jours, mais j 'ignore si depuis I'arriv^e des derniers couriers il 
s'est passe quelque chose de nouveau. Yvoy doit etre maintenant 
a Emerick, d'ou il tachera d'avoir des nouvelles de la Belgique. 
L'affaire de la Hollande et de la Belgique est d'un interet 
majeur a Mr. Grenville, et il ne les separe presqueplus. A moins 
de grands r overs du cote des Imperiaux, je ne doute pas que 
dans le cours de cet 6t6 on ne tente quelque chose de ce cote la, 
et je m'occupe en consequence a coucher mes idees sur le papier 
par rapport a ce que nous pourrions faire. Des que j'aurai 
forme mon projet, je le communiquerai chez vous et ici a Mr. 
Grenville. Les dispositions de la Cour de Berlin ne m'affligent 
pas moins que Mylord Grenville, et, en particulier, que Ton soit 
parvenu a eloigner si fort le roi de toute id^e de guerre. 

"Cependant il y a des moyens d'influencer plusieurs des 
personnes qui ont du credit. Peut-etre qu'en employant les 
v6ritables, on r^uisseroit a changer le syst^me." Extract. 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, April 10. Berlin. — "In my hurry to send Shaw with his 
budget of news, I overlooked one or two points to which your 
private letters have adverted, and I take this opportunity of 
adding a word or two to supply that deficiency ; and first with 
regard to Holland and to Count Haugwiz's doubts about naming 
the Stadtholder in the first efforts to be made in that country. I 
do not apprehend there is sluj finesse on his part in declaring that 
opinion, but I presume that his information leads him really to 
believe that more management is necessary on that point, than is 
in truth either requisite or advisable ; I should feel much disposed 
to think with you that this is a mistaken view in point of policy, 
but it is of a description to be easily corrected in the moment of 
acting, and as I apprehend no underhand design in this view, I 
have not, in my private conversations with him, jDursued any 
further that topic of discussion. They certainly feel upon the 
whole gratified by the liberal arrangements proposed from 



England for re-establishing the independence of Holland, and I 
have found the description of our disposition on this subject very 
useful to correct the impression whicTi the French industriously 
labour to establish here, of an overbearing and tyrannical design 
in Great Britain to engross and monopolize by force the trade 
and commerce of Europe. This French artifice is most easily 
traced here upon a variety of topics, and I am assured that they 
have succeeded in creating a very general belief that the present 
high price of coffee (which is in as general use in Germany as 
tea is in England) is entirely owing to that trade being got 
entirely into the hands of the English. I never hear this quoted 
without remarking how much it is our wish to see re-established 
in Europe the only commercial country which in wealth and 
industry could ever be compared to us; and I observe that wher- 
ever our desire of seeing Holland re-established is believed, w^e 
have ample credit for a conduct which seems more liberal and 
disinterested than in general they know how to think sincere on 
our part. The last news which I have from thence announces 
rather an ostentatious imprudence on the part of the French in 
sending all their force towards the Haul Rldn ; but this is so 
publicly announced that it is impossible not to suspect .some 
artifice in it, more especially as it is so much their practice to 
work by the operation of these reports ; and it is remarkable enough 
that, in the same moment, the old project of the union of the 
Batarian provinces to the French Republic is again very much 
circulated and discussed in Holland. 

' ' My last letters from Sir James Crawf urd upon our Hamburgh 
project state all the difficulties which he finds, and do not state 
many resources or assistances ; but I regard this the less because 
it seems to me that in temper and disposition he is naturally 
more sensible of difficulties than fertile of expedients to remove 
them ; he says the magistrates are frightened at having been 
questioned by Prussia whether they had desired the assistance of 
the Emperor of Russia, and that they have expressly disclaimed 
a wish for any such assistance, but that their fears of offending 
Russia by this declaration still give him some hold of this 
subject and the only hold which now remains. I do not feel less 
anxious than I did as to the ultimate success of an arrangement 
with Denmark for a combined force on that side either by land 
or sea ; but as that expedition could not succeed for Holland until 
the main Russian force should have aj^proached to Dusseldorff, 
all that I now wish is to have that cooperation established ; and 
an arrangement of that nature might be settled by Anstruther so 
as to be ready when it is wanted without previously challenging 
the Prussian neutrality, or awakening on that side the defence of 
the enemy. Meantime a Prussian engineer has been sent to 
consider of the defence of Cuxhaven, and I understand they 
mean to send some troops to that neighbourhood ; if however I 
am to give credit to Mr. Harward the agent at Cuxhaven, you 
have it in contemplation to make Norden your port of passage in 
future instead of Cuxhaven ; at least he tells me that he is 
ordered to report on this to the Post Office, and I conceive by his 



letter that he means to report favourably of such an arrange- 
ment. There is little doubt but that in point of facility of 
communication in winter, and nearer and more direct route to 
the middle of Germany, Nordeii would have the advantage; 
but how far the consideration of its being Prussian instead 
of Hamburgois is an advantage does not appear to me to be 
quite so clear ; and I have likewise some doubts whether the 
money packets will not be exposed to considerable danger from 
the small Dutch privateer row-boats which can so easily skulk 
about those little islands, and shelter' themselves on the Dutch 
side of the enihonchure of the Ems. Mr. Harward advises me 
to avail myself at Berlin of a measure so agreeable to the 
interests of the Prussian monarchy ; but before I do so I shall 
be glad to be better informed, and assured that such a measure 
will be agreeable to the interests also of the little island that I 
belong to ; pray let me know what are your wishes and opinions 
in England upon this subject. 

"Fauche and his friend have received passports from Petersburg, 
and are going thither to make the Emperor their plenipotentiary 
with Louis XVIII, instead of treating with him through the 
Due de Fleury ; you will already have seen by my letters how 
much I agree with you, both in the speculations of the whole affair 
and in the entire disinclination which I have to have anything to 
do with it. I never can believe Barras to be such a blockhead 
as to put his life and fortune so entirely in their hands, and I 
am persuaded that the Paris negotiation is only a bargain of 
some under intriguer who buys and sells with the name of 
Barras whatever he can get by it at any market ; we shall 
see what it will be worth at Petersburg. Before however I 
entirely quit these northern sovereigns let me again return to 
suggest to you, in one word, the consideration of the combined 
project between Great Britain, Kussia, and Denmark, as oftering 
no inconsiderable guard against the danger which you seem to 
apprehend of Prussia engaging the last of these i)owers in 
questions of naval jealousy and altercation with Great Britain. 
Surely any project of concert, naval and military, for any 
expedition in which Prussia had no part, would very much tend 
to diminish that danger; and on the other hand it should not 
be forgot that the transferring to Norden the commerce of 
English passage, is to put into the hands of the Prussian 
Cabinet additional means of peevish litigation and dispute, if 
upon such subjects any unpleasant disposition is in the least 
likely to shew itself at Berlin. 

" Since my last declaration to the Prussian Ministers I have 
sought for no other discussion with them, and wish only to hear 
from England what your decisions may be as to the employment 
of the Russian force, and what assistance you think I can give 
to that, or to any resolution that you may come to upon these 
subjects. They will certainly feel much embarrassed here at the 
solitary figure which they will display in the politics of Europe 
whenever Eussia and England shall publicly have taken their 
ground with Austria, and I have no doubt but that a good deal 



of that distrust and dissatisfaction will be shewn here which is the 
constant result of weak measures, and no bad punishment of the 
wretched system which has produced them. Of the insufficiency 
of Count Haugwiz to resist that system and those measures, 
however he may disapprove of them, I learnt a new and strong 
proof to-day. In Saxe- Weimar a celebrated professor has pub- 
lished a system of atheism which, when published, was immediately 
forbidden there, and was denounced at Berlin and Hanover as 
being a wicked and dangerous publication ; in Hanover it is for- 
bidden, in Berlin Haugwiz proposed and urged vehemently the 
suppressing it ; the forms here require however that this question 
should be submitted to a consistory, who decided in opposition 
to Haugwiz ; and one of the members gave for his reason, that 
he should be ashamed to believe in a God if he was afraid of any 
book that could be written to prove that there was no God. This 
difference of opinion between Haugwiz and the consistory was 
referred to the King, who decided for the consistory upon these 
liberal princij)les, and the book is sold publicly in all the streets 
of Berlin. I mention this matter to you not only as a proof of 
the incapacity of those who influence the King, but as a 
strong instance of the insufficiency of Haugwiz, who, vehemently 
urging another and a wiser opinion, has not firmness enough 
to give effect to his own sentiments, but submits to worse 
and weaker counsels on points which he himself believes to be 
of the greatest danger and importance. 

" It has been whispered here these last two days that the dis- 
grace and infamy of the Austrian negotiation with France is not 
confined to the shameful convention of Kastadt which you see in 
all the papers, but that there are secret articles of a still more 
scandalous description ; if I procure them I will send them to 
you, and I have desired Count Panin to endeavour likewise to 
get them and send them to Woronzow and to you. My Russian 
friend is under very great apprehension for the turn which 
things may take at Petersburg if Woronzow should refuse, and I 
fancy he writes to him by this messenger to tell him his mind 
upon that subject. I have a letter from Eden of April 3 with a 
confirmation of the Legnano victory as I sent it to you in my 
last ; but he speaks of Laudohn's having had a check in the Tyrol, 
before he could join Bellegarde, which however he has done. 
The freshest news here is a letter from Schaffhausen of 30th, 
which speaks of the French at that moment evacuating the town 
on the approach of the Austrian s. By Staray's approach, 
Jourdan is obliged to cross the Rhine. I have no public despatch, 
but I send to Cuxhaven as there is no messenger to bring me 
what despatches you may send there ; for Shaw's merits in our 
escape were so great that I could not refuse him permission to go 
on to England, and therefore I have on this occasion no back- 
carriage to bring your letters." 

Postscript. " I cannot get these secret articles yet, but as they 
are sent from Radstadt to disgrace the Austrians here, they will 
soon enough be known ; in my mind it is not easy to add to 
their shame in the book of Radstadt negotiations. 



8 

" The Prussian Ministers are ordered to withdraw from Uadstadt. 
We have it whispered here that Zastrow has had a dispute wdth 
the King upon mihtary arrangements which has lessened his 
favour ; and Schmettau, who is considered as heing dans les hons 
jnincipes, is talked of as advancing in the king's favour ; but all 
these are wretched and little pursuits too minute and of too 
confined a scale to tell with any advantage upon the great 
objects which ought to engross the attention and influence the 
conduct of one of the greatest powers of Europe. 

" The Prince of Orange has this moment left me, and has 
promised great activity among his friends for information from 
the Low Countries. He has given me an extract from the letter 
of a man very well informed at Paris, which shews that they 
seriously have the project of attack upon Hamburgh. Haugwiz 
does not encourage Baron Lynden with an expectation of early 
support, but distinctly promised that, if the Piepublic of Holland 
could re-establish itself, the King would prevent the French from 
re-entering Holland. The Prince of Orange's correspondents tell 
him there [are] not above one thousand French left in the 
country ; if so they might almost do the business themselves. I 
am impatient to hear from you." 

Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville. 

1799, April 12. Harley Street. — " Je vous envoi ce que j'ai 
re9U du Comte de Panin de Berlin, en vous prient deme renvoyer 
ces incluses des que vous les aurez lue. 

"Je vous demande la faveure de me comuniquer ce qu'on vous 
ecris de Petersbourg, tant sur les mesures qui se prenent pour 
sauver I'Europe, car je n'ai pas reyu des lettres de Russie par 
cette poste, et de me comuniquer ce que le Chevalier Whiteworth 
vous ecrit par a port [rapport] a ce qui me regarde. II doit 
en savoir quelque chose, puisque par la poste precedente, 
Katchoubey m'a ecrit du -^ Mars, que la nouvelle de I'invitation 
que I'Empereur m'a fait s'est rei)andue pars la ville, quoiqu'en 
expedient le courier, le -i% de Mars, I'Empereur ne I'avoit dit a 
perssone. 

"Come cette aft'aire comence a s'ebruiter ici, je dis (et cela est 
vrai d'apres ce que j'ai respondu a I'Empereur) que je vais par 
conge, et que j'espere de revenire Fete prochain. Je me rejouis 
avec vous sur la confirmation des victoires de I'Archiduc, et je 
suis tout a vous pour la vie." 

Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville. 

1799, April 12. Cleveland Piow. — " Your despatches and 
letters of the 8tli instant were received this morning. I have not 
time to answer them officially by this night's mail, nor indeed is 
there anything in them that much presses, but I would not let 
the post go without a few lines to you. I am vexed beyond all 
description to find that so late as the {3rd you had received 
nothing from me. You will since have seen that I have not 



9 

been so negligent aw you must have thought me ; but I am still 
at a loss to conceive how it is possible that my letters (the first I 
mean) can have been so long in reaching you. 

" The accounts of the Archduke's successes on the 28rd and 25th, 
added to those of the 21st which you have sent, have put us all 
into high spirits, but I have so total a want of confidence in 
everything Austrian that 1 look upon all this only as a prelude 
to some patched up peace that will give to Austria a score of 
leagues more in Italy or in Germany, and may possibly (but not 
probably) restore the King of Naples ; but will leave everything 
else exactly where the war found it. Still even this is one degree 
better than the immediate subversion of all Germany, which 
would have followed Jourdan's success. How Prussia can be so 
blind to both those dangers is perfectly incomprehensible on any 
principle of reasoning, and would be astonishing to anyone who 
had not been doomed to watch the conduct of these great politi- 
cians for six years. Oh that I could speak to them as Gustavus 
Adolj)hus did when he occupied Berlin, and told them that as 
they must pay either for being saved or for being ruined, he 
might as well force them to do the first, as leave them to be forced 
by Austria to do the second. 

'* I am very sorry that you thought it necessary to respect Sir 
M. Eden's seal. Pray do not do so any more, whatever reason 
he may have or not have for putting it. You had no loss. Your 
bile would have been still more moved to read how he 
' deplores as hopeless ' the only thing that he is ordered to 
do, and how he transcribes into that despatch his transcript 
of Thugut's nonsense. I am almost tempted to re-transcribe 
it, only changing Prnssia into Austria all through, and 
then send it him back. It is a sore evil, but God knows how- 
it can be remedied, for one would have not only to remove him, 
but to supply his place, and there are not two t/ous in the world, 
nor would the one you stay there long, after you had seen the 
impossibility of giving these people one sentiment of honour, 
honesty, or common sense. 

" You will have seen how, while our letters have been frozen up, 
or buried in the portmanteau of some lagging messenger more 
tardy than your friend Fabius Maximus himself, we have been 
writing the same thing to one another from the two sides of the 
water. We differ but in one point, and your judgment makes 
me distrust my own ; but still the more I think of it, the more 
a,dverse I am to bring the Russians to the Middle Pihine, where 
they will fall into the whole chaos of Prussian and Austrian 
politics, and will infallibly lose their way in that labyrinth, instead 
of going, as I trust they will, through Switzerland straight on 
into France, while Lord Hawkesbury's regiment meets them at 
the gates of Paris. My heart sunk within me when I read 
Whitworth's despatch, which adds to the difficulties, great as 1 
think them, of that plan others absolutely insuperable. There 
is no part of that frontier on which it would, I conceive, be 
possible to stir a step without a regular battering train. How 
are the Russians to bring that with them, or who is to supply it ? 



10 

The operation on Holland, either as the Duke of Brunswick 
proposed it, or by sea, turned that whole defence and took it in 
the rear. The operation on Switzerland turns it on the other 
side, and equally brings us behind the fortified line. But the 
Middle Ehine is the very centre of that defence, where France 
possesses now all her own iron frontier, and all that was opposed 
as a barrier against it. Surely then it requires not much more 
military talents than belongs to a major of yeomanry to see that 
this is the very worst of all points of attack. Add to this the 
j3olitical labyrinth which I have already mentioned. Add the 
inconveniency of renewing the system of multiplied and distant 
attacks, instead of bringing all to bear on one and that the 
weakest point. Add the impossibility of making any of these 
Electors and Landgraves stir a step without Prussia, the 
incurable jealousies which such a project would excite both at 
Vienna and Berlin, the ten thousand means of intrigues that 
France would set in motion against it, and fifty other reasons 
that you would be tired to read of, and surely you will not differ 
from me in the preference I so decidedly give to the proposition 
which we have made to Peter sburgh. All I fear is that they 
will be entetes with their own project. 

" My eyes will let me write no more. Do not forget maps, if 
there are any at Berlin worth sending." Copj/. 

The Marquis of Buckingham to Lord Grenville. 

1799, Apri 12. Dublin. — "The Speaker opened last night 
his long expected attack upon Mr. Pitt and the Union. The 
first hour was passed in a very laboured and tiresome detail of 
proofs that the arrangement of 1782 was final and conclusive to 
all objects and purposes ; and for this he read a great collection 
of addresses, resolutions, speeches. He then went at length into 
the examination of the commercial question between the two 
kingdoms, with the most violent, unconnected, and unbounded 
abuse of Pitt to the utmost extent ; and with the most unqualified 
expressions of 'weak, flimsy, paltry, contemptible, wicked, 
perfidious, designing, dangerous, ruinous' Minister ; and the 
most inflammatory address to all religions and descriptions to 
unite against this design, to which he expressly stated Parlia- 
ment incompetent. He controverted every part of the linen 
question, and dared Great Britain to commence a war of bounties 
or of regulations that would leave Ireland at liberty to profit by 
the natural advantages which she had over England. Extolled 
the vigour, independence, character, and conduct of the Irish 
Parliament in detectinf/ and jmttiuf/ down the rebellion ; stated 
the incompetence of a Legislature or Government sitting in 
London to meet the difficulties of this moment ; warned Ireland 
against the oppression and neglect that Great Britain had 
always shewn to Scotland, and even to Wales, since their union ; 
illustrated this by the neglect of the harbour and dock at 
Milford from local and national jealousy, considerations which 
he addressed to Cork ; and finished with an exhortation to 



11 

Ireland to run every risk, and to prefer ami possible evil to that 
greatest evil, the Union. He spoke four hours l)ut very ill, 
and without Parliaiit en tan/ effect ; but his friends say that his 
speech is to be printed, and that the effect is to be elsewhere; and 
I am told that it will be a very seditious, perhaps even a treason- 
able publication. All this proves him to be completely desperate, 
but I am satisfied that the temper of the country is changed, and 
that he mixes this acid with the mass in hopes of creating a 
fermentation where it appears wholly to have subsided. You 
will be told that it is not wise to press it till next year. I, on the 
contrary, shall persist in my advice to do what alone will earn/ 
the question, and then to propose it as soon as may be. 

"Adieu; most happy am I in the hopes that this is my last 
letter to you from this detested scene. I embark on the 17th, and 
hope to see you as soon as I can get to Stowe." 

Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville. 

1799, April 16. Harley Street. — " Yous vous souviendrez que 
quand vous m'avez luele passage dela depechedu Chevalier White- 
worth sur le changement fait a la marche du corp Eusse qui, au 
lieux de s'embarquer dans I'Adriatique pour passer directement a 
Naples ou en Sicile, devait aller joindre le Marechal Souvarow, 
que je vous ai fait observer les grands inconvenients qui doivent 
en resulter de ce changement de plan. Plus j'ai reflechi apres 
sur cette affaire et plus ces inconvenients m'on paru graves. J'en 
ai parle avec le Marquis de Circello qui en a ete aussi tres alarme. 
J'ai cru de mon devoir de faire quelque observations a I'Empereur 
sur ce sujet ; je vous envoi la copie de ma depeche en vous 
prient de me la renvoyer, et en vous suplient de donner vos ordres 
au Chevalier Whiteworth d'apuyer, en comun avec le Due de 
Seracapriola, les arguments de cette depeche, pour eviter le mal 
qui s'en suivra si on ne revient pas chez nous au plan primitif, 
et a la maniere de secourire le Koi de Naples par un debarque- 
ment directe dans un de ses deux royaumes." 

Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, April 16. Cleveland Eow. — " I wrote to you so fully by 
the last mail that I have little to add to-day to my i^ublic 
despatch. You will readily understand that the only intention of 
that despatch is to keep you for some time longer where you are, 
without its being possible to specify any good that you can do 
precisely in the present moment. But so many different events 
may alter the present state, or rather it seems so certain that it 
must be altered in some manner by any course of events, that I 
should be in despair at seeing you quit la partie just now. I 
cannot help entertaining sanguine hopes that these Austrian 
successes, if they continue a little longer, will begin to rouse the 
Prussians, in order that they may come in for their share of the 
fruits of victory ; but although this would not be a very 



12 

magnanimous motive of action, I should be well content to take 
the war, and leave the motive to shift for itself. 

" I have however learnt a very curious circumstance which, to a 
certain extent, I know with certaint}^ to be true. Yander-Goes, the 
minister of foreign affairs at the Hague, certainly told the JJanish 
Minister there, in confidence, a little more than a fortnight ago, 
that the French had purchased the neutrality of Prussia at the 
rate of two millions per month, the first payment of which the 
Dutch were then taking measures to provide for. Whether 
Talleyrand has bamboozled the Dutchman, and means to put this 
money into his own pocket, or whether the Directory makes this 
a pretence to squeeze more money from their Batavian allies, or 
whether the Dutch Talleyrand was laughing at the Dane, who is 
certainly no conjurer, or whether De Luc's magnanimous and 
virtuous friend really meant that both i^arties should pay him for 
doing nothing, I do not pretend to decide. Perhaps you may 
have some grounds for forming a conjecture on the subject, 
but you must not mention the intelligence even to Panin. 

" Woronzow goes most reluctantly to Petersbourg. It is, I really 
believe, the most sincere }i<)lo cpiscopari that ever wasi)ronounced, 
but go he must. He has however stipulated that in the first 
instance he shall go only })ar coiif/c, and that no one shall be 
named to succeed him. This is not witiiout its inconveniences. 
Lisakewitz, whom he leaves, is, I believe, a well disposed man, but 
his opinions can have but little weight at Petersbourg." Coptj. 

Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville. 

1791), April 17. Harley Street.— " Je vous suis Ijien 
reconnaissent pour les exellentes nouvelles que vous venez de me 
donner. Le comencement de cette guerre est si beau, si 
encouragent pour TAutriche, et si propre pour decourager et 
avilire les troupes Francaises, qu'il y a esperer que la continuation 
et la tin repondront aux brillents succes de cette belle ouverture 
de campagne ; I'ardeure de PArchiduc ne pent etre asse loue. 
L'entree des Autrichiens en Suisse est ce qu'il y a de 2:)lus 
heureux ; ce sera une brave nation delivree, et qui, armee contre 
ses opresseurs, aidera les allies en s'arment et en se joignent a 
eux. Le Comte Panin ne m'a rien ecrit par cette poste ; mais un 
de nos Ministres qui est aupres de I'Empereur, M. llostopchin, 
m'ecrit de Petersbourg qu'on est tres mescontent du Roi de 
Prusse, et qu'on vient de lui demander une reponce cathegorique. 
Je voudrois qu'on ne heurta pas trop ce Pvoi ; mais avec de la 
douceure et de la patience, jointe aux grand succes des 
Autrichiens, on pouroit peut-etre le determiner a proliter des 
desastres des Fran^ais, pour netoyer la Holande et les Pays-Bas. 
Mais, si on le choque, il refusera net, se raprochera davantage 
des Francais, et une foi jete dans leurs bras, il sera difficile cle 
Ten retirer." 

Count Woronzow^ to Lord Grenville. 

1799, April 18. Harley Street. — " Je vous envoi ce que j'ai 
re^u par votre courier de Berlin. Apres avoir lue les incluses, 



18 

je vous siiplie de me les renvoyer, afin que je puisse r^pondre 
demain an Comte Paniii. Sur la difference d'opinion par aport 
au theatre de la guerre, je demande mille pardons au General 
Stamford; mais je trouve que le Secretaire d'Etat, Lord Grenville, 
a mieux juge que le militaire, et que quarante-cinq milles hommes, 
isoles et entoures de forteresses, ne seront que sacrifi^s, et que le 
meme nombre emploj^^ en Suisse fairont un bien infini, renforce- 
ront TArchiduc, et penetreront en Franche Comtee. L'harmonie 
parfaite qui regne entre Monsieur votre frere et le Comte Panin 
me fait un plaisir extreme. Je vous suplie de m'envoyer une 
copie de la notte de Diedrichstein dont le Comte Panin me parle 
et ne me I'envoi pas, esperent que je I'aurai de vous." 



Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville. 

1799, April 18. Cleveland Kow.— " I am answering to-day 
two very welcome letters of yours of the 8th and 10th instant, the 
first of which I received yesterday, the other to-day. The 
opening of the campaign is really brilliant, and, whatever else 
may happen, it must be productive of solid and permanent good 
to shew that these tigers may be resisted by firmness and 
courage, at land as well as at sea. We are told that the first 
column of the Eussians cannot arrive in Italy till about this 
time, so that the Austrians will have had to support their 
position alone for near a month later than our accounts. 
Craufurd however writes of a further success obtained by Kray 
on the 30th. I cannot quite discharge from my mind the 
apprehension that in the middle of all this we shall hear of some 
Austrian negotiation with France, and yet, if they do lose the 
present opportunity of saving themselves, they will deserve their 
fate. 

"Since 3^ou wrote your private letter, No. 15, you will have seen 
at full length all my arguments, stated to Sir C. Whitworth, 
against the project of employing the Russians on the Bas-Rhin, 
and in favour of sending them into Swisserland. I perfectly 
agree with you that, if they go there, their cooperation with the 
Austrians must be complete and unlimited ; and you will have 
seen that, since this idea has been decidedly adopted, I have 
dropt all mention of limitations and restrictions. I never indeed 
had much more in view than to make Piussia require that the 
Cabinet of Vienna should not, on the arrival of the Russians, 
weaken the Archduke's present force. But even this is so easily 
evaded that it seems hardly worth insisting upon it. The 
Emperor of Russia's notion of letting the same army at the same 
moment act against France and awe Prussia, is with me a strong 
confirmation of my former opinion that, in trying both, it will do 
neither. 

" I suspect that the Danes and we are on the very point of 
quarrelling about illicit trade, and seizures of neutrals, and 
blockade of Dutch ports. They are fitting out ten sail of the 
line, which can mean nothing but to alarm us, for half 



14 

that number of frigates would, as things now stand, protect their 
commerce against France, which is the ostensible pretext they 
use to us, though they do not mean that we should believe it, but 
the contrary. All further plans about Hamburgh must therefore 
be pressed upon them from Russia, who may do at Copenhagen 
whatever she really pleases to do. You will see how much I 
agree with Panin in thinking that your continuance at Berlin is 
in the present moment a point of the utmost importance, 
particularly with this very view of urging Russian cooperations 
in every quarter. When you do come away it is settled (and 
announced) that you are to be succeeded by Paget, with whom 
the Elector of Bavaria has picked a quarrel, evidently in order to 
pay his court to France. He will stay at Ratisbon or in the 
environs, but will not go to Berlin till you have left it, which I 
trust will not be for some time yet. 

"I had heard nothing of the project about Norden, but agree 
much in your speculations concerning it, and will take some 
steps to check Mr. Harward's zeal. 

" Lord William Bentinck goes to the army in Italy. I had kept 
this nomination back as long as I saw any hopes of operations in 
Holland, because I thought his name and connexions particularly 
fitted him for that ; but this dream is over, and he goes to learn a 
little Russian tactiqiie. He will set out on Tuesday for Vienna, but 
I suppose, as things now are, will not pass through Berlin. I will 
do as you suggest about Lord Talbot. It is curious that while 
Craufurd writes of nothing but the Hamburgh jealousy of Russia, 
and desire to abide by Prussian protection exclusively, the Danes, 
who ought to know better, think that the exact reverse of this 
picture is the true one. I conclude from it that Messiairs Ics 
Ilamhourgeois are not a little afraid of all these great protectors, 
and I cannot much blame them for it. The Senate have written 
to me to beg leave to send Napper Tandy and his colleague about 
their business, but I am adamant. 

" Your anecdote about Haugwitz and his master is horrible. If 
these madmen could but ruin themselves without involving 
others, who would pity them. 

" Woronzow does not refuse, but is quite persuaded that he will 
not maintain his ground three months, and keeps this mission 
open that he may return to it. 

" God bless you my dearest brother. It would be a vain attempt 
to describe the satisfaction I have felt from our correspondence, 
and I beg you to believe that this is not the language only of 
my affection, for the same opinion is entertained by all who see 
it. Our master is particularly (and I believe very sincerely) 
gracious on the subject." Copy. 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, April 18. Berlin.—" In the last half hour which I had 
destined to my private letter the Prince of Orange breaks in, and 
makes it impossible for me to write more than a few lines to you. 



15 

The negotiation here is, as you see, with respect to its original 
object completely at a stop, and I agree with you in thinking 
that tliere seems little chance of my being more useful at Vienna 
than I have been at Berlin. I should therefore naturally have 
proposed to you to consider of my return, if I did not see that you 
still attached some idea of advantage to my prolonging my stay 
here. You will have seen by my former letters that I do not 
entirely differ with you as to the theory of extending into the 
Continent, by the confidence which you place in me, something 
of a more immediate communication with the leading Courts 
than their distance from London will seem to admit of; 
but, tempting as this sounds in the advantage which it seems 
to offer, I fear it must be found entirely impracticable when 
it is applied to use, for with all that you know and see of 
the jealousy of resident Ministers as to the interference of those 
whom they consider as interlopers, I do not see or know 
how it will be possible for me to keep up that intercourse with 
any essential effect. My desire however is, as you know, to be 
useful, and my peculiar desire would certainly be to be useful to 
you. I have therefore only to say that any arrangement which 
seems to promise any public service more peculiarly through me, 
will certainly be cheerfully acquiesced in by me, if it can be made 
to seem to promise any real benefit. 

" Baron Armfeldt has communicated to me from his cor- 
respondent the intelligence which I send in my despatch re- 
specting Flanders ; his correspondent is a man of no abilities or 
talents, but he says is of most perfect veracity. The intelligence 
from thence seems so important that I have desired General 
Stamford to send by estafette to endeavour to establish means of 
correspondence through M. de la Palue; and I have told him 
that fair expenses and gratifications shall be allowed according to a 
plan delivered for that purpose. Haugwiz's information concern- 
ing Brest is through Sandos, from the Spanish Minister at Paris." 

Henry Dundas to Lord Grenville. 

1799, April 19. Wimbledon. — "The enclosed letter addressed 
to the Prince of Orange was yesterday put into my hands by the 
Duke of York. It is too general to make any practical system 
out of it, but if you think any more defined could be obtained, 
you may think it right to suggest to the Prince of Orange the 
propriety of the writer of the letter coming over here that we 
may [learn] precisely his plan, and the means of accomplishing 
it to any beneficial extent." 

Earl Temple to Lord Grenville. 

1799, April 19. Avington. — "I have this instant seen a letter 
from a gentleman of property in this county mentioning, as a 
certain fact, that Lord Bolton is to be appointed Lord Lieutenant, 
and that I am not, I trust there is no authority for this 
assertion, but as Mr. Pitt has not thought proper to send me one 
word of answer to my letter to him, I thought it best to apprise 



X6 

you of this circumstance, and to beg of you to exert yourself as 
much as you can in my behalf ; as I cannot help thinking my 
pretensions to the full as good as Lord Bolton's, and I must 
confess I feel not a little hurt at the very cavalier manner in 
which Mr. Pitt has chosen to treat my application." 

Lord Grenville to Henry Dundas. 

1799, April 20. Dropmore. — "I return the letter you sent 
me yesterday. Mr. Grenville has already taken, at my desire, 
some steps in concert with the Hereditary Prince of Orange for 
sending into Brabant some two or three persons of the 
description there mentioned. But this is very circuitous and 
uncertain in its result. The object appears to me so pressing 
that I think it would be a great pity that so much time should 
be lost as w'ould be necessary to bring M. de Thuyl from Munster 
into the Low Countries. 

" If the Prince of Orange knows him and has a confidence in 
his principles, I should think it much better to desire His Serene 
Highness to write at once to approve of his engaging without 
delay in this enterprise. It might be necessary for that purpose 
to remit to him some small sum of money, which either 
Huskisson or Hammond would easily settle wdth M. Fagel ; and 
some assurance should be given of further aid, if necessary, to a 
limited amount." 

Postscript. " If he succeeds in getting into the country he 
should be ordered to use his utmost efforts to open a communica- 
tion either with England or with Mr. Grenville at Berlin." Copi/. 

"Alexandre" to [H. Fagel]. 

1799, April 23. Berlin. — "Je me souviens que vous m'avez 
demande un jour de ne point mettre de c^remonie dans mes 
lettres, et je vous obeis. 

"J'ai a la fin pris le parti de sortir de mon affreux exil de 
Lick, et de me rendre ici, ou j'ai le plaisir de voir souvent 
Kobert, qui jouit maintenant d'une tres bonne sante. Au 
moment de mon depart le L[and] Gr[ave] de Hombourg me pria 
de passer a Francfort ou il me remit les papiers que je vous 
envois. Je m'acquittais ici de ce dont il m'avait charge ; le 
Pr[ince] Hereditaire d 'Orange me conseilla d'en parler a Gar like, 
qui me transmit de Mr. Grenville la communication qu'il ne 
pouvait entrer dans aucune de ces idees. Garlike y ajouta comme 
de lui-meme que rien n'empecherait qu'on ne les communiquat 
directement au ministere Britannique. Le Landgrave me marqua 
son desir que cette demarche se fit : comme je ne sais comment 
y mieux parvenir que par vous, pardonnez-moi la peine que je 
vous donne de vous en incommoder, et quoique la chose paraisse 
ne presenter que des impossibilites, je voudrais, vu I'amitie et 
I'estime que j'ai pour celui qui en est I'auteur, qu'il ne s'imaginat 
pas qu'il ait des r^proches a me faire sur le manque de reussite 
d'un projet auquel il tient extremement par zele et devouement 
pour la bonne cause et nullement par ambition : de quoi 
la moindre connaissance de son caractere doit persuader 



17 

un chacun. Daignez done me donner une r^ponse que je 
piiisse lui communiquer, et si c'est par la voie de la poste, 
veuillez ne le point nommer : ayant des relations et de grands 
rapprochements de parents ici, cela pourrait le compromettre 
d^sagreablement. 

" Je saisis cette occasion avec empressement pour vous assurer 
que ni des lieux ni le temps n'apportent jamais d'alt^ration a 
Tattachement inviolable que j'ai voue a tous les int^ressants 
individus qui composent votre famille." 

Knclosure. 

Memoire [by the Landgrave of Hesse Homburg]. 

" Dans la position actuelle de I'Allemagne et de I'Europe, ou 
les succes des Francais menacent le systeme actuel d'une destruc- 
tion totale, il parait qu'il y a encore un moijen pour pr^venir ce 
malheur. 

1. "II faudroit au nom de I'Empereur lever et mettre sur 
pied une arm^e de 50,000 hommes sur quelque point eloign^, la 
Boheme par exemple, de maniere toute fois que cet enrollement 
se fit sans ^clat, et simplement sur le pied de mettre les regiments 
au complet. 

2. " Cette armee qui devrait etre form6e des troui)es des 
Princes ecclesiastiques, des contingents de celles de I'Empire, 
de recrues de la Suisse et de I'ancienne armee d'HoUande, 
qu'on pourrait avoir a foison, pourrait etre sur pied dans 2 on 3 
mois. 

3. " L'Angleterre devrait se charger du payement. II serait 
plus de I'interet de cet etat, qui deja a et6 tant trompe par tous les 
recruttements partiels qu'il a paye, d'en entreprendre un en 
grand qui peut-etre mettrait fin a la guerre ; il faudrait 3 ou 4 
millions de livres sterling. 

4. *' La destination de I'armee pourrait etre a 

ou comme reserve, de couvrir la grande armee, servir a ses 
communications, faire des sieges sur ses derrieres, remplir les 
intervalles ; utilite d^ja tres grande. 



6. "Mais elle pourrait en avoir infiniment davantage en 6tant 
employee de la maniere suivante. 

*' D'abord on divulgueroit qu'elle est destinee pour I'ltalie ; apres 
quoi on la ferait passer pour etre prise a la solde des 6tats du 
nord de I'Empire j)our renforcer la ligne de demarcation ; a la 
suite de quoi, par des marches forcees et sur des chariots autant 
qu'on le pourrait, elle s'avancerait vers le has Rhin ou elle se 
dirait pay^e par VAngleterre, ferait prendre les armes aux 
habitantes de la rive gauche du Rhin, tomberait sur les Francais 
qu'elle trouverait, passerait le Meuse, se r^unirait aux insurges 
des Pays-bas, chasserait tous les Fran9ais du Brabant, sur quoi 
6303 B 



18 

la revolution en Hollande eclaterait d'elle-meme. Dans le meme 
moment 30,000 Anglais debarqueraient en Flandres ; on 
assiegerait avec la plus grande energie les places si rapprochees 
de Conde, Valenciennes, Quenoy, Landrecies et Maubeuge, occasion 
a laquelle le numeraire devrait ne point etre 6pargne pour tirer 
parti de toute les intelligences, complots, et espions ; au cas que 
cela prit trop de temps on ferait bloquer ces villes par des Anglais 
et des insurges. Dans cette meme epoque Loids 18 devrait 
arriver a I'armee. On marcherait droit en avant, et entrerait en 
France par St. Quentin aussi vite que possible, accompagne d'un 
manifeste par lequel le roi promettrait une amnistie pleniere (avec 
le seule clause que ceux qui ont vote la mort du dernier roi 
devraient quitter la France) et la promesse que les acquereurs 
de biens d'emigres resteroient en possession, avec la reserve que 
ceux-ci conserveraient le droit de les revendiquer pour le prix de 
r acquisition. 

"Pendant ces operations, les puissances continentales n'au- 
raient autre chose a faire qu'a prendre une attitude menacante 
pour tenir les armies ennemies eloignees de I'interieur de la 
France. 

"Comme il serait impossible de donner dans les details des 
magasins, il serait indubitablement necessaire qu'on ne manquat 
jamais d'argent pour pouvoir payer tout comptant, meme en 
pays ennemi, et donner I'exemple d'une discipline parfaite. 

' ' II est de la plus grande probabilite que les peuples de 
France, voyant paraitre leur roi sous de pareils auspices, 
accouriront en foule a lui, et s^coueront le joug de leurs 
tyrans ; apres quoi il ne sera pas difficile de faire la paix 
generale avec le nouveau roi, s'entendant sur le pied du statu 
quo qui avait lieu en Europe avant ]a guerre, avec I'exception 
que la maison d'Autriche garde Venise, et que celle d' Orange 
obtienne les Pays-bas. 

"Une reflexion importante est que dans toute cette affaire 
personne ne serait compromise, que si elle devait ne point 
reussir elle ne nuirait point aux affaires en general, et que, 
quelque chim^rique que peut-etre ce plan paraisse au premier 
abord, il ne faut, a un examen plus mur, pour son execution 
qu'un chef determine, de la promptitude, de I'argent, et surtout 
un secret impenetrahle. 

" II y a quelqu'un qui offre de se charger de cette entreprise, et 
de se sacrifier pour son execution." 

"II est a remarquer, qu'il s'agit de deux moyens d'employer 
I'armee, comme reserve, ou comme agissante. Je serai tres fache 
qu'on adopta le premier, parceque rutilite en serait nulle ; je serais 
sans cesse tiraille de tout cote pour des secours, et les choses au 
fond resteraient au meme point. 

''Uessentiel est qu'on adopte I'autre projet. C'est Y unique 
moyen qui reste de sauver I'Europe, qui tot ou tard sera engloutie 
si la RepubHque subsiste. II faut mediter le projet plusieurs fois, 
avant de le rejetter. Tout risque qu'il parait d'abord (quoique 
personne n'y risque que ceux qui y vont) on trouvera que si tous 
les points demandes sont remplis dans le moment marque ; si 



19 

I'argent ne manque jamais ; si Tarmee marche sous les pr^textes 
allegu^s; si on pouvait, outre cela, faire quelque diversion en 
Hollande ; si les Autrichiens empechent surtout la rentree des 
armies Fran(;aises ; si les Anglais debarquent a point nomrn^ ; 
si Louis XVIII arrive a I'instant propose ; s'il publie le manifeste 
dans les termes projett6s ; la vraisemblance de la r^ussite 
approche de la certitude. 

"II faudra meme des le commencement que je sois fourni d'une 
bonne somme d'argent necessaire, pour quantite de fraix de 
voyages, d'envoi de courier; j'offre de rendre mes comptes a 
la fin de I'expedition, ou meme tous les mois, et j'espere etre a 
I'abri de tout soupcon de motif d'interet dans cette affaire. 

"II faudra qu'on me laisse le choix des generaux et de I'etat- 
major, qu'on ne me gene en rien dans les operations, qu'on garde 
le secret le plus impenetrable, et que pour cet effet le moins de 
personnes possibles soient informees. 

" Je desire que le Prince Hereditaire d' Orange fut le premier 
qui sut la chose, qui donna ses conseils, et voulut bien diriger la 
n^gociation. 

" Comme je ne voudrais pas que les Cabinets en fussent informes, 
mais qu'il est absolument necessaire que ce soit I'Angleterre qui 
en fasse la proposition, il faut s'ouvrir au Mr. Grenville, ou 
apres son depart a I'ambassadeur Anglais. 

" Peut-etre que I'envoye Russe doit aussi le savoir; ce sera selon 
que le Prince d' Orange et Lord Grenville decider ont. 

" Au cas que I'Angleterre ne voulut pas y entrer, peut-etre 
faudrait-il se rabattre sur la Russie. Si, d'apres la proposition 
de I'Angleterre, L'Empereur ne voulait pas qu'on enrolat en 
Boheme, il faudrait voir si cela pourrait se faire en Bologne, ou 
autre part. S'il etait possible que mon nom restat cache dans 
le public pendant quelque temps, cela serait fort a souhaiter 
pour mon pays et ma famille. Cependant je serais en desespoir 
si on voulait confier a un autre I'execution de I'entreprise. 
Quoique rien ne serait plus aise que de trouver quelqu'un qui 
s'en acquitterait mieux comme general, cependant comme le 
projet vient de moi, personne n'est plus attache a sa reussite ; 
tout autre que moi aurait des vues politiques, des jalousies, qui 
seraient tres nuisibles dans cette occasion ; personne n'y serait 
certainement plus desinteresse que moi, d'autant plus que je 
compte de p6rir ou de reussir dans cette entreprise." 



Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville. 

1799, April 24. Harley Street. — " Ce seroit un grand plaisir 
pour moi que de pourvoir avoir la satisfaction de passer 
avec vous, avec my lady, et avec Monsieur Pitt, un jour 
ou deux a Dropmore, et d'y mener mon fils qui sent avec 
reconnaissance les bontes que vous avez pour lui et pour son 
pere ; mais il y a un obstacle qui m'empeche de sortire de la 
ville avant lundi prochain. Vous savez que nous autres de la 
religion Greque suivons un autre stil que le votre, et que, -poiu 



20 

la celebration des Paques, nous suivons la decision du Concile 
de Nicee. Or les peres qui y etoient assembles ^toient pins' 
remplis de saintete que de la sience d'Hiparque, aussi ont-ils 
cru que I'equinoxe du printems devoit etre eternellement le 10 
de Mars; dela, ils ont tellement embrouilles leurs calculs que 
nos Paques se rencontrent rarenient avec les votres. C'est 
dimanche prochain que sera notre Paque, et nous somes 
a present dans notre semaine sainte, ou il y a, matin 
et soir, des services a notre eglise, desquels, et par ma 
place, et come pere de famille, il m'est impossible de 
m'absenter. Yous n'avez done qu'a fixer tel autre jour 
qu'il vous plaira, pourvue que ce soit apres dimanche 
prochain. Plus je vois la n6cessit6 indispenssable d'aller en 
Russie, plus je vois celle de causei* a fond avec vous et avec 
Monsieur Pitt sur les affaires. II y a huit ans que nous n'etions 
pas d'accord, Monsieur Pitt et moi, et cela a du metre du froid 
entre nous ; mais d^puis que nous travaillons dans le meme sens, 
que nos principes en politique sont conformes, je suis un de ses 
plus zele admirateurs ; et je me fiatte qu'il me rend aussi la 
justice d'etre perssuade que, n'ayent jamais change d'opinion sur 
la n^cessite d'une union intime entre nos deux pays, que j'ai mis 
a I'ex^cution de ce princii:)e le zele le plus ardent, et qu'aiment 
ce pays a I'^gal de ma propre patrie, je me trouve bien heureux 
de voir mon desir acompli, grace aux soins que vous et lui vous 
vous etes donnes pour I'acomplicement de cette union, qui sera la 
vraie cause du salut de I'Europe." 



Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 
Private. 

1799, April 24. Berlin. — " It is not the value of the commu- 
nication which induces me to reserve for my private letter the 
further discussion of the Paris romance, and the mutual confi- 
dences of Louis XVIII. and the Diret'tenr Barras, but I send them 
to you in secret because I have even greater reluctance than you 
have to agitate these precious questions of French restoration, 
and to follow the many monks of the day who see in their daily 
dreams of the French monarch}^ the millions of lirres they are 
to roll in at the end, and will not overlook the English guineas 
which I presume will be wanting to set them a rolling in the 
beginning. Stamford's good sense would go far, however, to 
assist in overcoming these prejudices, if they are such ; and I do, as 
you see, condescend to read something of the discussions which he 
mixes in (however de dislikes them) because he dislikes the revolu- 
tion still more, for, as he himself says, ' contre cette maudite revo- 
lution il f ant pourtmit malheu yen semcnt se servir de tout.' I have 
forgot to ask you what his own situation is, but sure I am that his 
merits and services are such as entitle him to a better situation 
than he seems to have to boast of ; he is really an invaluable 
man, whom it is not easy to praise as much as he deserves, but 



21 

who appears to me to be better esteemed than he is rewarded. 
The negotiators are already on their road to Petersburg, and 
before Fauche went, he communicated a short notice, which I 
likewise enclose to you, of French l<niis cVovh passing into 
Ireland in the shape of French claret, and a sujualement of two 
suspicious men whose steps I fear are not enough traced, though 
their features and general description may be. 

" You will see that I have latterly been chiefly employed about 
Holland and Hamburgh, and you will perhaps have been more 
amused with my project of i^roving to the Emperor that his 
embargo is an act of kindness, than you will have been satisfied 
of my success in the suggestion which I have made to Sir 
Charles Whitworth about it, ' mais dans cette maudite rcrohition il 
Jaut ])()urtant iimlheurcuscnient sc serrir de tout.' Am I not 
however fairly entitled, in the barrenness of all my present com- 
munications, to question without any super-abundant modesty 
whether His Majesty's expectation of my important services by a 
few weeks longer residence is reall}^ very likely to l)e effectually 
gratified, according to the present political appearance of things 
upon the Continent ? Having offered this impartial question to 
your consideration, I shall like to hear w^liat can be reasonably 
replied in answer, or how it can be urged that I can do any good 
by staying when, as you see, I have really nothing to write to you 
while I do stay. I believe however that I have got you two or 
three good maps, and I do assure you whenever I hear of one I 
do not omit to ask if there are two. 1 do not believe that I shall 
have anything to add to the two despatches which I have written 
to you, unless a conversation which I am endeavouring to have 
with Haugwiz should be managed before my messenger sets out 
to catch the packet of 8unda3^ With him and with the other 
Ministers I have had very little communication since I found 
him so entirely set upon the necessity of English subsidy that I 
could not bring him to discuss any of the great considerations of 
the establishment of Europe, or to look at any other motive for 
the possible activity of this great monarchy except the old 
hackneyed motive of putting ' five pounds into a certain 
place.' 

"The littleness of such a disposition surprised me as much as 
it disturbed me, for surely, made up as they are here of fears and 
prejudices upon the north and upon the south of them, a guaranty 
against any such dangers, and an invitation to make in partner- 
ship that general arrangement which may otherwise turn out to 
be prejudicial to them, was an offer more tempting to the mind 
of a great statesman than could be found in the very limited 
measure of pecuniary subsidy ; yet to that alone are all their 
ideas so inseparably attached, that I have not advanced with 
Haugwiz even in the smallest discussion of any of these great 
objects of negotiation. It is barely possible that the violent and 
ungovernable temper of the Emperor of Russia may enough 
increase their apprehensions here to produce some momentary 
advance on their part, and for that I am looking." 



22 

Pu^tscript. 1799, April 25, Berlin, 12 at noon. 

*' I have delayed my messenger till the last moment in order 
to say a few words to you of my conference this morning with 
Count Haugwiz, which I had been prepared for with great 
appearance of mystery and importance. The news which they 
have received of the hostile intentions of Eussia towards them 
has produced the greatest uneasiness here, and though I put the 
best face that I can upon it, it is impossible for me not to share 
very much in that uneasiness. No formal notification of the 
embargo has been as yet made here, but, whenever it is, Count 
Haugwiz means to apply to England and Denmark for their 
interference ; and I made no scruple of telling him that I had 
already written to Petersbourg, in the persuasion that the 
embargo in question was meant only to prevent the return of 
those ships to Hamburgh till proper measures of defence for that 
city had been adopted ; he fears however, and I wish it may not 
be with reason, that the French will make this hasty measure 
a pretence for seizing all the Hamburgh ships in their ports, which 
amount to a very considerable value. With regard to the orders 
for a Russian rendezvous at Dantzik, he observes that besides the 
expression of division which he thinks may mean rupture between 
the two Courts instead of dispersion of tlie squadron, he says they 
cannot receive the Russian fleet at Dantzic or in the rade without 
some previous amicable communication. The first of these doubts 
as to the word division I think I have satisfied him can have no 
real object ; the second I try to make him think will be satisfied 
by the usual practise in all similar cases. He says that a very 
large force is assembled near Memel, and that all the Russian 
officers plainly declare that they are going to war with Prussia, 
and that Poland already begins to stir in this expectation ; that 
therefore he has been obliged to give orders to resist the Russians 
if they offer to pass the Memel, and that they mean to remons- 
trate both about Hamburg and the rendezvous at Dantzick. He 
is persuaded that the French are at the bottom of this hrouillerie, 
and he complains with reason that Chevalier, an actor and the 
intimate friend of Collot d'Herbois, is protected by the Emperor 
and received there in a Russian uniform, because his wife 
is the mistress of Kotizuff the Emperor's favourite ; and he 
thinks he has good reason to believe from the language of 
Syeyes here, and of Madame de Stahl [StaelJ at Geneva, that 
the French are both active and successful with the influence 
which they use at Petersburg. He made these communications 
to me, as he said, at the King's particular desire, who ordered him 
to speak in the most confidential manner to me upon it, and to 
express his reliance upon my agreeing with him in endeavouring 
to divert this great evil. I told him, with ]3roper civilities, 
that it was scarcely necessary to observe to him how strongly it 
was the interest of Great Britain to prevent such an unfortunate 
breach as that which he feared, and I assured him that I should 
think myself bound to use every endeavour in my power to pre- 
vent it. I persuaded him to put their representation about 
Hamburgh into the hands of Panin rather than their own 



23 

minister, and induced him as much as I could to regard 
this business as a French stratagem to defeat the con- 
federacy which they fear. I again suggested to him that 
complete concert between the great Courts was the only 
solid security againt these doubts and jealousies so artfully 
circulated by the enemy, and when I reproached him with 
not having pursued the last idea which I had suggested of 
concert for eventual offence, combined with previous arrange- 
ments between the great powers, he said he had only put it by 
in the hopes of still leading the King to immediate and decisive 
measures, but that he was ready to pursue that object with me 
whenever I pleased. They are upon the whole alarmed to a 
great degree, and Haugwiz fears that the rupture will not be 
prevented ; but he puts his best hopes in us upon this subject, 
and properly enough, for I do think no such entire ruin could 
in any other way be produced as would result now from war 
between Prussia and Kussia. The messenger will be too late if 
I proceed, and my remarks are scarce worth an extra packet." 
Tu'o enclosures. 

Enelosiirc 1. 

Rapport SUV luie iiegociation relative an retahlissement de 
la monarchie en France. 

" Sa Majeste Louis XVIII. anommepour son agent aupres des 
personnes qui voudroient concourir au retahlissement de la 
monarchie, un homme qu'aucun obstacle n'a rebute, et dont le 
zele ardent mais circonspect s'est attire les plus grands eloges. 
Une derniere lettre dela mainde S[a] M[ajeste] ne laisse aucun 
doute sur I'etendu de la confiance que merite cet agent. 

" D'ailleurs il est de fait que c'est alui qu'est due I'ouverture et 
la negociation du plus grand plan qui ait ete con^u dans cet 
objet, celui dont I'effet fut interrompu au 18 fructidor par le 
Directoire. ' 

"A cette epoque meme cet agent etoit a Paris. Les placards 
qui denon(^oient la confederation Ten designerent nomement 
comme premier instigateur. 

"Cet agent actif, embarrass^ d'abord de pourvoir alasurete de 
sa personne, ensuite refugie, re9u avec amitie chez un franc 
et loyal monarchiste, s'occupe de preparer un nouveau 
mouvement. 

"II etoit porteur d'un billet du Eoi con^u en ces termes, con- 
fiance au porteur clu present billet ; suivent la date et la signature. 

" II s'autorisa de cette lettre de creance, dont il s'etoit autorise 
vingt fois, et il parvint a determiner celui auquel il devoit son 
azile et sa vie a tenter des ouvertures aupres de Joseph, I'un du 
Directoire. 

"Alexandre, c'est le nom de celui qui a sauve I'agent du Koi, 
Alexandre avoit d^s rapports avec le secretaire intime du Direc- 
teur. C'est par ce secretaire qu'il est parvenu a avoir des 
explications precises avec le Directeur lui-meme. 



24 

" Ce dernier se chargera de faireun mouvement et de r^tablir 
la monarchie a condition qu'on lui donnera surete et indemnite. 
' II n'impose aueun limitation a I'autorit^ monarchique.' 

" Ces premieres donnees ont 6te transmises par lettre a I'agent 
du Roi apres sa sortie de France. Alexandre demanda en meme 
terns qu'on lui fit passer un pouvoir, a I'aide duqael il peut 
justifier la mission qu'il avoit commence de remplir. II observa 
que la demande lui en etoit faite a lui-meme, et qu'il ne pouvoit 
s'y refuser sans danger pour I'affaire. 

" L'agent du Roi recrivit a Alexandre pour lui confirmer-les 
intentions de S[a] M[ajeste] en I'invitant a faire un voyage a 
Hambourg ou il combineroit et recevroit le pouvoir demande. 

"Le voyage entreprit et faitdevint inutile, parceque Tagent du 
Roi avoit ete appelle a Londres par une affaire pressante et 
majeure. 

" Mais au lieu meme du rendezvous se rencontra Dubois, I'ami, 
I'associe, le charge des affaires de cet agent. II avoit ordre 
d'accueillir tout etranger qui auroit quelque rapport au Roi. Au 
nom d'Alexandre il reconnoit celui qui est charge au nora d'un 
Directeur de provoquer un mouvement monarchiste. II se 
charge lui-meme d'annoncer au Roi d'une part, et a son agent de 
Tautre, cette arrivee venue a contretems. II est arrete que le 
voyage se fera de nouveau, et qu'on preparera dans I'intervalle 
les pouvoirs demandes. 

"Dubois n'obtint point de communication plus intime de 
I'affaire, parcequ'on la suposoit entendue par le Roi et par son 
agent. II ecrivit done dans le sens qu'il pouvoit I'entendre. 

"Le Roi, par une lettre ecrite de sa main, temoigna la i)lus 
grande bienveillance a son agent et a Dubois, et leur annon^a le 
pouvoir demande. 

"Alexandre avoit deja fait presenter deux choses, la premiere 
que la communication du projet a quelques puissances devenoit 
indispensable ; la seconde que la nature et les termes des 
pouvoirs ne pouvoient gueres se concerter que dans le Cabinet 
du Roi; il avoit ajoute a cela une troisieme observation, c'est que 
l'agent du Roi dont il avoit recu les ordres, et I'ami de cet agent 
qui I'avoit un moment remplace, I'accompagneroient aupres du 
Roi pour faciliter les ouvertures, et reciter eux-memes ce qui leur 
etoit personnel dans la negociation. 

"L'agent de S[a] M[ajeste] et son ami Dubois, ayant participe 
ces dernieres ouvertures par leurs correspondances a la Cour de 
Mittau, recurent une lettre de M. de St. Priest qui les blamoit de 
toute communication faite avant que d'y etre autorises, rendoit 
leur voyage avec Alexandre incertain, declaroit qu'une affaire 
de cette importance devoit sortir de leur main, et qu'on devoit 
a Mittau seulement juger de I'a propos et du moment. 

" A I'arrivee d'Alexandre cette lettre lui f ut prudemment cach^e 
par Dubois et par l'agent de S[a] M[ajest6]. Elle eut entraine 
des explications, et peut-etre des ruptures. 

"A cette arrivee Alexandre vit M. le Due de Fleury, qu'on lui 
dit charge des pouvoirs du Roi. 



26 

" Ces pouvoirs communiques se trouverent destines, non pas a 
etre remis dans les mains d' Alexandre pour justifier sa qualite 
d'envoye du Eoi aupres du Directeur, mais a rester dans les 
mains de M. le Due de Fleury, et I'autoriser de prendre le titre 
d'envoye du Roi. 

" Ce mal-entendu se seroit expliqu^ s'il n'avoit tenu a un 
prejuge qui repoussoit toute confiance. M. de Fleury n'a 
cesse de voir dans Alexandre un democrate qui venoit au nom 
d'un Directeur imposer des conditions a la restitution du 
trone, et couvrir les exces d'une conduite l)lamable. Quelques 
douceurs que M. de Fleury ait pu mettre dans ses insinuations, 
elles ont eu un mauvais efret. EUes ont donn^ de Tamertume a 
Alexandre, qui se dit a bon droit I'un des plus constants et des 
plus lideles sujets de S[a] M[ajeste]. Elles Font decide a ne 
prendre point le titre de fonde des pouvoirs du Directeur. 

" Alexandre s'est resolu d'aller lui-meme presenter ses hom- 
mages respectueux et ses explications a Mittau. 

"II en a ete empeche par M. de Fleury, qui a declare qu'il 
mettroit obstacle a toute delivrance de passeport. 

"On doit dire que M. de Fleury y a consenti cependant, mais 
qu'il y a mis une condition qui a detruit Teffet de son consente- 
ment. 

"La condition etoit qu' Alexandre d6clareroit et donneroit parole 
qu'il emportoit avec lui un blanc seing du Directeur, qui lui 
tenoit lieu de pouvoir. Alexandre avoit fait insinuer qu'il seroit 
muni du blanc seing, mais qu'il avoit ordre de pourvoir a la surete 
de ce titre indeiini par tons les moyens possibles ; qu'on devoit 
lui laisser une grand lattitude pour la disposition de ce titre en 
cas d'accidents ; que les conditions qu'on lui presentoit etoient 
senties ; mais qu'on ne devoit point y insister, qu'il f alloit laisser 
a son jugement la disposition libre de ce titre; sauf a le reclamer 
lors de la conclusion a Mittau. 

" M. le Due de Fleury n'ayant point voulu entendre a ces in- 
sinuations, Alexandre se disposa a faire son rapport, et declara 
qu'il I'enverroit a Mittau par I'agent du Roi avec lequel il avoit 
traite. 

"M. de Fleury rompit les conferences avec une telle impetuosite, 
qu'il refusa de se charger du temoignage de respect et de 
devouement d' Alexandre aupres de S[a] M[ajeste]. 

" C'est apres cette rupture qu 'Alexandre a ete informe de la 
lettre de M. de St. Priest, par laquelle il blame toute declaration 
a des Ministres de Cours etrangeres, interdit le voyage a Mittau, 
et reserve au Roi seul de decider I'a propos des communications 
et des mouvemens. 

" Sans doute qu' Alexandre a rendu justice a M. de St. 
Priest en se i3ersuadant qu'il y avoit dans sa lettre quelque 
erreur, quelqu' omission involontaire. Car il est sensible 
qu'on ne pent dans une affaire de ce genre, dont I'execution 
n'a que six mois de delai ulterieur, attendre que I'a propos 
soit decide a six cents lieues du theatre ou doit se passer Taction. 



26 

II ii'est pas possible non plus que celui qui est charge du mouve- 
ment eprouve des entraves pour les voyages et les declarations 
qu'il croira necessaires. 

" La seule mesure qu' Alexandre croit utile, c'est de declarer aux 
Ministres, et par eux au monarque magnanime dont ce projet 
lixera I'attention, qu'il n'entre point dans les vues de celui qui a 
fait les ouvertures aupres du Directeur, ni dans celle du 
Directeur lui-meme, de penetrer le secret des autres operations 
de meme genre, ni de toutes autres negociations diplomatiques. 
lis livrent avec confiance leur secret, et ne demandent point a 
connoitre celui des Cabinets. 

" Pour abreger toute explication, Alexandre aredige, d'apres ses 
instructions, la formule des actes qui vont determiner I'execution 
du plan. 

"II demande a B[a] M[ajeste] Louis XVIII des lettres 
patentes, qui, en menageant la dignite du monarque, assure a 
Joseph sa surete, ses proprietes, et la bienveillance de S[a] 
M[ajeste]. 

•' Sans doute que Louis XVIII ne pent sans secours de quelque 
puissance fournir aux fraix d'une telle operation. 

"On ne pent aussi avoir le projet de ramener Louis XVIII vers 
son trone sans en faire la declaration a I'Empereur des Eussies, 
dont il a ete accueilli avec magnanimite. C'est a ce genereux 
ami d'un roi dans I'infortune qu'iVlexandre voudroit faire par- 
venir ses voeux, le tableau de ses efforts, et rapper(;u de ses 
moyens. On y verra peut-etre la tres grande possibilite du 
succes. 

Qiielques vues sur Vcdecntlon, 

" Je n'examinerai point quelles causes ont fait avorter les 
tentatives qu'on a fait jusqu' a ce jour pour le retablissement de 
la monarchic en France, mais j'indiquerai les caracteres indis- 
pensables que doivent avoir les pro jets de meme genre, pour 
que I'on puisse s'en promettre quelques succes. 

"L'espoir de retablir la monarchic est fondee sur I'attachement 
general des Francois a leur ancienne constitution. II trouve un 
puissant appui dans le mecontentement general qu'occasionne 
Toppression du gouvernement actuel. 

"On a X3U croire d'abord que les vrais zelateurs de la monarchic, 
excites par tous les moyens possibles, et reunis a la foule des 
mecontents, determineroient par la force de I'opinion un retour a 
I'ancien etat. On s'est convaincu depuis que les zelateurs les 
plus ardens n'ont pas une action suffisante, qu'ils sont difficiles 
a diriger, et que le concours des mecontens ne coincide pas au 
meme but, ce qui forme une diversion aussi dangereuse dans le 
succes que dans les revers. 

" Tout ce que I'experience dans ces essais a produit d'avantageux 
pour la cause de la monarchic, c'est qu'on apprit que I'esprit 
general en France est port6 vers I'etat monarchique. II est 
impuissant pour retablir cet etat, mais si Ton y parvient, il est 
pret a 6clater pour y donner son assentiment. On doit observer 
d'autre part que le developpement de cet esprit, s'il precede 



27 

I'etat monarchique, ne pent qu'augmenter les difficuUes de 
rctablir le trone ; puisque c'est un puissant avertissement aux 
usiirpateurs de I'autorit^. Je vols dans cette prematuration la 
cause qui a renverse jusqu'a ce jour tous les projets monarchistes. 

"La premiere condition pour le retablissement du trone est 
dans le silence de I'opinion. II suivra de ce principe que le 
peuple restera etranger au mouvement, et que le remplacement 
du trone sera fixe et d'un coup de main. Sans doute pour le 
succes d'un tel mouvement, il faut le concours de quelque chef 
puissant. Sans doute encore il faiit des agens qui forment avec 
ce chef une confederation. A cette confederation eniin sont 
necessaires tous les moyens possibles de surety et d' action. 

" Tout ce qu'on pourra dire sur un plan de cette espece se reduit 
a ce mot. II faut un chef qui imisse et qui sache former sa con- 
federation ; carte blanche — voila son i^ouvoir. 

" Quel obstacle peut eprouver le retablissement du trone en 
France ? 

"L'opinion publique est prete en tous tems a le reclamer, encore 
mieux a le recevoir. Le Corps Legislatif est d'une nullite 
absolu, reste le Directoire et les armees. Des cinq Directeurs, 
si I'un devient le chef du projet, il ne reste a ecarter que 
ses quatre collegues. Paraliser Faction de quatre individus, 
les eloigner, les separer, rendre physiquement impossible leurs 
deliberations, ii'est pas une tentative hors de la portee de I'un 
des Directeurs. C'est la seule chose necessaire pour proclamer 
sans contradiction le retablissement de la Monarchic. 

" Les armees, quand elles ne recevront point d'ordres, seront 
immobiles. Une armee, gagnee et influence, donnera son assenti- 
ment, les autres suivront I'exemple. 

" Pour determiner I'attitude des armees on les desorganisera en 
destituant les chefs et ofticiers. On nommera soudain, mais par 
un autre acte, quelques chefs convenus desquels on sera sur, avec 
pouvoir de replacer tous les autres dans leur grade, a la change 
du serment de fidelite. 

"L 'administration de I'interieur ne soufrira pas de suspension 
si Ton employe a changer ses rapports les moyens indiques pour 
r armee. 

" Je ne pretends point que les mouvemens indiques s'operent 
avec la facilite la plus grande, j'y suppose au contraire beaucoup 
d'obstacles. Tout projet a les siens, mais plus la confederation 
sera reserree, plus son action deviendra rapide ; les accidens 
seront moindre et les secours plus puissans." 

Lettrcs patentes da Roi, portant nomination de Coniniissairc 
pour le retail is s em ent de la monarchie, donnees a M. . . . 

' ' Louis par la Grace de Dieu Koi de France et de Navarre, a 
tous ceux qui ces presentes verront, salut. 

" Appelle par notre naissance et par I'ancienne constitution de 
I'etat a nous imposer le fardeau du gouvernement Francois ; 
persuade que le premier et le plus essentiel devoir qui nous est 
commande a ce titre est celui de retablir le bonheur de nos peuples 



28 

en mettant un terme a la succession de calamites qui leurs est 
ouverte depuis les principes de la Revolution ; prevenus que nos 
bons et fideles sujets, qui forment lapresque totalite des habitans 
de notre royaume, n'attendent que la declaration de notre ferme 
et stable volonte pour concourir avec nous a cet important objet ; 
Nous, de I'avis de notre conseil, et de notre certaine science, 
legitime puissance, et autorite royale, voulons, et nous plait, 
disons, declarons, et ordonnons ce qui suit. 

Art. 1°. "Dans le delai de six mois a compter de ce jour, le 
retablissement de la monarchie sera proclamee en notre noni 
dans toute I'etendue du territoire Francois compris entre ses 
limites reconnues avant I'ouverture de la guerre actuelle. 

Art. 2°. " La meme proclamation sera etendue au territoire qui 
se trouvera lors occupe par les armees ou par les autorites Fran- 
coises, sans tenir a consequence, et sans prejudicier aux anciens 
traites du royaume. 

Art. 3". " Nommons pour notre commissaire special a I'effet de 
preparer, executer, et maintenir la susdite proclamation par tous 
moyens convenables, et qui seront a sa disposition, Notre tres 

clier et feal , . 

auquel nous donnons par ces presentes tout pouvoir 
ji I'effet ci-dessus, meme de nommer et s'adjoindre tel nombre 
d'autres commissaires qu'il jugera convenable, et de ne suivre 
dans le mouvement ordonne que ce qu'il croira conforme a la 
raison de I'etat. Les dits commissaires adjoints seront tenus de 
faire enregistrer leur brevet de nomination dans le delai de trois 
jours a peine de nuUite. 

Art. 4. " Nous mettons a la disposition de notre commissaire 
special la somme de 1,500,000 livres, a prendre sur les caisses 
qui lui seront indiquees lors de la remise des presentes en ses 
mains ; et ce pour les frais du mouvement. 

Art. 5. " Apres la proclamation faite de nostre autorite dans 
toute I'etendue de notre royaume ou dans partie d' . . . . 
defendons a tous juges, cours de justice, et autres autorites 
quelconques de prendre, sous aucun pretexte et dans aucun cas, 
connoissance des faits qui ont precede depuis I'origine de la 
revolution, qui precederont ou accompagneront le retablissement 
ci-dessus ordonne de notre monarchie, en tant que les dits faits 
seroient directement ou indirectement relatifs a notre dit com- 
missaire special, ouaux autres commissaires qu'il se sera adjoint ; 
declarons celui ou ceux qui voudroient en prendre connoissance, 
ennemis de notre personne sacree ; ordonnons, le cas y echeant, 
qu'ils soyent poursuivis comme coupables de haute trahison et 
de lese-majeste. 

Art. 6. " Engageons notre autorite et parole royale a maintenir 
pour toujours et en tout lieu de notre obeissance la surete, la 
liberte, et la tranquilite de notre dit commissaire special et de 
ses commissaires adjoints; meme d'employer efficacement notre 
puissance et mediation s'il y a lieu pour leur surete et liberty en 
pays stranger. 

Art. 7. "De meme maniere garantissons a notre commissaire 
special et a ses commissaires adjoints I'entiere liberte et immunite 



29 

des droits et des biens par eux acquis ou poss^d^s dans I'^tendue 
de notre royaume et pais actuellement occup^s par les Francois, 
encore qu'il en fut autrement ordonne par les loix anciennes, on 
par les loix a venir auxquelles il est expressement d6rog6 par ces 
pr^sentes, renoncant expressement a ceux des dits biens et droits 
qui serroient d^pendans de nos doniaines, et nous i)ortant fort 
pour la cession de tons autres si le cas requiert. 

Aug. 8. "Youlant donner en outre a notre dit commissaire 
special et a ses commissaires ad joints un temoignage particulier 
de notre satisfaction et bienveillance, ordonnons que dans un 
mois au plus tard du retablissement de la monarchie proclamee 
dans notre ville de Paris par le sus-dit commissaire special, il lui 
sera paye a la presentation des presentes, sur sa simple quittance, 
et sans autre ordonnance, controle, ni visa, a titre d'indemnite 
personelle la somme de - - - - 10,000,000 livres, 

et pour repartir a ses co-operateurs, ce que 
nous confions entierement a son jugement et 
honneur, une autre somme de - - - 2,000,000 livres, 



ce qui fait en total la somme de - - 12,000,000 livres. 

Art. 9. "La somme totale ci-dessus sera payee en especes 
sonnantes et au titre actuel, par notre tresorier principal sur les 
fonds destines a notre personnel ; la perception ou le recouvrement 
en seront exerces concurremment sur toutes les caisses de 
I'ordinaire et de Textraordinaire de nos finances, et par privilege 
a tout autre payement. 

Art. 10. "Les presentes ne seront sujettes a aucune sorte 
d'enregistrement, et non obstant, vaudront comme declaration et 
ordonnance relatifs aux besoins de notre personne." 

" Le commissaire speciale repondra qu'il recoit les lettres 
patentes de S[a] M[ajeste] en date du . . ., qu'il accepte la 
commission speciale qui lui est donnee. 11 temoignera sa recon- 
noissance pour tous les autres de bienveillance dont il est I'objet." 

Cojne de la lettre de David, adressee le 7 Mars au Roi a 
Mittaii, et remise a M. le Comte de Panin. 

" Yotre agent confidentiel Louis Fauche Borel, porteur d'un 
billet ecrit et signe de la main de Y[otre] M[ajeste], qui lui 
servoit de lettre de creance, m'a engage a me charger d'ouverture 
pour le retablissement de la monarchie en France ; la negociation 
a ete ardemment suivie, elle a developp^ un plan bien concu, 
une execution facile ; elle etoit conduite par des agens de toute 
confiance, il ne restoit plus qu'a engager par 6crit deux hommes 
dont la foi pouvoit etre equivoque, lorsqu'un mal-entendu a 
change la forme de vos ordres necessaires a cet objet. 

" J'avois demande c\Y[otre] M[ajeste], Sire, la confirmation 
des pouvoirs qui m'avoient ete transmis ; au lieu de cela, ces 
memes pouvoirs demandes ont ete accordes a M. le Due de 
Fleury ; alors mon role etoit interverti. Je devenois I'agent de 
I'homme aupres duquel je m'etois presente au nom de Y[otre] 



30 

M[ajeste.] M. le Due et moi n'avons pii nous entendre. J'aurais 
eu I'honneur, Sire, de porter mes expressions devant V[otre] 
M[ajeste,] j'y aurois accompagne les deux amis qui m'ont engage 
et seconde dans cette difficile enterprise, si Ton n'avoit arrete tout 
passeport qui auroit pu nous etre delivres. Mais Ton s'est 
trompe, Sire, si Ton a cru que rien puisse me dispenser 
d'accellerer la negociation que j'ai commencee, ni detendre 
incessament a son execution. 

" Le bonheur de votre empire, la tranquilite de I'Europe, le sort 
entier de I'humanite parroissent attaches. Sire, au retablissement 
de votre trone. V[otre] M[ajest6] retrouvera, je retrouverai moi- 
meme des co-op6rateurs partout ou il y a des hommes 
capables de penser. J'ai cru arriver a un terme prochain 
et heureux en donnant pleine connoissance de I'affaire au 
General Pich6gru, livrant ensuite d'apres son avis la nego- 
ciation a des hommes d'etat, et a un Prince magnanime 
(I'Empereur de Russie) qui seuls dans ce moment peuvent 
vous transmettre nos voeux et nos penseas. Le tems 
presse, il m'est difficile de manager de nouvelles temporisa- 
tions, laissez approcher aupres de V[otre] M[ajeste] Sire, le 
sujet tres fidele (M. le Marquis de la Maisonforte) qui a obtenu 
une fois votre bienveillance et qui a partage mes travaux. II 
vous expliquera les details que je ne puis expliquer moi-meme. 
II est autant que moi I'homme necessaire a reoperation, sa discre- 
tion extreme, sa modestie I'ont empeche de vous demander des 
pouvoirs, I'interet de Y[otre] M[ajeste] m'oblige de vous sup- 
plier de la lui accorder. Non, Sire, ne chargez point aupres de 
moi de vos volontes des hommes qui ne m'entendent pas, si du 
moins V[otre] M[ajeste] consent que je tente a I'acheminer 
vers le trone. Consentez, Sire, que vos sages volontes me par- 
viennent par cet ami, c'est mon co-operateur. Get ami n'a comme 
moi d'autre d^sir que de meriter sa place dans sa propre estime 
et de fuir le champ de I'intrigue." Copy. 

Enclosure 2. 

Note by General de Stamford. 

Quelques considerations relatives a un certain pro jet presentf 
d Louis XVIII. 

1799, April 12. Berlin. — "On a raison, sans doute, d'etre 
continuellement en garde contre les ruses et les artifices du 
Gouvernement Fran9ois. Trop d'exemples nous fait voir combien 
il pent etre dangereux de ne pas user d'une extreme circonspec- 
tion a cet egard. 

" Cependant, comme la proposition faite a Louis XVIII. par 
I'agent de Paris, ne renferme rien qui autorise a soup9onner la 
sincerite de son commettant, il semble que ce seroit pousser trop 
loin la defiance que d'imaginer que ce dernier, en feignant de 
vouloir retablir le trone en France, voit dans cette ruse un 
nouveau moyen de consolider son usurpation. 



31 

*' Mais, en adiiiettant meme que telles puissent etre ses vues, 
on ne voit pas qu'en donnant suite aux negociations 
entamees en son nom, il puisse en resulter quelque chose 
de facheux pour Louis XVIII. puisquelles ne sauroient 
compromettre ni son honneur, ni sa dignite. Sans doute 
que la rentree de ce prince en France seroit accompagnee de 
plusieurs difficultes, et de tres grands risques, mais on trouvera 
assez de moyens de les ecarter et de pourvoir a la siirete de sa 
personne, si jamais les choses peuvent etre amenees jusqii' au 
point de rendre ces moyens necessaires. 

" Yoici quelques precautions et mesures que provisionellement 
on oseroit proposer comme pouvant devenir utiles a cet effet. 

1". " On pent attendre de la justice et de Tame genereuse de 
Louis XVIIL que ce prince ne quittera pas I'azile dont il jouit 
dans les etats de I'Empereur des Russies, sans s'etre engage 
envers ce monarque magnanime, par un acte formel, de rendre a 
la France les limites qu'elle occupoit avant la Revolution, et de 
retablir dans leurs proprietes, privileges, et droits legitimes les 
princes qui, avant cette epoque, avoient des possessions situ^es 
dans les etats du royaume de France. 

2". " Comme les Pais-Bas, depuis la demolition de leurs places 
frontieres, sont de tous cotes ouverts et sans defense du cote 
de la France, on croit que Ton ne sauroit trouver injuste la 
demande qu'il soit stipule dans Facte ou traite susclit, que 
telles et telles places de la frontiere Fran^oise, comme Conde, 
Valenciennes, Lille, Dunkerke, seront livrees au souverain des 
Pais-Bas, a condition qu'elles recevront des garnisons composees 
de troupes de celles des Puissances qui seront garantes du traite, 
bien entendu, qu'elles n'y resteront que le tems n6cessaire an 
relevement des fortifications des places qui autrefois formoient 
la frontiere militaire des Pais-Bas, au nombre desquelles seront 
probablement Tournai, Courtrai, Menin, Ypres, Charleroi, Mons. 
On pourra fixer par le traite le tems qui sera jug^ indispens- 
able au retablissement des dites forteresses, apres I'echeance 
duquel les places appartenantes a la France, qui n'auront 
possedees que comme un gage de bonne foi et de surete, lui 
seront fidelement restituees dans le meme etat ou on les aura 
revues ; a moins qu'a I'egard de Dunkerke on ne soit convenu 
d'avance de quelque autre arrangement que I'Angleterre, en 
.vertu d'anciens traites avec la France, auroit 6te en droit 
d'exiger. 

3°. "Ce qu'on vient de proposer a I'^gard de ces places dans 
Particle precedent semble etre une precaution indispensable pour 
la surete meme de Louis XVIIL puisqu'elle met les Puissances 
ses amies a portee de lui porter des s6cours, dans le cas ou des 
troubles imprevus, qui compromettroient sa surete a I'^poque de 
sa rentree en France, lui feroient un besoin de leur assistance. 
Mais une autre precaution, non moins indispensable que la 
precedente, et qui devra necessairement preceder le mouvement 
dans Paris, c'est que celui qui imprimera et dirigera ce mouve- 
ment, devra avoir trouve moyen, sous quelque pr^texte que les 
circonstances lui fourniront aisement, de faire passer dans le 



Brabant une armee composee de troupes et de chefs qu'il saura 
portes pour le retablissement de la monarchie et de I'ordre en 
France. 

" Cette armee confiee au commandement du General Pichegru, 
dont les dispositions, le courage, et les talents militaires sont 
connus, conduira le roi a Paris, pendant qu'une autre armee, des 
Puissances amies de ce monarque, s'avancera pour prendre 
possession des places dont il a ete parle a 1' article second. 

4° " Tout cela se liant parfaitement aux idees que I'auteur de ces 
considerations a eu I'honneur de communiquer a M. de Grenville 
dans sa lettre du 9 de Mars, il est evident de quelle importance 
il seroit pour la reussite du projet dont il s'agit ici, qu'on effec- 
tuat une descente dans les provinces de Frise et de Groningue, 
qui s'opereroit avec facilite a une epoque convenue, qui seroit 
celle ou les troupes Francoises auroient entierement evacue la 
HoUande pour se joindre a I'armee royaliste dans la Belgique. 
Coxry. 



Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville. 

1799, April 25. Harley Street. — " Par les lettres que j'ai 
re(;u de Berlin, je vois que notre concert avec la Prusse recule au 
lieux d'avancer, et qu'a Petersbourg on prend trop d'humeur, et 
un ton qui ne servira qu'a resserer les liens de la Prusse avec la 
France. Cette conduite de la Cour de Bussie est tres impolitique, 
et je crois que c'est encor les intrigues de Cobentzel qui nous 
poussent a ces imprudences. De Hambourg on me marque 
qu'on mit un embargo sur tous les vaisseaux Hambourgeois 
dans tous les ports de Russie. Que veut dire cette incartade? Je 
ne le comprend pas. 

" Si vous avez quelque nouvelle de Viene et de Petersbourg faite 
moi la grace de me les comuniquer. Je desire sur tout de savoir 
I'etat de la sante du Prince Bezborotko." 



Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville. 

1799, April 26. Harley Street. — " Je viens de voir notre ami 
Starhemberg, qui m'a dit avoir aprit d'Almeida que le Comte 
de la Marque est entre au service du Portugal. Quoique beau- 
frere de Starhemberg, celui-ci avoue qu'il en est aussi 6ton6 
qu'aflige pour la bonne cause, car son beau-frere n'est qu'un 
intriguent, perdu de moeurs, et qui n'a ni foi ni loi. Je puis 
vous assurer aussi que le Comte de la Marque est un sujet 
execrable, qui a ete I'ami et le compagnon des d^bauch^s du 
Due d'Orleans le guillotine, et I'ami intime de Mirabeau, et de 
I'eveque d'Autun. Coment peut-on confier quelque comande- 
ment a un tel homme? II ne cessera d'intriguer dans tous les 
sens, et ce sera un homme tres dangereux a Lisbone. Apres ce 
que je connois de cet homme, et ce que m'a confirme Starhem- 
berg, je crois devoir de vous en avertire." 



38 

Postscript. " Je vous envoi le brouillon de ma d^peche 
d'aujordhui. Si vous I'aprouve, elle partira ce soir ; si non, elle 
ira avec les corections que vous jugerai a propos de faire." 

Paul I., Emperor of Kussia, to M. Mouravieff, 
Kussian Minister at Hamburg. 

1799, April 26. St. Petersburgh. — "En consequence de votre 
rapport que Nous venons de recevoir aujourd'hui sur I'effet qu'a 
produit sur le s^nat et les habitants de la ville de Hambourg, la 
nouvelle du sequestre qui a ete mis sur leurs batiments marchands 
qui se trouvent dans les ports de notre empire, Nous vous pres- 
crirons de declarer an Senat de Hambourg, que les m^sures prises 
par Nous contre la ville de Hambourg, resultaient de, et devaient 
mettre fin a celles qui ont ete prises, et ont journellement eu lieu 
dans cette ville contre la tranquillite des autres 6tats ; et que la 
ville de Hambourg, de ville commer(^ante, est devenue un nid des 
mal-intentionn^s, et un refuge de toute espece de vagabonds, qui 
veuleut se soustraire a la justice, et qui, pour avoir seulement du 
pain, sont prets de tout entreprendre. D'apres ces raisons notre 
bienveillance et notre protection ne peuvent etre restorees a la 
ville de Hambourg avant qu'elle ne detruise le club nomm6 
la Society Philantropique, et qu'elle n'ait livr^ au Ministre 
Britannique, ou encore mieux a son gouvernement, les rebelles 
Irlandais qui y ont ete arretes, et parmi lesquels se trouve aussi 
Napper Tandy. D'une autre part, Nous avons vu avec plaisir 
par votre rapport, que I'envoye Fran9ais Marragon a quitte 
Hambourg." Cojyi/. 

Lord Grenville to His Royal Highness the Duke of York. 

1799, April 26. Cleveland Row.—" The King having been 
graciously pleased to approve of Lord William Bentinck, whom 
I had humbly recommended to His Majesty to proceed with a 
mission in His Majesty's name to the Austrian and Russian 
army in Italy, it has occurred to me that some advantage might 
possibly arise if your Royal Highness saw no impropriety in his 
having the local rank and letter of service of a Major-General 
on the Continent. This idea has not been suggested to me by 
Lord William Bentinck, but occurred to me in fixing the rate of 
his allowances. But as its decision must in the first instance 
rest entirely with your Royal Highness, with whom it would also 
lie to receive His Majesty's pleasure upon it, I have not thought 
myself at liberty to mention the subject to His Majesty till I 
knew whether the proposal met your Royal Highness' s approba- 
tion." Co2)i/. 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, April 30. Berlin.—" The unremitted work of three days 
has so completely exhausted my mind and pen that I cannot add to 

6802 C 



84 

my despatch as much as I should naturally wish to do upon so im- 
portant a subject. What I have sent you is the result of the 
attack which I told you in my last private letter I should once 
again make upon the hopes and fears of Count Haugwiz ; and 
though I cannot boast of sending you all that I wished, yet I 
confess I think that there is ground enough for very serious con- 
sideration of this project at London, unless it be that my con- 
stant desire of working out the salvation of Holland inclines me 
to look with too much partiality to every possible project which 
seems to offer any chance of success there. I do not however 
disguise to myself the difficulties that hang upon it. In the first 
place Haugwiz himself may have over-calculated his influence, 
and may not be able to obtain the king's consent to this 
project ; he may seek only to divert the storm which he fears 
from Russia by engaging us in a negotiation which would ensure 
our efforts in mediation with Russia ; he may feel the necessity 
of arming against the menaces of Russia, and wish to engage us 
in furnishing that first expense, leaving afterwards to events to 
determine what shall be the direction given to that force. He 
evidently thinks, how^ever, that he can obtain a positive engage- 
ment on the part of the King to name by a secret article the 
day on which he will begin military operations ; and, if this point 
be distinctly obtained, I own that I attach so much importance 
to it as to think that much should be sacrificed to obtain it ; and 
if the King of Prussia is once engaged in hostilities with France 
for the recovery of Holland, I think one may trust that the 
most advantageous military steps will be taken by Prussia as far 
as is consistent with her own safety. The construction to which 
this is liable leaves certainly a door open to fraud, and they may 
refuse the enterprise of Holland under a description of difficul- 
ties the truth of which we may not admit ; but, if on the 15th of 
July they bind themselves to begin military operations to rescue 
Holland, I do not think we run an unreasonable risk in not 
specifying beforehand the precise line of operations which is to 
be followed ; but it certainly is of the highest importance that the 
engagement to begin military operations be clear beyond the 
possibility of doubt, dispute, or cavil, and so it is understood 
between Count Haugwiz and myself. I have however most 
earnestly to entreat you to send back such a secret article as 
would meet your ideas upon this subject, because I distrust my 
own pen on a point where the choice of diplomatic words may 
decide upon the advantage or disadvantage of the whole subject. 
In the case too of the idea being pursued, I must beg some 
assistance as to the military terms of the treaty of subsidy, of 
which I know nothing. 

"You will see what my object was in shortening the term or 
extending the number of men, in as much as it gives us for our 
1,200,000/. 60,000 men instead of 35,000; and I cannot teach 
myself to doubt that, before December, Holland may be itself 
again, and may be enabled to assist in the charge of such Prussian 
garrisons as may be wanted there during the winter. Haugwiz 
has suggested to me the idea of our employing also the Dutch 



85 

money in our English funds, for raising Dutch troops, in like 
manner as he says we employ Swiss money for raising regiments 
in Swisserland ; but, as I know nothing of that transaction, I 
could only say that I doubted whether any such existed. Upon 
the project of Holland, Haugwiz has likewise had a great deal 
of conversation with the P [rince] of Orange, who seems much 
inclined to believe them here in earnest upon the subject ; and it 
is most certain that all accounts concur in proving beyond a 
doubt that even a demonstration from hence would be sufficient 
now to do the business in that country. 

" With respect to the King of Prussia's beginning by demand- 
ing the evacuation of Holland, instead of declaring war, so far 
from objecting to it, I think it in every respect the best and wisest 
course which could be followed, because it takes the strong ground 
of a pre-existing engagement to which this King of Prussia 
succeeded with his crown, and there can be but little doubt that 
such a summons to the Directory will be as effectual a declaration 
of war as any which could be adopted. I have sometimes 
been apprehensive, it is true, that the uncertainty which they 
are studious to build round their march to Holland might 
likewise be extended to the publication of this summons, and 
that if any military motives be alleged in July against marching 
to Amsterdam they may be alleged for delaying likewise the 
manifesto of summons ; but, on the other hand, if they are 
engaged to military operations on that day, why should we fear 
that the Duke of Brunswick will see military difficulties with as 
feeble an eye as he has shewn in his political speculations ; and 
what motive can induce him at that time to propose any other 
military operation than that which has always in these last 
months seemed to engross both his thoughts and his wishes. 
The better however to ensure this point I shall lose no time in 
employing General Stamford, who has latterly been occupied in 
establishing the correspondence which we want with Flanders 
through M. de la Palue, nephew to M. de la Riviere the minister 
from Saxony. I believe I have forgot to say that I have 
authorised General Stamford to offer to him as far as 200Z. for six 
months' correspondence, which you will then judge whether you 
ought to renew. I hope that, if you approve of our projected 
convention, you will follow it up by trying to unite the force of 
Denmark with us, and to combine the internal measures in 
Holland and Flanders which must be ready to co-operate for the 
July manifesto ; and, above all, I trust that you will assist the 
wording of the convention if it takes place, as I do really distrust 
my pen both in the diplomatic and the military terms to be 
discussed. 

"I have every reason to think that Haugwiz will pursue the 
last project of negotiation as proposed by you if this subsidy 
convention should fail. I have seen in him upon this a great 
desire to extend the mutual guaranty to the Elector of Hanover 
and of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse and other German 
princes. I presume this is meant to include the Elector Palatine 
for the sake of Bavaria, and I told hjm that I saw his object, 



36 

but that I did not see any difficulty in our adopting that principle 
of the integrity of the German empire which Austria had itself 
adopted in disclaiming all indemnities on that side; and I 
reminded him that this principle must likewise put an end to all 
those projects of secularisation which Prussia had, as I thought, 
given too much countenance to at a time when establishments 
had great value as being such, without any other reference to the 
question; and I further said that, although it would be idle to ask 
a mutual guaranty from the lesser German princes, I did not 
know but that it might be worth considering whether the great 
Powers might not extend to these lesser princes the benefit of 
that guaranty, which might prove a useful security to the 
established governments of Europe. I have seen likewise in 
Count Haugwiz an inclination to doubt the advantage of Prussia 
(without navy) giving guaranty to our insular possessions ; 
whether he is embarrassed in this view about the Cape and 
Ceylon I know not, but more then once he has said our 
navy is our best guaranty to our insular possessions, and he had 
questioned the propriety of Prussia proffering to defend what she 
could not reach. I have hitherto contented myself by treating 
that objection lightly, and I have asked whether he thought our 
guaranty to Poland would not be worth something in spite of the 
distance which separated us. I must not quit this subject 
without reminding you that if this proposal of guaranty, as stated 
in your despatch No. 15, is to be pursued, some communication 
should be made by you upon it to Petersburg, in order that 
Count Panin may be instructed to co-operate in it ; they leave him 
at present entirely without any communication whatever, and he 
is so disgusted that he has written for leave to go to Carlsbadt 
for his health." 



Enclosure. 

Dutch Affairs. 

"line personne distingu^e arrivant de la Hollande, ou elle a 
pass6 dix mois avec tous les gouvernans et generaux Fran9ais, 
dit que tous ces derniers n'avaient qu'une maniere uniforme de 
penser, laquelle etait qu'aucune coalition ne les effrayerait tant 
qu'ils conserveraient pour alli^ la Prusse, et que Si^yes leur 
r6pondait de ce Cabinet. Mais qu'arm^es et gouvernans se 
croiraient perdus, si elle se mettait contr'eux. Ces informations 
ajoutent que parmi tous les generaux qui agissent dans ce 
moment-ci, Joubert serait le plus redoutable par ses moyens, ses 
talens, et son caractere ; mais qu'heureusement le Directoire en 
a eu peur, et I'a d^goute par des passe-droits. 

" La meme personne a vu I'^tat des revues des troupes qui se 
trouvait en Hollande au mois de fevrier, lequel n'allait pas au 
dela de 12,166 hommes ; et les Fran^ais en ont depuis retire pour 
les envoyer sur le Pihin. Tous les habitans sans distinction 
rappellent et d^sirent aujourdhui leurs anciens maitres." 



37 

His Royal Highness the Duke of York to Lord Grenville. 

1799, May 1. Horse Guards. — " I have to acknowledge the 
receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 26th instant, proposing 
that Colonel Lord William Bentinck should, in consequence of 
his proceeding with a mission in His Majesty's name to the 
Austrian and Eussian armies in Italy, have the local rank and 
letter of service of a Major-General. I should have infinite 
pleasure in attending to your Lordship's wishes upon this, as 
well as upon all other occasions, and I should not hesitate in 
takhig his Majesty's pleasure upon the subject in question, was 
I not decidedly of opinion that the advantages which would 
result to Lord William Bentinck from holding the local rank of 
Major-General during the continuance of His Majesty's mission 
are not such as would counterbalance the inconvenience which 
the service might eventually suffer from the establishment of a 
similar precedent." 

Lord Grenville to Count Woronzow. 

1799, May 1. London.—" Une lettre de Whitworth 
m'annonce I'embargo sur les navires Hambourgeoises, sans que 
Ton connut a Petersbourg les motifs de cette resolution subite et 
violente. De Yienne j'ai la douleur d'apprendre la maladie de 
FArchiduc Charles, que Ton cachoit au public. Un de nos 
couriers Fa vu a Stockach, ou Ton disoit qu'il se portoit mieux. 
La premiere colonne Eusse est arriv^e a Padoue le 10. Le 
parti de Schimmelman, Connich, triomphe a un tel point que si 
Ton ne parvient pas a y porter remede, bientot nous en serons a 
des extremites. La flotte de Breste est sortie forte de 18 a 19 
vaisseaux. Lord Bridport est a leur poursuite. Apparemment 
qu'ils sont destines ou pour I'lrlande, ou pour le Portugal. Ce 
n'est que cet alternatif qui nous est embarrassant." 

Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville. 

1799, May. 1. Harley Street. — " Je vous envoi la lettre de 
Krudener de Copenhague qu'on vient de dechifrer dans ce 
moment. 

"Le Vice-Amiral Macaroff, qui est venu ici hier et repart 
demain pour Sherness, a re9u aujourd'hui un ordre de 
I'Empereur dont il m'a donne la copie. Je I'ai fait traduire 
pour vous en Franyais. Cet ordre, qui est assez curieux, vous fait 
voir au moin le motif de ce qu'on fait chez nous contre la ville de 
Hambourg. J'ai besoin de vous voir pour ce sujet, et je vous 
prie de me fixer un quart d'heure dans la matinee de demain, 
avant ou apres le cercle de la Eeine." 

Enclosure. 

Paul, Emperor of Eussia, to Vice -Admiral Makaroff. 

1799, Mars 21. St. Petersbourg. — " Ayant depuis quelque 
tems remarque le penchant de Hambourg vers les principes 



B8 

d'anarchie et le gouvernement des usurpateurs Fran9ais, Nous 
vous ordonnons de saisir comme bonne prise tons les vaisseaux 
marchands et autres qui leur appartiennent, et de les envoyer 
sous convoi dans nos ports." Copy. 



Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville. 

1799, May 3. Cleveland Kow.— " My faith in Fauche and his 
negotiations is not, nor ever will be, great. I have seen and 
known them too long to trust for one moment to their visions. 
My despatch of to-night will show you that I am not insensible of 
Stamfort's merits, though in truth I know not how to set about 
rewarding them. The suggestion of his going to Petersburgh is, 
however, Woronzow's, and I think it is a very good one ; for 
Whitworth would be staggered by the first of the many solid 
objections which may be urged against this plan. But were there 
no objections to be made when Caesar marched into Italy, or the 
Duke of Marlborough into Bavaria ? The first great point must 
be to persuade Stamfort himself that the scheme is practicable, 
and then I doubt not that he will easily succeed in persuading 
a set of people who will probably not know much of the 
matter. 

" Of all the difficulties, that of transports is the greatest ; but we 
have as you see undertaken to surmount it, and I am confident 
we shall do so, and that in the course of a fortnight or three 
weeks, we shall have enough, in readiness to sail, to carry a first 
division of 15,000 men, and in my conscience I believe that these 
15,000 men would do the business. 

" There is little probability that the sailing of the Brest fleet will 
disturb these plans. If they have common sense they are gone 
to Ireland, and if they are gone there they are, I trust, inevitably 
destroyed. Lord Bridport is gone oft' Cape Clear, and no body of 
troops that they can land will do lasting mischief in Ireland, 
though it may lead Lord C [ornwallis] as long a march as the 
last. If accounts received today are to be believed, they have 
but 3,000 troops on board. This is utterly inconsistent with the 
idea either of Ireland or Portugal, and can mean nothing but a 
project to unblock Cadiz, or to relieve Bonaparte. Both of them 
pretty hazardous undertakings ! 

*'They are said to be eighteen of the line. Lord Bridport had 
sixteen and five more have sailed successively to join him. Lord 
Keith is supposed to have seventeen off Cadiz, and Lord St. 
Vincent has in the whole under his command thirty (including 
Lord Keith's) besides Turks and Eussians, who, though I suppose 
not worth much, are probably as good as many of the French 
ships. 

"It has occurred to me that Prussia, if she wants an excuse to 
change her mind (not otherwise) might be tempted to increase 
her forces, according to her own proposal, on receiving not 
money but a mortgage on Holland ; that is a promise that in the 
event of Prussia's acting, and of Holland being restored, the 



39 

expenses of the previous preparation should be defrayed by the 
United Provinces. Would it not be worth while for you to try 
whether anything can be made of this idea ? 

'' With respect to your Hamburgh project I do not know whether 
you ever adverted to the circumstance that Holstein is not within 
the line of the Prussian neutrality, as marked on Chanchard's 
map by themselves, and transmitted here by Lord Elgin. 

"As to the question you ask about yourself, my despatch of 
to-night is the answer to it. I am confident you will not feel a 
wish to come away from the place where you are, little agreeable as 
it is, while you can contribute (as you can in this instance most 
essentially) to the execution of a plan which promises so much 
in its results. The effect of your residence at Berlin really is to 
bring England just ten days nearer both to Peter sburgh and 
Vienna. 

'' With respect to the latter place I am turning in my mind a 
plan for a change there, and I am confident it can hardly be for 
the worse, so much has Eden put himself into the hands of 
Thugut, and thereby rendered himself worse than useless." 
Copy._ 

The Marquis of Buckingham to Lord Grenville. 

1799, May 5. [Stowe.] — "I am indeed most anxious to see you, 
but I cannot yet prevail upon myself to break in upon that 
relaxation from constant anxiety that has pressed so much upon 
me, and that endears my own fireside so dearly to me ; but I fear 
that, in the course of fourteen days, I must set my face towards 
London. Your account of the Arch-Duke Charles has damped 
my hopes of seeing the blow followed up most vigorously in 
Switzerland ; conceiving as I do that it is more than possible 
that, in the course of this summer, not one Frenchman will be 
left in lower Italy, supposing always that the Swiss game is 
fortunately and warmly pushed ; but I am equally pleased and 
surprised with your hopes that Alexandria is or will be in our 
hands, as I will acknowledge that I had formed no such hope, and 
feared very much that the Brest fleet would — at least in part — 
have found its way into the Mediterranean, where it would 
certainly break in upon many of your plans. But it is a very 
sincere gratification to know that such is the state of our internal 
defence that we can spare our Channel fleet to follow them 
wherever they go ; and that a competent number of vessels of 
all sorts will still remain for any unexpected attempt. I cannot 
persuade myself that they are meant for Ireland, and yet the 
number (3,000) of troops appear unequal to any serious attempt in 
the Mediterranean, and unfit for any object of unblocking Cadiz. 
As to Ireland, you know as well as I do that the appearance of 
such a fleet would be enough, even without troops, to bring on a 
serious explosion in the south ; but I cannot think that the 
French will venture it. I will beg you to send me your report 
from your Secret Committee as soon as you can, as I am very 
anxious to see it; but as I know that these people just seized in 



40 

Dublin had great correspondences in England, I wish you to keep 
it open, till you know from Cooke whether any discoveries have 
been made that are worth your insertion. Wright the surgeon 
was the real efficient Director in Dublin ; and O'Hanlon, who 
had been in the Spanish service, is a very intelligent and 
dangerous man. 

"I am delighted with the statute of Henry VIII., and I trust 
that you will keep Lord Thanet's right hand and that of his friend 
Ferguson in hot water for some time, before the King in his 
mercy remits that part of his sentence. I have prepared for Sir 
William Young, who goes to town on Tuesday, an amendment 
which I think material to Mr. Pitt's Bill ; namely a power to the 
Attorney-General to file an information out oj term before any one 
Justice of the King's Bench, as of the first day of the ensuing term, 
against any printer or publisher ; and that upon such procedure, 
of which proper notice shall be given, an injunction shall issue of 
course to stop all sale of the work till the information shall 
have been tried. This appears necessary from the constant 
sale, pendente lite, of prosecuted libels ; and the principle is 
recognised in private prosecutions for pirated books or counter- 
feit editions, where the injunction issues from Chancery of 
course." 



Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville. 

1799, May 6. Harley Street. — " Je vous soumet, d'apres votre 
volonte, ma faible opinion sur la proposition de Thugut. 'Si elle 
est conforme a la votre, je suis perssuad^ que vous ne vous 
contenterez pas d'envoyer vos ordres a ce pauvre Eden, mais que 
vous depecherez, tout de suite, un courier a Petersbourgpour que 
le Chevalier Whiteworth explique vos raisons pour le maintien de 
votre premier plan, et qu'il inssiste sur son execution ; car je 
suis sur qu'avant de parler k Eden, Thugut en a deja parle a 
Razoumowskoi, et en a ecrit a Cobentzel ; et je ne puis vous 
cacher qu'on n'est pas chez nous dans I'habitude de retlechire sur 
les affaires, et que tout vat avec chaleure, precipitation, et 
enthousiasme. 

*' II est tres importent pour vous que ce soit les Busses qui 
soyent en Suisse, parcequ'etant joint par vingt milles Suisses 
que vous voulez lever dans ce pays, vous aurez soixante-cinq milles 
tout-a-fait dependents de vous ; ce qui ne serat pas si ces vingt 
milles Suisse se joignent aux Autrichiens, et mes pauvres com- 
patriotes seront inutillement sacrifies sans pouvoir rien faire sur 
la rive gauche du Rhin. 

" J'ai re9u hier-au-soir trois demandes, coup sur coup, avec 
un empressement etonant, pour donner un passeport au 
capitaine Popham pour Revel. Je I'ai envoye, mais je vous 
conjure de faire retenire ce capitaine jusqu'a ce que je 
vous voye, ce qui sera aujourd'hui a deux heures apres 
midi." 



41 

Enclosure. 

Military Operations against France. 

"La proposition du Baron de Thugut est tres singuliere ; ce 
qu'il propose n'est pas executable, meme pour les Autrichiens, 
encore moins pour les Kusses, et le motif principal est tellement 
faux, que lui-meme croyant I'appuyer, le renverse par des 
contradictions manifestes. 

" II veut que les Russes passent le Rhin a Philipsbourg, 
et se promenent sur la gauche de ce fleuve, ay ant de 
tous cotes des forteresses Fran9oises que I'Autriche elle- 
meme a livrees au Directoire : il pretend que de la ils 
pourron t faire diversion, et appuyer les Beiges bien-inten- 
tiones, oubliant qu'il y a, entre le Bas-Rhin et la Flandre, 
les places que la France possede sur la Moselle et la Meuse. 
Comment notre corps de trouppes pourra-t-il subsister ? qu'est 
ce qu'il pourra fairre ? il est etranger et aux Allemands 
de la rive gauche du Rhin, et aux Flammands, anciens 
sujets de I'Autriche ; au lieu qu'une armee Autrichienne parlera 
aux Allemands au nom du chef de I'empire, et aux Beiges au 
nom de leur ancien souverain, promettant aux uns et aux autres 
de les delivrer de leur joug, et le prommettant au nom de celui 
qui est le plus interesse a leur delivrance. 

" Les generaux Autrichiens connoissent tout ce pays, et y ont 
des relations particulieres avec les habitans : tous ces motifs et 
ces moyens manquent a mes compatriotes, et s'il est possible 
d'avanturer et de faire subsister une armee dans ces contrees, il 
n'y a qu'une armee Autrichienne qui pent y etre utilement 
employee, mais pas une armee Russe ; par les raisons ci-dessus 
expliquees. 

" Apres I'incoherence de la proposition, venons aux contradic- 
tions manifestes qu'elle contient en elle-meme. Le Baron Thugut 
dit: 'que depuis la premiere fois qu'il exprima son desir que 
ces trouppes fussent employees en Suisse, les circonstances 
de la guerre etoient considerablement changees ; le gros de 
I'armee etait maintenant sur la frontiere de ce pays ; les magazins 
de toute sorte y sont consequemment transportes : si les Russes 
y marchent il y aura plus de troupes qu'on ne pourroit y 
emj)loyer dans ce quartier ; on seroit oblige de deplacer I'armee 
Autrichienne et ses magazins.' Apres avoir etabli ces raisons 
comme victorieuses, il nous jette sur le Bas-Rhin parceque nous 
arriverons la, je ne scais d'apres quel calcul, trois semaines plus 
tot que les Autrichiens ; il oublie, tout d'un coup, que les 
Russes entrant en Suisse, composeroient un corps de trouppes 
plus qu'il n'en faut, et feroient deplacer les Autrichiens et 
leurs magazins, et il dit qu'au lieu de ces 45 milles Russes, 
^VEmperenr cVAllemagne s'engageroit d'envoyer une force egale, 
ou plus s'il etoit necessaire, pour agir effectivement et de concert 
avec le General Hotz pour la delivrance de la Suisse.' 

" Votre cher Chevalier Eden n'a pas compris ces contradictions 
palpables ; it n'a objecte que la difficulte de changer une destina- 
tion deja fixee ; sur quoi le fin Thugut lui repliqua que c'est 



42 

pour la convenance mutuelle et pour I'utilite commune qu'il le 
proposoit ; qu'il croyoit que I'Empereur d'Allemagne, en envoyant 
un nombre egal de ses trouppes pour agir dans la Suisse, etoit 
[otait] I'objection principale. 

" Vous voyez I'incoherence du plan et ses contradictions 
absurdes, qui n'ont pu echapper au Chevalier Eden que par 
quelque malheureuse distraction qu'il a eue quand Thugut lui 
parlait, et quand apres il vous rapportoit dans sa depeche." 
Copi/. 

Earl Spencer to Lord Grenville. 
Private. 

1799, May 7. Bath. — "I send you copies of some letters 
which I have had from Sir Sidney Smith, lest your dispatches 
from his brother should not contain all the information they 
convey. I confess I do not much like the accounts of the French 
penetrating into Syria, and of the disposition of the inhabitants 
in that country to receive, and of the armies to run away from 
them. 

''I have never seen a copy of the treaty which has actually 
been signed by the Smiths with the Porte, but I do not know 
what to make of what appears about it in these, and some former 
letters. They seem to have entered into stipulations that . were 
not in my contemplation, both with respect to the British force 
to be employed on the coast of Egypt, and to inviting the French 
to leave Egypt and return to Europe. Sir Sidney appears to 
be of opinion that the disadvantages of this latter measure will 
be done away by their being considered as prisoners of war, 
but I cannot see it in that light, because the instant they set 
their foot either in France or Italy, they will make very little 
scruple of serving either against us or some of our allies ; and, if 
it was only for the sake of example, I should be extremely sorry 
that any considerable proportion of that army were ever to 
return on any conditions." 

Enclosure 1. 

Commodore Sir W. Sidney Smith to Earl Spencer. 

1799, March 6. Tif/re, off Alexandria.—" I profit of the 
departure of the Cidlodea to acquaint your Lordship of my 
having relieved Captain Troubridge upon this station in pursu- 
ance of Lord Nelson's orders. I shall pursue the plan of 
operations his experience points out to me with this difference, 
that, according to the measures adopted as the result of the con- 
ferences at the Porte, we shall no longer keep the enemy damned 
up in Egypt, but allow him to evacuate the territory by all 
means except that of permission to retire with arms in their 
hands, at liberty to use them elsewhere. 

" Buonaparte, in his secret instructions to an agent of his, says 
'si jamais on vous jaisait la question, les Fram;ais conscntiront-ils 



43 

a quitter VEijifpte / poarqttol pan / poitrvu que les deux empereurs 
fussent finir la revolte de Passican Oglou et ahandonnent leur 
projet de se partaker la Turquie Europienne ; que, qnant a nous, 
nous Jerons tout ce qui pourwit etre favorable a V empire Ottoman, 
et le mettre a Vahri de ses ennemis. Mais que le imdiminaire de 
toute negociation, comme a tout accomodement, c'est un firman qui 
^asse relacher les Fran(;ais partout ou on les a arretes, surtout en 
St/rie.' To this I mean to answer him by his courier now on 
board (not Beauchamp) that the sense of this article of his 
instructions being clear, I have only to assure him of my 
readiness to listen to any reasonable proposition ; at the same 
time reminding him that his passage back to Franc6 depends 
entirely on the British squadron cruising off Alexandria, and 
that, according to agreement with the Porte, my passports alone 
are valables with them, and the Barbary powers, for British 
prisoners of war, I mention this, thus early, to enable your 
Lordship to judge of probabilities in this quarter where every- 
thing is as yet in embryo, dependent on Turkish armies which 
may never be what they are promised to be. On n'attrape pas 
des mouclies avcc du vinaigre — ainsije leur off re du miel; and it is 
not to Buonaparte alone that I offer this pont d'or, but by other 
channels indirectly to all individuals of his army. I hope to 
come at those, by this means, that are out of the reach of our 
shells ; as for the latter I consider them a surer prey from what 
I hear." Copt/. 

Enclosure 2. 

CoMMODOKE Sir W. Sidney Smith to Earl Spencer. 

Private. 

1799, March 7. Tigre, off Alexandria. — " Having received an 
offer from an Albanian chief to furnish me as many men as I 
chose on the footing of our marines, I have found myself very 
fortunate in such a resource at a time when I feel the want of 
men to land and secure the ports that the enemy would 
surrender to us, though they would defend them to the last 
extremity against the Turks for fear of the ill usage their 
prisoners meet with. I have thus found myself under the 
necessity of accepting this offer, and have accordingly sent a 
transport down to bring up some. I shall write officially about 
this when I have seen the thing realised sufficiently to enable 
me to speak more positively as to the efficiency of these men, 
who, it is understood, can row as well as use fire-arms. I shall 
put them on the Tigre' s supernumerary list, rated according to 
their qualifications. I see no other w^ay of satisfying their officers 
by a proportionate addition of pay than by bearing as many 
numbers, after the manner of widow's men, as will make up the 
proportion ; but for this deviation from the established rule on a 
supernumerary list, I must have an order from the Admiralty ; 
further these people require to be paid monthly on the spot, 
which is a sine qua non it seems. The French troops write on 



44 

their quarters j^oint d' argent point de soldats, and complain much 
of being seven months in arrear ; thus they will not be able to 
recruit their arm}^ in this way by the Albanians, who, like the 
Swiss, quit their mountains and the coast of the Morea to serve 
the neighbouring Pashas for present pay. They are the only 
people for this sort of service, and if we had a few of them just 
now, I could profit by the weakness of Aboukir Castle, as 
announced in Du Muy's letter to Beauchamp, a copy of which 
is enclosed, and cut off the only channel by which Alexandria 
receives supplies at present. I have my doubts of the Turkish 
troops promised arriving in time, or being efficient and active 
when they do ; besides I can only expect to influence them by 
example, and our own marines are too essential to a cruising 
ship to be detached for anything but a coup de main ; we cannot 
retain posts with them without having a port to secure the ships 
in the interim, and there is none on this coast. What we do 
we must do before the May and June breezes set in, and be 
already in a fair way to profit by the rise of the Nile to send the 
flotilla up it. Without that we may correspond, to the right 
and left, with Gezzar Pasha, Murad Bey, Ibraham Bey, but we 
shall never come to blows with enemy I see." 

Midnight, secret. " As I am writing to Mr. Forgli, a Turkish 
ship is come down from the eastward with the letter, of which a 
copy is enclosed, from our factotum at Acre, which I am enabled 
to send through Mr. Forgli to your Lordship by the vessel which 
I am about to dispatch to Zante to bring up some Albanian 
recruits, now, as your Lordship sees, become more necessary 
than ever. I have already answered my Acre correspondent, and 
written again to Gezzar Pacha pointing out what he can yet do 
to save his capital by constantly harrassing the French rather 
than risking a pitched battle, and also what I can do on the coast 
to support him. I have detached the Theseus to the eastward as 
desired. Captain Troubridge not having any frigates to give me 
in compliance with my official request to him, has left me the 
Lion, which I leave off the Western port of Alexandria while I look 
out on the eastern one, and Eosetta, from whence recent move- 
ments indicate an intention in the enemy to send something 
eastward. You see how insufficient the force at present under 
my orders, without numbers of small vessels, is for the work in 
hand. The appearance of our two decks keeps the eight frigates 
they have in the old port in check ; the three French built ones 
and two Venetians lately coppered there are evidently ready for 
a start, which corroborates recent intelligence ; they would rather 
go home than go on," Copy. 

Enclosure 3. 

Commodore Sir W. Sidney Smith to Eart. Spencer. 

1799, March 8. Tigre, off Alexandria. — "On second thoughts 
I have, to save time, made my official proposition to the 
Admiralty to extend the number of Albanians already engaged' 



46 

to three thousand. If they do not like to take our two last as 
marines, will you get Mr. Windham to state to me the terms 
which he can allow me to offer these chiefs who offer their 
services. The Albanians are the Swiss of this part of Europe, 
and he may have two regiments of a thousand men each to serve 
in this country if he likes it, on writing me a single line." Coiry. 

Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville. 

1799, May 8. — " It is now one o'clock in the morning, and I 
have been the whole day unremittingly employed in enabling 
myself to forward these despatches to you to-night. You will not 
therefore expect much of private letter with them, and my great 
anxiety not to lose another day must explain any inaccuracy or 
indistinctness that there may be in them. It was a happy day 
when you first consented to undertake this troublesome and 
unpromising task, and you will be the happier for it all the days 
of your life. 

" French papers talk of 25 sail of the line and 14,000 troops 
— sed ego non creclulus illis. Every day makes it more and more 
probable that their destination is to relieve Buonaparte. The 
curious papers you sent seem to confirm this; we have heard no 
more of our fleet." Copy, 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Prwate, 

1799, May 9. Berlin. — " Loose and incorrect as the French 
memorandum was which I enclosed to you in my last despatch, 
I preferred the sending it in its original terms as written by 
Haugwiz, because the embarrassment of his views and conduct 
is better described in the bad French and confused language in 
which it is written, than by any detailed description of mine. 
I believe the truth to be that he personally wishes this measure 
to succeed, and that he has good hopes of accomplishing it, but 
his natural timidity and anxiety makes him afraid to support by 
open and unqualified language the opinions w^hich he entertains 
and the system which he recommends, until he shall have 
persuaded himself that the small confidential circle of aid-de- 
camps and secretaries at Potsdam shall be in unison with him. 
He is therefore eternally struggling through his speculations 
about his own situation and influence, and as you will have 
observed, has seldom or ever the courage to pursue a plain and 
direct line, but seeks to express himself in involved and ambiguous 
terms in order to avoid being positively pledged and committed 
upon any precise and determinate object. This disposition is 
certainly unfavourable to the success of our measure of conven- 
tion, and increases extremely the difficulties in treating of it, 
and the doubts which will attach upon the execution of it in case 
it should be completed ; yet, with a very full sense of all these 
discouragements, and a very sincere wish that it had not fallen 
to my share to discuss them, I am still so much impressed with 



46 

the incalculable importance of pursuing through Prussia the 
successes of this one campaign which may decide the fate of 
Europe, that I acknowledge I am more ready than in prudence 
perhaps I ought to be to risk greatly for this great object ; 
and I should not deal fairly with you, if I did not so far 
put you upon your guard in all that you hear from me upon 
this subject. Our separate article, such as I have enclosed it 
in the despatch, was drawn up by Count Panin and myself 
for Count Haugwiz to carry to the King in order to describe 
the proposition in question in the manner the most likely 
to engage the inclination of the King's mind ; if it be 
adopted our course would naturally be to make the whole con- 
vention secret in order not prematurely to announce the attack 
upon Holland, and some immediate guaranty of present posses- 
sions and of future security to the United Provinces would 
naturally make a part of such a convention. I took Count 
Haugwiz's account of the sum proposed as applying to 60,000 
men for six months, but I see upon a closer examination, that at 
the rate of 80,000^. per month for 35,000 men, one million will 
pay the 60,000 men for six months and will also very nearly 
defray the fraix de mohilite. The question is whether you will 
trust the Duke of Brunswick and them with the discretionary 
power they ask for, of making their march into Holland depend 
upon their view of the then existing circumstances of the cam- 
paign, and whether any Eussian force can supply that protection 
on their left without which they will think 60,000 men too small 
a force to challenge the hostility of France. You will see that 
they have sent me a very coarse and stupid note which has given 
me the trouble of writing them an answer, which you may per- 
haps think too captious, but which, I think, is scarcely enough so. 
Their note was written by Struensee and Alvenslaben who are 
completely adverse to English connection, and Haugwiz, in this 
as in many other instances, has not courage enough to resist 
what he has sense enough to disapprove. 

" The French faction triumph in the murder of Roberjest and 
Bonnier by the Austrians ; I enclose to you the account as sent 
here by the Prussian legation, but I would not do the French 
deputies the honour of naming them in my public despatch. It 
is undoubtedly a dirty piece of business, and I therefore indulge 
myself in talking of it as being probably the act of the Directory 
to get rid of two men who have both been named to succeed in 
the ensuing vacancy ; there is very little truth in this suggestion, 
but it is better than abusing the Austrians, and the Directory are 
very little entitled to the benefits of truth and candour. " 

Enclositirs. 

(1.) Recit de la mart des Deputes Fmnqois a Rastadt. 

1799, Avril 27. Eastadt. — "Les Ministres F[ran9ois] ont 
donn6 avant-hier une protestation contre les demarches des 
A [utrichiens] concernant la surety du congres, en declarant 
qu'ils ne pouvoient plus continuer de traiter a E [astadt,] qu'ils 



47 

recevroient les propositions de ceux qui voudroient traiter. Un 
nouvel incident vint les embarrasser. Le courier ordinaire 
F[ran9ois] fut arrets liier par une patrouille sur la route de 
Seltz. On le conduit a Gernsbach, apres lui avoir enlev6 les 
d^peches. Les Francois I'adresserent a la mission Prussienne 
pour intervenir a obtenir son ^largissement, la restitution des 
depeches, et la surete du passage de la mission sur I'autre rive 
du Rhin. 

"On I'y pr6ta avec empressement, en envoyant a cette fin le 
Comte de Bernstorf au Colonel Barbaczay, afin de reunir ses 
representations a celles que les Barons Albini et Edelsheim 
alloient lui faire. II repondit qu'il ne pouvoit s'expliquer avant 
de recevoir les ordres du general, auquel il avoit expedi^ un 
courier. Le depart commun fut ainsi sursis. 

R [astadt] le 29 Avril. "Nous venons de passer une nuit terrible. 
Le Colonel B[arbaczay] ayant fait sommer hier les ministres 
F [ran9ois] par un officier suivi de Hussards, de quitter R [astadt] 
dans les vingt-quatre heures, ils resolurement de partir incessa- 
ment. C'etait a huit heures du soir. Arretes pendant une heure 
a la porte, on leur permit enfin de sortir, mais sans leur accorder 
I'escorte qu'ils demandoient. A peine parvenus a 500 pas de la 
ville, une troupe de cavaliers arrete les voitures. On arrache les 
trois ministres I'un apres I'autre, et les massacre a coups de sabre. 
Bonnier et Roberjeot restent sur la place hach^s en pieces. 
J[ean] de Bry, assailli le premier, quoique crible de coups, n'ayant 
pas re(;u de blessures mortelles, eut le bonheur d'echapper a la 
faveur de I'obscurite des mains des meurtriers. Rosenstiehl 
doit sa vie a son domestique qui eut la presence d'esprit de le 
jetter malgr^ lui hors de sa voiture,. et le for9a a prendre 
la fuite a travers un marais aboutissant au jardin du chateau, 
ou les Hussards ne pouvoient le suivre. Apres s'etre rendus 
maitres de tout ce qui se trouvoit d' argent et de precieux 
dans les voitures, ils les forcerent a retourner en ville. 

" Comment entreprendre de decrire I'etat desfemmes qui furent 
t^moins du sort affreux de leurs maris, ou de peindre les 
sentiments qu'eprouvoient les personnes accourus de toutes 
parts, en les voyant rentrer. La plupart du corps diplomatique, 
dechires d'un spectacle si terrible, I'empressoient de donner a ces 
malheureux tous les soins dont leur situation les rendoit 
susceptibles. Epuise de fatigue Jean de Bry, cache dans le 
bois au creux d'un fosse, attendoit la pointe du jour. Assez 
heureux pour se soustraire aux yeux de ses persecuteurs, il 
parvint a sept heures du matin a gagner I'hotel de M. le Comte 
de Goertz. Je I'ai vu ensanglante, convert de blessures, 
defigur^, ses habits tombant en haillons, courrir se jetter aux 
pie[d]s du Comte, implorer sa protection. V[otre] E[xcellence] 
devine la maniere ou il fut accueilli. Tout le monde s'empressa 
autour de lui. On fit pauser ses blessures et approcher sa femme 
et ses deux fiUes qui avoient passe la nuit dans les transes sur 
I'incertitude de ce qu'il etait devenu. A deux heures apres midi, 
lui, sa femme, I'infortun^e veuve de Roberjeot, avec les autres 
personnes attaches a la mission passerent heureusement le Bhin, 



4B 

proteges par ime escorte qu'enfin Ton avoit obtenii dn Colonel 
B [arbaczay] leqnel, desavouant le fait, t^moigna ses regrets dans 
une lettre. 

"On pretend avoir desdonnees non equivoques pour croire que 
cet attentat n'a pu se commettre sans une autorite sup6rieure 
quelconque. On va jusqu'a assurer que le butin fait dans cette 
occasion, evalue a 60 mille florins, a ete partage parmi les soldats 
et officiers a la lanterne auberge, situee hors de la ville sur la route 
de Carlsruhe. La majeure partie du Congres n'eut rien de plus 
presse que de partir ensemble, formant un cortege de trente 
voitures escortes par des Hussards de Bade et de Darmstadt. 
Nous apprenons que les depouilles de Koberjeot et Bonnier ont 
ete enterres hier avec ceremonie a K [astadt] . 

(2.) Carlsruhe le 2 de Mai. 

"M. de Dohm a redige un expose historique des 6venements 
qui ont precede notre depart de Kastadt. On en a fait part, au 
nom des divers deputes assembles ici, au Margrave de Bade et a 
I'archiduc Charles. L'etendue de cette piece, aussi detaill^e 
qu'interressante, et mes occupations m'empechent d'envoyer la 
copie a V[otre] E [xcellence] . Les A[utrichiens] se sont saisis 
de tous les papier s de la mission Fran9aise, et I'officier com- 
mandant a K [astadt] s'est obstinement refuse a les restituer." 

1. Piece. "Une lettre des membres du Congres au Colonel 
B [arbaczay] pour lui communiquer I'attentat, et demander surete 
pour leur personnes. 

Signce Goertz Jacobi Dohm 

Reede Hanovre 

Danois Rosenkrantz 

Baviere Rechberg 

Darmstad Gazert 
Wetteren Solms 
Nassau Knye 

Schweitzer 
Cassel Taube 

2. R^ponse du Barbaczay ; c'est une tres belle lettre exprimant 
son horreur de I'attentat, et ajoutant que ce malheur affreux ne 
seroit pas arrivee si la mission F [ran^aise] auroit voulu partir 
du jour. 

3. Lettres des d6put6s du Congres pour obtenir I'escorte du 
Capitaine Burkhard commandant a R [astadt] pour la protection 
du passage de la mission F [ran9aise] . 

4. Premiere intervention des deputes pour obtenir les escortes 
de protection a la mission F [ran^aise] au Colonel B [arbaczay] , 

5. Reponse et rapport du M. de Bernstorff. Le colonel ne 
pent accorder les escortes sans ordre sup^rieur. Depositions des 
postilions." Copy. 

Count Woeonzow to Lord Grenville. 

1799, May 10. Harley Street. — " Vous verez par ma lettre 
olficielle, et par I'anexe qui y est jointe, qu'il y a quelque m^sen- 
tendu chez nous paraport a Kuxhaven, qu'on supose que vous 



49 

voulez occuper ; et come cet endroit apartient a Hambourg, je 
crois en verite que nos demarches hostiles centre cette ville ne 
provienent du refus que les Hambourgeois ont fait de vous 
rendre les conjures Irlandois, et que, soit par les lettres de votre 
ministre a Hambourg au Chevalier Whiteworth, soit les raports 
de celui que nous y avions, on s'est imaging chez nous que les 
Hambourgeois 6toient des Jacobins fieres qu'il faloit punire. 

" Faite moi I'amitie de me repondre officiellement, afin que je 
puisse envoyer en cor ce soir la copie de ma lettre et votre reponse. 
Si je n'etois pas malade, je serois venu vous demander ce que 
vous avez r6pondu a la proposition du Baron du Thugut, qui 
veut absolument exclure les Russes de la Suisse, et les faire pro- 
mener sans aucune utilite sur la rive gauche du Rhin, entouree 
de toutes ces fortresses que possedent les Fran9ais. Quelque 
soit la reponse que vous fairez, je vous prie de la comuniquer au 
Chevalier Whiteworth pour qu'il la fasse connaitre chez nous, et 
d^jouer les intrigues de Cobentzel." 

The Earl of Mornington to Lord Grenville. 

1799, May 12. Fort St. George.—" Concluding that you know 
the whole history of the war in w^hich I have been compelled to 
engage with Tippoo Sultan, I say nothing of the causes, or first 
operations of it, but I lose not a moment in transmitting to you 
the inclosed Gazette, which I know you will read with pride and 
satisfaction equal to any which I can feel. The event is indeed 
brilliant, glorious, and substantially advantageous beyond my 
most sanguine expectation. Dundas or Cabell will furnish you 
with all such details as I yet have obtained ; they all tend to 
throw additional lustre on this (in India) unequalled event ; and 
with all your Duncan's and Nelson's thunder sounding about you, 
may I not venture to say to you, 

* Et nos tela, Pater, ferrumque hand dehile dextrd 
' Sparf/imus, et nostro sequitur de vulnere sanguis.' 

*' To you I shall use no disguise, but inform you plainly that 
the manner in which I have conducted this war has been received 
with exultation, and even the most unqualified admiration in 
India; and (to talk like Lord Abercorn) you will gain much 
credit by conferring some high and brilliant honour upon me 
immediately. The Garter would be much more acceptable to 
me than any additional title, nor would any title be an object 
which should not raise me to the same rank which was given to 
Lord Cornwallis. Tippoo Sultan fought better and had a much 
more efficient army than in the last war ; yet the British army 
entered Mysore on the 5th of March, and took Seringapatam on 
the 4th May. In my conscience I believe the army fitted out 
under my eye, and commanded by General Harris, to be as fine 
as an}^ in the world. I trust to you not to suffer me to be 
neglected. If my success at Hyderabad and at Seringapatam, 
accomplished within less than twelve months, be not merit, 1 
know not what the public service is, and I cannot return to my 
happy indolence at home too soon. 

6803 P 



50 

*' I am on the point of departure for Kykottah, and probably 
from thence I shall proceed to Seringapatam to settle the affairs 
of Mysore ; a task in which I expect more unpleasant pangs 
from the view of fallen dignity, than real difficulties in practice." 



Thomas Geenville to Lord Grenville. 
Private. 

1799, May 13. Berlin. — " In reading my former despatches 
you will have seen that I had succeeded in convincing the Minister, 
but in reading this despatch you will see how little I am for that 
advanced in the more arduous task of convincing H [is] P [russian] 
M [ajesty] . While I have worked myself to a lath in working upon 
the foreign secretary, around and stupid aid-de-camp who scarcely 
knows one step beyond the daily parade of the King's guards at 
Potsdam, works daily upon the easy and undistinguishing ear of 
the King, and in the voice of this mentor is lost all the hope of 
the uncommon exertions which were sincerely made by Haugwiz. 
It is difficult to describe the degree of mortification which 
Haugwiz seems to have felt in this disappointment, and although 
he endeavours to conceal it in conversation with me, I see that 
he is sorely hurt at his being checked and counter-acted upon 
so important a matter. At other times we have been inclined 
to think that as much w^as to be apprehended from Z astro w's 
influence as from that of Koekeritz, but upon this occasion 
the opinion of the former is considered as being rather favour- 
able than otherwise to the measure of hostility ; and in truth it is 
not easy to conceive upon what reasoning or with what specula- 
tion any reasonable man in Prussia could refuse himself to the 
conviction of the advantages which belong to the present moment 
for hostility to France ; in the King there is naturally a great 
indolence, and it is partly by working upon that indolence, and 
partly by an appeal to the King's conscience as to exposing 
Prussia to the expense and calamity of war, partly too by profit- 
ing of his suspicions towards Austria, and out of that making the 
new terror of Prussia being alone engaged in war with France, 
these are said to be the motives which Koekeritz employs ; 
whether on his own jjart weakly, or corruptly, or both, is a 
matter much disputed, but successfully as you see by what has 
so recently passed. With respect to the disappointment of the 
project, I rest less upon that ; because, in truth, there were so many 
difficulties attending both the drawing up of the treaty and 
the execution of it, so much opposition to be feared from 
the Duke of Brunswick having so small a force, so much 
doubt about succeeding in the obtaining the Russian force, and 
so much embarrassment in specifying all these conditions of an 
indistinct and complicated contract, that I have never been 
enough in love with it to suffer in the loss of it. My thoughts 
now all centre in the immediate march of [the] Russian force 
towards the Lower Rhine, and as I am persuaded that they would 
thus succeed in arriving at Dusseldortt*, I cannot but believe 



51 

their appearance there would tell with sufficient effect in Holland 
to give complete success to the rising in that country, even if 
any French troops should remain in it, which is I think by no 
means certain. I make to myself some scruple of always recurr- 
ing in my despatches to this project, the repetition of which may 
be embarrassing to you; but I hear so much of the means which 
prevail there, I feel so much the importance of the object and 
the facility of obtaining it, and I dread so much the letting go 
by a moment so made for acting upon the confidence of our 
friends and the fears of our enemies, that I cannot in conscience 
as an honest man restrain my pen from tracing my eager and 
sanguine hopes on this inviting prospect of success. I do not 
now see what I can do that is likely to be useful at Berlin, and I 
am tempted to think that I might do more good by coming and 
tormenting you all daily with the daily visitations of my fancy 
upon this subject. Meantime I have concluded a bargain with 
La Palue through General Stamford ; he is a good officer, a very 
intelligent man, has about 7001. per annum of his own, and 
takes 200/. for six months to pay his spies and his communica- 
tions; he will live at Emerick and Wesel, and if you find he does 
not answer you may get rid of him. I have drawn upon you for 
one hundred pounds for him, for which I will send you receipt 
when I have more time." 



Lord Grenville to Henry Dundas. 

Secret. 

1799, May 13. Dropmore. — " I have examined very attentively 
the different papers which you have sent, and which I now 
return, respecting Batavia. They contain two perfectly distinct 
and even opposite proposals. The one, for a conquest of Java 
conducted on the same wise and liberal principles on which we 
have acted at Ceylon and elsewhere, securing to the public the 
real advantages of the conquest, and protecting (but under 
British laws and sovereignty) the inhabitants of Batavia (as we 
protect those of the Cape) in the enjoyment of their property ; 
effectually restraining them at the same time from remitting 
that property to Holland where it would be at the mercy of our 
enemies, and would infallibly be put in requisition to be 
employed against us. The other is, as I conceive, nothing but 
a proposal from some of the parties concerned in the most 
scandalous system of fraud and perjury that was ever exposed, 
that we should by a solemn engagement, and even by an Act of 
Parliament, cover their transactions in future ; and renouncing 
all advantage from the possession of Java, allowing all its 
produce to be remitted either in kind, or at least in value, to 
Holland, undertake the whole expense and loss of its defence. 

" Seeing them in this light, I need hardly tell you to which of 
them my opinion inclines. I have always thought the conquest 
of Java an object of great importance, and much regretted that 
the state of our affairs in India did not seem to allow us the 



52 

means of collecting a force there for that purpose. Captain 
Popham's papers certainly suggest more reasons in favour of this 
project than I was before acquainted with, and I by no means 
think that our views of continental operations for the delivery of 
Holland ought to prevent or delay the adoption of his plan. If 
the Stadtholder is restored, one of the greatest difficulties we 
should have to encounter will be the demand for the restoration 
of Ceylon and the Cape, which, from what I have already seen, 
will, I am certain, be pressed upon us by Prussia as well as by 
the Dutch. It would be a great means of putting this by if we 
had Batavia and Surinam to restore to them. There is also 
another consideration that will deserve attention. It is this, that 
if a counter-revolution takes place in Holland without our having 
taken steps to secure these 23oints, there is danger of the French 
or Spaniards being before hand with us there. 

Postscript. ''You know best what could be done with sepoys, 
but I have always understood that for the conquest of Java we 
might procure Malays, and other troops of that description, from 
Ceylon and the Eastern Islands, which would not feel the same 
objection as sepoys to naval expeditions, and distant service." 
Copy, 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Prii'ate. 

1799, May 16. Berlin. — " Wagstaff's despatches of yesterday 
from you have so completely occupied me in writing to Whitworth 
and to the Office, and in arranging all that in conversation could 
be arranged with Stamford, that I shall with difficulty be able to 
save the packet if I delay Dietry in writing a long private 
letter. Stamford is fully impressed with the grandeur of 
your Kussian naval project, and goes with good heart and zeal 
to Petersburg on Saturday the 18th, where I really think he will 
do invaluable service in the assistance which his talents and 
energy will give to support Whitworth in his negotiation. For 
myself I walk in air, and can hardly reduce my imagination to 
wait for the progress of the great events which I am confident 
will arise out of this spirited enterprise. In the midst of this 
burning fever arrives your second despatch to Whitworth, your 
laborious and j)rompt assistance to my convention, and your 
praise of my successful exertions at Berlin. Your letter to 
Whitworth I desire him not to regard, but to get by heart the 
despatch which i^receded it. Your pwjet d'articles and your 
ready assistance I know not how enough to thank you for ; but 
your praises and congratulations you will already have seen that 
I have in no degree the smallest pretensions to, and that all I can 
boast of is that I have managed so as not to make the expectation 
of my Berlin project retard the better energy of Paul and 
Petersburg. 

"Meantime I must take notice that you have sent me no 
directions how to forward your last despatch to Sir M. Eden, but 
as it is important, and moreover not in cipher, I shall send it on 
this evening by messenger. 



53 

"I enclose to you a communication made by Mr. Diemar 
respecting the person who has the contract at Cuxhavon for 
victualling our ships. I know nothing of the facts, if they are 
true he ought to be removed. I send you likewise the last news 
which I have received from the Prince of Orange, which continues 
to be very promising. I cannot send you the receipt for La 
Palue's 108/. till the next messenger. Be so good as not to 
forget the letter from the Stadtholder, to regret his son, and to 
recommend his interests to the Emperor. Stamford would not 
take any money here, but wishes to be enabled to draw upon 
Whitworth for what he may want for his expenses there, and I 
told him I would desire you to write accordingly. 

' ' I fear there has been strange intriguing against the Archduke, 
but while he retains the command I still think all will go on w^ell ; 
and as for the disposition of your 45,000 Russians, I have no 
doubt but that the Germans may be brought at Vienna to take 
that position which they wish to be taken on the Rhine, and 
leave the Russians to advance towards France. 

"I am interrupted by receiving a message confidentially from 
Haugwiz to tell me that he has got Count Finckenstein to unite 
with him in making a declaration to the King that they wall 
resign if their opinion is not followed in favour of the convention, 
and he desires to see me on this to-morrow, and to repeat to me 
the good hopes which he has that he shall succeed. I have sent 
him word that I will come, but my determination is to tell him 
that we can no longer suspend for a single day the measures of 
the campaign in waiting the reluctant and tardy decisions of 
Berlin, and therefore that nothing short of the immediate accept- 
ance of the proposition can now make it practicable. My 
messenger shall go to Petersburg to-day; if they are in earnest 
here that will be a spur to them, but I cannot and will not recom- 
mend to you one moment's delay. The spirit and activity of 
your last project delights me, and I will not let the cold air of 
Berlin blow upon it ; if they accept the proposition, I wdll then 
act on your last despatch, provided they accept it immediately." 

Enclosure. 

Affairs of the Netherlands. 
Extraits de diferentes lettres du 7 et S Mai. 

" Les lettres de la Hollande deviennent tous les jours plus 
pressantes, et il est serieusement a craindre de deux choses I'une, 
qu'il y aura du desordre partiel, mal-dirige, et sans succes ; ou que 
les Directeurs actuels, voyant qu'ils ne peuvent plus mener la 
barque, tenteront une coalition avec le bon parti, parmi lequel il 
y en aura qui s'y preteront, voyant qu'il n'y a plus d'autres 
ressources. Surtout a Amsterdam on paroit assez dispose a cela, 
et c'est aussi par la que la bombe eclatera s'il y a du desordre 
serieux, car depuis que les Anglois bloquent serieusement les 
ports et n'y font plus rien entrer, il y a beaucoup d'effervescence. 

" Le retard des postes Angloises donne matiere a plusieurs con- 
jectures, car malgr^ que le vent a ete favorable, il nous manque 



54 

dans ce moment trois malles, d'ou Ton conclut qu'il doit y en 
avoir de pris, ou bien que legouvernement, projettantune expedi- 
tion, a contremande toute communication, comme lors de 
I'entreprise sur les ecluses du canal. On pretend qu'ils se sont 
deja montres en force sur les cotes de la Z^lande avec beaucoup 
de vaisseaux de transports. 

"Dans ce moment les Bataves n'ont plus d'autres ressources que 
de faire venir tout de Bremen par les Wadden ; si les Anglois 
empechent cette communication, il pourroit y avoir une famine. 

" Brune, a ce qu'on assure, a declare que si le republique Batave 
fut attaquee dans les circonstances presentes, il n'y auroit pas 
moyen de I'aider, et que par consequent, on devoit penser a sa 
propre defense. Ceci doit avoir occasionne le message du 
Directoire concernant 1' augmentation de I'armee. On doute 
toujours que le requisition passera, et on la dit meme deja 
rejettee par la seconde chambre. 



** Pendant mon sejour a la Haye, et en general en Hollande, d'ou 
je suis ressorti il y a quelques jours, j'ai furete partout, consulte 
grands et petits, et meme un des cinq Directeurs que je puis vous 
assurer avoir trouve bien dispose, ainsi que le sont ses confreres. 
lis seroient dans leur joye s'ils pouvoient contribuer a nous faire 
avoir I'orangerie de retour. Je ne crois pas que dans ce moment 
il y ait un etre dans toute la Kepublique qui en doute, et sure- 
ment I'unanimite desire un changement ; il n'y a guerres de 
Fran9ois, et le militaire y est bien disj)Ose; ce seroit le vrai 
moment d'entrependre quelque chose, et, en outre, les villes fortes 
etant degarnies de canons et de soldats. Je serois tres tente de 
croire que, si cela traine encore, on s'entendra en Hollande pour 
y prendre des arrangemens entre soi, ainsi gare la maison 
d' Orange ! C'est a elle d'y penser bien murement ; il n'y aura 
pas de notre faute, car nous I'avons assez avertie ; si I'heure du 
berger est passe, il est difficile de la rattrapper ; alors c'est sauve 
qui pent. 

" Les Beiges sont de tres bonne volonte, surtout le Pays de 
Waes ; les villes de meme, mais n'osent encore se montrer 
puisqu'ils craignent leurs cites, et qu'il n'y a point de tete qui les 
commande ; ils ont envoye a diflferentes reprises des emissaires 
en Angleterre pour etre soutenus et secourrus. Si Ton veut 
commencer une revolution en Hollande, nous serons surs de 
notre fait; mais si elle se fait d'elle-meme, il est a craindre deux 
contre un pour la maison d'Orange, car alors I'interet s'en mele, 
et on n'en pent prevoir ses suites." 

Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville. 

1799, May 17. Harley Street. — " Voila deux poste arivee 
depuis quatre jours et je n'aipas de lettre demon pays. Je crois 
qu'on s'est imagine la, qu'aussitot que j'ai reyu I'ordre de venire 
a Petersbourg, j'ai pris d'abord la poste, que je suis deja en routte 



55 

courent come uii enrage pour saisire une place dans le ministere. 
Le Prince Bezborotko est mort le /y d'Avril, a, ce que marquent 
des lettres parfciculieres re^u dans la cite. Je perds un ami de 
81 ans, et ma patrie perd le plus habil ministre qu'elle a jamais 
eu. C'est une perte irreparable. 

" Si vous avez quelque nouvelle de Petersbourg, faites moi 
I'amitie de me le comuniquer. 

'^ Je crois qu'il n'y a rien a attendre de Berlin avant qu'on 
ayent re^u la la reponse de Petersbourg sur les ouvertures qui 
ont etes faites, a monsieur votre frere et au Comte Panin. Nous 
devons etre bien contents de la rapidite des progres des allies en 
Italie, J'espere que ce serat de meme en Suisse quand 1' Arcliiduc 
Charles sera en etat de reprendre le comandement de son armee. 
II est facheux seullement de voir que le General Belegarde 
[Bellegarde] au lieux d'avancer avec tout ce qu'il a de forces et 
netoyer les Grisons et I'Engadine, ne fait la guerre qu'a la fayon 
du Marechal Lassi [Lascy] , se tient enferme dans le Tirol, et 
n'envoit que des petits detachements qu'il laisse battre par les 
Fran9ais."' 

Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville. 
Private. 

1799, May 17. Cleveland Eow.— " Many thanks for your 
trouble about the maps. I will immediately replace the money 
to your account at Coutts's, and I should be obliged to you to 
send the maps by degrees as messengers come. I indulge the 
hope that their arrival will be frequent. I do not at all grudge 
the expense of the two other maps j^ou have ordered. 

"I have to reproach myself with having omitted to write to you 
about your own concerns. There cannot be the least difficulty 
about replacing to you the full amount of your loss, and the only 
point is to ascertain it. For this the Office must of course refer 
itself to you, and the mode I meant to follow was to write to you 
an official letter saying that H[is] M[ajesty] having been pleased 
to express his disposition to replace to you the amount of your 
loss sustained, I am to desire that you will transmit to me a 
statement of the amount thereof as nearly as you can ascertain 
it. This statement, of course, need only be of a general sum, 
without the necessity of your specifying so much for the blue and 
silver and so much for the green and gold. Before I take this 
step I will wait for your answer to this. 

" These Austrians are really going on at a great rate in Italy, 
but as much as their armies delight me, so much am I disgusted 
with their cursed politics. I sometimes start when I think what 
great generals we are grown with our 40,000 Russians, which 
Austria wants at Philipsburgh, and Prussia wants at Dusseldorff, 
and which we are obstinately bent on sending to Basle. But 
after all one cannot surrender one's common sense to fifty Duke's 
of Brunswic, or five hundred Thuguts. I think one may venture 
to pronounce on past experience that if 60,000 Prussians, aided 
by the debarkation of 20,000 Russians, are insufficient to conquer 



56 

Holland, 230,000 are infinitely more so. The former may 
succeed, but I would forfeit my head if the latter do, for the first 
operation would stand some chance of being conducted on mili- 
tary principles ; the latter would inevitably be nothing more than 
a political demonstration. 

"You will have seen that your Secret Article is in some respects 
stronger and more explicit than what we had made up our minds 
to be satisfied with, but I hope you wdll be able to save us the 
fraix de mobiUte. I do not know whether I made myself intelli- 
gible in the parallel between the two Subsidy Treaties, but if you 
will yourself go through the process of the comparison, you will 
see that nothing is clearer than that [this] is a worse bargain, 
even so, than the other. 

"As for Russian force to cover their left, and the D[uke] of 
B[runswick]'s fears lest France should do in 1799 what she did 
not do in 1787, it is all fudge, and deserves no more courtly 
phrase. 

"I am delighted with your note in answer to my old friend 
Alvensleben, whose style I easily recognise. In truth you must 
not think it flattering when I assure you soberly and sincerely 
that I have never received one despatch from Berlin since you got 
there without seeing fresh cause to admire your judgment and 
talents, and to lament that you have not given them more 
frequent occasion to show themselves as they have now done. 

"You see, of course, that your coming away while this convention 
is in question (may I not say while its execution is so ?) is not to 
be thought of. Nor do I think you wish to leave such a work im- 
perfect. The occupation is not always amusing, but the success 
must, I am sure, already amply repay you. 

"God bless you, my dearest brother; you will easily judge the 
interest that I must feel in continuing to receive such assistance, 
especially when I am every hour hearing (from everybody who 
has success (? access) to know anything about it) the strongest 
expressions of its ability and advantage to the public service." 
Copy. 



The Earl of Mornington to Lord Grenville. 

1799, May 18. Fort St. George.—" I refer you to the packet 
of Gazettes for the fate of Tippoo Sultan, and I rely on your 
friendship to see that justice is done to the author of that imjDor- 
tant event. I am very well ; whether you praise or blame, me 
me adswn qui feci ! We have found Tippoo' s correspondence 
with the French in his palace. I am now proceeding to Sering- 
apatam, where I have little doubt that I shall soon be able to 
settle a good arrangement. The kingdom of Mysore is absolutely 
at our disposal. I wish you to read my dispatches to the Court 
of Directors and to Dundas. 

" You shall hear from me again soon, if the hot weather does 
not kill me. We have every reason to believe that the French 
are established in Egypt." 



Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

1799, May 19. Berlin. — " As neither of my messengers are 
returned from Cuxhaven I shall not he able to write to-morrow 
for Thm-sday's packet ; in truth, however, as Mr. Cockburn's 
immediate departure gives me an opportunity of telling you that 
nothing new has arisen since my despatch of the 16th, I do not 
regret the want of a more regular communication. The inter- 
view which I expected took place on the 17th ; it announced to 
me some better hopes, but of too uncertain a description to offer 
any ground of conduct, and I remained after the conversation 
perfectly satisfied with myself that I had not suffered the expec- 
tation of it to delay either of the messengers for one moment. I 
heard the new hopes with more patience than confidence, and I 
professed that I now thought no decision here could overtake the 
arrangements made, or bring back the same shape of things of 
which there had been question ; but that there doubtless would 
be found in the great objects which still remained for discussion 
sufficient inducements of another description to enable us to act 
together as soon as a ready disposition to it should be manifested 
here. In this shape it now rests. My fellow labourer begins his 
pilgrimage in a few hours ; when I write my next despatch, I will 
say more to you of his general ideas than I care to do at present, 
more especially as I can say nothing which is to affect anything 
you can do in the business before we hear of him ; he is more 
moderate in his view of numbers necessary than you seem to 
have been in England, but he thinks the short line of communi- 
cation beyond all measure preferable to the other, and I do most 
heartily hope that it will, upon examination, be found practicable 
in every sense of the word. We have no fresh military news ; 
we hear that Rewbell is out of the . Direction, but we know^ not 
who has succeeded to him in it." 

Endosure 1. 

Thomas Grenville to Sir Charles Whitworth. 

1799, May 19. Berlin.— "Although my letter of the 16th 
instant will, I am sure, have sufficiently interested you in the 
arrival of General Stamford at Petersburg to ensure to him all 
the assistance which you are so well enabled to give to him, I can- 
not nevertheless allow him to begin this journey without taking 
the liberty of adding to the claim of his eminent talents, 
whatever you will be so good as to allow to the testimony which 
I can so well bear to his good qualities and his very amiable 
manners. 

" Attached by opinion only to the cause in which he is engaged, 
he gives to his exertions in it, at the expense of a feeble state of 
health, all the powerful faculties of a mind uncommonly ardent 
and vigorous. It is imjDossible to know him two days without 
feeling his value, and though my praise cannot add to it, it will not 
lessen, I am sure, your good offices and good inclinations towards 
him. 



58 

" It will not be difficult for him through your assistance to have 
an audience of the Emperor on account of the verbal compliment 
which he will deliver from the Stadtholder, previous to the letter 
in question, and it is possible that his audience of the Emperor 
may have its advantage. 

" I would likewise take the liberty of requesting you to introduce 
him to Captain Popham, if he shall be arrived, or to any other 
officer with whom it may be useful to him to have communication. 
And you will likewise forgive me for suggesting that upon a husi- 
ness so pressing both in time and in importance it may be useful 
to have more frequent recourse to messengers than is done in the 
ordinary habits of official correspondence. 

'' The course of the military operations being once concluded 
upon. General Stamford will be impatient to return to a post 
where his local information will be peculiarly valuable to the 
further success of the enterprise for the deliverance of Holland." 
Copy. 

Eiidosare 2. 

Thomas Grenville to Captain Popham. 

1799, May 19. Berlin. — "It is with very great pleasure that I 
have heard of the share which you are likely to have in the 
important business which is in negotiation at Petersburg, being 
well persuaded that the issue of this great enterprise depends 
altogether upon the zeal, the resources, and the activity which 
will be necessary to superintend it. 

'* To assist in relieving those difficulties which the novelty of 
the proposition may produce at Petersburg, General Stamford 
has undertaken to go thither to discuss the military objections 
which will, perhaps, be put forward by the Eussian officers, and 
may require some knowledge and some address to surmount. 

"It is to request from you your assistance to him, and your co- 
operation with him that I have taken the liberty of addresing this 
letter to you. You will find in him, in addition to his acknow- 
ledged military talents and experience, a mind ardent, intelligent, 
and fertile of resources. I know how much these qualities will 
be congenial to you, and I have therefore the most extreme 
satisfaction in reflecting upon the assistance which this great 
object will derive from your mutual discussions and communica- 
tions." Copy. 

Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville. 

1799, May 20. London. — " We have an account to-day that 
the French fleet has been seen on the 2nd and 3rd of May off the 
Portuguese coast, steering S.W., evidently for Cadiz. If no 
accident happens to Lord St. Vincent by the junction of the two 
fleets, which naval men do not seem much to apprehend, all will 
be well, and we can easily reinforce him time enough to prevent 
the combined fleet from doing us any serious mischief in the 
Mediterranean. The Cadiz accounts do not speak of more than 



59 

sixteen ships fit for sea; the Ferrol squadron has, as you will 
have seen, missed them in the Bay, and is got into Aix. The 
being relieved from all watch of Brest will wonderfully ease our 
operations here, both naval and military. I thought of sending 
you a despatch to-day about (jeiieral concert, but on the whole I 
have judged best to delay it till I hear from you again, and by 
the paper you enclosed in your last letter it does not appear that 
Haugwiz's ideas on that subject are as yet very far advanced. 

" It requires more philosophy than I possess to see with any 
degree of patience these two German Courts struggling so hard 
against being saved. Still I trust the current will drive them to 
shore in spite of themselves. All this violence about the three 
most worthy representatives of the French Government at 
Rastadt is very fortunate for us, because it puts at a greater dis- 
tance the possibility of Thugut's sacrificing, by some deep stroke 
of policy, all the present advantages of the situation in which 
Austria stands, in order to obtain a French guaranty of some 
square miles more or less in Germany and Italy. God bless 
you. 

" It is true that we want the Elbe ships elsewhere, and do not 
withdraw them in order to save the question. It may be neces- 
sary that you should make this felt at Berlin, in order to keep 
them in order. If Denmark does not mend its manners we shall 
very shortly have a fresh naval war. Provided we dispose well 
of this combined fleet we need not much fear the hostility of 
Denmark. 

" I send you the enclosed for criticism. It has been much 
approved here. It is the joint production of Pitt and your hum- 
ble servant. You will perhaps say that we might both find better 
employment for our time than in writing Latin inscriptions." 
Copt/. 

H. Fagel to Lord Grenville. 

1799, May 20. Duke Street, Westminster. — "I send you the 
two papers which I mentioned yesterday, and which you told me 
you had not yet received from Mr. Grenville, to whom they have 
been communicated by the Hereditary Prince of Orange. The 
one is a note which was conceived between the Hereditary Prince 
and Count Haugwitz, and which the latter, if I recollect well, 
took with him to Minden, and promised to lay before the King 
of Prussia. It contains a request that those inhabitants of the 
United Provinces, who may be obliged to leave that country in 
consequence of the newly decreed requisition, may find an 
asylum in the neighbouring Prussian provinces. The other is a 
sketch of some of the most material improvements which the 
ancient constitution of the Republic seems to stand in need of, 
and of some preliminary measures which might be taken in the 
event of a happy change of circumstances. I doubt not but 
your Lordship will find that the paper contains some useful 
hints, tho' not very accurately expressed. It is to this latter 
circumstance that I chiefly attribute the Prince of Orange's 



60 

remark, which you will lind in the enclosed letter. I thought it 
right, however, to send this letter to you, together with the 
paper to which it alludes. I hope to have the pleasure of seeing 
you soon." 

Enclosure. 

Prince of Orange to H. Fagel. 

1799, May 19. — " Je vous envoye le projet de constitution, et 
la copie de I'addresse de mon fils au Eoi de Prusse, avec priere 
de communiquer ces pieces a Mylord Grenville ; mais, en meme 
temps, il est necessaire d'observer que je n'ai pas eu le loisir 
d'examiner a tete reposee ce projet de constitution, et que je 
n'ai pas pu y faire les remarques et peut-etre les corrections 
necessaires ; en gros je me conforme avec les idees contenues 
dans ce projet, mais je crois qu'il y a quelques points qui 
devroient etre retouches et elucides, tels que I'article de la 
Presidence tant dans les- etats-generaux que dans les differents 
colleges que Ton voudroit y donner au Stadhouder, et que je 
doute qu'il puisse prendre sur lui ; les occupations attachees aux 
devoirs de son poste ne lui laissant pas de loisir d'assister 
journellement a les differentes assemblees; et peut-etre y a t'il 
encore d'autres points qui demanderoient des changements." 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

1799, May 21. Berlin. — "General Stamfort began his journey 
yesterday to Petersburgh ; taking with him Colonel Dumas, who 
is an old friend of his, and who accompanies him, though without 
being informed of the particular business which is in question. 
General Stamfort's intention was to endeavour to direct the course 
of the proposed expedition from Kevel to the neighbourhood of 
Delftzyll, and to land there 15,000 men, having previously 
established a corjjs de reserve of 5,000 men in the Eussian 
principality of Yevern. He prefers this line of attack to any 
other for many important reasons ; in the first place in pursuing 
Captain Popham's idea of passing along the Eyder, the Russian 
troops may go from the mouth of the Eyder to the coast of 
Delftzyll in so short a time as to keep the troops fresh for service, 
to require no intermediate place of rendezvous, and create none of 
those apprehensions which might be entertained about them in a 
longer passage. In the next place, the troops being so landed, 
will be easily masters of Schantz Buyrtang and Coverden, and 
thus have complete possession of the provinces of Groningen and 
Friesland, where they could long maintain themselves against 
any force which a change of circumstances in the campaign could 
enable the French to send there ; a consideration which may 
become very important if at Petersburgh they are inclined to 
represent this enterprise as being unreasonably hazardous, in 
case of unexpected reverses on the Rhine. The landing in North 
Holland he describes as being much more precarious in practice, 
and much more doubtful in success from the means of attack 
which the enemy might find in the ships of Amsterdam and the 



61 

fleet of the Texel. He considers, however, an attack to be made 
at the same thne uj)on Zealand as an essential part of this plan, 
and regards that expedition as naturally taking place from the 
British Coast, in co-operation with the landing in Friesland ; and 
he is persuaded that by means of these two attacks in Zealand 
and Friesland, with the circumstance of the English fleet to 
check the enemy at the Texel, and the favourable disposition of 
the people of the country, the command and possession of the 
United Provinces would immediately fall into our hands. He 
regards the principality of Yevern as a very great object in 
affording an useful point for the collecting of magazines and for 
the establishing a coiys de reserve ; and he considers 20,000 men 
as being a force so amply sufficient to the whole object that, in his 
last conversation with me, he frankly declared that he thought a 
larger number would be more embarrassing to the country than 
useful to the expedition, and repeated that he desired not a man 
more than 15,000 to land in Friesland, and 5,000 to remain as a 
corjjs de reserve in Yevern. 

"If his military experience seems to authorise this more limited 
number, many considerations appear to me to concur forcibly in 
recommending it. Although there may be no actual ground of 
jealousy for us in seeing a large Kussian army in Holland, yet 
common prudence would seem to suggest many motives for not 
putting that country more than is necessary into the hands of 
any foreign power ; and if this consideration applies in some 
degree to English views, the prejudices of the Dutch too upon 
this subject should perhaps not be neglected ; and I have 
frequently observed among some of our friends of that country 
considerable traces of uneasiness at the idea of a large Eussian 
army taking possession of Holland." 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, May 21. Berlin. — "You will have seen that Sir Charles 
Whitworth's last letters from Petersburg are not very flattering 
to our hopes of General Stamford's success, but I do not never- 
theless abandon the enterprise, and I have persuaded myself, 
though probably I may not have persuaded you, that either by 
part of the old subsidiary army, or by a neiv subsidiary army, we 
must and will make good your project of 20,000 Eussians 
assuring the deliverance of Holland by disembarking from the 
Baltick on the coast of Friseland. I have so long and so often 
tormented you by recurring to your 45,000 men for the means of 
attacking Holland, that I expect you all to be a good deal out of 
humour with me for venturing to suggest the employing one third 
of this force, in case no other troops should be supplied by Eussia ; 
and yet in honour and conscience I cannot avoid making this 
suggestion to you, and earnestly requesting you to consider 
whether you should not send, without a moment's delay, to direct 
Sir Charles Whitworth to take this course, if they should adhere 
to their last answer at Petersburg, and refuse to furnish to 



62 

England any new subsidiary corps; nor can I help entreating you 
to remark how infinitely pre-eminent in importance it is that, at 
all hazards and in all events, this one blow of Holland should be 
struck now, when it is utterly impossible that any resistance can 
be offered on the part of the French. Upon this point, however, 
it is to you only that I can write, and I feel that I must not 
venture to say anything more to Whitworth which can affect the 
actual march of your subsidiary army after the formal decision 
which you have taken upon it, and the measures which you may 
perhaps have taken in consequence of it. If the knowledge of 
your deliberate determination had not precluded me, I would, on 
my own responsibility, have written instantly to Whitworth to 
entreat him to delay the march of the last 15,000 of the 45 ; but 
it would be unjustifiable in me to do so, and therefore I can only 
again conjure you not to let this disposition of force towards 
Swisserland lose to you the invaluable and perhaps irretrievable 
opportunity of the recovery of Holland. If both objects can go 
on together, there can be no doubt of that being the preferable 
course, but if an option is to be made and a sacrifice is requisite, 
surely there can be no hesitation in deciding between the posses- 
sion of Holland and the increased effort of the combined army in 
Swisserland. 

" You will observe that I have not noticed your despatch about 
the proposed convention, except to thank you for it, and I suppose 
you will understand my silence upon it to arise only from its not 
appearing now necessary to discuss it ; I will only remark that 
their treaty of demarcation includes all the countries behind the 
line of it and therefore includes Holstein ; the absurdity of their 
treaty is that by its literal interpretation Russia likewise would^ 
as you see, be included ; I trust, however, that you will resj)ect 
no such neutrality, but that you will persuade Paul to insist upon 
his troops j^jassing along the Eyder, and that you will likewise 
make of his principality of Yevern the commodious magazine 
and point of reserve which Stamford wants to make of it. I am 
impatient for news of the fleet. God bless you, dearest brother. 

' ' You will easily comprehend that in the obscurity in which 
Schwerin has passed the last three years it is not easy for Stam- 
ford to hunt him out, now that he is on the high road to 
Petersburg. Mahony, who was proposed as second in command, 
is by this time in London, and as second is highly recommended 
by Stamford. 

" You write to Garlike to complain of the Prussian posts 
retarding your messengers ; I believe your messengers should 
be complained of for retarding the post. I never knew how bad 
they were till it was so much my business to observe them ; it is 
shameful to see how^ negligent they are. Panin's couriers arrive 
at Berlin usually in nine, sometimes in ten days, ours are upon 
the average from twelve to thirteen days from Petersburg ; from 
Cuxhaven your messengers are usually three days to Berlin. 
Dietry, who goes from here, almost always arrives at Cuxhaven in 
between fifty and sixty hours; in short, depend upon it, you wDl 
have no good messengers till some account is regularly taken ot 



63 

the dates of tlieir arrivals in their land journeys ; the sea passage 
will always leave some room for abuse, but by land you may 
correct it. Panin is going to Carlsbadt for his wife's health ; he 
will be a great loss." 

Eael Spencer to Lord Grenville. 

1799, May 21. Admiralty. — " Should you see any objection 
to our ordering away from the Elbe the frigates which were 
stationed there some time ago under the apprehension of an 
attack on Hamburg ? That attack seems at present not to be 
very probable, and we are in very great want of our small 
squadron to scour the North Sea, which swarms with privateers, 
who run in and out on the Norway coast in a very intolerable 
manner, and will, I fear, do much mischief to our trade. 

"I wish much to speak to you on one or two other points, and 
should be extremely obliged to you to let me know whether 
I could see you to-day between two o'clock and four, or at any 
other time after two, being engaged till then." 

Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville. 

1799, May 22. Harley Street. — " Votre courier m'a aporte 
des depeches qui 6tent en Russe ne pouront etre traduite que 
demain au soir. Pouriez-vous me donner, dans la soiree de 
demain entre les 8 et les 10 heures, une demi-heure d'entrevue, 
car vendredi, il y a un courier Portugais qui vat a Peter sbourg, 
et par lequel j'ai beaucoup a 6crire, et mille lettres particulieres 
au quelles je dois repondre. Votre courier m'a rendu le plus 
heureux des hommes. J'ai la certitude de recevoir par un autre 
de vos couriers, qui doit incessament partire de Peter sbourg, la 
determination de I'Empereur qui me permet de rester ici. Soyez 
persuade que je serai plus util pour le bien des affaires de loin 
que de pres, ou un tal[taille] d'enemis s'elexeroient contre moi 
pour me traversser, et me donner tous les degouts possible, ce 
qui m'auroit oblige de quitter tout-a-fait le service. 

" Ainssi, et en ami et en politique, rejouissez-vous avec moi, 
et pardonez moi la joie inexprimable que j'ai de rester dans ce 
pays que j'aime, on j'ai des amis parmi lesquels vous etes le 
premier." 

The Hereditary Prince of Orange to the Prince of Orange. 

1799, May 24. Berlin. — "Le depart du general de Stamford 
pour Petersbourg a fait grande sensation ici ; comme de raison. 
Je tiens a cet 6gard le language dont je suis convenu avec lui, et 
en ai meme parle de cette maniere a Haugwitz, qui m'a dit 
trouver tres-naturel que mon pere envoy e quelqu'un en Russie 
pour y veiller a ses interets dans des momens comme les 
pr^sens, et ou I'Empereur de Russie employe des moyens et 
avance des intentions pour le succes de la bonne cause. Du 
reste je suppose que Stamford vous aura fait savoir lui-meme les 
v^ritables motifs de ce voyage, et dans le public ici personne ne 
semble douter que le but ne soit d'employer les 45^000 Russes 



64 

qui doivent passer en Allemagne pour la delivrance de la 
Kepublique. Je lui ai fourni des cartes marines du Zuider Zee 
et des Waddens qu'il a prises avec lui pour pouvoir consulter sur 
cette matiere vaillant, et concerter les moyens d'une descente 
dans les provinces de Groningue et de Frise, si la chose entroit 
dans les plans des cours respectives. Je ne puis que me louer, 
par continuation, de la conduite de Mr. Grenville a mon egard, 
et je lui communique tons les renseignemens et informations que 
je recois, tant par rapport a la Belgique qu'aux Provinces-Unies. 
La confiance que Lord Grenville veut bien mettre en moi, d'apres 
ce que vous me marquez, ainsi que I'assentiment qu'il donne aux 
mesures prises et proposees me flatte beaucoup, et puisque mon 
pere y donne egalement son approbation, je continuerai a agir 
dans les memes vues et les memes principes. Je dois remarquer 
que si on travaille a etablir la communication avec I'Angleterre 
depuis la Belgique, il seroit interessant de savoir 1°, de quelle 
maniere les Anglois pourroient favoriser semblable entreprise ; 
2^* de combien de forces disjDonibles pourroit ensuite etre fait 
usage pour se maintenir, et aider a f aire prendre de la consistance 
au soulevement general." Extract. 

Intelligence Respecting Holland— /ro//; M. d'Yvoy. 

1799, May 25. Emmerick. — "En Hollande I'armement de 
I'escadre de chaloupes canonieres Russes y cause les plus vives 
allarmes. La crainte qu'il est destine pour les cotes du pays de 
Yevern, et la possibilite que la Russie y a envoye des troupes, a 
porte le Directoire a en envoyer beaucoup dans les provinces de 
Frise et de Groningue : plusieurs regimens, avec presque toute 
I'artillerie a cheval, sont partis pour la derniere; quelques autres, 
avec ce qu'ils ont de hussards, occupent les frontieres de la Frise. 
La requisition d^cretee n'etoit point encore publico hier. On 
I'attribue principalement a ce que le plan d 'organisation souffre 
beaucoup de contradictions. On presume qu'on mitigera la 
premiere idee en commencant par former un corps de volontaires, 
qui sera paye sur le pied des troupes de ligne, et devra etre 
toujours en activite et servir avec I'armee : que du reste, on 
formera des corps de bourgeoisie armee seulement pour servir 
dans les districts, et qui ne seront payes que quand des troubles 
interieurs exigeront leur service. Tons seront obliges de faire la 
promesse de fidelite a la constitution et de la reconnoitre ; ceux 
qui s'y refuseront, ne seront point amies, mais payeront le triple 
de la contribution de ceux qui I'age exclut de la conscription. 
On me mande que M. de Leeuw remplacera Van Hooff comme 
Directeur, et que le premier sera remplace dans la seconde 
chambre par un nomme Jonckheer, fameux Jacobin. 

" Ce qui suit est en cliiffre : — 

" D'abord a la reception de la lettre de Yotre Altesse, je me 
suis rendu a Munster pour m'aboucher avec M. de Tuyll, que je 
trouvai prevenu par la lettre de M. F[agel]. II sentoit parfaite 
ment la necessity de ne rien faire sans I'aveu et la connoissance du 
Prince Hereditaire, et je suis assure qu'il ne fera rien de son chef, 



65 

et qu'il n'agira que conform^ment aux intentions du Prince. 
Comme il n'avoit pas encore re9U la lettre de Monseigneur le 
Prince, et qu'on a des notions tres-imparfaites sur la situation en 
Flandre, il partira incessamment pour la, afin de s'assurer par 
lui-meme de tout ce qui concerne la position militaire, I'esprit 
public, et d'etablir une voye sure de correspondance, ce qui 
prendra tout au plus deux a trois semaines, et ne derangera en 
rien le plan qu'on pourroit trouver bon de suivre. J'attendrai ici 
le resultat des arrangemens pris, afin de pouvoir, en consequence, 
me concerter sur I'endroit le plus propre a favoriser et faciliter 
la correspondance, me trouvant ici dans un vrai foyer de tripotage, 
et d'un espionage pueril qui ne finit pas. Je m'occupe, en 
attendant, a preparer les voyes pour etre bien inform^, et ne 
negligerai surtout point I'article d'une communication directe." 
Extract. 



Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville. 



Private. 



1799, May 25. Cleveland Row. — " You will easily suppose by 
the feelings of your own mind those with which I received your 
letters to-day. My despatch will remove all difficulty which had 
been created by the variations of our wishes in the different 
prospects of Prussian politics. I trust very much to the 
Austrian successes for renewing the energy of this sleeping 
Cabinet (or interior Cabinet) at Berlin, and I feel a happiness that 
I cannot express to you, in being myself, as I am now, here in 
London to plan, and there at Berlin to execute. 

"It seemed very important to procure Woronzow's support of 
our plan, and I therefore urged him to write by this messenger to 
that effect. He begged me to put in writing what it was that we 
particularly urged in this moment, and I sent him the enclosed 
minute, which I will beg you (in order to save me the trouble of 
another letter to-night) to forward inai^rivate Z^^^^^??* to Whitworth, 
that he may know what it is that Woronzow writes, for I am con- 
fident his despatch will be conformable to my suggestion. I will 
not forget the letter from the P[rince] of Orange, but I could not 
have got it to-day, and I was not willing to delay this messenger. 
A Portuguese messenger goes on Tuesday, and I will send it by 
him. 

"Naval news we have as yet none of any importance. Captain 
Peard of the Success was chased by the French off Oporto on the 
1st. They were then, as he counted them, no more than nineteen 
sail of the line, and their list of twenty-five is said to be certainly 
false. Peard bore away immediately for Cadiz. Lord Keith was 
returned to his station, but we do not accurately know his 
numbers. If Lord St. Vpncent] is apprised in time he may 
have seventeen or eighteen, much more than enough to give an 
account of nineteen French. 

6802 E 



6(y 

'' Then there is a story that the French were seen again from 
Lisbon on the 9th, but I thinli that is entitled to Uttle credit. If 
it were true, Whitshed wathfive s[ail] of [the] l[ine] might join 
Lord St. V[incentJ before the French got there. He might very 
well be at Cadiz the 12th. 

"Lord Bridport has, we fear, been kept by the south-w^est winds 
on the west coast of Ireland, and consequently will not have been 
able to detach. But I see little or no room for uneasiness on this 
subject, and all the rest seems to go from good to better. 

"I have received a project which is said to have been shewn you, 
from the L[andgra]ve of Hesse Homberg. I think nothing can 
be made of it. Pray tell me what hope you think there is of 
Saxons, and what course one could in your opinion best pursue 
on that subject." Coj)!/. 



Enclosure, 

Note DeijIvered by Lord Grenville to Count Woronzow. 

''L'objet de I'exp^dition du courier de ce soir porte sur la pro- 
position que Ton avoit d^ja charge le Ch[evalier] Whitworth de 
faire, d'un corps de trouppes Busses pour etre employe a une 
descente sur les cotes maritimes des Provinces-Unies, et pour y 
retablir I'ancien gouvernement. 

"Quand on I'a cru impossible d'obtenir la cooperation de la 
Prusse, on a charge le Ch[evalier] Whitworth de porter sa 
demande au nombre de -10 ou 45,000 hommes. 

''Depuis est venue la proposition de Haugwitz pour fournir un 
corps de 60,000 Prussiens pour le meme objet. 

" J'ai alors ecrit a Whitworth de se borner a demander 20,000 
hommes pour 1' operation maritime, ce nombre etant evidemment 
sufitisant pour, avec cooperation Prussienne aidee aussi par celle 
que nous pourrions fournir, chasser les Fran9ois entierement des 
Provinces-Unies, et des Pais-Bas. 

'' Aujourd'hui nous avons encore quelques esp^rances vagues 
d'obtenir cette cooperation, mais, comme toutes ces decisions 
Prussiennes sont si incertaines, j'ecris a mon frere et a Whit- 
worth; au premier, de poursuivre toujours sa negotiation, s'il y a 
lieu de le faire, mais a Whitworth de traiter a Petersburg pour le 
meme nombre de 40 a 45 mille trouppes, dont nous nous 
chargerons de tous les fraix de transport, et qui nous 
donneront la certitude de delivrer la HoUande sans que cela 
depende d'une politique aussi vacillante qu'est celle de Berlin. 

"En tout cas il vautmieux avoir trop que trop peu de forces. 

" Je vous prierai done d'appuyer aupres de I'Empereur cette 
demande, a laquelle nous mettons tout I'interet que nous inspire 
naturellement la delivrance de la Holland e. 

" Vous excuserez la peu de precision de cette note, faite a la 
bate comme vous I'avez demande." Copy. 



67 

Earl Temple to Lord Grenville. 

1799, May 26. Wotton. — "With respect to your question as 
to the importance of the Lieutenancy to me in my future pros- 
pects, I need not say that certainly my ultimate object must be 
Buckinghamshire ; but as, thank God, that object is not only I 
hope and trust, but is in point of fact in all human probability, 
very very distant (and it cannot be more than I pray it may) it 
ceases being the objection to my holding tlie Hampshire Lieu- 
tenancy which it otherwise would. With respect to my residence, 
I have not the least difficulty in saying that my residence will be 
fully sufficient to enable me to fulfil the duties of the office, 
should his Majesty confer it on me. I am fully aware of the 
trouble and the importance which attend it, but if it is given me 
I shall take it with my eyes open, and with a full determination 
to resign it the moment I should find my situation such as, from 
non-residence or any other cause, might make a proper attention 
to the duties of it difficult. Under these circumstances I trust I 
shall not be thought too pressing in urging the accomplishment 
of an object which a great many circumstances, private feelings, 
and (entre nons) a little family pride make important to me. 

''"When I see you I shall wish to talk with you respecting the 
possibility (supposing the Lieutenancy given me) and the 
propriety of my retaining my Buckinghamshire commission. 
For every possible reason I should feel the greatest and most 
insurmountable objections to the idea of leaving the regiment in 
which I now am ; and as both the Hampshire regiments are 
full, I should suppose there would be no difficulty on that 
point." 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, May 27. Berlin.— "My opinion still is that w^e shall at 
last succeed in bringing the King to a declaration against France 
by a manifesto of summons to evacuate Holland ; and Haugwiz 
is grown so sanguine about his journey that he takes with him 
all that shall be necessary for this measure, in hopes of firing his 
manifesto from Wesel on the day of the King's arrival there ; you 
may easily imagine with how much impatience Count Panin and 
I shall be looking out of our windows on the Brunswick road 
towards the 4th of June, about the time that you will be dancing 
the first country dances at the ball of St. James's ; my imagina- 
tion does not carry me beyond the expectation of seeing Haugwiz 
return on that day to conclude the convention with us, to accept 
the ofter from Bussia, and to take immediate measures for 
collecting the army which is to act for the deliverance of Holland. 
I questioned our Prussian Minister very closely about his infor- 
mation respecting the French troops opposed to the present army 
of observation, and he assures me that there are not above 4,500 
men in Holland, about the same number in Mayence, and not 
more than 5,000 scattered about in bodies of 600 at Coblenz, 



68 

Ehrenbreitstein, Dusseldorff, Maestricht; so that in truth the 
Duke of Brunswick's army is unquestionably strong enough to 
march forward in the present moment, if the Landgrave of Hesse 
will only undertake, with the 18,000 now under arms at Cassel, to 
watch Mayence while the Prussian troops are collecting. The 
only check which 1 now fear is from the deplorable weakness or 
indecision of the Duke of Brunswick's character ; if he has the 
energy of a mouse in the present moment the thing is done, and 
I have not failed to put in his way the remark that if he does not 
now take his part and do the business, we shall do it by a Kussian 
General, and leave him with his doubts and his difficulties and his 
army of observation, to observe how easily eight or ten Eussian 
battalions will take possession of Holland while he is looking at 
it, and menace the Flemish frontier of France while he is trem- 
bling at the feeble garrison of Mayence. Yet the last letter which 
I saw of his writing described with satisfaction the new eagerness 
which he found in his army, and which he justly attributed to the 
spirit of emulation which the Austrian successes have inspired. 
I have sometimes been apprehensive that he would be reluctant 
to commit his military reputation to an army of numbers com- 
paratively small ; but on the other hand it must be remembered 
that he will have the sole command of that small army, whereas 
upon the large scale which had been proposed the King would 
have commanded, and would have brought with him the influence 
of General Keukel, Kocheritz, Zastrow, who would hold the 
Duke of Brunswick, and govern him through the authority of the 
King. I had once the idea of suggesting to Haugwiz the 
additional advantage of our immediately co-operating by a descent 
in Zeeland ; but as he has never required it, as the immediate 
difficulty might be increased by the uncertainty respecting the 
Brest fleet, and as I w^as sure that he w^ould generally be prompt 
enough in asking this, and all of you enough prepared to furnish 
it, I w^ould not add to the details of the first discussion, and 
have left it without any new remark. In truth I still retain 
too much doubt of our success with the King to build with any 
certain and secure hope on the journey in question, and you will 
have observed that I cannot bring myself to recommend the 
slackening of any of our new efforts, on account of the better 
appearance of the state of things here. Let us pursue our hopes 
here with all possible activity and energy, but let us not put con- 
fidence enough in them to sacrifice to our speculations here a 
single man whom we can employ with the certainty of success 
upon so important an object. Meantime it would almost amuse 
you to see how much Haugwiz and I have changed places in our 
conversations, how he triumphs over those doubts and hesitations 
with which he has inoculated me, and belabours me with all the 
zeal, ardour, and confidence which my friend Panin and I have 
hitherto unprofitably wasted upon him. I cannot better describe 
this to you than by repeating that he yesterday assured me that 
if the King would publish his manifesto next week at Wesel he, 
Haugwiz, would undertake to settle the arrangement of Holland 



69 

by going with 500 Hussars to the Hague, and peaceably making 
the new settlement of the country. Let us dream of this while 
we may, but let us nevertheless get our 20,000 Russians to march 
with while we can. 

"I presume that you will already have taken notice that 
it is in consequence of a direct order to Panin that he has 
offered to the King of Prussia tJie army which has of late 
appeared to menace the Prussian frontiers ; according to the 
terms of this offer the army in question would therefore be a 
voluntary addition of means furnished by the magnanimity of 
the Emperor, and so I have considered it, and so I have always 
spoken of it to Haugwitz and to Panin ; but when I recollect that the 
Emperor made a similar offer to Prussia six months ago, and yet 
that the corps thus offered was really the subsidiary corps paid by 
England, I am sometimes afraid that they will endeavour to recur 
to the same course in this instance at Petersburg, and that after 
the orders given to Whit worth from England to propose another 
engagement for 45,000 men, the Russian Cabinet may mean to 
conclude with Whitworth for them in case the King of Prussia 
should accept this offer, and then two great inconveniences would 
happen ; in the first place the Emperor would have the grace of 
an offer which we should have the pleasure of paying for ; in the 
next place we should be engaged in our convention here for 
60,000 men, and at the same time at Petersburg for 45,000 men 
more, which would unreasonably extend our expenses and 
engagements. Perhaps you will think that I am over-cautious 
and suspicious as to our friends and allies, but I confess I think 
any misunderstanding at Petersburg so great an evil that I can- 
not help recommending you to direct Whitworth at all events 
to conclude only for the 20,000 men which Stamford is gone to 
negotiate for ; in that case, supposing our convention here to 
fail, you will have a surplus of your original sum, which will 
be applicable to the unavoidable expenses of Holland and of 
Flanders with which the Russian expedition there must be 
supported ; but if no previous explanation be had upon this 
matter, it may happen either that you may be loaded with a very 
heavy expense, or engaged in a misunderstanding by refusing 
yourself to it after that they shall have reckoned upon it. 

"We have lost our French Minister, and I very much regret 
his departure, for both in conduct and in character here he was 
all that we could desire the Minister of the great nation to be ; 
another ground for regretting his loss is one of which you are 
likely to feel the inconvenience ; he is considered as entertaining 
the opinion that France should stand upon the defence of its 
limits and offer peace to Europe, and his desire at all times for 
peace is said to be built upon the persuasion that peace would 
consolidate the power of the French Republic, an opinion on 
which he has so fundamentally differed with the ex-Director 
Rewbell ; it seems, however, doubtful whether he will prevail in 
recommending this conduct, and if he does I still conceive that 
his description of limits would still point to the Rhine, and I 



70 

cannot but hope that before any such negotiation can arise, the 
Rhine may again have found some of its old acquaintances upon 
its banks. 

"We have to-day uncertain rumours of movement in the 
Austrian army of the Archduke, and our poUticians speculate 
upon the probable evacuation of Swisserland by the French 
troops now that Luciensteig is taken and General Raim is in the 
Valois ; the last news from Vienna of the 18th instant describes 
Moreau to be encamped near Alexandria with 17,000 men ; of 
the Neapolitan army I know nothing, but presume that the King 
is returned to his capital." 



Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville. 

1799, May 27. Cleveland Row.— " There is I believe no 
messenger's place now vacant, or if it is, my turn is not come 
round. Dietry has I fear no chance, there being hardly an 
acquaintance I have in the world, or a peer who votes with 
Government in the House of Lords, that has not a valet de 
chamhvc who ' has travelled and would make the best possible 
messenger,' 

"Either Pelham or Lord Minto will go to Vienna; you know 
them both so much better than I do that I regret never having 
asked your opinion as between them. But I had another project 
which has failed. 

"Who is Mr. Diemar? His information seems w^orth attending 
to. 

' ' I received a few days ago a letter from you through Crauf urd 

and respecting Crauf urd' s nephew. I had 

immediately on your going answered the father (I believe) of the 
young man (Craufurd of the Pay Office) by stating, what is the 
real truth, that my engagements leave me very little prospect of 
being able to bring him into the Office in any reasonable time, 
and that I would by no means advise him to sacrifice other pros- 
pects or vieAYS of any kind for one so remote and uncertain; 
almost all the clerks in the Office now being quite young men, 
and I myself being already under some engagements for 
vacancies. 

" We shall be, as always happens, later wdth our transports than 
we had talked of ; the plan of gallies would certainly be much the 
best, if no fresh difficulties are found in it. 

"Did you mention to Stamford before he went what I said to 
you in my despatch about cavalry? I see it was omitted to be 
mentioned by me to Whitw^orth, but I hope you supplied the 
deficiency ; if not, Stamford probably will, and, at all events, this 
despatch may be in time to do it. 

" No news of the fleets. 

" I believe I have not mentioned to you that Woronzow stays, 
and that Kotschouby is to direct the whole machine at present. 



71 

I fear lie has not weight enough with the Emperor to prevent 
many extravagancies from being committed which will, in the 
course of time, much embarrass us." Copy. 



Lord Grenville to Sir Charles Whitworth. 

1799, May 28. Downing Street. — **In answer to your private 
letter of the 30th April, I can at present only say that I should 
hope his Majesty would not be disinclined graciously to comply 
with your request in appointing you one of his Privy Council ; 
but that appointment is no otherwise made than by calling the 
person appointed into the council, and there administering to 
him the usual oaths. This mark of his Majesty's favour towards 
you must, inevitably, be deferred until your return to England." 
Copy 



Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, May 28. Berlin.— " As it is doubtful whether I shall 
have any communication this day or two which is worth the 
journey of a messenger, I write a few lines by this night's post 
to acknowledge the receipt this morning of your despatches 22 
and 23, with your private letter, as also your private letter by 
Mr. Casamajor of the 10th instant. By intelligence from Paris 
of the best source I am told that the object of the French fleet is 
to unite with that of Cadiz, to proceed to Toulon in order to 
embark troops there, and then to act successively upon Minorca, 
Naples and Sicily. My letter from Sir M. Eden of the 22nd 
instant encloses official accounts which I transmit to you of the 
success of the Austrians at Luciensteig, Coire, Sargans, ; he 
also mentions a messenger having passed through Vienna with 
despatches to Lord Nelson acquainting him with the sailing of 
the Brest fleet ; he further informs me that Ruff the messenger 
had arrived with the despatches of which he was the bearer, and 
that the Austrian Minister had very cheerfully acquiesced in that 
employment of the troops which was proposed in these despatches 
from you. 

" I presume that you will have had official despatches with these 
accounts more detailed, and it is only ex ahnndanti that I 
indulge my cautious temper in sending them likewise by Berlin 
post. 

"I shall write by Mr. Casamajor to Petersburg in the same sense 
with that of my last despatch to you, Number 32. The numbers 
which I mention in that despatch become the more necessary 
to be repeated in consequence of the letter from Sir Charles Whit- 
worth of [the] 14th instant under flying seal, which is forwarded 
by this post." 

Postscript. ' ' We have accounts arrived here of the occupation 
of Genoa by the Russian and Austrian troops, and of a defeat of 



72 

the advanced guard of Macdonald's army ; these accounts come 
from Nuremberg and appear probable, though they are hitherto 
imperfectly related. I doubt a little of the good policy of the 
measure which you announce in your No. 22, though I suppose 
that you may have reasons for it which I do not understand. I 
will write about it by my next messenger." 



Count Woronzow to Lord Grenyille. 

1799, May 30. Harley Street. — '' Circello vient de me montrer 
un billet qu'il a re9u de mylord Spencer, qui lui annonce que les 
Fran9ais ont evacue Naples. II ne se possede pas de joie et je 
partage celle qu'il rescut. Voila done un souverain legitime que 
vous avez eu la gloire de reintegrer dans ses etats. II faut 
esperer que nous aurons enssemble la satisfaction d'aprendre que 
la meme chose arivera au Roi de Serdaigne, et que I'Etats de 
FEglise, quoique sans Pape, retournera sous la domination du 
Sacre col^ge, et qu'aucune parcelle de ces 6tats, ainssi que du 
Piemont, ne seroit pas demembres pour satisfaire I'apetit 
devorent et inssaciable de I'Autriche." 



The Earl of Elgin to Lord Grenville. 

1799, May 30. Ipswich. — "I left London on Friday on a visit 
to some of Lady Elgin's family, and intended returning early this 
week, but she has, most unfortunately, been seized with a violent 
indisposition which, though somewhat abated, is not yet sufficiently 
so for me to think of leaving her without an absolute necessity. 
This delay induces me to use the present mode of requesting your 
Lordship to be so obliging as to determine and notify the allow- 
ances attached to my mission, and the date at which they 
commence. The arrangement rests entirely with you ; I never 
did propose, nor do I wish to propose, anything on the subject. 
But I hope that the nature of my embassy ; the assistance it is 
to hold out at my expense for researches of various kinds ; the 
number of English officers, naval as well as military, who will 
naturally make my house their home ; and the aid and support 
(always leading to much expense) which some Foreign Ministers 
in London assure me their Governments expect from the English 
mission at Constantinople ; these considerations, while they have 
guided me in the extent of my preparations, induce me to hope 
your Lordship will put the embassy in point of appointments, as 
well as in dignity, on the footing of an extraordinary one. I 
know that the appointments are in a regular course of payment 
from which there is no deviation. But you may probably be 
able to direct the allowances made on fitting out to be paid 
immediately ; and it really is a matter of very great consequence 
to me, since my outlay on objects quite indispensable for me has 
been enormous, and ought to be paid before! sail. Some steps 



73 

having been announced to me as being taken at the Chamberlain's 
office for my plate, I applied while in London for the allowance 
in money, as I was obliged to collect the quantity required on 
such an occasion from different quarters, there not being time for 
my having a full set made at present. But it seems I cannot 
have this allowance for a twelvemonth, and having positively 
purchased the plate, this delay would be a material inconveni- 
ence. 

" I am extremely sorry to have to trouble your Lordship so 
very much, but in fact I am anxious to be ready to sail as soon 
as the navigation is secure ; and I foresee no delay whatever on 
my part but from these arrangements, on which I consequently 
feel very desirous of knowing your decision and having your 
assistance." 



William Wickham to Lord Grenville. 

1799, May 31. Duke Street. — " The enclosed paper seems to 
me to contain all the material points upon which it is necessary 
that I should Ije instructed. 

" I do not think that there can be any objection to preparing 
the King's letter even in the present state of Switzerland, the 
Government of which may fairly be considered by his Majesty as 
suspended only ; particularly if the letters were to begin in this 
manner, ' Not doubting but that it shall have pleased God to 
have restored you to the full exercise of your sovereignty and 
the enjoyment of your liberties before our Minister shall reach 
you.' 

" If your Lordship approves of this idea, I will procure a copy 
of the usual letter and submit it to you with such alterations as 
the occasion may seem to require, ki all events the letter to 
the Grisons may now be prepared immediately ; and, supposing 
I should find Switzerland still occupied by the enemy, I should 
strongly recommend, myself, an immediate assembly of the 
magistrates either in the Grisons, or, what would be still better, 
on the territory of SchafThausen, the whole of which canton, 
about five square miles excepted, is occupied by the Austrians ; 
and surely the Austrian bayonet is as capable of rendering an 
Assembly legal at Schaffhausen as the french cannon at 
Lucerne. 

" At all events I feel it most important that I should set out as 
soon as possible, and I know of nothing that can detain me 
beyond the Birthday. I presume that it will not be necessary or 
even advisable for me to kiss hands, even though it is your Lord- 
ship's opinion and intention that I should have a regular com- 
mission. 

" Your Lordship will, I trust, direct a letter to be written to the 
Admiralty to desire that I may be taken over in a ship of war. 

" I have a private letter this morning from Lord Castlereagh, 
who tells me that the country has more the appearance of being 
settled now than it has had for these last two years. 



74 

" I will call in the course of the morning to receive your Lord- 
ship's command. The Irish Debentures are at 81, an increase 
in the revenue in the year ending 25th March of 500,000/., a full 
fourth of the entire amount ; and this notwithstanding the 
rebellion." 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, May 31. Berlin. — '' You will see that I have sent you 
the scold w^hich I menaced you with for moving your gun-boats 
to the coast of Norway instead of leaving them to control the 
many supplies which had been used to pass both to the French- 
Dutch through the Waddens and to the French-Irish by the 
activity of Napper Tandy's Privy Council at Hamburgh ; the 
trading from that place to Holland has been so extensive and so 
undisguised that I do assure you Haugwiz had been entirely 
persuaded that we were all parties to it in England, and w^hen 
our little flotilla arrived and gave some check to it, he desired me 
to explain to him why we had altered our system in disturbing 
an intercourse which he presumed we had thought profitable to 
ourselves, from our having so long tolerated it without interrup- 
tion ; if Lord Hawkesbury and you are really such determined 
traders as Haugwiz appears to think you, my remonstrances will 
not be well received by you and him ; but as I feel pretty confi- 
dent that this cannot be the case, I have thought no time should 
be lost iii writing to you formally upon it, and I have said some- 
thing to Lord Spencer upon the same subject. When I sent you 
an account of the Emperor of Eussia's c/racious and conditional 
forgiveness of the city of Hamburgh, I felt a little too English to 
be perfectly satisfied with the prospect of our owing Napper 
Tandy and the satisfaction which we required about him to the 
interference of our friends at Petersburg ; and, with every acknow- 
ledgment to the kindness of their motives, it appears to me that 
this point is one peculiarly of national dignity, and therefore one 
which should not invite on our side any, even friendly powers, as 
parties to it ; I am making this observation only as a ground on 
which to express my hope that you will not direct Crawford or 
Whitworth to pursue this object in Russian partnership. I do 
not apprehend that it will soon come to issue, as it has been 
referred to H[is] P[russian] M[ajesty] and to the Duke of 
Brunswick as co-directors ; and besides the usual laudable delays 
of such discussions, I flatter myself that on this day those great 
personages are employed in discussions of a more important and 
interesting nature. Yet as long as Cuxhaven continues to be 
our only point of contact with the Continent, it is in all its 
relations both of commerce and of ordinary communication a 
subject that requires very close attention from us ; I 
wish I was satisfied with the attention and intelligence of all 
that you employ in that quarter, or that I could put you into 



75 

a better course than that which exists ; you will have seen, by the 
different detached observations which in many letters I have 
made to you on these subjects, that I have a restless desire to see 
all the business of our port of Cuxhaven pursued with activity 
and intelligence ; I do not by this mean any particular reproach 
to Mr. Harward, of whom I know nothing, but I cannot help 
expressing some desire that our general superintendence of this 
great English bridge was watched from home with all the atten- 
tion whieh it deserves, and was not so much abandoned to the 
ordinary course of common packet-boat agency. If all goes well 
I trust we may soon expect a better road through Flushing, 
Helvoet, and Amsterdam ; but while Cuxhaven is our only stepp- 
ing-stone, it is in importance worthy of very active and efficient 
control, and you would find the advantage of making Harward, or 
somebody at least, supply that to you. 

"I delight in your confederate inscription, which I think, without 
flattery to either of you, is uncommonly good ; my only criticism 
upon it is that it is a little too much prolonged, and therefore, in 
defiance of your parental feelings, I send you back your child with 
some of his fingers and toes cut off, and I own ' I like him the 
better therefore.' Voluntarii milites with nltro oferentes is a 
pleonasm. The Lavs and Fama is, I think, of too ordinary a 
style for so distinguished a composition, and ohmutescat is not to 
my fancy. I cannot help thinking that after telling the story of 
the Dead the comment of praise should be made by the reader. I 
suppose you will both of you think my erasures very impertinent, 
and that you will probably add a line or two to the original in order 
to convince me how mistaken I was in thinking that there was a 
word too much ; yet you will observe that I have the modesty to 
add nothing but one little word, which I do not entirely protect, 
though I think the sense of it is wanted, for without it nobody 
knows where they died ; ihi should therefore be somehow found, 
though close to iidem there is what Johnson would have called a 
cacophony of iiii. I think I should upon the whole prefer ihi 
etiam exceptiiri. Tpsd in mortc invxcti seems to stand better 
after occuhuerunt. I should not criticise much if I did not 
greatly admire. I thought I had concluded, but I must come 
back from Latin to English. 

** I have heard here at various times, since your intention has 
been known concerning Mr. Paget, objections and difficulties 
stated which, though coming from leading persons here, I did not 
think it necessary to trouble you about, more especially as I have 
not the smallest personal knowledge of him ; but I have grown 
more uneasy about this subject since I have seen the strong 
impression which Panin has received upon it, and the serious 
anxiety which he expresses to me about it. I do not know how 
far this impression is in fact justified, but it is a matter of serious 
consideration that at so important a time any man should be sent 
here as English Minister against whom there is an unfavourable 
prepossession, which will stand very much both in his way and in 
the way of his Court. I have therefore, though with reluctance, 



76 

determined to mention the matter privately to you in order that 
you may give to it suoh consideration as you think fit. The 
objections which are made to him are stated to be a supposed want 
of knowledge of business and a want of attention to it, together 
with a violent and headstrong temper, and an affectation of 
hrusquerie in his manners and conduct. The persons who 
are quoted to me for dwelling much upon these objections 
are Haugwiz and Gotz and Panin ; to me Haugwiz has 
said nothing except now and then a remark upon 
Paget's youth and indiscretion; but Gotz, who is well 
considered here and was Minister at Petersburg, has strongly 
urged Panin for his own sake to endeavour, if possible, to procure 
any other appointment here ; and I cannot fairly conceal from 
you that Panin's prepossessions are so strong upon this matter 
as to leave me very little hope that it will be possible for them to 
have that communication and friendly intercourse which, in these 
times, appears to be so desirable between the Russian and 
English Minister at Berlin. I do assure you that I have long 
hesitated to say anything to you which might step across the 
fortunes of a young man who is entirely unknown to me ; but with 
all that I hear and fear upon it, I should not treat you with 
proper confidence if I did not advise you to pause upon it, and if 
[I] did not acquaint you with what I have heard of the impression 
made by his supposed appointment here. Would it not be 
worth while to consider whether you might not take this 
opportunity of endeavouring to bring into the line of foreign 
mission some higher rank both of talents and of general situation 
than the present course of succession in the line will afford to you ; 
and would it not be a very considerable advantage to the whole 
of your foreign establishment if, by mixing in it a few persons of 
rather higher calibre, you could add both to the general estima- 
tion of the foreign line, and by increasing the desire to belong to 
it, you could add to the number of candidates from amongst 
whom you would have to choose. I cannot help thinking that, if 
you read the Peers and Commoners in the Red Book, you will 
easily find some of those names which we have more than once 
talked over ; and the natural vacancy which I am now daily 
expecting to make for you at Berlin, in the conclusion of my 
business here, will give a fair opportunity for your introducing at 
once here some new man of talents, character, and rank enough 
to help you in his mission, instead of being helped by his pro- 
motion here at some cost both of anxiety to you and of insufficiency 
for the public business. — D'lxi. — You will not be sorry that I have 
arrived at the last period of my diplomatic sermon." 

Private, 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

1799, June 3. Berlin. — " You will see by my public letter 
that, in the uncertainty whether the Emperor will not still delay 
your new engagement till he hears from Berlin, and doubting 



77 

whether his new offer to Berlin will admit of such extensive 
supply to you likewise, I have done what I could to lead them at 
Petersburg to adopt at least the measure of the 20,000 troops for 
Frieseland and Groningen. Nothing would give me greater 
pleasure than I shall feel in the knowledge of this embarkation 
having entered the Eyder, though you do not tell me what hopes 
you have of that important passage being secured for us. Stam- 
ford's journey, and the obvious speculations arising besides from 
the general state of things, have created a good deal of discourse 
in the public upon measures of this description, and you will see 
by the Dutch correspondence that the enemy begins to move a 
little in that quarter. I have not, however, any apprehensions 
on that account, though certainly it furnishes a new reason for 
the greatest diligence and activity on our part. There is still a 
little confusion in the correspondence from Petersburg, though 
none that I think very essential ; the force which Panin was 
directed to offer was no specified number, but was described to 
be the army on the confines of Prussia ; yet Whitworth's letters 
speak of the same offer as ])eing a specific offer of 45,000 men. 
Whitworth's letter expressly renounces on the part of the 
Emperor all further English subsidy while there is any hope of 
Prussia receiving it, and therefore I think myself justified in 
presuming that the Eussian offer to Berlin is at the Emperor's 
cost, and has no reference to future English subsidy. Panin has 
no distinct orders upon this, and was at first inclined to think 
that the new offer from Russia to Berlin was grounded upon 
hopes of English subsidy and would depend upon it ; but I think 
I have quite converted him by Whitworth's last letter, as I 
shewed to him that the Emperor expressly took credit for the 
generosity of his declining English subsidy in the moment when 
he was offering his new proposal of military aid to Prussia. I do 
not fear the result of any embarrassment on these questions, 
because 1 see that you are prepared in England to subsidise, if 
necessary, both the 60,000 Prussians and the second corps of 
45,000 Russians ; but I have not told Panin of this determination, 
because it would be desirable, if possible, to save you that 
expense. My speculation therefore is as follows. I think it not 
improbable that Haugwiz will return in a day or two, and offer 
to conclude for Prussian hostility as soon as the troops can be 
collected, provided we sign our convention for 60,000 men, and 
that Russia makes good the Emperor's last offer of 45,000 men 
to act upon the left of the Prussian army. Upon these terms, if 
the King consents, we shall be probably able to conclude ; if we 
do, the 20,000 Russian troops will, I hope, still pursue the same 
plan of expedition, because by doing so they will both enable the 
Prussians to act more vigorously towards Flanders, and besides 
that, there will, I think, be an advantage in our having in the 
United Provinces Russian force enough to make us independent 
of Prussian co-operation, although I would not have that Russian 
force large enough there to put any bad thoughts into the head 
of Paul. Supposing, however, our treaty with Haugwiz to take 



78 

this turn, Panin is inclined to propose his concluding a separate 
treaty with Prussia for the 45,000 men, and my concluding 
separately with Prussia for the 60,000 men, and then an act of 
mutual accession to these treaties ; perhaps this would be the 
clearest course to pursue, but I am not quite sure that the same 
impression of general concert would be produced in this shape, 
and I shall expect that Haugwiz will not be inclined to part with 
the security of Great Britain being connected immediately 
in the Prussian treaty with Eussia, but for this we must 
be governed by what shall appear to be the most quickly 
practicable ; the fault of the times is that every where but 
in England the whole world is fast asleep. Perhaps we 
shall fail at last in rousing the Prussian eagle at Minden, 
but even then we shall still be marching with our 20,000 
Kussians ; and I delight in my spirited old general's insisting 
that more than 20,000 would embarass the cause and the 
country more than they would assist it. 

" With respect to Saxony I do not see what can be done 
there until this Prussian question is determined ; if it ends 
favourably, Saxony will naturally drop into that system ; if 
we continue to slumber here, that cannot be longer than 
until our Kussians are in Holland, for if that event does 
not wake them their sleep is eternal. I know no separate 
way of influencing Saxony but by the old project which I 
used to plague you with of Kussian march. What are you 
doing with Fagel and your old Stadtholder ? my young one 
seems to do well." 



W. Pitt to Lord Grenville. 

1799, June 3. [Holwood.] — '* I hope you will persist in 
the idea of discouraging absolutely all detachment from the 
45,000 Kussians destined to Switzerland ; and of concluding a 
treaty for 20,000 to be employed on the side of Holland. If 
more can be had, and General Stamforth is right in supposing 
more not wanted in that quarter, we can find other purposes to 
apply them to, and I am most inclined to think Prussia will have 
adopted very soon such a line, as will leave no objection at 
Petersburgh to parting with a larger part of their force. The 
great points certainly are, to keep unimpaired the force for 
Switzerland, and to ensure what is necessary for Holland ; but 
it seems very desirable to keep up the idea of our subsidising as 
many more as Kussia can spare, to be employed wherever it can 
be done to most advantage." 



Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville. 

1799, June 3. Cleveland Kow. — " If we cannot have forty, and 
if Stamford undertakes that twenty shall do, to be sure we must 



79 

take them if we can get them. But I cannot think we should do 
well to retard the march of any part of the first forty-five, with a 
view to this object. If I have learnt anything by the disagree- 
able lessons of this war it is that success in military operations 
wholly depends on acting en masse on one or two chosen points, 
and in avoiding to distract your force by multiplying your objects 
of attack. 

" If my whole forty-five were at this hour in Swisserland I am 
confident there would not be a man too many there ; and if 
either by any waverings in our decision, or by any effect of the 
cursed crooked policy of my friends at Vienna, the force in that 
quarter is diminished before the object is completely obtained, 
the whole game will be thrown back again, and then our twenty 
in Holland will only be food for frogs. I never felt so confident 
in my life on any one point as I do that the success of the whole 
and every part of this war depends on pushing the campaign 
with vigour in Swisserland, and this can only be done by the 
arrival of a new army there, for you see how a first army wastes 
itself away even by its own successes. 

"Another and no inconsiderable advantage is that these 
Kussians will now, by the course which events have taken, be 
more or less under Suwarow's orders, which they could not be if 
any other destination was assigned to them. 

" Let Stamford therefore limit the new force to twenty thousand 
men if he will, but I cannot spare him a man of the others, and 
had rather undertake the reconquest of Holland from hence, with 
militia regiments, unpromising and difficult as that project 
would be. 

' * I have taken your hint about the messengers, and you will 
receive an official despatch on the subject. 

"You will think we have on the whole no reason to be dissatis- 
fied with the naval news, though, to be sure, one had rather have 
beat them. I suppose you will hear the details from Lord Spencer, 
but as I know it is not very kind to one's friends at a distance to 
act on that sort of supposition, I will just mention that Lord 
Keith with fourteen or fifteen was a day and a half between the 
two fleets ; the French fleet had the wind of him though they have 
published that they were manoeuvring to get it. The Spaniards 
(nineteen sail of line) were in movement in their port, but did 
not come out of it. The junction was evidently the object the 
French had in view. The storm or gale of wind dispersed them, 
and probably drove them into the Mediterranean. They passed 
the Streights the 4th or 5th and Lord Keith four or five days 
after them. Lord St. Vincent's intention was to collect the whole 
at Minorca. He would have there nineteen or twenty sail, and 
Whitshed with five more was off Lisbon the 16th, and would 
therefore join him a few days after. This is much more than 
enough to block Toulon, and I hope therefore he will not have 
interrupted the services of Sicily, Malta, and Alexandria. But 
he did not know at first of Whitshed being sent, and it is there- 
fore to be feared that he may in his first anxiety have despatched 
orders to collect his whole force, 



80 

" Lord Bridport has received, and probably has by this time 
executed orders to detach Gardner with seventeen sail of line to 
reinforce Lord St. V [incent] . These I presume will continue 
the blockade of Cadiz. In the meantime it is reported that the 
Spaniards have sent out seven sail of line from Cadiz, probably 
to the Havanna. If so they have gained some, though a very 
inconsiderable advantage from this move, by which France has, 
at a great expense of men and money, contrived to place us in a 
much better and more secure position than we were before, both 
with respect to the facility of naval operations, and also with a 
view to the most important point of all to us, which of course is 
that of Ireland. 

" There is not the least ground to fear that any mischief can 
arise from their being five dsiys before us in the Mediterranean. 
They had got into Toulon and were repairing and refitting there 
— operations which in any state of that port, but much more 
now, would take them some time. 

" Smith writes me word not to believe the Constantinople news 
of success against Bonaparte. If Hamilton and Lord Nelson's 
opinions are to be relied on, the King of Naples must long before 
this be returned there ; but they are. both sanguine, or rather the 
latter is so, and the other takes any impression that is given 
him. 

"Pelham has refused Vienna, and Lord Minto will be sent, but 
I have not yet spoken to him. Wickham returns for a few 
months to Swisserland, where his assistance will indeed be invalu- 
able to me. He can ill be spared here, but ©ur Jacobins are 
brought so low that we can leave them for a few months with less 
attentive watching. 

" The Emperor of Eussia will oblige us to have our Irishmen, 
whom I could have been content to leave in prison where they 
are. If they are sent to us they must be hanged, and God knows 
they will deserve it. 

" I leave this open till to-morrow, though I suppose the 
pleasures of Court dinner and ball will leave me little time to 
add to it. I have seen Mahony and have recommended him to 
Almeida. You forgot to recommend him to me, or I have forgot 
that you did so ; but Lord Spencer did, and that answered the 
same purpose." Copy. 



CoMMODOEE Sir W. Sidney Smith to Brigadier- 
General KOEHLER. 

1799, June 4. Acre. — ''I have to acknowledge the receipt of 
your several letters of the 3rd, 9th, 12th, 23rd, 24th and 26th 
April, which I find accumulated here on my return from a 
successful cruise between Jaffa and Damietta to pick up the 
wreck of Bonaparte's retreating army, and cut off his supplies 
meeting him. 



81 

"It is needless to say I entirely approve of your obvious plan 
of campaign, as you see I have successfully executed a principal 
part of it, and the execution of the rest is easy, as I have success- 
fully sown discontent and insubordination in the French army 
by the distribution of the proclamation of the Porte among 
them from high to low, so that a more disorderly army never 
was seen under arms. Our success will now depend entirely on 
the early assembly of the forces destined to act against them in 
Egypt. I have sent positive orders to those committed to 
my direction to come forward without waiting for each other, 
that we may profit by the distress of the enemy before they 
recover after the passage of the desert. I have sent a copy 
of these orders to my brother, who will no doubt communicate 
them to you; and shall transmit this letter by another con- 
veyance, in order to multiply the chance of your being early 
informed of my present movements. I need not tell you how 
much I long for your presence on the scene of action, where your 
peculiar talent would much shorten the business. I have 
hitherto endeavoured to profit by the lessons in the art of land 
operations which your instructive conversation has frequently 
given me, and with such success as to make me thankful to 
you. The Nile will be of course the high road by which the army 
must be supplied as it advances in Egypt, and from which it 
never can separate far. I am taking measures to have a respect- 
able flotilla on the coast ready to enter the river when its banks 
are sufficiently protected by the advancing army ; thus each will 
mutually support each other as at Acre, and Bonaparte has seen 
that such a combination is an over match for him. 

"Major Faed's arrival enables us to begin putting Acre in 
such a state of defence as will allow of its garrison moving on. 
The Pasha is too overjoyed at the arrival of an additional 
Englishman for it to be possible for me to announce, in the same 
breath when I present him, that you require his immediate 
return. 

"As to the Charon, I can only say that I have been most 
anxiously waiting for the supplies of ammunition she contains, 
which, I need not say, were much more wanted in the presence of 
the enemy than anywhere elee. I considered myself as 
authorised to order her to join me, not knowing she contained 
anything besides what I had pointed out at Woolwich for the 
equipment of the flotilla ; in which idea I was confirmed by 
General Kosse's letter of the 17th November, of which I enclose 
you a copy, to prove to you that I did not act unadvisedly in the 
business. I have now only to tell you that I am obliged to beg 
and borrow powder of the Turks, after having spared them mine 
in action, to ensure your not detaining the Charon from joining- 
me at Aboukir." Copy. 

The Maequis of Buckingham to Lokd Grenvillb. 

1799, June 5. Stowe. — " The newspaper of Tuesday, which I 
received this morning, explains to me what I had not understood 



before, namely, your expectation of seeing me in town on Monday, 
of which I never had the smallest idea ; but having seen the 
account of what passed in the House of Lords with respect to 
Lord Berkeley's marriage, it was natural for you to expect to see 
me there. Perhaps you will be surprised when I tell you that I 
never had heard of his intention to bring that matter forward ; 
and that the information which I got this morning at ten o'clock 
was the first I received that it either had, or was to be discussed ; 
and I have been very seriously distressed as to my line of conduct, 
A very confidential communication respecting his connexion with 
Miss Tudor, or rather with respect to her children then born, 
had been made by Lord Berkeley to me some years since ; and 
that communication was, at his desire, made by me to his brother 
and Mrs. Berkeley. His brother considers that communication as 
very material on the question ; for, the last time I saw him, namely 
in May, 1798, he recalled it to my recollection and discussed it 
with me, repeating the inference which we both drew from it at 
the time. I can, between the two brothers, have no choice or 
object but that of justice. I do not even guess whether George 
Berkeley means to take any part, either now or hereafter, upon 
this question ; but I should rather imagine that he does. I can- 
not write to Lord Berkeley upon this subject without committing 
his brother's name, which I have no authority to do, and which 
perhaps might make ill blood between them ; and I am very 
doubtful how far I ought to volunteer on this occassion the dis- 
closure of communications which were strictly confidential, and 
which I have never mentioned save to his sister Lady Berkeley, 
with whom Lord Berkeley has, at very many times, conversed very 
confidentially upon this matter. At the same time I feel that 
George Berkeley has a right to my evidence, and to that of my 
wife ; and so has Lord Berkeley. The latter has not called 
for it, but I should think it highly probable that his brother 
would. Under these circumstances I should myself move in the 
House of Lords to postpone any resolution till after the return 
of Admiral Berkeley, if (as I said before) such a step did not seem 
likely to give his brother umbrage as with respect to him, from 
a jealousy that it was done in concert with him ; and for the 
same reasons I do not choose to write to Lord Bathurst or the 
Duke of Richmond. But, having the highest confidence in Lord 
Loughborough's private honour, as well as his great discretion 
upon these most unpleasant family discussions, I wish you to 
communicate this letter to him in strict confidence, for no one 
save Lady Buckingham will know that I have written it, with my 
earnest request that he would find means of putting oft* (upon 
points of order) any final or conclusive resolution till George 
Berkeley has the means of personally judging for himself what it 
befits him to do, as with respect to the question itself, or with 
respect to my evidence and that of Lady Buckingham upon it. 
And I will beg you very particularly to keep this letter entirely 
private from everyone save Lord Chancellor. I have long seen 
this very unpleasant storm gathering, and am reri/ very sorry for 
it. 



83 
The Hereditary Prince of Orange to the Prince of Orange. 

1779, June 7. Berlin. — ''Au lieu de revenir ici avant-hier, 
comme Haugwitz I'avoit annonce, il accompagna le Roi a Cassel 
et ne sera que le 14 de retour a Berlin. D'apres ce qu'il a dit a 
son depart, on devroit juger que c'est un bon signe ; du moins 
etoit-il d'avis qu'on devoit le regarder comme tel. II n'a pas 
ecrit ni a Mr. Grenville ni au Comte Panin, mais il a donn6 de ses 
nouvelles au Comte de Ginck, et celui-ci a dit hier au Panin, avec 
sa circonspection ordinaire, que Haugwitz paroissoit content de 
son voyage et du Due de Brunswic ; ainsi c'est un motif de jdIus 
d'esperer. On pent d'ailleurs compter que si le Landgrave de 
Hesse est consulte, ce qui semble etre I'intention, il travaillera 
et conseillera tout a fait dans le bon sens ; et pour lors les lettres 
de I'Empereur de Eussie, qui en a ecrit a ces deux Princes, comme 
j'en rendis compte dernierement par rapport au dernier, pourront 
faire encore leur effet. II n'y a, en attendant, rien a faire de 
notre cdt6 que d'avoir patience encore une dixaine de jours, et 
meme, d'apres I'avis deMr. Grenville, je fais rester Tuyll ici, qui 
est venu prendre des instructions avant de partir pour la 
Flandre, et qui etoit porteur de tres-longues lettres d'lvoy, qui 
a 6tabli une communication avec Ruys et Michiels, et par lequel 
canal nous avons appris que le Due de Brunswic cherche a avoir 
des renseignemens sur les Pays-bas." Extract. 



Intelligence Respecting Holland, from M. cVYvoy. 

1799, June 8. Emerick. — '* En Hollande les d^faites des 
Francais influent sur les meneurs : tout annonce confusion, et 
abattement. On travaille sans plan a remettre I'Yssel en etat de 
defense, tandis que d'autres ouvrages annoncent I'incertitude 
centre qui ils devront servir. On s'attend a voir arriver le 21 du 
courant la colonne Russe destinee pour la Baviere. Un corps 
nombreux des memos troupes se trouve rassemble sur les frontiers 
du cote de la Prusse-meridionale, et le bruit se soutient toujours 
que quelques milliers d'hommes de la meme nation seront sous peu 
debarques dans le Holstein. On voit clairement que les meneurs 
en Hollande prevoient le terme de leur domination s'avancer a 
grands pas, qu'ils se doutent de quelque dessein des puissances, 
mais ne savent de quel cote cela viendra. Dela la confusion de 
tous leurs plans et la nullite de tons leurs travaux. La 
requisition, loin d'etre pousse avec vigueur, trouve les plus 
grandes entraves, sugger^es par les Directeurs meme. Le 
nombre de Francois, diminue a vue d'oeil, et I'exportation libre 
de tous effets mobiliers, d6fendue depuis 9 ans, decretee 
aujourd'hui, n'est que pour faciliter la retraite de ceux qui 
sentent ne pouvoir attendre le denouement." 

Ce qui suit etoit en chifre. 

*' Depuis que je me trouve dans ces quartiersj'aieu occasion de 



84 

m'entretenir avec plusieurs Beiges Emigres, qui ci-devant 6toient 
membres du Gouvernement : chez la majeure partie j'ai trouve 
rinclination marquee de voir s'effectuer une reunion de leur 
pays ave les Provinces- Unies sous un meme chef, et c'est avec le 
plus grand plaisir que j'ai vu qu'il n'existoit aucune dissension 
sur le choix de ce chef, au cas que les Puissances, dont dependra 
le sort de ces deux pays, n'ayent point de raissons de s'y 
opposer. J'ai toujours craint que la difference de religion feroit 
du cote des Beiges une difficulte insurmontable ; ou bien que lors 
meme qu'ils glisseroient sur ce point dans le premier moment, 
cette difference pourroit dans la suite amener des troubles 
nuisibles pour I'autorite souveraine dans des momens de mecon- 
tentement. Mais j'ai ete tranquillise sur ce point, et j'ai trouve 
a cet egard un esprit de tolerance et de moderation chez ceux 
meme qui par etat sont le plus attaches a la religion Catholique 
Romaine, et que toute difficulte de ce c6te-la est levee. Les 
Beiges, et surtout ceux du Brabant, ne desirent aucun change- 
men t dans leur constitution, et toute autre forme de 
gouvernement qu'on voudrait leur donner que celle d'un souverain 
sur le pied de la joyeuse entree, ne les contenteroit pas. II y en 
a meme qui m'ont demande pourquoi si les Provinces-Unies 
faisoient des difficultes, et qu'on ne jugeat point prudent de faire 
adopter a ces Provinces la meme forme, on ne pourroit pas etre 
a la fois Stadhouder des 7 et souverain des 10 ; que, quant a eux, 
ils envisageoient la reunion, non des 17 provinces entre elles, 
mais sous un meme chef, comme le plus grand bonheur pour les 
deux pays ; que le souverain, prenant I'engagement de ne point 
aligner ni separer les dites provinces, devoit etre le seul lien qui 
les associat ; qu'on devrait bien se garder d'etablir entre elles un 
pacte d' union, ou d'en former un seul corps, repr^sente par une 
assembl^e d'Etats-Generaux : qu'en prenant pour base du 
gouvernement dans chaque province en particulier la joyeuse 
entree du Brabant, le souverain obtiendrait toute I'autorite 
necessaire pour gouverner cet ensemble, et que chaque province 
conservant sa constitution primitive, aucune d'elles n'auroit a se 
plaindre, puisqu'un chacun conserveroit ses loix et ses privileges, 
sa religion, et sa liberte. Les obligations du souverain con- 
sistent (1) a ne j^oint lever de taxes que du consentement des 
etats ; (2) a faire rendre justice a chacun par son juge 
competent, et d'apres les lois etablies ; (3) a n'introduire aucun 
stranger dans les charges de I'etat. Pour le reste I'autorite 
souveraine reside dans le chef. C'est sur ce pied que je m'assure 
que les Beiges verroient avec plaisir, desirent meme, que cette 
union se fasse ; mais on n'en est encore qu'au sentiment 
particulier de quelques individus, qui, une fois assures et 
instruits des intentions des Puissances a cet egard, n'adopteront 
pas seulement pour eux-memes cette forme, mais contribueront 
par leur influence a la faire confirmer par le voeu unanime du 
peuple. Ceci n'est point une nouveaute pour les Beiges. En 
1715 le meme plan a existe ; en 1791 ils I'auroient execute avec 
plaisir ; mais a ces deux epoques ils furent rendus a la maison 



86 

d'Autriche, ce que les rend scrupuleux aujourd'hui a faire plus 
que d'exprimer leur desir, et s'expliquer par maniere de conver- 
sation parfciculiere sur la forme a adopter, et les moyens d'y 
parvenir. Si les Puissances, dont le sort de la Belgique dependra, 
pouvoient dans ce moment s'expliquer sur leurs intentions a cet 
egard, si elles pouvoient donner aux Beiges ne fut ce que 
I'assurance de leur disposition a etablir cette reunion, et a y 
consentir pour le bonheur des deux pays, au cas que les 
circonstances rendent la dite reunion possible, on verroit les 
Beiges marcher avec conliance vers ce but, et ne rien negliger 
pour en assurer le succes ; mais tant qu'on ne peut s'expliquer a 
ce sujet, la possibilite de se voir ramener sous la domination 
Autrichienne, et I'incertitude des vues que les Puissances ont sur 
eux, les rend circonspects et sur leurs gardes afin de ne pas se 
compromettre. II y a quelques semaines que j'en ai ecrit a 
Berlin, mais j'ai eu pour reponse qu'on croyait trop premature 
encore que I'Angleterre put s'expliquer sur un point de cette 
importance." Extract. 



Lord Grenville to Lord Minto. 

1799, June 8. Dropmore. — " In consequence of what passed 
in conversation between us a short time since, I lose no time in 
mentioning to you that Sir M. Eden's quitting his present situa- 
tion being now finally determined on, I should have the greatest 
pleasure in being permitted by your Lordship to submit your 
name to the King for the important duties of that situation, on 
the active and able discharge of which the interests of this 
country so much depend in the present moment. 

"As it is wished that the termination of Sir M. Eden's mission 
should be arranged in the manner the most satisfactory to his 
feelings, it will be desirable that the circumstance of your being 
destined to it should not be publicly declared till the return of 
the messenger now sent to Vienna ; but I am very anxious that 
you should, in the meantime, make such preparations as may 
enable you to set out with the least possible delay after Sir M. 
Eden's resignation is received." Cojjy. 



Lord Minto to Lord Grenville. 

1799, June 9. Roehampton. — ''I am this moment honoured 
by your Lordship's letter of yesterday, and am much flattered 
by your opinion that the important affairs of the mission to 
Vienna may be confided to me, and I beg you to accept my best 
thanks for this mark of your Lordship's confidence. The strong 
sense I entertain of the importance attached to the affairs of 
that quarter in the present moment would make me more 
diffident of myself, if I were not encouraged by reflecting that I 
shall act only under your direction ; and I need only add that I 



shall hold myself ready to obey your commands whenever you 
are pleased to call upon me. 

" It will be matter of real satisfaction, and indeed relief to my 
mind, that my appointment should stand clear of everything 
uncomfortable respecting Sir M. E [den] , and I shall be careful 
to observe the caution you prescribe on that subject. 

*' One of the preparations I should be most anxious to 
make for my departure would be to peruse the correspondence 
from Vienna, and I shall take the liberty of applying to 
your Office for leave to do so, if your Lordship does not 
disapprove of it." 



The Marquis of Buckingham to Lord Grenville. 

1799, June 9. Stowe. — " Your resolution to suppress 
my letter in consequence of the determination to keep the 
question upon Lord Berkeley's marriage open till George 
Berkeley returns, is exactly what I could wish. Nothing 
can pain me more than to be obliged to appear as an 
evidence on such a subject, and I should not have written 
even to you upon it if I had not feared that the chapter 
might have been closed without an opportunity having been 
given to the brother to act and speak for himself. It is 
impossible that Lord B[erkeley] in his character of husband, 
father, and brother, can come out of this fiery trial to advantage. 
His line of conduct, upon his own statement, is most incorrect, as 
well as most silly ; but those who do not believe the statement 
he makes of his first marriage will, of course, think that no con- 
duct can be more dishonest. I was aware of all the circum- 
stances you have stated, except the averment that the first 
marriage was by banns ; and I perfectly agree with you that no 
parson could have publicly proclaimed those banns in Berkeley 
church, or registered the marriage afterwards in the public 
register, without an immediate discovery of both those steps. The 
character of Hipsman (son to an old governess of Lord Berkeley's 
sister) always was most villainous, and his share in this transac- 
tion adds to the doubts upon it. I am most happy that I w^as not 
in London when Lord Berkeley called upon you to make his com- 
munications, which you cannot have been more anxious to avoid 
than I should. 

"I am now to request from you two favours, neither of them, 
as I hope, very troublesome ; the one a common letter to Sir M. 
Eden recommending in the usual manner to his protection Mr. 
Blaquiere, who is arrived at Vienna from Munich on his travels, 
and whom my partkular friend Sir J. Blaquiere, his father, 
requested through John Beresford, that I would recommend to 
you for a letter of this description. 

"My second favour is that you would recommend for the 
honour of knighthood my friend Dr. Pegge, who wants to be Sir 
Christopher Pegge, who is to be presented to the King as major 
of the Oxford volunteers on Wednesday the 18th. He is an 



87 

Oxford Professor of Anatomy; his brother Professor at Cam- 
bridge has been knighted. J line lacrynue! till you wipe them 
from his cheek, by notifying to him the King's consent through 
me to this high honour. Setting aside this folly, in which I 
suspect his wife has the greatest share, he is a most excellent 
good man, and very high in his profession, and the real father 
of all the Oxford armed associations." 



Lord Grenville to the Lord Chancellor [Loughborough]. 

1799, June 10. Dropmore. — ' ' I send you a letter which appears 
to me to be well deserving of attention. 

"There could, I think, be no objection to, 1. Expunging the 
present power of licence or approbation given to the Grand 
Master, a person totally unknown to the law or to Parliament. 

"2. Eequiring all Lodges now existing to register themselves 
and the names of their members with the Clerk of the Peace for 
the place where they meet. 

" 3. Prohibiting any new Lodge from being formed ; and 

"4. Empowering the Quarter Sessions, at their discretion, 
to dissolve any existing Lodge. 

"5. Obliging all new members of any old Lodge to register 
themselves within six months after their admission. And in 
case these conditions are not complied with, subjecting the meet- 
ings to the general provisions of the Act. 

Postscript. "I am sorry to trouble you again about Lord 
Dunstanville, but, you will see by the inclosed, I cannot avoid 
it." Copy, 



Henry Dundas to Lord Grenville. 

1799, June 10. Wimbledon. — " I received your letter last 
night. If the possession of the island you mention would have 
the effect of enabling Lord St. Vincent more effectually to 
blockade Toulon, it is certainly most desirable, and is an 
additional ground of regret in the deficiency of our offensive 
force. By the despatches which went some time ago. Lord St. 
Vincent, for the safety of Minorca, is entitled to make a call upon 
the Portugal force, and likewise to call for one regiment from 
Gibraltar. I can extend that liberty to the other object by to- 
morrow's despatches, but I do not perceive that I have the means 
to do more at the present moment without disturbing the 
arrangement I have made to be ready to execute our engagements 
at the isle of Walcheren, if called upon for that purpose. The 
enclosed paper will show you the arrangement I have made. 
They are a body of excellent troops, and I trust adequate 
to the purpose, but it would not be wise to take anything 
from it ; and I am only enabled to do it by borrowing from 
Ireland and Jersey and Guernsey, having in view to replace the 
force so borrowed by the fencible regiments now raising for 
European service." 



S8 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, June 10. Berlin. — " I take advantage of the suspension 
of business produced by Haugwiz's journey, and sit down to 
answer a few detached questions in your last letters which I have 
not yet had occasion to notice. When you ask me my opinion of 
the comparative merits of Lord Minto and of Pelham, I think I 
cannot answer you according to my own ideas more satisfactorily, 
than by referring you to what you yourself officially know of 
them, and by reminding you how much more secure from humour, 
irritation, and eccentricity you would find your correspondence 
with Pelham than you can hope to find it with Lord Minto. I 
know Pelham well enough to feel confident in his good sense and 
good judgment, in his close observation of the tempers of other 
men, and in the perfect command which he has of his own ; 
added to which he has a natural cheerfulness and gentleness of 
disposition which very much assists him in communications of 
business, and makes all transactions with him more easy as well 
as more agreeable. Lord Minto's talents are superior to Pelham's 
as applied to any single object of composition, and I have no 
doubt that he would write a better argument and make a better 
speech than Pelham could do ; but for the average of business, 
including conduct, discretion, and temper, I should have no doubt 
in preferring infinitely the commoner to the peer, and I believe 
you will trace this opinion very strongly if you converse with the 
Duke of Portland, who has corresponded so much both privately 
and officially with both of them. They are however both of 
them in the class which I adverted to in my last letter, and you 
will already have seen in that letter how important it appeared 
to me to be that you should give yourself the best materials 
which can be found, in order to give to the business of your 
department all the advantages to which it is so well entitled in 
your hands. Did I ever name to you upon these subjects the 
name of Lord Amherst ? He is a young man with whom I am 
personally not much acquainted, but the little that I have seen 
of him has given me a very good opinion of him ; and I have 
heard from many who know him well so high a character of him, 
that I cannot help thinking that he would be an acquisition to 
you in the foreign line ; his rank in life would make his appoint- 
ment creditable, his talents would, I believe, make it useful to you, 
and his very limited income would probably make it convenient 
to himself, and enable you from his youth to place him at some 
of the second courts, the missions to which would be infinitely 
more sought after if two or three such appointments could take 
place. In the same view, among the peers. Lord Boringdon 
might perhaps also occupy the subordinate situation of a second 
or third rate court, till occasions of promotion should occur ; the 
names of Lord Hobart and Lord Bathurst I do not mention, 
both because they are obvious enough, and because they apply 
only to the highest class of business ; whereas, in my view, I want 
to see your succession-house well stored, besides all that is wanted 



89 

of the best for immediate use and consumption. You once 
thought of proposing some such matter to Lord Carysfort ; I do 
not know whether he would l)e inclined to it, but I should think 
that he might like it for a year or two, and that it might not be 
disagreeable to him ; if so, and if Elisabeth could take to it, I 
believe they would both like it and be amused with it, and I am 
persuaded that he would do well in it ; but perhaps these are all 
dreams and visions. 

" You ask me concerning Diemar ; he is, I believe, a Swiss, has 
been in our service in some of the foreign levies of this war, and 
was, I believe, in the commissariat in Flanders ; he has long been 
well known to general Stamford, and it is upon Stamford's 
authority that I stated Diemar's Cuxhaven intelligence as being 
to be depended upon ; our general thinks he will be likely to be 
of use in the necessary arrangements in the principality of 
Yevern, as he perfectly knows every inch of that country, and is 
well versed in the knowledge of the commissariat part of his pro- 
fession ; meantime he is at present only in quality of post-chaise 
friend and companion to Petersburg. The mention of these last 
names reminds me of the business upon which they are employed, 
and of the desire which you shew in your last letter to keep clear 
of any large embarkation of cavalry ; I believe I have neglected 
to tell you that I had already spoken in the same sense to Stam- 
ford, and that I found his opinions entirely agreed with those 
which I see you entertain ; the idea therefore upon which we had 
agreed was to embark at Eevel only a small body of dismounted 
cavalry with all the necessary accoutrements, and trust to 
Frieseland and Groningen for mounting them when they arrive. 
If the French should be able to collect any considerable force in 
Flanders, it will then be necessary to have the assistance of 
English cavalry in a country where they can act with so much 
advantage ; but for the first landing in the neighbourhood of 
Delfzyll, the dismounted Eussian cavalry would easily find a 
sufficient number of horses ; or if it be thought more advisable, 
those horses might be provided in Yevern which is accessible, as 
I am told, by a tolerably good seaport, and which is always con- 
sidered in our military conversations here as the most advan- 
tageous spot for a depot of every description. The more I consider 
this project of attack the more partial do I grow to it, nor can I 
figure to myself any formidable difficulty to encounter in the 
execution of it, if either by fair means or by foul you can pass 
them along the Eyder ; for the difference between this course and 
that of the Northern Ocean may decide upon the success of the 
enterprise, and perhaps may decide the Court of Petersburg as to 
the engagingMn it. The feverish state of English politics at 
Copenhagen seems to offer very little resource upon this point, 
but I endeavour to persuade myself that if the Emperor's vanity 
be well engaged in the prospect of recovering Holland by Russian 
regiments, he will not be pushed out of his project by the Danish 
punt-poles in the river Eyder. 

"If I had a mind to hunt after new sources of uneasiness 
I should dwell more than I do upon Panin's last letters from 



90 

Petersburg, which hint at some uneasiness arising there with 
respect to Stockholm about their Finland frontier ; it had gone 
far enough for Paul to recall from his German corps one 
or .two of his officers who have served in Sweden, and to 
begin to make some military arrangements for the possibility 
of Swedish war; but I trust that this irritation will have 
subsided in the last anti-Gallican declaration of the King of 
Sweden, and that they will shake hands, and threaten the 
French Directory at Paris instead of blustering at one 
another upon the banks of the Kiemen. In truth, however, one 
cannot but be uneasy in observing all the dangerous violence, 
precipitation, and change which mark the character of the 
Emperor, and the total want of ability and influence to keep it 
within any degree of bounds or discretion ; if, however, these 
evils weaken the solid grounds of our alliance there, they ought 
to be a spur to us to make the best advantage of the moment 
there, and to employ every possible effort in this instant, for fear 
the next should breed some new caprice and inconsistency as 
little to be accounted for as those which we have seen. It is not 
unimportant in the present moment to keep up at Petersburg 
the dislike and distrust which the Emperor has shewn of the 
continuance or extension of the Prussian system of neutrality ; 
and you will see in my despatch 36 that I cannot help express- 
ing some suspicion that the princely conferences which belong to 
the Royal Prussian progress may look much more towards a 
continuance of this same blessed system, than to any prudent 
or manly change of it. 

" Whitworth's despatch to you under flying seal is just arrived; 
I do not much relish the languid and diffident tone in which 
he chants forth the difficulties of the measure, instead of looking 
them manfully in the face, and hurrying the troops on board as 
he ought to do, and as I trust Stamford will make him do when he 
arrives there. I am likewise a little disturbed at the indiscretion 
of writing en clair, for the benefit of the Prussian government, 
of the jealousy prevailing at Vienna against Suwaroff, and of the 
Wirtemberg application for English money supported by the 
interference of the Russian minister ; surely if there is any Court 
in Europe in which it would have been wise to have kept these 
points of discussion secret, Berlin is ^;ar preference the very Court 
which one should have most wished to have kept in ignorance; 
but these are subordinate considerations when compared to the 
object of the grand expedition ; do try and make Whit worth put 
his shoulders to it with good heart. Panin begins to be afraid 
of its failing at Petersburg, and I see that he is driving at me to 
go there and help it, but there are many reasons against this, 
three of which are I think sufficient to mention : in the first place 
what can be done in that way will be done by Stamford ; in the 
next place there is not time for new hands in that business ; in 
the third place, faint as our hopes are here, it is not fit to abandon 
them till the answer is given, though I hope little from it." 



91 

Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville. 

1799, June 11. London. — "I received this morning your 
despatches Nos. 33 and 31, and very much concur in your 
reasoning respecting the subjects of both ; but as one day more 
would probably enable you to throw new light on ])oth, I have 
determined not to write any answer by to-night's post, especially 
as the wind is still East. 

''The subject of your private letter gives me much uneasiness, 
but the thing is done and unremediable. It is only a new reason 
for things as they are.'" Copy- 

Earl Spencer to Lord Grenville. 

1799, June 11. Northampton. — "I am much obliged to you for 
a sight of the enclosed, which I return herewith. The reason for 
recalling the squadron from the Elbe was rather (as you may 
recollect) for the purpose of facilitating some naval arrangement 
we wanted to make with the ships that composed it, than on any 
political ground. If your brother should state any apprehension 
of the necessity of a defence for that river, we can easily resume 
the station when it is wanted, and we shall, of course, send some 
more small vessels to that coast, when our operations now 
preparing in Kussia come into execution. 

" I am here in the midst of yeomanry and dust, and cannot 
help mentioning on the occasion the extremely good spirit which 
appears to pervade every part of this country ; the improvement 
which has taken place in it within these last two or three years 
is as surprising as it is comfortable. 

"I am afraid your brother's news about Genoa is not founded; 
it would be a most material point to have possession of. I had 
already that of the isles of Hieres, and I am jDersuaded from what 
Lord St. Vincent once said to me on that subject that it will not 
be absent from his mind ; but some officers to whom I mentioned 
it some time since in conversation seemed to think that they 
were very strongly fortified." 

Postseript. "1 shall be in town on Thursday ; I could not avoid 
attending my corps here, and I hope I shall not miss any vote 
on the Slave Trade question." 



Lord Grenville to the Earl of Elgin. 

Private. 

1799, June 13. Cleveland Eow. — "With respect to archi- 
tectural pursuits, I really believe all has been done by travellers, 
and by the magnificent publications of their discoveries, that 
could reasonably be expected now ; and I do not think that we 
could (at least certainly not from any funds at the disposal of the 
Foreign Department) defray, with any propriety, the expense of 
that encouragement which a person qualified, as you mention, 
would be entitled to expect for such an undertaking. It is very 
difficult for me to form any accurate calculation of the expenses 



92 

of the embassy, but the Hne I adopted was not fixed without a 
good deal of consideration. I really am inclined to think you 
will not find it below the mark. You must consider that, although 
in some respects the representation may equal (or even in a few 
points exceed) that of a mission to a Christian Court, there are 
other points in which, the society being so much more limited, 
your expense must be much less. And you are, no doubt, aware 
how much this allowance exceeds that of any former case. 

"I perfectly know that you have no wish upon the subject but 
that of discharging the duties of the embassy in a manner 
creditable to yourself and to your country, and I cannot help 
hoping that this may be done on the footing proposed." Copy. 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 
Private. 

1799, June 14. Berlin. — "You will easily see that the chief 
object of my sending to-day to Cuxhaven is to give you immediate 
information of the ready disposition which Van Braam has shewn 
to manage the junction of the Dutch fleet of the Texel with that 
of Lord Duncan, whenever he shall be assured of foreign troops 
being ready to assist the restoration of the Stadtholder, I 
flatter myself that moment is now so near that instant measures 
ought to be taken for assuring the means of this co-operation ; 
the only conditions which I understand him to insist upon are 
that he shall receive an order from the Stadtholder to take this 
step, and that he shall be fully satisfied upon the point of the 
Dutch ships being treated by us as allies, and being not required 
to strike their flag or do any act of submission ; he undertakes to 
control Storey, he assures the consent of the generality of the 
fleet, and he answers for every officer on board of his own ship 
except one ; he further requires that some officers of the old 
establishment shall be ready to join the ships under his command, 
which do not at present exceed the number of five of the line and 
eight or ten frigates, the others not being yet manned. The reason 
of his waiting for some order or opportunity to go out is that 
some new batteries have been erected upon the Texel and the 
Helder, and he believes those batteries, which have been erected 
to control the fleet, would completely destroy it if it declared 
itself in port. 

" I have thought the secrecy of this communication so 
necessary to its success, that I have abstained from mentioning 
the particulars in my despatch, but have thought it best to refer 
you entirely to the letter written upon this subject by Robert 
Fagel to his brother, because that enclosure will give you all the 
information which I have, and it may be as little communicated 
as you please. I learn besides from Fagel that General Daendels 
is now very actively employing himself in fortifying the line of 
the Greb, upon which five or six hundred men are incessantly 
employed ; but by his account the French force in the country 
appears to be still less than our other informations have described, 
and he is persuaded that all the new levies which they are 
endeavouring to make there, will join the Stadtholder's army 



98 

whenever it shall appear. Fagel however does not believe in 
Daendels being accessible to any offers from the Orange party, 
but he considers him as a most determined and active enemy, 
and one who is much esteemed by the common soldiers in Holland ; 
what strikes me most in his report upon the general state of 
things is the reluctance and terror which he finds still to prevail 
so as to make every man, however anxious for a change, tremble 
at the idea of committing himself by any decided act ; and it is 
evidently his opinion that some leading men must be immediately 
sought and found to give the proper tone in this business. I have 
done what I can to occupy the Prince here with these details, and 
he very readily engages in them, but nevertheless I trust that the 
Greffier and you are likewise working and making the Princess 
work upon this very interesting scene. I do not find any other 
person to be very much consulted or very confidentially employed 
by the Prince except M. d'Yvoy and M. de Thuil, but I presume 
that it is known to the Greffier and to the Stadtholder who are 
the persons to be brought forward in the different parts of the 
United Provinces ; as however I never think anything is clearly 
understood till it can be clearly stated, I have recommended to 
the Prince to endeavour to state upon paper the exact position 
and duty of some leading individuals in every part of the 
United Provinces, and perhaps you will agree in thinking 
that the Greffier would very usefully assist such a general 
plan of arrangements. There certainly appears to be a want of a 
few men with talents leading enough in the country to become 
the points round which the loose and unsettled disposition of 
the people may collect and form itself ; I have no doubt that 
this is to be found, and hitherto my fear has been that it would 
shew itself too soon ; but approaching as near as we now do, I 
cannot help thinking that every possible arrangement should 
now become complete, in order that, in the moment of action, 
there may be nothing left to do but to execute what had been 
preconcerted. My wish therefore certainly would be to have drawn 
out upon paper such a plan of arrangements throughout the whole 
country as might immediately be executed whenever the military 
measures can begin ; and as I do not see sufficient means for that 
arrangement in anybody here, I cannot help earnestly recommend- 
ing the consideration of it to those who have a competent know- 
ledge both of the country and of the influencing persons in it. 

"I begin to be surj)rised that I hear nothing of general 
Stamford, and shall be very anxious for the arrival of the 
messenger whom Whitworth talks, in his last despatch, of 
sending speedily ; we have not heard of our general since his 
leaving Dantzick, yet if he was ill, he would surely have made 
colonel Diemar write to us ; I trust therefore that all is going on 
as it ought, and I do not, for my part, see how it is possible that 
our enterprise should fail. It is not as easy to engage my friend 
Panin in naval as in military arrangements, but I have at last 
completely succeeded with him, and he has written to his Court 
a long and pressing letter earnestly recommending the immediate 
adoption of your plan. 



94 

"I know not what to think of the result of the Cassell con- 
ferences, not having heard one word of Haugwiz. Fagel met 
general Pichegru two days ago on his road to Miinster, 
where he was going to meet two or three officers of the 
Dusseldorff army ; Pichegru said that the Duke of Brunswick 
had told him he believed that Prussia would act, but Pichegru 
added that everybody else told him they would not, and that he 
rather himself believed in this latter opinion. For my own part, 
I still suspect that some half-measure is in agitation. You will 
see that I cannot refrain from putting Whitworth upon his 
guard against the Emperor's suffering his new jn-oteges of 
Bavaria and Wirtemberg to be put within the possible scope of 
Prussian neutrality. It is not that I have any information upon 
this head, but I cannot get rid of an indistinct suspicion that our 
friends here will perhaps endeavour to find some mode of 
ostensibly preparing a confederacy against France, but that their 
measures, both in their shape and their real object, will be directed 
to an extension of their neutral system in Germany, by which at 
Berlin they will fancy that they provide a security against France 
and against Austria, without committing themselves to the danger 
and expense of actual hostility ; some such proposition therefore 
I expect as may belong to such motives, and am guarding against 
it as well as I can by telling their secret before they have ripened 
it into a regular project. The idea of summoning France to 
respect Prussian territory, and to restore the United Provinces, 
all seems to me to belong to some such notion as I have described ; 
and you will observe that, whenever there has latterly been 
question of Prussia declaring itself, they have always been 
seeking for the means of reconciling their declaration of war 
with a continuance of their system of neutrality ; and if they did 
this two months ago, they will surely be not less disposed to do 
so now that, by their jealousy of Austria, their German interests 
are so much more awakened. But why should I weary you with 
speculations, when a few days will enable me to give you the 
better grounds of facts ? 

" I send you a statement of losses by wreck which is consider- 
ably within the mark, but if you think either the sum or any 
of the articles improperly stated, pray do not scruple to draw 
your pen across them. Mr. Coutts's book offering a perfect 
blank, it is an object that what is to be paid, should, if possible, 
be paid immediately." 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, June 15. Berlin.— "I do not wonder that in the 
multiplicity of all that you have to remember, the name of Count 
O'Mahony and the recommendation which I gave you of him by 
General Stamford's desire, should have escaped your recollection ; 
yet you will find that in two letters, one public and the other 
private, I have mentioned him as an officer highly recommended 
by General Stamford as a fit person to be second in the command 



95 

of which there was question. The other officer whom I named 
has not yet been found by such enquiries as could be made, and 
therefore it is that I have not repeated the discussion of that 
subject. 

" We had yesterday the satisfaction of hearing from General 
Stamford ; he had been delayed by a fever upon the road, but he 
was entirely recovered, and thought himself sure of arriving at 
Petersburg on the 11th or 12th inst. The Vienna post is come 
in this morning, but it brings no news of the armies, though it 
contains an invitation from the Emperor to the Diet of Eatisbon 
to send deputies to Villingen to assist at the examination of all 
that relates to the death of the French Ministers at Badstadt. 

"I find that letters are just arrived to Count Panin from 
Marshal Suwarow at Turin dated 29th ultimo. They contain an 
account of the taking of Turin and of the beginning of the siege 
of the citadel ; they also mention the occupation of the city of 
Alexandria and the blockade of that citadel, where there is a 
garrison of 1,500 men; they further state the retreat of Moreau 
to Coni with the remainder of his army, consisting of 10,000 men 
only, though he is said to have received reinforcements from 
France since his arrival at Coni. A copy of Suwaroff s letter is 
sent to Count Woronzow. 

"M. de Haugwiz is expected to arrive this evening, though I do 
not find that he has written to say so ; it seems that the King of 
Prussia prolonged his stay at Cassel, and that circumstance is 
said to have delayed the return of M. de Haugwiz to Berlin." 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, June 16. Berlin. — "You will easily see how infinite is the 
satisfaction which I feel in forwarding to you the despatches from 
Petersburg which announce the formal acceptance of the project 
for the deliverance of Holland. I ought not however to conceal 
from you that M. de Kotchoubey has written to Count Panin to 
say that all the Bussian troops being now upon the frontiers of 
Prussia, he believes it will be difficult to furnish the necessary 
body of men ready for embarkation before the month of August ; 
I hope however that our coadjutors at Petersburg will not give 
w^ay to this difficulty of time, and I am at a loss to conceive how^ 
it is possible that the distance from the Prussian frontier to Bevel 
should require anything like the interval of time which is 
mentioned by the Bussian Minister. The Emperor appears to be 
so dissatisfied with the account which he had received from Count 
Panin of the fate of our j^i'ojct (Varticle secret at Berlin, that 
he has directed Count Panin to avail himself of this opportunity 
to go to Carlsbadt, and he accordingly proposes to set out on the 
20th instant for the baths of that place and take leave of the 
King, leaving M. de Sievers here as charge cV affaires ; he has availed 
himself of this new order by making Count Finckenstein sensible 
how much danger there is of exasperating the Emperor by these 
repeated delays, and as the Emperor's order contains in it an 



96 

expression that orders will be sent to Count Panin at Carlsbadt 
relative to his future destination, Count Panin has given it to be 
understood that it is very doubtful whether he shall ever return 
to Berlin; he has moreever proposed to Count Finckenstein 
to send a courier to Count Haugwiz to apprise him of these 
circumstances, and he has offered to meet Count Haugwiz upon 
the road, in case there should be really anything substantial to 
do. All this is likely to be useful in urging them here. Count 
Panin thinks that there is some danger at Petersburg of the 
Emperor being diverted from the immediate Baltic project by 
the expectations which he will have of the Minden and Cassel 
conferences, which had not been announced to him at the time 
of Fabiani's departure. I trust however to Stamford for goading 
them well at Petersburg, and hope you will help as much as 
possible the same spirit from Whitworth. I will not detain the 
tardy Fabiani. Adieu. The enclosed notice comes through 
Schulembourg, who is Ministre de Police.'' 

Enclosure. 

"Otto, charge d'affaires du gouvernement Francois a la cour de 
Berlin, vient de recevoir une lettre d'un emigre Francoise r^sidant 
a Londre par laquelle il lui donne avis que plusieurs agents 
de I'Angleterre sont charges d'enroler les emigres HoUandoises et 
les militaires au service de I'ancienne republique des Provinces 
— Unies, pour en former un corps de troupes regulieres pour le 
service du Stadhouder. On designe le duch6 d'Oldenbourg et 
les environs de Breme comme les points de rassemblement, et 
on indique avec beaucoup de detail les personnes charg^es de 
I'operation. 

" Cet avis a ete envoie au Directoire par Otto, et sa lettre 
aiant ete ouverte a la poste, M. le Comte de S [chulembourg] a 
decouvert la trahison, dont il a donne connoissance au Comte de 
Panin pour en prevenir [le Cabinet] de Londres. On ne sait pas 
le nom de I'emigre Francois." 



General de Stamford to Thomas Grenvillb. 

1799, June 18. St. Petersburgh. — " Sans m'arreter a vous 
faire le recit de tons les accidens qui ont retarde mon arrivee en 
cette ville, pour le moins de 5 a 6 jours, je vais aborder tout de 
suite la question principale, celle qui concerne I'objet de ma 
mission. 

" M. le Chevalier Whitworth vous apprendra que tout est en 
regie pour ce qui regarde le nombre de troupes que sa Majesty 
I'Empereur des Kussies croit pouvoir fournir pour I'exp^dition 
sur la Hollande. Elle a fixe ce nombre a 18 milles hommes, ce qui 
me paroit suffisant, vu les 8 milles hommes qu'on esp6re que 
fournira la Suede. Quant a cet article je me suis parfaitement 
rencontre avec M. Popham; mais quant au point d'attaque sur 
les provinces de Groningue et de Frise, nos opinions etoient 
d'abord un peu diff^rentes. Je me suis trouve vouloir attaquer 
le taureau par le flanc, lui par les cornes. 



97 

" Le projet de M. Popham consiste, pour ce qui r^garde ces 
deux provinces, a porter une force de 9 milles hommes dans I'isle 
d'Ameland ; a fournir de la des amies, des munitions, et des 
troupes, s'il le faut, aux habitans de la Frise et de la Groningue, 
qu'il dit savoir disposes a se debarrasser eux-memes de leurs 
oppresseurs ; et a faire avec le reste des forces, et celles qu'y 
joindra I'Angieterre, une descente en Zeelande, dont, a mon avis, 
il a parfaitement bien combine les operations. 

" J'ai eu I'honneur de vous expliquer dans plusieurs entretiens 
que nous avons eus ensemble a Berlin sur le chapitre de ces 
descentes, les raisons qui me faisoient preferer, a tout autre projet, 
celui de p6netrer dans la Groningue du c6t6 de Delfzyl, et je 
vais prendre la liberty de vous retracer ici sommairement ces 
memes raisons. 

" 1^ En operant une descente avec 15 milles hommes pres de 
Delfzyl, je me rendois probablement maitre de cette place en y 
jettant quelques bombes, et je me procurois par la une premiere 
place d'armes tres importante. 

''2° En meme tems que je me presentois devant Delfzyl, je 
pouvois porter des troupes sur le fort de Buyrtang et sur Coever- 
den ; et il y a bien pen d'apparence que, vu le denument ou se 
trouvent ces deux places, ainsi que Swartesluys et Zwol, elles se 
fussent dispos^es a faire quelque resistance. 

"3"^ Maitre de ces points, je I'etois des provinces de Frise et de 
Groningue, et je pouvois, en me trouvant au milieu de leurs 
habitans, avec bien plus de fondement compter sur leurs bonnes 
dispositions, qu'on ne pourra le faire lorsqu'on ne sera qu'en 
possession de quelques-unes des iles sur les cotes de la Frise. 

"4** L'ennemi vouloit-il porter des secours de troupes dans ces 
deux provinces, j'etois en etat de Ten empecher, en prenant avec 
les miennes une position sur 1© Yecht, d'ou je pouvois moi-meme 
faire des incursions dans les provinces de Gueldre et d'Overyssel, 
qui probablement n'auroient pas tard^es a se soulever en faveur 
de la bonne cause. 

" 5° Enfin, une fois etablis dans la Frise et la Groningue, 
j'attirois indubitablement dans mon parti la majeure partie de 
I'armee Hollandoise, que je pouvois employer dans les places, 
tandis qu'avec les troupes etrangeres, je penetrois plus avant 
dans la republique. 

"M. Popham a objecte a ces argumens. 1° Qu' une descente du 
cote de Delfzyl seroit regarde par la Prusse comme une infraction 
faite a sa ligne de neutralise, puisqu'elle pretendoit avoir la 
souverainet^ sur les deux branches de 1' embouchure de I'Ems, 
appellees I'Ooster et la Wester Ems. 2^ Que s[a] M[ajest6] 
rEmp[ereur] des Kussies ayant d6ja donne son entiere approba- 
tion au projet d'attaque de M. Popham, ce seroit peut-etre Ten 
degouter tout-a-fait, que de lui montrer des difficultes, ou de lui 
proposer des changemens. 

"Vous pensez bien, que j'aurais eu bien des choses a 
opposer a la premiere de ces objections, mais que je n'avois rien 
a repondre a la seconde. Cette derniere me parut en effet si 
grave, que je ne hesitai pas un instant a entrer dans les vues de 

6802 G 



M. Popham, et me proposal tout de suite de les appuyer aupres 
de TEmpereur, s'il arrivoit que sa Majeste daignat m'en parler. 
Tout bien consider^, il faut se demander ici de quoi s'agit-il? 
De d^gager la Hollande. Or, que cela se fasse, en dirigeant 
I'attaque principale centre la Zeelande, d' apres le plan de 
M. Popham, ou centre les provinces de Groningue et de Frise, 
d' apres le projet de M. Stamford, peu importe, pourvu que les 
chances soyent a peu pres egales, comme elles le sent en effet. 

*' Vous voyez, d'apres ce que je viens d'avoir I'honneur 
de vous dire, que c'est la r^ussite de la chose qui me tient 
a coeur et non la gloriole de la faire marcher conformement 
a mes vues, pour qu'il m'en revienne un peu plus d'honneur. 
C'est vous dire en peu de mots que j'ai tellement adopts le plan 
de M. Popham que je I'envisage des a present comme s'il m' 
appartenoit ; mais soyez sur en meme tems que je n'en agis ainsi 
que par ce que je le trouve bon, — parfaitement bon. S'il en 
6toit autrement je vous le dirais avec cette franchise que vous me 
connoissez. Je suis trop presse aujourd'hui pour m'entretenir 
plus longtems avec vous, quelque envie que j'en aye, et je suis 
afHige de n' avoir pas le tems d'ecrire un mot de lettre a notre 
excellent Comte de Panin. Veuillez me rappeler a son souvenir. 
Je lui suis attache ainsi qu' a vous par tous les sentiments qu'une 
veneration sans bornes peut inspirer." 

Intelligence Kespecting Holland. 
M. d'Yvoy to H. Fagel. 

1799, June 19. Emerick. — "J'eus hier quelqu'un du pays 
chez moi, qui m'a assure que Daendels a perdu toute confiance, et 
qu'on travaille a le culbuter. On se plaint beaucoup de la peur 
et du peu de support qu'on a a attendre des anciens Eegens. 
Personne presque n'ose ni ne desire se meler des affaires. La 
majeure partie des bien-intention6s est dans le meme cas. 
M. d'Enghuysen vient me voir de temps a autre ; il est tres- 
bien dispose, et ne menage rien pour la bonne cause. Je me 
flatte d'avoir trouve moyen d'etablir des correspondances dans 
les differens ports de la Hollande, et dans les villes de Dort et 
Delft pour les magasins. Mais comme jusqu'ici je n'ai encore 
aucune certitude de ce que je puis employer a cela, je dois aller 
avec trop de retenue pour m'en promettre une expedition aussi 
prompte que cela meriteroit. Quant a la correspondance directe, 
la defense de la peche sur la cote y porte grand obstacle, les 
gouvernails et agrets de tous les batimens pecheurs ay ant ete 
enleves. J'attends reponse s'il sera possible de I'etablir avec 
I'escadre Anglaise devant le Texel meme, et je ne desespere 
point que cela pourra s'ex^cuter, puisqu'on m'assure qu'il n'est 
pas difficile d'entretenir commerce avec eux devant le Texel. Je 
serois charme en attendant qu'on m'instruisit (1) comment et a 
qui je pourrai adresser mes lettres ; (2) si dans un cas pressant je 
puis envoy er mes lettres par estafette jusqu'a Cuxhaven a I'agent 
des paquet-boats ; tant que la correspondance directe ne sera pas 



99 

6tablie, elles pourront arriver de cette fa9on a temps, et ne seront 
pas huit jours entre Cuxhaven et ici, coinme c'est le cas en ecrivant 
par la poste ordinaire ; 3" a qui en ce cas je devrai les adresser en 
Angleterre, et que Tagent a Cuxhaven soit autorise a les expedier 
a leur destination par le premier paquet qui mit en mer, sans qu'il 
soit necessaire qu'elles entrent dans la malle. 

"La reflexion amene en Hollande la peur dans les esprits. Je 
ne doute pas qu'on ne commence a faire des propositions, et qu'un 
chacun ne veuille avoir I'honneur d'avoir contribue a un change- 
ment; mais j'espere qu'on tiendra bon, et qu'on n'entrera dans 
aucun arrangement qui ne pourroit que Her les mains pour la 
suite. Pour I'armee, on n'a besoin de gagner aucun officier, car je 
r^ponds que du moment qu'une force etrangere se montrera sur 
la frontiere, ou qu'une revolution commence (ce qu'on empechera 
autant que possible, avant qu'il en soit temps) I'esprit du soldat 
sera bon, et qu'ils chasseront leurs officiers. II en est a peu pres 
de meme des bourgeois. H y a peu d'endroits ou le peuple 
redemandera ses anciens Kegens, et c'est sur cela, je pense, que 
j'ai les notions les plus sures. Je ne puis rien dire par la 
presente de la Belgique. Le Prince Hereditaire a garde Tuyll, 
et je ne I'attends de retour que dans 10 ou 12 jours avec les 
intentions de s'Altesse. — Le rapport ci-joint est de quelqu'un 
qui est alle seulement pour fixer la correspondance dans les deux 
provinces, et ne sert, par consequent, qu'a donner une id^eg^nerale 
de la situation actuelle." Extract. 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, June 20. Berlin. — " I have thought myself obliged to 
write so much at length in my public despatch that I have very 
little to add for your private eye. The letter upon which I have 
had to write so tedious a comment has in no respect surprised 
me, because I did not very much expect anything so good as a 
plain, clear, and reasonable proposal ; but it requires neverthe- 
less a good deal of attention, and is upon the whole worth the 
trouble which you see I challenge from you in the consideration 
of it. We had heard of this letter from Brunswick, before we 
saw it, by the means of Ml de Gallatin, who is there, and who, 
being a confidential friend of the Duke's, had seen a copy of it 
in his hands before it had reached Finckenstein, to whom it was 
addressed! The Duke's remarks upon it to M. Gallatin were, 
that we ought to accept the proposition at once, and that we 
should observe that the condition did not require the capture of 
the strong places, but only required positions upon the Rhine ; 
the truth however is that there are two sentences in the letter, 
in one of which the word " positions " stands alone, in the other 
there is added to it the phrase of strong places upon the Rhine ; 
we were, too, obliged to reason upon Finckenstein's interpretation 
of it, and he seemed to think (though evidently not informed 
upon the point) that the capture of the two fortresses was in- 
tended to be expressed ; if it was, you will certainly agree that 



100 

we did right in rejecting it ; if any other sense is to be given to 
it, there is an easy way for Haugwiz to do so, upon Finckenstein's 
report of our conference. It was the secretary of the conference 
who questioned me as to money from England, if the proposition 
should end only in requiring the Kussians to take a position 
which would block the garrison of Mentz, and as he is a shrewd 
man and well informed of w^hat is intended, I am inclined to 
believe that this may be the proposition intended. It is not 
entirely impossible that as the military here have all the notion 
that the scarcity of forage ought to delay their operations till 
harvest, it is not impossible that they seek only to drag on the 
negotiation till that period of acting should arrive ; but much 
is gained in drawing from the King even so feeble an expression 
of decision for war ; and now that he is once advanced so far, I 
cannot help believing that they would soon quicken their march 
if they thought we were sailing into Holland as fast as I trust 
and hope we are. 

*' I perceive it is imagined that Haugwiz will not return 
much before the King, so that another fortnight may pass before 
we can fully discuss this matter. Though I have not noticed 
it in my despatch, it is right that you should be informed 
that from more than one quarter I am told of General Daendels 
in Holland having said that, in order to resist this damned 
coalition, they should be obliged to call in Prussia ; is this a proof 
of Daendels paving the way for a revolution in which he will 
introduce the forces of Prussia ? Yet Fagel thinks him a thorough 
Jacobin ; if so, can it be possible that he can have reason to hope 
for Prussian assistance to support the Batavian republic ? I think 
that cannot be ; but it is possible that Prussia may try a Dutch 
negotiation of its own for the deliverance of Holland, and that 
possibility is another strong motive with me for wishing to see 
the question quickly determined by your Russian expedition. 
Panin's journey to Carlsbadt is necessary for his wife's health ; 
it will do some harm in giving a notion of our negotiation failing ; 
it may do some good if it alarms and quickens the government 
here. I will try to obtain as much of the good, and prevent as 
much of the evil as I can. I am impatient to hear what you do 
with our Dutch fleet, and what measures the old Stadt and 
Greffier and you are taking ; it will all do well." 

The Prince of Orange to H. Fagel. 

1799, June 22. London. — " Je vous envoye mon projet 
d'ordre pour le Capitaine Van Braam, que je vous prie de com- 
muniquer ce matin a my Lord Grenville. Je d^sirerois obtenir 
une declaration par 6crit de la maniere dont les vaisseaux seront 
traites et, s'il se pent, une copie des ordres que my Lord Duncan 
recevra a cet ^gard, avant de faire expedier et envoyer cet ordre ; 
afin que je puisse etre sur que les vaisseaux qui voudront, 
resteront des vaisseaux appartenants a la R^publique des 
Provinces-Unies, et que lui seront rendus a la paix, et des 
qu'elle sera d^livr^e du joug des Fran9ais et de ses oppressions 



101 

actuels; et que ces vaisseaux resteront sous mes ordres comme 
Amiral-G^n^ral des Provinces-Unies ; et que sa Majesty Brittan- 
nique daignera pourvoir a Tentretien de ces vaisseaux, et de leurs 
equipages, jusqu'a ce qu'ils puissent retourner dans leur patrie. 
II me serait fort agreable de pouvoir obtenir a cette occasion la 
d^livrance des prisonniers HoUandais qui se trouvent dans ce 
pays, et qui voudraient se laisser employer a bord de ces 
vaisseaux pour en completter les Equipages ; et particulierement 
celle des malheureux pecheurs, tant de Schieveningen que 
d'autres villages d'Hollande, qui ont 6tes pris durant cette guerre; 
et, s'il 6tait possible, d'avoir une liste de tous les prisonniers 
Hollandois qui se trouvent, tant dans les diff^rentes prisons que 
sur les vaisseaux qui servent de prison, avec les noms des bati- 
ments, et le lieu, et le temps ou ils ont etes pris. Je la recevrai 
avec la plus vive reconnaissance, puisqu'alors on serait a meme 
de voir quelles personnes on pourrait delivrer sans risque, et 
quelles personnes il serait peut-etre utile de ne pas delivrer avant 
la paix, et le retablissement des choses dans notre patrie. J'ai 
dresse la precis en HoUandais, et vous prie de vouloir bien la 
traduire en Fran^ais, afin que Messieurs les Ministres puissent la 
mieux comprendre, et suis pret a y faire les changements que 
sa Majeste trouvera bon, et jugera pouvoir mieux servir au but 
de delivrer notre patrie, et d'oter les moyens de defense a ceux 
qui, sans aucun titre legal, y exercent I'autorite supreme. La 
seule chose sur laquelle je dois insister est que ces vaisseaux 
restent vaisseaux de la Eepublique des Provinces-Unies, et que je 
soye sur qu'ils retourneront dans les ports de la P.,epublique quand 
elle sera delivree. Je vous prie aussi de faire remarquer que je 
promets de recompenser, mais non de garder au service, ceux qui 
passeront, et que les recompenses peuvent etre en gratifications 
ou pensions. Si cela etait sujet a trop de difficultes, de les 
employer apres le retablissement des choses avec les officiers qui 
sont restes fideles a I'ancienne constitution, et n'ont pas voulu 
reconnaitre ou servir les oppresseurs de leur patrie." 

Lord Grenville to the Lords of the Admiralty. 

Most secret, 

1799, June 25. Downing Street. — "A confidential communi- 
cation having been made to his Majesty's government that 
several of the officers commanding the Dutch ships of war in the 
Texel are desirous of throwing off the yoke of the present 
government of the United Provinces, and of joining his 
Majesty's fleet, provided that the ships and their crews shall, 
in that case, be considered as belonging to an allied power, and 
as being under the orders and direction of the Prince of Orange, 
I have received the King's commands to signify his Majesty's 
consent to these conditions. The enclosed copies of a note 
which I have addressed to the Prince of Orange on this subject, 
and of the orders which his serene Highness has transmitted to 
Captain Yan Braam, will explain to your Lordships the conduct 
which is to be observed by the commander of his Majesty's fleet 



102 

after a junction has been formed with the ships of war from the 
Texel ; and I have therefore to signify to you his Majesty's 
pleasure that you communicate both these papers to Admiral 
Lord Duncan, or the officer commanding his Majesty's fleet in 
the North seas. It is probable that by means of a fishing boat, 
or through some other channel, Captain Van Braam will open a 
secret communication with Lord Duncan, and will settle with 
him the signals to be made, and the measures to be taken for 
the execution of this plan ; and it is his Majesty's pleasure that 
his Lordship should be instructed to enter into such communica- 
tion, and to concert such arrangements as may appear to him 
best calculated to facilitate and ensure a junction between his 
Majesty's fleet and the ships from the Texel ; provided that 
the commanders of the latter appear disposed to act with good 
faith, and in conformity to the orders transmitted by the Prince 
of Orange. It is farther his Majesty's pleasure that, in the 
execution of this plan, his Majesty's officers should not only 
abstain from any hostile proceeding against the Dutch ships of 
war which shall, according to such concert, come out in order 
to join his Majesty's fleet, but should treat the officers and crews 
with the kindness and attention due to the officers and crews of 
ships of war belonging to a power in alliance with his Majesty. 

"It is likewise his Majesty's pleasure that, after the junction 
has been formed, his Majesty's fleet, or such portion thereof as 
may be judged sufficient, should, together with the Dutch ships, 
immediately proceed to Yarmouth, or some other port of this 
kingdom." 

Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville. 

1799, June 25. Harley Street. — " Par les depeches que votre 
courier vous a aporte ce matin du Chevalier Whiteworth vous 
devez etre bien content de mon Empereur. Je vous envoi 
quelques-unes des lettres que j'ai re9U de Sa Majeste Imperiale. 
II y a d'autres que je dois vous lire, et que je vous aporterai 
demain avant ou apres le leve du Koi, suivent que vous me 
fixerez I'heure. 

" Apres avoir lue les pieces que je vous envoi, faite-moi 
I'amitie de me les renvoyer, car j'en ai besoin, et si vous 
voulez en avoir de copies, je vous les fairai copier chez moi, et 
je vous les enverai demain. 

" Craignant que n'avez perdu la clef de mes cassettes, je vous 
envoi cachet6 la clef qui me reste, et si vous n'avez pas perdu le 
votre, dans ce cas renvoyez moi la miene cachetee. 

*' Je suis enchante de plus en plus du zel de mon souverain 
pour la bonne cause, et de la noblesse avec la quelle il le fait. 

" C'est nos deux souverains et nos deux patries qui auront la 
gloire de rendre le bonheur a I'Europe." 

Postscript. " Mr. Hammond vient de m'^crire dans ce 
moment pour m'avertire que vous allez envoyer un courier ce 
soir pour Petersbourg. Je vous suplie de le remetre, au moins 
a demain au soir, car il faut que je vous entretient avant ; la 



difference de 24 heures n'est pas grande, et je ne suis pas pret 
pour repondre ce soir a tout ce qu'on m'a ecrit, et ce me sera 
impossible d'ecrire la dixieme par tie de ce que j'ai a grifone." 

2nd Postscrijrt. "Les Comtes Kotchoubey et Rastopchin 
m'^crivent que I'Empereur conssent a I'envoi des vingt-six milles 
homme pour la liberation de la Holande, et qu'on n'attent que 
I'arivee du General Stamford pour regler cette affaire. Je vous 
envoi aussi ce que j'ai re9u du Comte Panin, et je vous prie de 
me renvoyer le tout." 

LoKD Grenville to Thomas Grenville. 

1799, June 25. Cleveland Row. — " You will naturally suppose 
the pleasure with which I received the despatches by Fabiani, 
who has however been so tardy that I think he must be put on 
the superannuated list. I shall send a messenger either to- 
morrow or the next day through Berlin to Peter sburgh, but as 
this depends on other people in some degree I cannot be sure. 
Lord Minto goes on Friday or Saturday. He will pass through 
Berlin. I am occupied with what you so earnestly press." Cojyy* 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private, 

1799, June 25. Berlin.— '' As I find by Sir Charles Whitworth's 
despatch under flying seal of the 11th instant, that a messenger 
from thence will pass through Berlin to-morrow or next day, I 
merely write a line by the post of to-night to tell you that no 
new event of any description has happened since my letters of 
the 20th by Wififin. The King passed one day with the Elector 
Palatine at Anspach on the 20th, and Count Haugwiz continues 
with him, so that our business does not advance in discussion. 
Count Schulemburg is ordered by the King to meet him at 
Dessau, and it is possible that Count Haugwiz may then return 
to Berlin, unless he remains to complete the royal progress ; but 
nothing certain is known of his intentions. 

"We have letters from Turin of the 5th instant which describe 
the government established there by order of Suwarow, and 
seem to speak with confidence of their expectation of being soon 
masters of the citadel, as their provisions are scanty, their 
garrison only one third of its number, and that third divided in 
its wishes and interests. 

"The last letters from Swisserland are from Bern and Geneva 
on the 12th, on which day both those cities were still occupied 
by French troops ; but at Berne they had already decreed the 
release of the hostages, and everything bore the appearance of 
immediate retreat, the main army then marching upon the line 
of Soleure to Basle ; at Geneva French engineers had arrived to 
put the city in a state of defence, but nothing had been begun, nor 
was it clear that they had the money, the time, or the men 
necessary for the construction of new works of defence. 



104 

"From Paris all the accounts agree in describing the immediate 
expectation of a great explosion. I have reason also to believe 
that Azara is upon the point of being recalled, the Directory being 
well satisfied with Urquijo, and not desiring to support Azara in 
contradiction to him. At Paris they report their fleet to have left 
Toulon on the 31st, but they do not seem to speak positively of 
this ; they do however agree that the damage done to the Spanish 
fleet by the tempest will require some weeks before it can be 
repaired. 

"The last mails from Italy and Germany brought no authentic 
accounts from Naples, nor any good intelligence of the real 
situation of Macdonald and his army. 

"Count Panin went on Saturday to Carlsbadt. I write by the 
post and therefore could add nothing very interesting, but I have 
in truth nothing to add since my last despatches by Wiffin." 

Postscript. "Lord Folkestone is just arrived here from Mittau. 
I open my letter to say that the Vienna post of the 19th June 
is just come in. I enclose from Sir M. Eden a gazette by which 
it appears, I think, that Moreau has joined Macdonald's army at 
Savona. Sir M. Eden adds that the Toulon fleet (consisting 
of 24 sail) had landed 8,000 men at Vado, and that a regular 
report of this had been made by General Sechendorff on the 8th 
to head quarters at Turin, but without any date, or any mention 
of the English fleet ; and on the 10th Suwarow was marching by 
Asti towards the enemy, having left the citadel of Turin blockaded." 

Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville. 

Private, 

1799, June 26. Cleveland Bow. — "This is an answer to a 
great many hitherto unanswered letters of yours. No. 27 is 
about the gun boats moved from the mouths of the German 
rivers to the coast of Norway. I believe you attach rather 
more importance to the thing than belongs to it, but in truth 
some measure of protection to our trade against that swarm of 
privateers which have their resort to the bays of Norway was 
become absolutely necessary, and Lord Spencer thought he 
had no resource for the purpose but in these vessels. If we 
succeed in my proposal of bullying the Danes into common 
sense we may then be at liberty to resume our blockade of the 
Wadden's. 

"I can by no means answer for it that Haugwitz's suspicions, 
as applied to Lord Liverpool, are wholly unfounded. He loves 
a little contraband trade as dearly as it he shared in it, and I 
believe really thinks that the commercial interests of this 
country are very much promoted by manoeuvres of this sort, to 
which I am ex officio naturally hostile. 

"You will have seen by my having said nothing to Whitworth 
about Napper Tandy and the others that I saw that subject in 
the same light that you did. 

" Now as to our great project. My joy in Whitworth 's despatch 
is greatly damped by what he says about the flotilla, and still 



105 

more by two letters from Kotchoubey and Rostopchin which my 
friend Woronzow gave me to read to-day, and which express a 
a great deal more doubt on the subject than Whitworth seems to 
have been aware of. There is however no use in reasoning about 
this, for before you can receive this letter the aye or no will have 
been finally pronounced, and you will know the decision. But 
then comes this unfortunate business of transports. If we do 
not in some manner or other get assistance on this head either 
from Russian flotilla, or from English ships in the Baltic, the 
whole project is, I fear, irrecoverably defeated, though my 
sanguine colleagues do not yet allow it. But the fact is not the 
less apparent because they shut their eyes. The end of June is 
now come, transports are now to he provided for 10,000 men, and 
when that is done, then we are to see if we cannot begin to 
provide for 10,000 more. And I thought all the while that 
transports for 20,000 were preparing ! and they were urging me 
to make the 20,000, 40 ! All my hope is therefore in Popham's 
zeal and resource, and dashing spirit. But if he also should 
have relied on the thing being done for him here, then all 
is over for this year. Still however, even with this opinion, 
I urge on the measures for these 10,000. They have been 
preparing transports for 10,000 British troops for the Zealand 
expedition ; a part of them is now employed in bringing troops 
from Ireland; a part consisted in revenue cruisers which 
could not be spared out of the N[orth] Sea. But when the 
moment comes I should hope about half of this quantity of 
transport might be added to the 10,000 above mentioned, so as to 
leave the Zealand expedition to shift a little for itself, and to 
send at once transports for 15,000 Russians. But do all you can 
to urge and stimulate Popham to find or to supply resources from 
thence, for here it is but too evident that we shall be miserably 
deficient. The difficulty that is stated on this head of transports 
exceeds all imagination. One would think that in carrying on 
all the trade of the world we do so without any ships. 

"You talk of other people being asleep and ask what the Stadt- 
holder is doing. Why, he is fast asleep, snoring, and not even 
dreaming of doing anything. Nor has he (in my conscience, I 
believe it) the least desire to return to Holland. 

*' You will have seen that Lord Minto is named, and within a 
few days after receiving this letter you will see him at Berlin in 
his way to replace his Irish Lordship of Henley. I anticipated 
your judgment of preference, and made the offer to Pelham, but 
he would not hear of it. Lord Minto seems right enough in his 
ideas just now, and I hope will continue so, but he takes with 
him his Corsican Lord President, who I wish was anywhere else. 
Of your other names I see little that is promising, except Lord 
Amherst, of whom I will enquire more. 

" Pitt told me that he thought Watson had spoken to him 
unfavourably of Diemar, but I have had no opportunity of 
learning any further particulars, and W^atson's judgment of men 
cannot be implicitly relied on, though I believe his integrity may. 
Perhaps one of the reasons against their complying at 



106 

Peter sburgh with our project of the flotilla may be found in 
the desire to keep always in their reach this powerful instrument 
of hostility against Sweden. Perhaps the objection may be no 
more than an unwillingness to own how much all this part of 
their force has been suffered to go to ruin. I entirely agree in 
your ideas as to the plan of your going to Petersburgh to supply 
that energy which is wanting in Whitworth. I rely much on 
Stamford and Popham ; the latter I know, and the former I hope, 
to be peculiarly well qualified to inspire activity and exertion, 
and we cannot spare you at Berlin in the present moment, 
especially under the circumstances which you have mentioned to 
me about Paget. 

" Instructions are sent to Lord Duncan to endeavour to settle 
with V[an] B[raamJ the execution of his plan. You wdll 
receive by this messenger a copy which theP[rince] of [range] 
sends to his son of his orders on this subject, and also a copy in 
English for yourself of the orders. A duplicate of them will be 
sent into Holland directly by a channel which seems a safe one. 
May one not however doubt whether there is any real disposition 
to come out, and whether the whole is no.t rather a plan for 
managing a loop-hole in case of a new revolution? 

"I have had several conversations with F[agel] on the 
prospects that are opening to us. He yesterday sent the 
P [rincess] an account of our plan and a note stating the extreme 
importance of forming our plan of insurrection, and of establish- 
ing in each province comm[itt]ees of persons capable of putting 
the thing in motion with a reasonable hope of controlling its 
direction. He is to see her to-morrow, and in the meantime is 
w^orking on the subject. When this is tolerably digested, one of 
his brothers will go to you at Berlin with it, and will return from 
thence to Minister, where he will establish himself in order to 
keep up the correspondence. 

" I am vexed at the success these cursed French intriguers have 
met with at Petersburgh. I am incredulous, and am quite 
persuaded that even if our reports (of Paris insurrections and of 
Barras being at the head of everything) were true, still we should 
never get any assistance from him till his assistance would not 
be worth having." Coinj. 

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Grenville. 

Private, 

[1799,] June 26. Dublin Castle. — '' I have been honoured 
with your Lordship's letter of the 19th, and shall not fail to 
avail myself of its suggestions as soon as Lord Mountmorris 
returns to Ireland. I hope his Lordship is not the only convert 
which a deeper investigation of the subject has produced. 

*' Knowing how deeply your Lordship is interested in the 
success of the measure of Union, I should trouble you with some 
particulars of our progress, were not your Lordship in possession 
of the official correspondence. I look forward with much 
anxiety to an opportunity of communicating with your Lordship 



107 

in person on the many important points that yet remain to be 
considered of this interesting work ; and trust I shall receive the 
Lord Lieutenant's permission to visit England in the course of 
the summer, when I shall beg leave to solicit a renewal of that 
confidence with which your Lordship honoured me w^hen last in 
London, and from which I derived so much valuable information 
on the subject of my mission." 

Sir Morton Eden to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, June 26. Vienna. — '' I avail myself of the messenger 
Slater's return to England to convey to your Lordship my sincere 
acknowledgments for the immediate and very flattering attention 
which your Lordship has been pleased to give to my wishes 
communicated to your Lordship by Lord Auckland, who, in all 
that he has done on the subject, acted in perfect conformity to 
the desires and sentiments which I had more than once expressed 
to him, and the result of whose endeavours cannot but give me 
entire satisfaction. 

'* I have, at the same time, to express to your Lordship my 
most grateful sense of the very flattering terms in which your 
Lordship has been pleased to speak of my services, and of my 
retreat from the foreign line; and to return your Lordship my 
unfeigned thanks for the representations which your Lordship 
purposed to make to the King, in order to induce His Majesty to 
mark my retreat by some gracious testimony of His Koyal 
approbation and favour. 

''Next to the satisfaction which I must necessarily feel from a 
conscientious discharge of my duty, my greatest pleasure must 
be to know that I have acquitted myself, in the honourable but 
very arduous situation in which I have been placed by your 
Lordship's protection, in such a manner as to have met with 
your Lordship's approbation. Your Lordship's very handsome 
letter has left me nothing to desire on that head, and I shall 
retire into private life with the most lively sense of the many 
and very great marks of kindness which I have uniformly 
experienced from your Lordship, and the remembrance of which 
I will cherish to the last hour of my life. 

" The choice of my successor must give satisfaction here. I 
will cheerfully remain with him as long as he may think that 
my services can be useful to him." 

Count Starhemberg to Lord Grenville. 

1779, June. London. — "Le porteur de ce billet est le negociant 
Flamand, dont j'ai eu I'honneur de vous parler hier. Je crois 
qu'il vaut mieux qu'il vous voie seul. II est prevenu sur 1' 
unbounded confiance qu'il doit avoir dans la probite et secrecy de 
mon ami Lord Grenville. Puisse-t-il reussir avec vous a tirer 
ses braves compatriotes du joug des monstres qui les assassinent." 



108 

Count Starhemberg to Lord Grenvillb. 

1799, June. London. — " Je suis complettement de votre avis 
au sujetde la proposition, et je transmetterai lespapiers quevous 
m'avez communique a ma Cour par le courier prochain. J'aime a 
croire, et je me flatte, qu'on y verra la chose comme on le doit. 

" Le ciel continue a b^nir nos armes. Nous allons en Italie 
de succes en succes ; et il parait que I'Archiduc pourra continuer 
a commander." 

Lord W. Bentinck to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, June 30. Alexandria. — "I take the liberty of sending 
your Lordship the copy of a letter which Field Marshal Souvarof 
has this day written to Lord Nelson." 

Milord Nelson, Baron du Nile. 

" Taclicz de derenir Due de la riviere levante, ponente, et de 
Genes, avec Malta. Je vous emhrasse tendrement. Excellence, grand 
Nelson. 

Votre frere, ami, et adorateur. 

(signed) Comte Alexandre Suworow Rimnikski." 

Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 1. Harley Street. — " Je vous envoi les lettres de 
notifications de I'Empereur et de son fils aine a Sa Majeste le 
Roi au sujet de la naissence d'une princesse, que je vous suplie 
de remetre a Sa Majesty. 

" Je vous envoi, en meme tems, la lettre que le courier du 
Chevalier Whiteworth m'a aport6 du Comte de Rastopchin ; come 
son ecriture est peu lissible, mon fils I'a copie, et il n'y a qu'un 
mot peu imiDortant que j'ai souligne qui ne pr^sente aucun sens. 
La lettre de Hawkwitz a Finkenstein est vraiment impudente. lis 
veullent rester neutres, nous defendent de passer par leur 
teritoire, et quand nous aurons repris les deux fortresses, dont 
I'une a ete livree par I'Autriche, et I'autre a ete prise parceque 
la Prusse ne I'a pas empeche, c'est alors seullement que cette 
derniere se d^terminera a entrer en Holande, ou il n'y a pas de 
troupes pour defendre le pays. Le Comte Panin fait bien de 
s'en aller d'une Cour qui se joue si inde9emment des autres. 

" J'espere que vous etes content de la c^lerite avec la quelle on 
a depeche I'aifaire pour la quelle le tres dilligent Capitane 
Popham est venu chez nous. Son voyage est miraculeux ; en six 
jours de Shernes a Cronstat, c'est inoui ! 

"Les huit milles Suedois, avec les dix-sept milles Busses, 
fairont un bon corp pour delivrer la Holande. Je ne m'imagine 
pas que vous ayez besoin des huit vaisseaux de ligne que la 
Suede vous ofre. Quand a ce qui se fait a Berlin, vous avez 
sans doutte re9u de Monsieur votre frere tous les details 
possibles. lis sont bien desagreables. 



109 

"En v6rit6 si TAutriche et la Prusse n'6toient pas en Europe, 
elles meriteroient bien qu'on les abandone a leurs mauvais sort, 
et qu'on les laissa revolutioner par les Jacobins." 

Enclosure 1. 

Count Rastopchin to Count Woronzow. 

1799, June 13. Petersburgh. — " Je vous 6cris cette lettre que 
j'envoie par le courier de terre, et une copie sera exp6di6e par 
mer, afin que vous soyez instruit de I'objet de cet envoi. 

*' Le Capitaine Popham est arrive ici de la maniere du monde 
la plus singuliere, car il n'a mis que six jours de Londres jusqu'a 
Cronstadt ; il a ete presente aujourd'hui a I'Empereur, a eu une 
conference de trois quarts d'heure, a dm6, et reviendra apres 
demain. Vous connoissez I'objet de sa mission, voici ce qui en 
resulte : 

" L'Empereur donne 17,000 des troupes de la division de la 
Livonie. 

" Ces troupes seront embarques a Lihau et Riga. Les trans- 
ports seront Anglais et aux fraix de I'Angleterre. L'Angleterre 
fournira a I'entretien de ces troupes dans le trajet, et pendant 
tout le terns que ce corps restera aux ordres et a la solde de 
I'Angleterre. En cas que I'expedition ne puisse pas avoir lieu en 
Hollande, alors les troupes seront transferees en Angleterre pour 
y hyverner, et etre ramenes en Russie au printems, ou employ^ 
de nouveau d'apres les circonstances. Le Lieutenant-General 
Herman commandera ce corps ; c'est un eleve de Bauer, home de 
merite. On fixe le depart au 1 d'Aoust. 

" Le Boi de Suede a offert de son propre mouvement 8,000 
homes pour servir contre les Fran9ais, et une flotte de 8 vaisseaux 
et 4 fregates. II prioit I'Empereur de lui negocier des subsides 
de I'Angleterre. On lui a depeche un courier avec la proposition 
de donner ce huit mille hommes pour la Hollande. S'il y 
consent on les embarquera a Gottenburg, et cela fera avec les 
notres 25,000. Sinon, les 17,000 Busses seront embarques seuls. 
Les probabilites sont pour, au pis aller, cela occupera les forces 
des Fran9ais, et attirera leur attention. Cela peut decider le Boi 
de Prusse a entreprendre quelque chose de son cote. Car, alors, 
il y aura tout a gagner et rien a risquer. Une fois le Boi de Suede 
dans la coalition, le Dannemarc entrera aussi. Selon moi, cette 
expedition, qui ne derange en aucune maniere les mesures de 
I'Empereur, peut avoir les suites les plus importantes. Dieu 
veuille que la prosperite accompagne nos braves et respectables 
soldats. — La cour de Vienne est inconcevable, la masqiiee a fait 
encore une farce. Elle souffre M. Hompesch comme un phantome 
de Grand-Maitre a Trieste, il y a Cour et envoi des deputes. Je 
vous dirai que I'Electeur de Bavierre fait ses soumissions ; on a 
expedie un courier a Vienne pour arranger cette affair e. 

" Je ne sais si M. Thugut sera content de cette reconciliation, 
car il aimeroit assez qu'on le laisse faire de la Bavierre ce qu'ils 
ont fait de Venise. Le Comte Cobenzl est bien malade ; il est 
dans un etat affreux, faible, couvert de plaies, et frappe de son 



110 

6tat. Les medecins craignent qu'ils ne Ten tireront pas. Le 
jour de bapteme il y a eu des graces. Malgre mes prieres 
I'Empereur m'a fait Directeur- General des Postes. C'est une 
place qui embrasse tout I'empire. Ce n'est ni les revenus 
immenses de ce departement, ni les gens a y employer qui 
m'embarrassent. C'est I'ordre a y etablir. Adieu M. le Comte ; 
plaignez-moi et souhaitez-moi plus de sante." 

Enclosure 2. 

Portrait dit Marechal Souvarow, 

*'Le Marechal, Comte de Souvarow, est un homme d'une 
taille moyenne, age de 65 a 65 ans, et quoique tres maigre, il est 
encore jusqu'aujourd'hui plein de force, de feu, et d'activite. 
Son corps est d'une trempe si extraordinaire, qu'il est aussi 
inaccessible au froid et aux intemperies de Fair, qu'il est 
insensible aux fatigues. Sa maniere de vivre et ses mceurs 
sont d'une simplicite sans egale. Une botte de paille forme 
son lit ordinaire, et lorsqu'il est en campagne, la premiere 
chaumiere qu'il rencontre au bout de sa marche lui sert de 
palais. Personne n'est plus sobre, ni plus frugal que lui. D'une 
famille distinguee, ne au milieu de I'aisance, il a conserve cette 
austerite de moeurs qui tient du stoicisme, mais dont la source 
est infiniment plus pure. Ennemi de la mollesse, du luxe, et de 
la volupte, il s'est durci de bonne lieure dans le choix qu'il a fait 
du metier leplus rude, qui est celui dela guerre ; et ce n'est que 
dans ce metier, au bruit des armes, et au milieu des combats, 
qu'il trouvait ses plaisirs, et qu'il passait sa vie. Avec une ame 
ardente et taill^e en grand, un esprit juste et entrepr^nant, un 
cceur genereux et desinteresse au point de dedaigner meme les 
richesses, et avec une force de caractere qui le rend aussi 
inflexible et ferme dans le bien qu'insensible a la crainte, cet 
homme, en embrassant la carriere des armes, a cultive les talens 
militaires par de profondes etudes ; et Ton peut dire, hardiment, 
que nul homme n'a medite davantage sur les campagnes des 
grands capitaines ; nul n'a etudie mieux I'art de faire la guerre, 
tant des anciens que des modernes ; et nul n'a conserve, peut- 
etre aussi bien, la memoire des grandes actions qui se sont 
donnees sur les dilf6rens theatres de la guerre. Plus philosophe 
que la plupart des guerriers, il a senti'que I'homme n'est pas 
purement et simplement machine ; que si le corps, qui en fait 
une de ses parties, est sujet aux loix de la mechanique, sa partie 
la plus noble, celle qui dirige le mouvement et comande au 
sentiment, n'obeit qu'a des loix qui, suivant sa nature, lui sont 
particulieres ; et que si Ton ne cultivait que la partie la plus 
grossiere, sans songer a mettre de I'accord avec I'autre, I'home 
se reduirait a I'etat d'automate ; et pire que cela, car sa propre 
volont6, n'etant ni entierement detruite, ni dirigee, pourrait 
souvent se refuser a suivre la direcion qu'une impulsion 
^trangere voudrait lui donner. D'un autre cote, conoissant le 
desavantage incalculable qu'ont toutes les troupes automates, et 
par consequent, sans passion, vis-a-vis de celles qui sont 



Ill 

6lectris6es par les seiitimens qu'on a soiii de leur inspirer, dont 
I'imagination est exalt^e par la magie des diiferens tableaux 
qu'on trace devant eux, et qui sont enivrees de zele et d'ardeur 
par tous les prestiges qu'on met en usage : ce General ne se 
bornait pas aux seuls exercises qui donneut de la souplesse et de 
ladexterite aux troupes, mais il s'occupait en meme terns de 
I'esprit de I'arm^e, qu'il a tou jours cherch6 de cultiver ; en se 
servant pour cela de tous les moyens que son genie pouvait tirer 
de la conaissance exacte du caractere des individus qu'il cornande, 
de leur genie, leurs opinions, mceurs, coutumes. Un seal 
exemple suffira pour donner une id^e de la maniere dont il s'y 
prenait. Lorsque la Grande Catherine, peu de terns avant sa 
mort, se determina d'envoyer au secours de I'Empereur 60 mille 
hommes contre les Francais, elle nomma le Marechal Souvaroff 
pour commander cette armee, et lui communiqua la-dessus, 
quelques mois d'avance, ses volont^s. Le General 
rassembla les troupes destinees pour cette expedition autour de 
son quartier-general, et fesant venir, tous les jours et tour a 
tour, chaque regiment a la parade, il lui lisait, lorsque la parade 
6tait finie, quelques petites instructions qu'il avait soin de com- 
poser lui-meme. Ces instructions, ecrites de la maniere la plus 
simj)le et la plus analogue a I'esprit d'un soldat Eusse, roulaient 
sur ses devoirs, et sur les parties qu'il lui etait indispensable de 
connaitre, comme guerrier ; mais il y delayait en meme tems 
quelques ingrediens, bien choisis et bien calcules pour produire 
en lui une horreur pour les principes atroces des Fran9ais 
republicains, une haine pour cette nation degeneree, et une 
ardeur pour la combattre. Non content de cela, il ne laissait 
^chapper aucune occasion qu'il croyait etre propre pour 
entretenir en eux ce sentiment. Lorsqu'il les exer^ait, par 
exemple, soit par regiment, soit par corps, c'etait toujours les 
republicains qu'on avait devant soi; c'est eux qui etaient I'objets 
de toutes les attaques et de tous les manoeuvres qu'on faisait, et 
les bayonnettes au bout des fusils etaient toujours dirigees contre 
eux lorsqu'on marchait en colonne serree. Toutes ces choses ne 
pouvaient manquer de produire I'effet qu'il desirait, et qui etait 
celui de faire sur eux une impression si forte, que le nom seul de 
Francais republicain puisse leur servir de signal pour le combat. 
Ajoutez a cela que personne ne s'est plus applique a etudier I'art 
de se faire aimer des troupes, et n'a mieux r^ussi, parceque 
personne n'a 6t6 plus convaincu que Principes pro Victoria 
ptignant, comites pro principe. Si d'un cote la verite de cette 
maxime est attest^e par les experiences journalieres, qui nous 
font voir que les armies les moins propres a triompher sur leurs 
ennemis sont toujours celles qui sont composees d'individus 
dont les ames froides portent aussi peu d 'affection pour le chef 
qui le cornande, que d'interet pour la cause qu'ils defendent ; d'un 
autre cote, les succes brillants et non interrompus du Comte 
Souvoroff ne la confirme pas moins. II serait difficile, dans un 
6crit de cette nature, d'entrer dans les details de ses exploits qui 
viennent a I'appui de cette verite ; c'est pourquoi Ton se bornera 
de dire simplement que ce g6n6ral, ayant fait toutes les guerres 



112 

que la Kussie a eues dans les derniers 45 ans, s'est trouv6 a un 
nombre de batailles que pas un guerrier de nos jours n'a eu 
occasion de voir ; qu'ayant eu pour la plupart le commandement 
en chef, il s'est constamment tenu au-dessus des revers de la 
fortune ; et que dans toutes ces occasions, la gloire n'a jamais 
liesite, un seul instant, de se declarer pour lui. L'on pourrait 
6galement ajouter qu'il n'est, peut-etre, pas aise de trouver, dans 
les fastes de la guerre, un second exemple d'un general qui eut 
livre autant d'assauts que lui, et qui eut emporte des villes aussi 
bien defendues que celles qui, a la suite de combats sanglans, 
ont ete forcees de c6der a la valeur de ce chef, et a I'intrepidite 
des troupes Russes qu'il comandait. 

"Mais avant de finir, que Ton me permette d'ajouter quelques 
mots sur un prejuge qui a generalement prevalu parmi tons ceux 
dont le jugement superficial se brise sur la surface des objets, 
sans pouvoir jamais penetrer I'ecorce qui les couvrent ; ce prejuge 
est celui de croire qu'une certaine originalite dans le caractere, 
quelques singularites dans les manieres, beaucoup de simplicity 
dans les formes du discours, et un grand respect pour les opinions, 
les coutumes, et les usages de nos peres, sont incompatibles avec 
le genie et les talents militaires : un prejuge qui les conduit a 
une conclusion non moins fausse, qui est celle de supposer que 
tons les succes constans du General Souvaroff ne doivent etre 
attribues qu'aux effets du hazard. Sans m'occuper a combattre 
cette opinion, et a demontrer combien I'idee d'un hazard fixe 
repugne a la raison et a la saine logique, je tacherai de diriger 
I'attention de tons ceux dont le raisonnement a plus de suite et 
de methode, sur les qualites particulieres auxquelles tons les 
succes de ce general doivent etre, principalement, attribues, en 
leur citant quelques traits de ses exploits qui les mettront en 
Evidence. Lors de la derniere guerre avec les Polonais (celle qui 
d^cida de Varsovie), L'Imperatrice de Russie, fatiguee a la fin 
d'en attendre les derniers resultats qui tardaient d'arriver, 
voulait accelerer les operations en donnant ordre au General 
Souvaroff d'entrer en Pologne avec un corps de 15 mille hommes, 
qui se trouvant alors dispose sur les bords du Dniester, non 
loin de Balta, etait par la le plus a portee de ce pays. Ce 
General, au moment meme de suivre les ordres de sa souveraine 
et de se mettre en marche, re^oit la nouvelle que le Roi de Prusse 
a 6te oblige de quitter le territoire Polonais avec toute son 
arm6e qu'il commandait en personne, pour aller se porter dans ses 
propres etats, ou quelques insurrections naissantes demandaient 
sa presence et celle de ses troupes. Voyant alors que les forces 
qui avaient agis en Pologne etaient diminuees de 40 mille hommes 
(ce qui composait I'armee du Roi), il a senti qu'il ne lui restait 
d'autre ressource que celle de porter a ce pays un coup inattendu, 
en precipitant, autant que possible, la marche des troupes qu'il 
comandait, afin d'etonner I'ennemi ; et de le combattre avant 
qu'il eut le terns de connaitre le nombre des assaillants, et avant 
que ses propres troupes fussent informees des obstacles qu'elles 
auront a surmonter. Pour executer ce plan, il presse la marche 
des troupes Russes au point que la vitesse avec la quelle elles se 



iia 

sont port^es ne peut paraitre qu'un fait peu croyable pour toute 
autre nation. La distance qui les separait de Varsovie, le centre 
des forces reunies de la Pologne contre lequel ce general dirigeait 
ses efforts, etait de plus de 700 verstes, ou pres de 485 milles 
Anglais. Dix jours de marche ont suffi pour ce trajet. Au bout 
de ce tems, a peine arrive au point ou il brulait d^ja d'impatience 
d'y etre, qu'il fait une reconnaissance assez generale et assez 
complete pour coiiaitre la position de I'ennemi sur tous les points 
possibles ; et lorsqu'il n'eut plus rien a d^sirer de ce cdt6, il se 
decide sur-le-champ d'entamer cette ville du cdt6 de Prague, et 
distribue les orders necessaires pour le mettre en execution le 
jour suivant. Ce jour arrive, et quelques minutes decident 
du sort de la Pologne et terminent cette guerre. Ce trait-ci, avec 
tous ceux qui sont connus de lui, comme celui d'avoir battu avec 
une poignee d'hommes et mis en d^route totale I'armee nombreuse 
des Polanais commandes par le Prince Oginsky, lors de la 
premiere confederation ; celui d'avoir completement defait avec 
un corps de 10 mille hommes toute I'armee du Grand Vizir, une 
victoire qui lui a valu cette grande consideration dont il jouit 
dans I'armee Autrichienne ; tous ces traits, dis-je, avec une 
infinite d'autres, sont certainement les meilleures preuves que 
Ton puisse donner pour faire voir combien le jugement que 
quelques-uns ont porte sur lui, et dont nous avons parle plus haut, 
est mal-fonde." 



Henry Dundas to Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 1. Wimbledon. — "Lady Jane, at the request of a 
corps of volunteers in our neighbourhood, is obliged to perform 
a ceremony this forenoon in presenting their colours, and having 
nothing to do in town which I could not do here to better pur- 
pose, I have not gone to-day. It was at any rate my intention 
to be with you to-morrow forenoon at eleven o'clock, having 
appointed Sir Ralph Abercrombie to be at your house at that 
hour. You'll recollect I mentioned to you my intention in the 
view that Mr. Fagel, or anybody you please, might likewise be 
present, in order that the subject might be considered in 
different lights. I shall come to you at half an hour before 
eleven. 

" Don't be uneasy about the transports; I shall bring it all 
right. Entre nous, I think Lord Spencer sometimes listens 
when he ought not to official difficulties stated by his naval 
colleagues at the Board, without exercising his own understand- 
ing and authority on a general view of the subject as a member 
of Government. I have desired Huskisson to send for your 
perusal the letters I have wrote to the Admiralty, and it is my 
intention to write a private letter to Lord Spencer this morning 
to state the total impossibility of a great and urgent public 
service being obstructed from the want of a thousand or fifteen 
hundred seamen which can, without the smallest inconvenience, 
be taken from guard-ships or others for a short time. 

6803 5 



114 

*'I must send Lord Spencer the despatches from Popham the 
moment they come from the King ; but I will accompany them 
with a memorandum to send them to you as soon as he has read 
them." 

Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville. 

1799, July 1. Cleveland Row.—" This letter will not go till 
to-morrow night, but as I may probably be hurried then, I begin 
it now. 

" Your despatch by Wiffin brought me in yesterday from a very 
fine walk at Dropmore, and I am afraid I hardly thought myself 
repaid by the perusal of Haugwitz's display of the King of 
Prussia's most valorous resolution to make war the very moment 
it shall be clear that he can do so without either expense or 
danger. I most perfectly agree in the opinion you have stated of 
the impossibility of our acceding to the condition of taking Mentz 
and Ehrenbreitstein, operations which, you well know, I have 
from the beginning had no fancy for ; but I am inclined to go a 
little further in my negative resolutions, and to decline all 
engagement that shall be founded on any condition of Prussian 
co-operation, because where it is so evident that Prussia does not 
mean to give herself roundly and fairly to the cause, but to 
preserve in her hands every species of back game, I am not 
willing to afiford her so easy a means of doing this as must arise 
out of any such engagement, the non-performance of which may 
always be pretended, and frequently with some show of reason. 
We must therefore do our business ourselves. If Prussia will 
help us in it, even for the eleventh hour, it is well, Incro appone ; 
but if not, let us be quite sure that we can do without her. 

"But then these cursed transports ! pray tell me your opinion 
(we shall have full time to receive it) whether in the present 
state of affairs we might not with our 10,000 men from here 
strike the blow against Walcheren without waiting for the other 
attack which is, I am grieved to see it, still at two, should I not say 
three months distance. Transports to go from here to Riga one 
month, even if they were ready to-day. To embark the troops 
and to bring them to Yevern or rather to Gothenburg, one month 
more. Then the time, be it more or less, of preparing the attack 
and making it, and the result must bring the actual operation 
late in September; not an unfavourable season by any means for 
acting in Groninguen and Overyssel, but full late to commence 
operations by sea against Zealand or Holland. 

"If we attack Walcheren in one month from this time, and 
we could do it in less if this cursed transport service does not 
stand in our way, we could in all probability make ourselves 
masters of it without much difficulty, and there seems every 
reason to hope that we could hold it for two months longer 
against the whole force that the Batavian Government could 
bring against it, supposing their French allies as well occupied 
as they are now, and as they are likely to be. The course of this 
operation would naturally point to that quarter every effort that 



n 



115 

the Dutch Government could make, and would leave the n [orth] 
e[ast] frontier totally open to our projected attack supposing it 
executed any time in September ; and the success of this latter 
being thus facilitated and almost ensured, the whole country 
could ultimately be reduced. 

" The inconvenience (and almost the only one) to be appre- 
hended from this change in our projects is that the appearance 
of our forces on the coast, and still more their success, would 
probably occasion insurrections in almost every other part of the 
United Provinces, and these (as we should have no means of 
supporting them) would probably be crushed at once, the 
mischief of which would be infinite in a public light, besides the 
ruin which it would bring on so many individuals. 

" On the other hand, if we are to delay our attack for three 
months longer we give great time for strengthening the 
vulnerable points, and we defer acting till the season is very 
unfavourable for our share of the attack. I really hardly know 
to which side my mind leans in this balance. 

"The offer of Sweden, if it had been made six weeks ago, would 
have relieved all our difficulties, for there we might unquestion- 
ably procure transports sufficient. But now we shall hardly save 
time by this resource, though we may avoid other difficulties 
by it. 

"If even now we could make the King of Prussia take one 
manly resolution, we might save much time and exj)ense by 
landing our troops at Lubeck, and marching them either to 
Hamburgh, or at once to Bremen, or even toDeventer. But this 
is not very likely at the same moment that he prescribes to the 
Kussian army, whose assistance he asks for, that they shall not 
march through his territory, or any other enclave. 

"Did I mention to you in my last letter that I have set Fagel 
to work, and that his brother, who is here, will be sent to you 
with the result of all we can do here ; which all however I fear 
will not be much ?" 

July 2. — "I guessed rightly enough that I should have little 
time to write to you to-night, but the despatches to Whitworth 
will tell you much of what I wished you should know. You see 
our friend Paul has blabbed our secret, and this is the worse 
considering how much time must elapse before we execute our 
schemes. In other respects things look well." Copy. 

The Prince of Orange to the Hereditary Prince of Orange. 

1799, July 1. Hampton Court. — " Je vous envoye une lettre 
pour M. de Rhoon avec sa copie : je vous prie de la lui faire 
parvenir si vous n'y avez point de remarques ; et si vous avez 
quelques raisons de croire que cette demarche pourroit etre 
nuisible, et contrecarrer des mesures que vous pourriez prendre 
pour obtenir le but que nous nous proposons, scavoir, la 
d^livrance de notre patrie, je vous prie de me les marquer, et de 
me renvoyer la lettre afin que je puisse juger si vos raisons sont 
bonnes pour ne pas I'envoyer. On desire en general ici que 



116 

M. de Khoon soye employ^ a travailler au retablissement des 
choses, a cause de son zele pour la bonne cause, et que lui aime a 
etre employe. Je rends justice a son attachement a la constitu- 
tion, mais je ne voudrais pas que, pour satisfaire a ses desirs, on 
empechat I'effet de ce que vous pourrez faire pour la delivrance 
de notre patrie, et ce seroit lui rendre un mauvais service a lui- 
meme que de le mettre en avant, et de rendre par la, sa rentree 
dans notre patrie et son retablissement dans ses emplois plus 
difficile ; I'experience m'a prouve que son trop grand desir de tout 
faire a nui souvent aux affaires, et qu'il a desire d'obtenir, et a 
obtenu, des commissions qu'il auroit ete a souhaiter pour lui et 
pour moi qu'il n'eut point eues, telle que celle de changer les 
magistratures des villes d'Hollande en 1787 et 1788. Vous etes 
mieux en etat de juger que moi si ma lettre pent lui etre remise 
sans difficultes, et je vous laisse le maitre d'agir selon les circon- 
stances, vous priant de me faire scavoir, le plus tot le mieux, ce 
que vous aurez fait de ma lettre, afin que je puisse en informer 
ceux qui voudraient que M. de Rhoon fut mis en activity." Copy. 

Enclosure. 
The Pbince of Orange to Count de Bentinck Rhoon. 

1799, July 1. Hampton Court. — "Mon fils m'ayant inform^ 
de la continuation de votre zele pour la bonne cause, et de votre 
desir de voir une contre-revolution s'effectuer dans la Republique 
des Provinces-Unies pour la delivrer du joug des Francois, et de 
ceux qui sous leur autorit^ y exercent le pouvoir supreme sans 
aucun droit : je vous prie de me communiquer vos id^es a ce 
sujet, et specialement sur les moyens que vous croyez qu'on 
pourroit employer pour organiser une contre-r6volution dans la 
province d'Hollande, dans le cas ou Ton pourroit avoir I'assurance 
d'etre promptement assiste par une armee etrangere. 

"Je vous prie de communiquer ce que vous m'ecrivez a mon 
fils qui, etant sur le Continent, est plus a meme que moi de juger 
si les circonstances permettent d'agir ou non, et de ne point faire 
de demarches qui pussent avoir pour suite quelque explosion, ou 
qui pussent vous compromettre, ou exposer quelques-uns des bien- 
intentionnes qui se trouvent dans le pays, sans vous etre concerte 
la-dessus avec mon fils, et sans que vous soyez d'accord avec lui 
que ces d-marches sont utiles a la bonne cause." Copy. 

1799, [July], Memorandum of Monsieur Van de Spiegel, on 
the project of a Union of the Dutch and Austrian Netherlands 
under the House of Orange. 

" Serait-il avantageux pour notre republique, qu' au moyen d'un 
arrangement a faire a la paix generale, les dix provinces ci-devant 
autrichiennes fussent r^unies aux notres, et ne formassent qu'une 
republique ? 

" A consid^rer la question superficiellement on dirait qu'oui; 
^ar il semble qu'un pareil arrangement donnerait un grand 



iir 

accroissement de forces a I'etat ; et si Ton fait d^pendre unique- 
ment de la le bonheur d'un pays, Ton a raison ; mais il est 
encore d'autres considerations qu'on ne doit pas n^gliger. 

"En premier lieu la r^imblique changerait par la entierement 
de forme, et il faudrait conclure une ligue tout-a-fait nouvelle avec 
des contrees qui different de nous par la religion, par les moeurs, 
les interets, quelques-unes meme par le langage; or il est a peu 
pres politiquement impossible d'esp^rer une reunion solide et 
sincere entre des elements aussi discordants. L'Empereur Charles 
Quint a deja energiquement voulu cette reunion, mais il a ete 
oblige d'abandonner son projet a cause des difiicultes qu'il y 
voyait. On le r^prit pendant la guerre avec I'Espagne, et la 
pacification dc Gand de 1756 semblait y paver les voies ; mais on 
ne tarda pas a s'apercevoir combien il en resultait peu d'avantages, 
et, trois ans apres, les Sept Provinces se separerent des autres 
et conclurent entre elles TUnion d'Utrecht. 

2. " Notre republique est batie sur des bases toutes differentes 
de celles qu'il faudrait alors; nous avons ete une puissance 
maritime et nous deviendrions une puissance continentale ; la 
chaine de fortifications qui avait ete construite contre des attaqnes 
qui pouvaient nous etre f aites du cote des provinces Autrichiennes, 
devra etre placee ailleurs, et comme ces provinces n'ont point de 
forteresses, on sera oblige d'en construire des nouvelles. Notre 
politique a toujours ete d'empecher que le commerce ne se 
transportat de chez nous dans la Flandre et le Brabant, ce qui 
serait certainement arrive an moyen de I'E scant jusqu'a An vers, 
d'Ostende, et d'un canal qu'il aurait ete facile de creuser depuis 
Bruges, si notre republique ne s'y etait constamment opposee par 
la force et par les stipulations des traites. Maintenant ces 
maximes devraient etre changees ; et n'en resulterait-il pas bien 
vite que le Brabant et la Flandre redeviendraient ce que ces 
provinces etaient il y a 300 ans, savoir, le theatre d'une prosperite 
sans bornes, tandis que la Hollande et Zeelande rentreraient 
dans leur ancien etat, et serviraient de nouveau de demeure a 
quelques pauvres pecheurs. 

3. "Le voisinage de la France ne nous entrainerait-il pas 
dans des guerres continuelles ? La politique de nos ancetres a 
toujours consiste a eviter ce voisinage, et a avoir plutot une 
puissance intermediaire entre la France et nous ; c'est pour cette 
raison que le Prince Frederic Henri d'Orange n'a jamais pu 
reussir a faire la conquete des Pays-bas, conformement au traits 
de partage avec la France, quoiqu'il les ait attaqu^s a plusieurs 
reprises a la tete des armees Fran9aises et de celles de notre 
republique ; mais chez nous on voyait ces projets avec deplaisir, 
et on les a toujours traverses. C'est encore pour la meme raison 
qu'en 1701, lors de la Grande Alliance entre TEmpereur, la Grande 
Bretagne, et notre Eepublique, le roi Guillaume stipula que 
les Pays-bas Espagnols serviraient de barriere pour I'etat, 
mais ne chercha jamais a lui en procurer la propriete, ni en tout 
ni en partie. Le but de cette, barriere, qui explique toute notre 
politique a I'egard des Pays-bas Espagnols, etait d'en assurer la 
souverainete a une puissance dont il ne fut pas probable qu'elle 



iia 

devint Talliee de la France, et qui, en meme temps, fut assez 
considerable pour defendre ses etats ; le tout cependant de telle 
maniere que notre republique conservat tou jours une influence 
suffisante dans les Pays-bas, pour pouvoir empecher soit que le 
souverain de ces provinces en fit une place d'armes contre nous, 
ou qu'il y protegeat le commerce au prejudice du notre. Dans ce 
but nous entretenions des troupes aux Pays-bas, et etions maitres 
de la navigation de toutes les rivieres dont la France aurait du 
se servir pour entrer dans notre pays (excepte du cote de 
I'Empire) pendant que nous etions, en meme temps, en possession 
du commerce interieur le long de ces rivieres. 

"Et c'est la encore a present I'unique interet que nous avons 
aux Pays-bas ; nous n'en avons pas a les posseder en propre, ou a 
les incorporer dans notre republique. S'il est possible d'effectuer 
quelqu' espece de reunion avec ce pays-la, j'aimerais mieux que 
les dix provinces des Pays-bas devinssent une republique a part, 
sous le Stadhouderat de la Maison d' Orange, et unies avec nous 
par ce lien-la ; ou qu'elles fussent cedees en souverainete a la 
Maison d' Orange a titre de dedommagement, pour les posseder 
sur le pied de harriere ; ou bien encore, qu'afin de prevenir la 
collision que des interets commerciaux pourraient faire naitre 
entre nous et le souverain des Pays-bas, Anvers, Ostendc, et 
Bruges fussent cedees a notre republique, et tout le reste a la 
Maison d'Orange ; mais il est peu probable pour plus d'une 
raison que cela arrive jamais; il est toujours utile neanmoins de 
ne pas perdre de vue ces principes de nos veritables interets." 

The Prince of Orange to J. Fagel. 

1799, July 3. Hampton Court. — ." Le Prince d'Orange 
croyant utile pour les interets tant de sa patrie, que de sa maison, 
d'avoir une personne de confiance au Continent qui puisse y etre 
employe par son fils le Prince Hereditaire d'Orange a corres- 
pondre, tant de la part du Prince d'Orange que de celle du 
Prince Hereditaire d'Orange, avec des anciens membres de la 
Regence, et avec d'autres personnes bien-intentionnees qui se 
trouvent, soit dans I'interieur de la Republique des Provinces 
Unies, soit dans ses environs, a fait choix pour cet effet de 
M. Jacques Fagel, et I'a charge de se rendre dans le courant de 
ce mois en Allemagne, d'aller, directement apres son arrivee a 
Cuxhaven, a Berlin aupres du Prince Hereditaire d'Orange, et de 
prendre ses ordres, et les renseignements qu'il pourra lui donner 
sur les moyens de correspondre d'une maniere sure avec les 
bien-intentionnes qui se trouvent dans le territoire de la 
Republique des Provinces-Unies, ainsi que sur le choix des 
personnes avec lesquelles il pourroit et devroit correspondre. 
II se rendra en suite a Bremen, ou a tel autre endroit peu 
eloigne tant de la frontier e de la Republique des Provinces- 
Unies que du port de Cuxhaven, et qui puisse etre un endroit 
interm^diare entre Londres, Berlin, et la Republique des 
Provinces-Unies, que le Prince Hereditaire d'Orange pourra 
lui indiquer, et s'y etablira. II pourra porter en compte ses 



119 

debours, tant pour le port de lettres que pour les voyages qu'il 
pourra faire avec I'aveu du Prince Hereditare d' Orange, soit en 
Allemagne, soit dans I'interieur de la R^publique, soit meme en 
Angleterre dans le cas ou le Prince H^reditaire d'Orange pour- 
roit trouver necessaire qu'il s y rendit pour faire rapport de 
bouche au Prince d'Orange de la situation des choses, ou 
prendre ses ordres sur des articles qui ne pourroient etre confies 
au papier. II pourra assurer les anciens Regens, et autres 
personnes bien-intentionnees, sur la discretion desquelles il 
pourra compter, et avec lesquels il correspondra, de I'interet 
que sft Majeste Brittanique daigne prendre au sort de la R^pub- 
lique des Provinces-Unies et de la Maison d'Orange, et de son 
intention de prendre les mesures necessaires pour faire agir avec 
efficace la garantie du Stadhouderat qu'elle a donne par le 
traite de — du 1778. 

" II tachera par le moyen de ses correspondances d'entretenir 
les bons sentimens des bien-intentionnes, de prevenir un 
decouragement qui empecheroit de tirer parti de leurs bonnes 
dispositions lorsque I'occasion pourroit devenir favorable 
d'effectuer le retablissement de la constitution legitime de la 
Republique des Provinces-Unies et du Stadhouderat ; mais en 
meme tems il evitera tout ce qui pourroit les engager a des 
demarches inconsiderees, ou a une explosion prematuree, avant 
que les troupes des Puissances alliees pussent le sontenir et 
seconder leurs efforts, pour tacher de se delivrer du joug des 
Francois. II informera le Prince Hereditaire d'Orange de toutes 
les choses iihportantes qui parviendront a sa connoissance, et 
agira d'apres ses directions. II ecrira aussi au Prince d'Orange 
ce qu'il apprendra d'interressant, et si cela presse et ne peut 
etre confie a la poste, il est autorise d'envoyer des expres avec 
ses lettres. Quant a d'autres choses secretes qui ne sont pas 
assez importantes pour les envoyer par expres, il les ecrira en 
chiffre, et se servira du chiffre que le Prince d'Orange lui fournira. 

"Enfin il fera ce qui est en son pouvoir pour etre utile a sa 
patrie et a la Maison d'Orange, d'apres les directions qu'il recevra 
du Prince Hereditaire d'Orange, ou du Prince d'Orange." 
Copy ; enclosed in the Allowing letter. 

H. Fagel to Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 3. — "I have endeavoured, agreeably to your wish, to 
express in the enclosed paper your own and Mr. Grenville's ideas, 
which agree perfectly with my own, and to combine them both 
with the information and advice which, I have reason to believe, 
the Prince and Princess will have given to the Hereditary Prince, 
in consequence of what I suggested to them in your name, and 
with the establishment of that correspondence which is the 
principal object of my brother's journey. A detailed and regular 
plan of the nature alluded to can, I think, be definitely settled 
only by persons of the description mentioned, and being actually 
in the country, communicating their ideas on the subject to the 
Hereditary Prince, by means of the correspondence which is to 



120 

be set on foot. I know that the Hereditary Prince is already in 
correspondence with some persons of that description, as, for 
instance, with a Mr. van de PoU'at Amsterdam, a man of con- 
siderable abilities and influence in that city ; with Mr. d'Enghuysen 
in the province of Gelderland, and others. The Princess further 
points out to him some persons who might be usefully employed 
in the same way. He will of course instruct my brother to 
correspond with them, particularly for attaining the object in 
question, and I have not the least doubt myself but that, by this 
means, it will be attained. 

" I take the liberty also to submit to you whether you would 
not think proper to authorize my brother to inform, in general 
terms, Mr. Charles Bentinck in your name that the general 
circumstances of Europe are such as to afford a nearer prospect 
of a favourable change of circumstances in Holland, and to desire 
him to correspond with the Hereditary Prince on the measures 
to be taken in the provinces of Friesland and Groningen on the 
approach of an armed force from without, which will enable the 
well-disposed inhabitants of those provinces to come forward. 

"I don't know whether the enclosed paper will exactly answer 
your intention, either in point of substance or in form. I must 
submit that to you. I am still more in need of your indulgence 
with respect to the language. Writing in English in Lord 
Grenville's name would, under any other shape, and any other 
circumstances than the present, make me appear ridiculous in 
my own eye. 

Postscript. " If I should not hear from you to the contrary I 
mean to call with my brother to-morrow morning before 11 
o'clock. If he is to set off by next Saturday's packet, he must 
leave town Friday, very early in the morning." 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 6. Berlin. — "I do most heartily give you joy in 
forwarding to you without delay the important intelligence of 
the conclusion of all your Petersburgh arrangements, and I 
know not how to do justice to all that seems due to the extra- 
ordinary exertions and success of Captain Popham which have 
been well supported by Sir Charles Whitworth. Unfortunately 
he entirely forgot to send two letters to me from General 
Stamford, so that I know not a word of the General's opinions,'-'* 
but I think I can answer for his approving all that marks so 
strongly the zeal, intelligence, and activity of those who have 
been so successfully at work. Perhaps I might have wished that 
the fleet of galleys and the navigation of the Eyder had not been 
put by from political speculations about Hamburgh, or military 
apprehensions of summer camps and Danish boors ; but where 
there is so much to commend, one must not allow oneself to be 
too critical, and the merits of Popham are too great to bear any 
remark other than of great praise in this important transaction ; 
for the same reason I do not object to the objectionable part of 

* See letter of General de Stamford to Mr. Grenville, dated June 18, 1799, on 
page 96. 



121 

Whitworth's treaty in leaving to the Emperor the absolute recall 
of all his ships at any moment, and yet consenting to give him 
two months extra pay even in the case of sudden recall ; but the 
ships are there, the troops will be there, the expedition will take 
place, and must succeed, and therefore I am, as you will doubtless 
be, au comhle de lajoije. I really am only doing bare justice when 
I praise in my despatches the conduct of the Hereditary Prince of 
Orange ; he is reserved, prudent, and laborious to the greatest 
degree, and I have found him in every respect disposed to do all 
that his talents and situation can afford, and that without any 
appearance hitherto of wishing to press forward his own ideas 
and opinions ; he approves highly of what I have told him respect- 
ing the object in question, and I have recommended to him to 
make all his arrangements respecting the officers who are to be 
collected, and the other facilities which can be offered from 
the interior, without giving to any one individual person the 
knowledge of the proposed expedition. This is difficult, but it 
is necessary, and he has promised to conduct himself scrupulously 
upon this principle. It will however be necessary that some 
place should be fixed for the embarkation of those officers who 
will be wanted in the interior, and who dare not pass the frontier 
by land. I must take this opportunity to state to you that 
Robert Fagel is very apprehensive of the bad effects which may 
arise, if you should have taken an exact copy of his letter to his 
brother, and if that copy should reach the Stadtholder or the 
H[ereditary] P[rince], because there are six words in Dutch 
which speak slightingly of the Prince of Orange's memoire. I 
have therefore promised that, if you have taken a copy, you will 
erase those six Dutch words for fear of accidents, and I am con- 
fident you will not forget to do so as the letter was a private one, 
and not intended for the public eye. 

"With respect to our Berlin negotiation, I can add but little 
to my public letter. I understand from Haugwiz that these 
military difficulties have all arisen from the Duke of Brunswick 
himself, who has taught the King to believe that he must not 
run the risk of a French army collecting on the Moselle, a risk 
which Haugwiz holds as cheap as I can do. He is sanguine in 
his belief that his projet de convention, which I am to see to- 
morrow night, will furnish the grounds of a real agreement, and 
he has promised distinctly to specify the point at which the 
Russians are to arrive ; he is certainly sincere in his belief that 
the King will really act sooner than he will be bound to do, and 
I am ready enough to believe this, because I have alwaj^s thought 
they must act as soon as they are aware of our project, and that 
cannot now be long a secret. I have some reluctance therefore 
to consent to pay them sooner for acting only in the case in 
which they can act without danger to themselves ; but, upon the 
whole, the early declaration of Prussia is still so important, that 
I am inclined to think every practicable inducement should be 
resorted to for it, however disgusting it may be to act in measure 
with such feeble and wretched politicians. I am not quite with- 
out apprehensions that the Emperor of Russia may at last find 



122 

his army so drained as not to furnish the corps which he had 
offered to Prussia ; but when I recollect that a Prussian war with 
France will set the Emperor free from all disquietude on the 
Prussian frontier, I trust that he will not hesitate to fulfil his 
promise if the Prussians will claim it. It may however possibly 
happen that the Emperor will refuse, and I have reason to believe 
that, in such a case, the Prussian Ministers will be still more 
disposed to concert only with England, for I have remarked that 
Haugwiz has always caught with great avidity at the loose hints 
by which I have endeavoured to learn his wishes in such a case. 
It is in reference to this possible case that I am inclined to re- 
commend separate conventions on the part of Eussia and of 
England with Prussia, because then our contract may stand good 
by our accepting a positive epoch of time, instead of the general 
description of time implied in the arrival of the Eussian troops. 
You will probably agree with me that the demand of Eussian 
troops for Mentz and Ehrenbreitstein was intended to stop the 
march of the 45,000 men, and divert them from Austrian 
to Prussian co-operation, but I have stoutly defended your 
subsidiary corps, and have told Haugwiz we could not discuss 
with him the march of our troops till he made himself a party to 
the measures of which he now made question. 

" I presume that you will have instructed Lord Minto respect- 
ing the Austrian cession of Austrian Flanders ; till some 
measure is taken upon this point it will be found full of difficulties ; 
the desirable thing seems to me to be to obtain from Austria some 
declaration respecting their abandonment of the Low Countries, 
such as they have already on former occasions made at Berlin ; 
but it will be very necessary to keep them at Vienna to their 
original measure of compensation in the Venetian territory, as 
you are doubtless informed that they are openly looking to a 
great part of Piemont as necessary to complete their compensa- 
tion, and I find their greediness increases with their success. I 
have sent the Dutch intelligence to Stamfort. On the 1st instant 
Popham is to meet General Thule from Stockholm at Petersburg. 

"To the Dutch intelligence which I had enclosed, I now add 
a letter this moment received from the H [ereditary] P [rince] of 
Orange. I perfectly agree with him in thinking that the Texel 
fleet could usefully assist the insurrection of the coasts of the 
Zuyder Zee, but I have observed to him in answer that the 
new batteries which are constructed on the shore were considered 
by Van Braame as commanding entirely the fleet while in the 
Texel, and of course rendering all co-operation impossible till it 
shall be out of reach of that control. The other demand of arms 
is one which it is natural for him to make, and desirable that you 
should assist as you can, but my yeomanry recollections upon that 
subject do not give me great confidence in your assistance upon 
that point, as I do not ever recollect that there have in latter 
times been any surplus of arms in England. I have omitted to 
offer you my special congratulations upon the transport difficulties 
under which you laboured being now completely overcome ; for 
you will observe the first division is provided with Eussian ships, 



123 

for the second there are, by your own account, English ships 
sufficient, and for the third I have no doubt but that Sweden 
will hire her ships to Popham, or at the worst the Russian ships 
can come back to fetch them." 

Enclosure. 

Report from M. d'Ivoy. 

1799, July B. Emerick. — " On dit que Sa Majeste Prussienne 
a fait savoir au gouvernement Batave qu'elle desiroit que tout 
fut remis sur le meme pied qu'avant 1795 ; que dans ce cas elle 
oflfroit sa protection et employ eroit ses forces afin que le tout se 
lit sans confusion ; mais que, dans le cas d'un refus, elle se 
verroit oblige d'employer la force, et que la-dessus il falloit une 
reponse en trois jours. — Les autorites a la Haye ont ete assem- 
blees, extraordinairement, le 25 a 7 heures dans la matinee, a 
I'occasion de depeches arrivees la veille de Paris par courier. 
Rien n'en avoit transpire, mais on les croyoit relatives au 
changement qui y avoit eu lieu, et dont Lombard et Br une 
n'ont ete instruits que par le Directoire Batave, dont les 
membres apprehendent beaucoup de la continuation de Barras. 
Apres I'assemblee on s'est apper9u de beaucoup de trouble, et 
depuis, on a remarque beaucoup d'irresolution, surtout par 
rapport aux travaux et arrangemens militaires. On vouloit 
meme que I'ouvrage au Greb fut provisairement suspendu, mais 
mes nouvelles d'avant hier ne confirment point cette circon- 
stance; elles m'annoncent, au contraire, qu'on augmente les 
garnisons sur I'Yssel. 

" Les Francois ont fait entrer, il y a quelques jours, 80 pieces 
du plus gros calibre dans Venlo, venant de Maestricht, dont 
40 au moins sont HoUandoises, Cela fait presumer qu'ils se 
retireront derniere la Meuse, d'autantplus que millepaysans sont 
occupes a transporter les magasins de Dusseldorff et Cologne sur 
Maestricht et Breda. 

'' Ce qui suit est en chiffre : — 

"II y auroit moyen d 'avoir, soit au Terel, au Helder, ou a 
Hi'hoet, un batiment qui se chargeroit de passer les depeches 
en droiture ; ainsi par ce moyen on pourroit etablir une corres- 
pondance directe. Cela reviendroit a 4 florins par jour a titre 
de Icggeld, parceque le batiment devroit etre toujours desponible, 
et le trajet serait paye en consequence. Je n'ai pris aucun engage- 
ment encore, desirant de savoir prealablement lequel de ces trois 
endroits on pr^fereroit ; et d'etre instruit ou et comment Ton 
voudroit que ces batimens abordassent. Quand je serai informe 
des intentions a cet egard, il sera temps de mettre cette affaire 
en train. Edtract. 

British Expedition to Holland. 
Note of Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph Abercromby, K.C.B. 

1799, July 6. — " The object of the present armament is the 
conquest of that part of Holland to the northward of the Waal. 



124 

^' The advanced season of the year demands the greatest 
promptitude and vigour in the execution of it. No operation 
which does not immediately tend to the accomplishment of this 
object ought to be undertaken. It would waste your strength 
and your time to conquer islands ; except in so far as they are 
necessary to secure to you a firm footing on the continent of 
Holland, and to keep up your communication with Great Britain. 
The United Provinces must be attacked on the Meuse, or by a 
landing in the province of Groningen. The first mode of attack 
seems in the abstract most advisable. It gives you at once a 
footing in the province of Holland. It enables you to avail 
yourself of the Waal, as a line of defence on the side of France. 
It opens an immediate communication with Great Britain. It 
affords you a prospect of getting possession of the province of 
Holland during the good weather. It takes the lines of the Greb 
and the Yssel in the rear ; and it gives you the probability that, 
on the conquest of the province of Holland, the other provinces 
will submit-. All these advantages are of little moment if your 
force is inadequate, or if the means of landing the troops are 
precarious. Should your force be sufficient to attack the island 
of Voorn, and to effect a landing on the mainland at the same 
time, the object would probably be attained. But if you cannot 
effect a landing without previously getting possession of Voorn, 
the difficulty would be increased, because, whilst you were 
reducing the Brill and Helvoetsluys, the enemy would collect 
his force, and would throw many difficulties in your way. The 
question then is, -•'^can a fleet pass up the Meuse if the enemy is 
master of the island of Voorn ? Should this be practicable, which 
is the point where a landing ought to be made that will enable 
the troops to hold their ground until reinforced, and keep up their 
communication with the shipping ? It has been said that a 
landing may be effected at Schevelinge. This is obviously a 
precarious undertaking. But should the weather admit of it, 
the troops thus landed ought to march immediately and 
co-operate with their friends on the Meuse. Unless on the most 
favourable concurrence of circumstances no attempt on Holland 
ought to be made until the first division of foreign troops is 
within reach and ready to co-operate. At the moment of 
execution, demonstrations ought to be made from the mouth of 
the Somme to the Ems. 

"A number of regiments of cavalry being ordered for foreign 
service, and transports prepared for their reception, will add to 
the uncertainty and increase the alarm. As in the execution of 
this plan everything depends upon accurate information, the 
following queries are stated : — 

Queries. Answers. 

1st. What is the probable 1st. By Lord Grenville. — 
force in the Province of The French force cannot exceed 
Holland? 10,000 men. Little account is 

to be made of the Bataves. 

* Margin. Answered in the negative by Col. S. 



125 



2nd. Is the navigation of 
the Meuse clear and practicable 
for heavy transports and 50 
gun ships, from its mouth to 
Schiedam or Kotterdam ? 



3rd. Can the fortifications 
at the Brille, or on the opposite 
side of the Meuse prevent ships 
from passing up ? 

4th. Should neither the 
fortifications of the Brille nor 
the difficulties of the navigation 
of the river prevent ships from 
passing up to Schiedam or its 
vicinity, at what point can the 
troops be disembarked to the 
greatest advantage ? 

5th. Should it be necessary 
to take possession of the island 
of Voorn, where ought the land- 
ing to be made ? 

6th. What is the state of 
the fortifications of the Brille 
and of Helvoetsluys ? 

7th. What garrisons are at 
present in these places ? 

8th. Would not the posses- 
sion of the island of Voorn and 
of Willi am stadt give several and 
advantageous points of attack 
upon Holland ? 



2nd. By Colonel S.— that he 
believes the passage for heavy 
ships to Botterdam is by 
Helvoetsluys, which is the 
branch of the river leading to 
Rotterdam by Dort. The pas- 
sage by the Brille would not 
answer for large transports. 

3rd. By Colonel S.— Yes. 



5th. By Colonel S.— On the 
west side of the island. 



6th. By Colonel S.— The 
fortifications are good, the Brille 
has a covered way, and a wet 
ditch. 



8th. By 
certainly.'' 



Colonel S. — Yes, 



Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, July 8. Berlin. — "I think that I now begin to trace 
the exact operation upon the wretched politics at Berlin, which I 
had ventured to predict would be the sure consequence of the 
vigorous measures which you are pursuing from Petersburg ; and 
through all their doubts, their difficulties, their apprehensions 
and irresolutions, I think I now see strongly their new fear that 
we shall at length somehow or other do the business without 
them, and leave them to the solitary enjoyment of the solitary 
system which they have so curiously carved for themselves among 
the great powers of Europe. Count Haugwiz is now so convinced 
of our being determined to complete the business without them, 
that I am persuaded he is sincere in the desire which he professes 
to engage the King of Prussia with us, and I am inclined to 



126 

believe that he speaks truly when he represents his difficulties to 
consist partly in the personal reluctance of the King to commit 
himself to the measure of war, and partly in the military doubts 
suggested by the extravagant caution of the Duke of Brunswick. 
I do not see any reason to think that Count Haugwiz is as yet 
informed of the Baltic expedition, but it is hopeless to imagine 
that 15,000 men can be embarked there by the assistance of an 
English officer, without pointing out pretty distinctly the object 
of its destination. I made so many criticisms upon the paper 
which he shewed me that I have not been able yet to obtain from 
him a copy of it, though I am making another effort to get it for 
you before I close this letter. If he acts up to his conversation 
of yesterday in the alterations which he promises to make, I 
think it highly probable that we shall speedily come to an under- 
standing with respect to the English share in this convention, as 
he agreed to endeavour to adopt the idea of employing the 
million, which they asked, in monthly payments for the remainder 
of this year, according to the proportions of the last Prussian 
and Eussian subsidies. I do not see any great difficulty likely to 
arise on our own part so as to defeat the conclusion of the 
arrangement. The greatest difficulty which I apprehend is on 
the part of the Emperor of Russia who may hesitate to incur this 
new drain both of men and money, though it is certainly a direct 
offer made from him to Prussia, and one which Count Panin 
considered himself as authorised to conclude upon, if Prussia 
should accept it. We must not however forget that the present 
Baltic armament was not in question when he made the offer 
which is now claimed by Prussia, and that their home force is 
therefore diminished at Petersburg by the number of the 18,000 
men who are now to embark on the Baltic. I shall not put 
these difficulties in the way of Panin or of Paul, but I do not on 
that account feel perfectly satisfied that I shall not hear of them ; 
these difficulties may likewise be increased by the confidence 
which the Emperor may entertain of the success of this Baltic 
expedition, and by the reluctance which he may have to admit 
Prussia into the share of a conquest which his cltevaleresque 
character may make him glorious to reserve to himself. There 
is likewise to be added to this the reflection that his finances are 
scarcely sufficient to furnish at his own cost another German 
army of 40,000 men, and Haugwiz is so persuaded of his present 
poverty in men and money, that he assures me we shall not have 
more than 30,000 of the 45,000 Russians whom we are to pay for ; 
an information which, to Haugwiz, I appeared to discredit, but 
which is important enough to require your attention and that of 
your commissary. There would be no difficulty whatever upon 
the subject of this new Russian force demanded by Prussia, if 
we could make the troops of the Baltic expedition count in the 
Prussian estimation for the new army which they require ; in fair 
reasoning the troops who land in Holland will offer a more 
effectual assistance to Prussia than any who could approach the 
fortress of Ehrenbreitstein, and there is no question but that the 
spirit of the condition is more advantageously fulfilled by the 



127 

Russians acting on the Dutch and Flemish side of the Rhine 
than hy their acting towards the German and right hank of it ; 
and I think I could easily shew them, in defiance of all the doubts 
of their irresolute Ducal commander, that 25,000 or 80,000 of the 
allied troops in Holland, in giving to Prussia the disposition of 
the whole of its own force for its German frontier, give to it more 
effectual support than could arise from 40,000 men approaching 
to the fortresses of Mayence and Ehrenbrietstein ; but unfortu- 
nately we cannot have the benefit of this discussion without 
making them parties to our military projects, before they are 
absolutely engaged to co-operate with us ; and we must observe 
too that, however strong our general reasoning on this point 
might be, we should have to contend with all the prejudices which 
they would feel against an expedition calculated to put Holland 
into the hands of Russia instead of Prussia; and therefore that, 
by making a communication to them of our plan, we invite their 
certain opposition to it; and yet, without making that communica- 
tion, we cannot reasonably demand to have the benefit of it in our 
convention with them. Perhaps I over-rate the jealousy which 
I apprehend from them on this subject, but I own I should not 
be surprised to find that they will soon discover the object of our 
expedition, and that they will at all hazards pre-occupy the 
country by a Prussian force. If they did this early enough to 
save us the risk and expense of the Baltic expedition, I know no 
great harm in our having quickened them by that threat into 
doing what we have wished them to do; I only object to their 
having such a knowledge of our plan as would lead them to throw 
difficulties in our way without taking the task into their own 
hands. The fair and liberal course of proceeding would be to 
give them the knowledge of our new means for Holland, and take 
credit with them for that force as applying to the force which 
their convention demands from Russia; but to justify this frank 
and open communication we ought to be more assured than I am 
that none but a fair and liberal use will be made of this communi- 
cation ; it may however happen that the Prussian Cabinet may 
obtain the knowledge of our enterprise before we have completed 
our convention, and in that case, as there would be no secret to 
keep respecting it, there might seem to be some advantage in 
openly claiming this force as being to make part of the assistance 
which they claim from Russia. 

"Another idea which has occurred to me is that I might, without 
risk, state to Haugwiz an intention on the part of Great Britain to 
attack Holland by sea, and I might claim that the number of 
troops landed in Holland shall be considered as equivalent to the 
troops which he asks for the neighbourhood of Ehrenbreitstein ; 
the only objection which I see to this is that, though it does not 
actually tell our secret, it very much suggests the knowledge of 
it. Perhaps I am all this time fighting with a shadow, perhaps 
the Emperor will give his troops according to his offer, and 
I should like that best because that would produce for us the 
largest mass of force ; and I own I am strongly inclined to the 
opinion that every possible exertion should be made to the greatest 



128 

extent, in order to push with eifect the advantages of this 
campaign, and give to our enemy no breathing time to recover 
himself. In my conversation of yesterday I again felt the 
ground as to the possibility of our concluding with Prussia 
singly, in case the arrangement could not be made acceptable 
at Petersburg ; and I think I see it would not only be practicable 
to do so, but that in fact they wish rather for a separate connection 
with us, although they require at the same time the assistance 
and support of the arms of Russia. I have however taken 
care to tread this ground with great caution, professing always 
that our present intimate connection with Russia is an object the 
most forward in the views of the British Cabinet. Upon these 
various difficulties and doubts I shall be glad to receive any 
suggestions which you will furnish to me ; but if any occasion 
presents itself for a tolerable conclusion, I shall conclude as fast 
as possible for the best, and I will take my chance of being 
hanged, drawn and quartered afterwards ; the only sine qua non 
upon which I shall immoveably rest is, that no payment shall 
take place until the King of Prussia shall explicitly declare him- 
self at war with France for the deliverance of Holland and the 
jmys limitro2)hes, with a sure and strong frontier to them. By 
the pays limitrojihes Cologne is, I understand, included, as well 
as Berg and Juliers which are, as you know, reversible to Prussia. 
The English debate has made the King think it necessary 
distinctly to express that he will enter into no engagement for 
the re-establishment of Louis XVIII. nor will he undertake for a 
step more than the rescue of Holland and les pays limitrophes, 
with a sure frontier ; and having gained that he will return to the 
defence of it, and will pursue no other object in France military or 
political ; if he does that task well, I shall be better satisfied with 
him than I have hitherto been. 

" The Prince of Orange has just left me ; by his last accounts 
the French appear to take alarm about Maestricht, and they 
occupy themselves likewise upon the Greb ; but this is nothing ; 
we must not hope that if we give them time and means of 
preparation they will not turn them to some advantage. I 
understand that the Batavian Directory has been sounded with- 
out effect ; that they admit their own situation to be desperate, 
but do not lend themselves to the suggestions which are held 
out to them. The Prince has consulted me upon the 
position which he himself should personally take, and I have 
recommended to him to make no decision as yet, but to 
look to the probability of either marching in from Ameland at 
the head of that division, or of meeting it at the head of the well 
affected in Groningen and Frieseland ; I am rather inclined to 
the first of these two measures because I think the Russians will 
be less unpopular if they are headed by the Prince, and because 
the situation of the Prince will be less exposed at the head of a 
regular force than in the first explosion of the interior of the 
country ; but we shall have some time, and I hope not much 
time, to make this decision. 



129 

"I ought to have mentioned that in Haugwiz's last conversa- 
tion he spoke of the impossibiUty of preserving the ecclesiastical 
possessions, in any final settlement of the Empire. I have not 
yet been able to trace the exact object of this opinion which he 
has now for the first time expressed, and I contented myself with 
observing how desirable it was to keep the principle of Vintegrite 
de VEmjnre as much untouched as possible. 

"My letters from Flanders speak of great and redoubled 
vigilance in the Brussels Directory, and apprehensions of a 
renewed system of terror there as well as at Paris. My corres- 
pondent urges the necessity of a direct negotiation immediately 
from England in that country, and says they are afraid to 
negotiate with Prussia and the House of Orange. I have not 
time to send you the Dutch and Flemish correspondence." 

Lord Minto to Lord Grenville. 
Private. 

1779, July 9. Cuxhaven. — "I sailed from Yarmouth on the 
5th instant, a fog having prevented the Latona from sailing the 
day before. I landed to-day, and shall immediately proceed 
on my journey. On my passage I had occasion to learn that 
the officers on this station think the blockade of the Dutch 
ports would be much more effectual to distress the enemy if 
the Scheld were also included in the blockade, the trade for 
Holland being now in general directed to that river. I am 
persuaded your Lordship will think this point worthy of 
consideration, 

"I have also learnt that the peculiar situation of Embden 
affords a channel, which is not neglected, for a very extensive and 
fraudulent trade between England and Holland. I have seen in 
the possession of Captain Sotheron, who commands the Latona, 
positive evidence of a direct connection between several houses 
in London and merchants in Holland. 

" The vessels employed in this trade are bound to Embden, but 
the Dutch port being on the other side of the same river, they do 
not even use the ceremony of unloading at Embden, but carry 
their cargoes directly to the Dutch side and send them by canals 
to the interior of Holland. As the supply of Holland may seem 
advantageous to England in a commercial point of view, although 
it undoubtedly counteracts the exertions which are making to 
distress that country as an enemy, it is for the wisdom of govern- 
ment to consider whether means should be employed to restrain 
this intercourse with Holland. I understand that it is much 
favoured by the government at Embden, and the officers do not 
understand that there is a British consul at that place. An agent 
of our government would no doubt be useful at Embden in 
detecting and checking these irregular practices. 

"As these matters are altogether foreign to my mission I 
should not take the liberty of troubling your Lordship with them 
otherwise than in the form of a private letter," 

6802 I 



130 

Expedition to Holland. 
Minute of Lord Grenvillc. 

1799, July 10. — " The first plan which was given in for the 
deliverance of Holland (and which can be considered as at all 
applicable to the present circumstances), was contained in the 
me moire of the Duke of Brunswick, dated October 22, and received 
here November 7, 1798.^ 

"It rests entirely on the possibility of seizing by surprize or 
secret correspondence one of the strong places in Groningue or 
Overyssel, and of forming there a Dutch army of 10 or 12,000 
men, which should be transported in fiat-bottom boats from 
Staveren to Enchuysen, while one Prussian army should pass the 
Yssel and advance on the Greb, and another occupy the French 
between the Rhine and the Meuse. This operation to be favoured 
by a diversion made from this country either against the Texel 
or against Zealand. 

"A proposal had a few months before been in consideration 
here for seizing the islands of Ammeland and Schiermonick Ooge, 
in concert with some of the inhabitants of the provinces of 
Groningue and Overyssel, wdio w^ere thereupon to have risen 
and disarmed the Batares, there being at that time no French 
troops beyond the Yssel. The person who gave in this plan, and 
who is unquestionably a man of much ability and knowledge, is 
now on the frontiers of the republick, and is in correspondence 
with the King's government. 

" Various proposals have at different times been made respecting 
Walcheren, but these it is conceived to be unnecessary to detail 
here. This paper (No. B) also contains some considerations 
respecting the line of operations to be followed by the armies 
in Holland and the Netherlands. 

"About the beginning of May in the present year the state 
of the Court of Petersburg was judged such as to afford a 
probability of obtaining a body of troops from thence, which, being 
brought by sea, might operate on one part of the United Provinces, 
while the British Army could co-operate with them by an attack 
in a different quarter. Communication was had with Captain 
Popham as to some of the details of these ideas, and particularly 
about the means of transporting and disembarking such a force 
if furnished by the Emperor of Russia. 

" And the paper (No. 4) having been received from him, he was 
instructed to proceed to Petersburg with directions for his 
conduct, as in (No. 5.) 

"A letter (No. 6) was written to Mr. Grenville at Berlin com- 
municating to him what had passed on this subject, and desiring 
him to prevail upon General Stamfort to proceed to Petersburg in 
order to explain and concert the military details of such an 
expedition, in so far as related to the part to be allotted to the 
Russian troops. 

" Mr. Grenville's despatch (No. 7) of the 21 May, describes the 
plan which General Stamfort formed for this purpose, and which 
he proceeded to Petersburg to recommend.^ 

" [1 See page 350. Vol. iv.] " 

['^ See extract from, printed on page 60,] 



131 

" It consists in landing 15,000 men in the neighbourhood of 
Delfzyll, having 5,000 more in reserve in the principaHty of 
Yevern, where the depot of provisions was to be formed. 

" This army was to make itself master of Groninguen and 
Overyssel, while the British force should take possession of 
Zealand, and Lord Duncan's fleet block the Texel, or even make 
some demonstration of attack there. 

"The progress of these attacks was supposed sufficient to 
ensure a counter-revolution by internal risings in all the Provinces, 
particularly as by the latest accounts it appeared that the whole 
French fore 3 on that side amounted only to 15,000 men from 
Mayence inclusive, about 5,000 being in and about Mayence, 
5,000 men in the other fortresses, and 5,000 only in the interior 
of the liepublic. {See Mr. Grenville's despatch, where he states 
these numbers from the authority of Count Haugwitz.)^ 

"Captain Popham arrived at Petersburg near three weeks 
earlier than General Stamford, and it being found necessary in 
order to obtain the Emperor of Kussia's consent to the King's 
proposal, to suggest to him some distinct and precise plan of 
operations, an attack on the three points of Walcheren, Goree, 
and Ammeiand w^as proposed by Captain Popham, and after 
some discussion adopted by the Emperor with that eagerness 
which belongs to his character. When General Stamford arrived 
the whole business was nearly settled, as appears by Sir Charles 
Whitworth's despatches, Nos. 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37, and by 
Captain Popham's letters. The latter describes his project as 
including the occupation of Groningen and Overyssel in the same 
manner as General Stamford's, but as differing from it as to the 
point of disembarkation, which the one proposes to be on the 
Island of Ammeiand, the other on the continent, and near 
Delfzyll. It is to be observed as to the latter that some little 
doubt may arise respecting the line of neutrality at the mouth of 
the Ems, but this might probably be arranged or disregarded if 
the point were decided in a military view\^ 

"By Sir Charles Whithworth's last letter, No. 37, it appears that 
the treaty was to be signed at Petersburg on the 22nd, and 
it would probably be comformable to the copy (No. 10) which Count 
Woronzow has in confidence communicated to Lord Grenville. 

" According to that project the Russian troops would amount 
to 17,600 men, viz :— 

17 battallions Infantry 
2 companies Artillery 
1 do. Pioneers 

1 squadron Hussars 
to be embarked with their artillery, but without any horses of 
any kind. 

" For these, transports were to be provided in part by Russia 
and in part by this country, but the whole at our expense. The 
Russian ships of war which the Emperor lends for the purpose 
are calculated to hold 8,000 men, and to be ready by the middle 

[^ See also Mr. Grenville's private letter, dated May 27, on page G7.] 
[^ See De Stamford's letter of Jqne 18, on page 9C.] 



132 

or end of this month (July). The whole of the troops were to be 
ready to embark at the same time. But the transports for the 
10,000 men could not be depended upon as being to be procured 
even in part in the Baltic, and measures are therefore in course 
to send the whole from hence. They are however not yet sailed, 
and when they sail their voyage can hardly be calculated at less 
than 1 month — it may be more. 

"In consequence however of Lord Grenville's letter to Sir 
Charles Whithworth, extract of which is annexed [No. 11], it is 
probable that the first division of 8,000 men would sail as soon 
as they were ready, and rendezvous at Gothenberg. And it 
seems proper that the orders to this effect should be repeated, 
(See also what Captain Popham says on the subject in his note 
15-20 June.) 

" It may be hoped therefore that this first division may arrive 
at Gothenberg about the third week in August, and the second 
division in a fortnight or three weeks afterwards, according to the 
date of the arrival of the transports at Kevel. The Swedish 
troops that have been offered are 8,000 men. It is conceived that 
the most expeditious mode will be to collect these at Gothenberg, 
and that transports may readily be procured there for their use, 
so as the whole may be ready by the time that the first division 
of Kussians arrives there — say the middle of August. On this 
point, however, further details are expected, and the troops them- 
selves cannot yet be relied on with certainty, though there 
appears great probability of our having them. To this force 
either of 18,000 or of 26,000 men, according as we get the 
Swedes or not, is to be added that which is now collecting in 
this kingdom, and which may be put at 10,000^ infantry, and 
6,000 cavalry. It is to be observed that the Russians having no 
cavalry with them except a single squadron of Hussars, it would 
be necessary that, as soon as they are to act in any country where 
cavalry would be wanted, a due proportion should be joined to 
them from this country ; and that this is indeed stipulated in the 
treaty. 

" The points therefore to be decided are, supposing the two 
operations of Groningen and the islands of the Meuse 
determined on ; 

" 1. What proportion of this whole force of about 45,000 men 
should be allotted to these two operations, and which troops to 
each? 

"2. Whether the operations may not commence on the arrival 
of the first Russian division at Gothenberg, supposing the 
British and Swedes then ready ? 

" 3. With respect to the operation against Groningen, whether 
the landing should be made at Ammeland, or on the continent ? 

"This, it is conceived, must depend on points of detail, respecting 
which particular information must be procured and easily may, 
but the final decision of which must in some measure depend 
on the opinion of the officer commanding that operation. 

♦Increased to 12,000, July 13, 1799. 



133 

'' The papers annexed (No. 12) contain some information 
respecting Groningen during the last year, and by the means of 
the communications established, the most minute details may be 
obtained as soon as it is judged safe to let our agents see that 
our enquiries point to that quarter. 

" With respect to the operation against the Province of Holland, 
Sir R[alph] A[bercrombie]'s note contains the queries which are 
in the first place necessary to be answered. Steps are taking to 
procure information upon them ; and the note (No. 13) may be of 
some use in that respect. It is to be remarked that if, on a fresh 
consideration of the force to be employed, it should be judged 
necessary to bring it all to bear exclusively on one point, that of 
the islands of Holland, such a determination must without delay 
be stated to the Emperor of Russia, in whose mind it may raise 
some, but probably not insuperable difficulties. 

"As the obtaining the port of Gothenberg for a depot, though 
it is probable, yet cannot be entirely depended upon, some con- 
sideration ought to be had whether, in the contrary event, the 
first division of Russians must be brought to any rendezvous in 
Great Britain, or whether they could be carried straight to their 
point of attack. And in either case what steps are to be taken 
for supplying them with the horses which they may want in the 
first instance. 

"A plan should also be formed and digested beforehand for 
arranging as extensive a system of diversion as possible, and it 
might perhaps not be wholly impossible to circulate and accredit 
the report that the expedition is destined against Havre, or St. 
Malo. A shew if not a reality of attack on the Texel fort would, 
as it is conceived, be of the utmost importance in the same view. 
It should also be considered what steps must be taken with regard 
to the Dutch rassemhlement, as it is called, which must form the 
foundation of the army to be raised by the Prince of Orange on 
his restoration." 



Minute by Mr. Pitt. 

July 13th. — " The force to act in two divisions. The first, on 
the Isle of Yoorn, to consist in the first instance of 12,000 British, 
to sail as soon after 1st August as possible if 29th and 50th are 
arrived, or 1,000 men obtained from Militia ; to be joined by 
8,000 Russians who are to embark on the 20th July, and may 
arrive about 20th August. Afterwards by 10 or 15,000 British 
Infantry and 3,000 Cavalry who may also be ready by about 20th 
August. And then to penetrate into Holland. The second to 
land in Groningen, and consist of 10,000 Russians and 8,000 
Swedes, who may arrive about 15th September, and to be joined 
by 3,000 Cavalry, and a battering train with 500 Artillery from 
England, which will be ready by the same time. 

" Latitude to substitute 8,000 Swedes for the 8,000 Russians. — 
Engineers for second division. 



134 

Effective under Arms. 
5,000 now 
1,700 from Ireland. 
1,600 3 regiments. 

8,300 say 9,000 

Add Guards 1,000 

10,000 



Numbers to be carried 12,000. 



Transports. 

Troop ships for - - 4,000 men. 

Ordinary Transports for 5,000 ,, 

Ships of War-Cutters for 2,000 „ 

In a fortnight - - 11,000 ,, 
Wanting - - 1,000 ,, 
[Arrangement for conveying Recruits expeditiously to their 
Regiments.] 

Tons. 
For cavah^y 24,000 wanted by 15th August. 
For ordnance : — 

2,700 tons — by 1st August. 
2,600 ,, Battering Train by September. 
, Bat. and Artillery Horses, 

and other freight - - 6,400 by 

Intelligence from Holland. 

1799, July 11. Beckestein (North Holland).— ''II m'a et6 
impossible de debrouiller votre citron, ce que j'attribue a 
I'humidite que la lettre aura contractus entre les mains du 
porteur. J'ai cependant compris que vous desirez que je remisse 
la lettre moi-meme. J'ai ecrit le memo soir, mardi passe, a 
I'homme en question (van Braame) en le j)riant de me fixer un 
rendezvous,' mais sa r^ponse a ete negative, parcequ'en I'absence 
du chef, il remplit sa place, ce qui 1' oblige a rester a son poste. Je 
lui ai ecrit en consequence pour lui demander si ma venue chez 
lui ne seroit pas sujette a caution ; car je sais que deja il a eu 
une entrevue pareille. Sa reponse me determinera. Je I'attends 
demain, et si je vais chez lui je vous ferai part de ce que j'y aurai 
fait. Comme je suis dans le cas de rencontrer beaucoup de 
connoissances, vous ne trouverez pas la precaution que j'ai prise 
superfine. Vous me connoissez assez pour etre persuade que je 
ne n^gligerai rien pour bien m'acquitter de cette commission. 
Pour ce qui est de I'homme je crois que si Ton desire de lui qu'il 
se rende chez vous, il ne le fera qu'a bonnes enseignes, et en 
6tant sur d'y etre bien re9U et bien traite. II teint beaucoup a 
I'honneur de la Castille; il est un peu enthousiaste, un peu 



beaucoup meme ; rempli en outre de cette id^e d^orgueil et 
d'independance nationale que les emigres, en imitation du Roi 
Jaques, ont si fort mise a la mode; d'ailleurs brave homme, et 
homme brave en meme temps. Robert vous aura sans doute dit 
qu'un de mes camarades a eu une conversation avec ce meme 
homme, dont il a fait part a M.M. de Kinsk et de Bylands. 
Comme vous ne m'en dites rien, je suppose que I'intention n'est 
pas d'en informer ces Messieurs." Written with lemon juice. 
Extract. 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 
Private. 

1779, July 12. Berlin. — "I must not detain Johnson any 
longer than to say I have received yours of the 1st. You will 
already have found by the former despatches from Petersburg, and 
you will see by these that the first division will be ready, and will 
be embarked at Revel, and on their way to the Sound liy the end 
of this month. If this division should by your orders attack 
Groningen and Friesland from Ameland, as soon as you can 
attack Walcheren, and if I succeed in obtaining Prussian co- 
operation to give support to your enterprise by declaring and 
marching, all will do well, and the second division from the 
Baltick of Swedes and Russians will come in as a corps de reserve 
in later days. I am almost tempted to engage absolutely for you 
upon almost any terms if I can engage Prussia to this step, and 
I can work upon it independent of Russia. Stamford, as you see, 
has given way to Popham, and he really thinks the plan of 
Ameland very practicable. It is then to these two objects of 
Ameland and Zeeland that I imagine you will direct your com- 
bined attack of the first division of Russians, and the embarkation 
of British. They will be more than enough with Prussian co- 
operation if I get it ; they will be enough, I believe, if I fail of 
obtaining it ; but I think I shall have it. Do not groan therefore 
over the tardy transports which do not come, but trust to the 
10,000 first division from Revel, and add to that your 10,000 from 
England for Zeeland, and all will move prosperously. I do not 
like to promise for Prussia, but I am more sanguine here than I 
have ever yet been, and I think I have reason. You will see that 
I have no great hopes of Lubeck being admitted here, but if the 
King of Prussia shall have declared upon the expedition of 10,000 
men to Ameland and 10,000 to Zeeland, he will then I presume 
not refuse his consent, for then he will be at war. God bless you, 
I am tired to death. I do not write of good Berlin hopes to 
Petersburg for fear the Emperor should slacken and trust to 
Prussia entirely for Holland." 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 
Private. 

1799, July 12. Berlin. — "If my predictions respecting the 
conduct of the Berlin politicians had not been obvious enough to 
be the predictions of everybody who considered the subject, I 



136 

should have been vain of the accompHshment of my prophecy ; 
for it is evident to me both from the second edition of the project, 
and from the course of a very long conversation with Count 
Haugwiz that we are at last upon the eve of obtaining our concert 
with them, and in good truth I attribute it only to their seeing 
plainly that we were determined to do the thing without them. 
My former private letter will have prepared you for the advantage 
which I am endeavouring to take of the publicity which attaches 
to our preparations for some expedition from England. I am 
sure that you will all approve of my endeavours, if I succeed in 
obtaining a declaration from Prussia to welcome our Baltick 
expedition ; and if I do not succeed in this point, I trust at least 
that you will think I have proceeded with sufficient caution to 
prevent any bad consequences from my speculations upon this 
important subject. I have however still one more apprehension 
respecting Eussia, or rather I should have, if the calculation of 
time did not afford some security against that apprehension. I 
should be afraid that if our success at Berlin was known at 
Petersburg before the whole Baltick expedition was afloat, the 
Emperor might prefer to leave it to the arms of Prussia to make 
the easy conquest of Holland ; nay I will own fairly that it has 
sometimes also passed across my mind that I was not doing 
wisely in giving hopes in England which might lead also there 
to relax in the active pursuit of our Russian expedition. I will 
trust however that this latter danger is imaginary altogether, and 
I will trust to Captain Popham's activity for hurrying the 
Russian army on board, before there can be any question of 
convention or co-operation from the Court of Berlin. I have not 
yet been able to despatch Johnson, and I am vexed to have 
already detained him six and thirty hours, but as I am to see 
Count Haugwiz at eleven this morning, I cannot but believe that 
you will prefer my keeping him two or three hours longer in 
order to S23eak of Haugwiz's conversation since he has seen the 
King, for yesterday evening I was disappointed of the conference 
which I had expected with him, and to this moment I cannot 
answer with any certainty for the result of yesterday's consulta- 
tions at Charlottenburg. 

"By the second sketch in article third, you wdll see that they 
propose to begin their preparations as soon as the Russians begin 
their march ; if they adopt my proposal of considering an English 
expedition in Holland as an epoch of their declaration, I should 
see no difficulty in requiring them to prepare immediately, and I 
presume that as soon as the convention is signed, they would 
become entitled to a fair communication of those plans which 
they are bound to co-operate in ; according to this idea, therefore, 
I think in naming the subject I have done enough to justify the 
making it a ground of condition, but I shall tell them that no 
confidential communication of details can be made to them till by 
their treaty they have engaged themselves to co-operate with us; 
the only previous specification which they are entitled to is to fix 
the number of troops whose landing in Holland ought to engage 
them in hostility; I mean to state that as low as they will take it, 



137 

and not higher than 20,000 men, of which number we are pretty 
sure ; on their side I imagine they will require four weeks for 
preparation, and if they will engage for that time I shall be 
content. You see I go on reasoning upon this as if I was sure of 
success ; I own I feel sanguine, though not certain. I conceive 
it is probable that even if they do adopt my new epoch, they will 
still make the offer from the Emperor of 45,000 men a condition, 
but I have no great fear of refusal from the Emperor after so 
direct an offer, although I think he would probably be very slow 
and tardy in supplying those troops, from the difficulty which he 
made of furnishing more than 18,000 for Holland. I think, 
however, it is plain that the Ministers here do not so much want 
the actual assistance of the force of Russia, but that their object 
is to engage that country as deeply as possible in the expense 
and dangers of the contest. I therefore expect that when the 
Emperor has signed and sealed and begun his march, they will 
be ready enough here to act without him, if no new danger should 
assail any tiank of any of their Minister-Generals or General- 
Ministers. On the third article of the scconde esquisse, I remarked 
that the Declaration to be made ought rather to be to the General 
Commanding the French troops than to the Directory, in order to 
avoid all delay between that measure and the immediate advance 
of the Prussian troops, and this idea was not objected to by 
Haugwiz, who agrees with me in regarding this Declaration only 
as a form ; but i shall endeavour to give to it as short an interval 
of time as is possible, for I think it is to the last degree absurd 
to give your enemy notice of your approach and desire him by 
his answer to fix the period of your attack ; upon the last sentence 
of this article I told Haugwiz that I thought the direction of 
the Prussian troops on the day of hostility should rather depend 
upon military concert according to the circumstances of the day, 
than be specified in a treaty, but he said that the King thought 
he acted more fairly in plainly saying he would not be positively 
bound to march into Holland, unless his left was sufficiently 
protected ; upon the whole I give less importance to this obgect 
just now, because I hope I can trust that from our Baltick 
expedition we are much less solicitous to fix the Prussians 
down to entering the United Provinces ; what we want is their 
hostility to France, and the new impression of dismay which 
will be produced at Paris by their seeing a new and powerful 
enemy pressing upon them with all the other defeats and 
misfortunes of the campaign. 

"Upon the convention I have said in my despatch all that I 
can say till I come to closer quarters ; I hope I shall limit the 
sum somehow or other to one million from 1st August to 31st 
December, by periodical payments to be made on the 1st of every 
month ; and I presume there would be no objection to making 
the first payment on the 1st August, if they will positively engage 
for acting the first moment that we land, or that the Russians 
arrive in the cercle du Ilaiit Ehin. 

" By the fifth article you see Haugwiz retains the hope of 
being again upon the defensive after success, but as far as our 



188 

treaty is concerned in this, it gives me no pain, as our monthly 
payments will secure us against any improper application of our 
money; as far as it regards the general politics of Europe, though 
I had rather keep Prussia as an active ally against France, if 
however Prussia will fairly defend the Dutch provinces with their 
new limits, and maintain them against France without a new 
peace, I shall be content; against the separate peace of Prussia we 
have likewise the security of the sixth article, for I apprehend we 
shall not let Prussia make their own peace first, and ours 
afterwards. 

"I send you some interesting Dutch papers respecting the 
state of their military defences. I think it is evident that the 
French expect us in the provinces of Groningen and Zeeland, and 
their attention to the Greb betrays their apprehensions of 
Prussia ; they are applying with increasing activity, and I trust 
that their doing so will produce, as it ought, redoubled activity at 
London and Petersburg ; I was going to add too, at Berlin, but I 
must now see Haugwiz and will tell you if I can add that word 
at my return." 

1 p.m. — " I am just returned from Count Haugwiz ; all goes on 
well, he has seen the King who approves the second sketch, and 
we send to invite Panin to come in haste from Carlsbadt and do 
his business here. Haugwiz gave to me also the royal approbation 
of my project to make anew epoch of our claim to his declaration 
as soon as we had landed a force in Holland, and Haugwiz 
desiresi, himself to draw up his notion of our separate convention 
of subsidy, with this new condition stated in it. I shall be very 
proud of myself if I succeed in this to my wish. The Baltick 
expedition begins however to be much talked of, and Haugwiz 
told me to-day that they were alarmed at Copenhagen by our 
project of landing at Lubeck. I told him I was very glad of it, and 
that I desired no better than that the whole northern coast should 
be alarmed from Lubeck to Ostend, because the more general 
was the alarm, the more easy it would be to cover any real 
enterprise which it might be wise to undertake ; he again spoke 
of the necessity of our understanding each other for military 
co-operation in Holland, and I again told him that as soon as he 
had made himself an active ally by signing a treaty for active 
hostilities, we would then concert and communicate with him 
upon our military operations. 

"I enclose to you two letters from Stamford for j^our private 
eye ; they have added to the esteem and admiration which I 
have for him. Popham's present despatches to Dundas I have 
respected as they are not under flying seal. I think he has 
infinite merit and deserves infinite praise ; I will not quarrel 
with him for his desiring to make that praise exclusive. 

"I expect Stamford the end of this month; I hope he will 
come to take possession of Holland, and then I shall fairly have 
worked my passage home through Helvoetsluys. I am going to 
give the H [ereditary] P [rince] of Orange another sum of one 
thousand pounds ; if he has as much discretion and economy in 
public finances as in his own there will be no ground of complaint, 



189 

for I do assure you that among the prmces of the day he is one 
of the very best that I have seen. I shall wait impatiently for 
Panin ; he has sent me a report from Carlsbadt dated 8th instant 
of Sir Sydney taking Buonaparte and his army, and of Suwaroff 
having announced at Vienna the taking of Alexandria, and of 
Klenau having again beaten the French at Modena, taking 3,000 
prisoners and two generals ; but these are unsupported reports ; 
that which I mention in my despatch is sent from Munich both to 
Haugwiz and to the Bavarian Minister. If I judge of your fatigue 
by mine, you must be heartily tired of me both public and private. 
Pray send a messenger instantly to tell me how far you approve 
or disapprove, for I shall go on as fast as I can." 

Enclosure 1. 

General de Stamford to Thomas Grenville. 

1799, June 29. St. Petersburgh. — " Le depart du courier 
charge de vous porter ma lettre du 26, se trouvant retarde de 
quelques jours, je profite d'un instant de liberty que me laisse la 
vie tres dissipee a laquelle je suis oblige, pour vous ecrire encore 
quelques mots. 

"Les difficult^s pour les subsistances de I'armee Kusse de 
45,000 hommes, dont je vous parlai dans ma lettre d'avant-hier,^ 
seront l^v^es. M. de Cobenzl vient de donner a ce sujet les plus 
fortes assurances a 1' Empereur, et comme il a des pouvoirs fort 
etendus de sa Cour, il a exp^die, dit-on, des ordres tres-pr^cises 
en consequence. Les pr^paratifs qui se font a Cronstadt 
intriguent furieusement ce Ministre, et pour le moins autant 
que sa face hideuse, toute converte d'ulceres, intrigue son 
m^d^cin, qui ignore probablement s'il pourra le tirer d'affaire 
sans que le patient y laisse le nez ou les oreilles. II m'a 
tat6 et tourne de toutes les manieres pour tirer de moi quelques 
6claircissemens sur ces pr^paratifs ; mais se persuadant enfin 
que je n'en savois pas plus que lui, il m'a dit tout bonnement 
qu'ils ne pouvoient avoir pour but qu'un de ces trois objets : 
d'embarquer un corps de troupes soit pour le Portugal, soit pour 
les cotes d'Angleterre, ou elles seroient a port^e d'etre trans- 
portees en Irelande, soit enj&n pour faire une descente en 
Hollande. 

" On m'assure qu'il n'a tenu qu'a Cobenzl, a son arrivee ici, 
d'avoir 40,000 Busses de plus ; mais qu'il n'en a pas voulu, 
parcequ'il a craint de donner a I'Empereur de Bussie une trop 
grande influence sur les dispositions ult^rieures de la Cour de 
Vienne. On voit, a travers tout ce que cet homme dit, le faiseur 
de paix qui ne demanderoit pas mieux que de renouveller le 
traits de Campo-formio avec quelques avantages de plus pour 
I'Autriche, sans s'embarrasser le moins du monde de ce que 
deviendroit tout le reste. J'avoue que j'eus une belle peur en 
voyant, ces jours passes, debarquer ici son ancien collegue le 
Marquis de Gallo ; mais je suis r assure depuis que je sais que 
leurs chiens ne chassent plus ensemble. Ce dernier dit a qui 
veut I'entendre que I'Autriche se soucie si peu de voir le Boi de 

[1 This letter has not been found.] 



140 

Naples retabli sur son trone, que si elle trouvoit a faire pour elle- 
meme une paix comme elle la desire, la condition que le royaume 
de Naples restat republique ne I'effaroucheroit pas un seul 
instant ; et que c'est pour cette raison, et pour recommander les 
interets de son maitre a I'Empereur, qu'il est venu ici. Voila 
done un Campo-formien bien converti. Dieu veuille les convertir 
tous. 

"Je ne vous parle pas, de notre affaire xut'I^okyiv par 
ce que je sais que M. le Chevalier Whitworth vous tient au 
courant de tout ce qui se fait ici a ce sujet. Graces a I'activit^ 
de M. Popham, la chose se presse avec toute I'ardeur possible. 
Cependant, je crois devoir ajouter encore quelques mots a mon 
apologie sur ce que je n'ai pas, comme vous I'auriez peut-etre 
desire, insiste sur un nombre plus considerable de troupes. Tout 
etoit deja convenu et concerte entre sa Majeste I'Empereur et 
Messieurs Whitworth et Popham, lorsque je vins ici ; et quelque 
diligence que j'eusse pu. faire, je n'aurois jamais pu y arriver en 
meme tems que le dernier. Or, I'Empereur ayant d'abord 
aquiesce a la demande qui lui fut faite, mais en declarant qu'il ne 
pouvoit pas accorder au dela de 17,000 hommes, auxquels il a 
trouve bon depuis d'ajouter encore mille, j'aurois certainement 
indispose ce monarque si je m'etois avise de revenir a la charge 
pour lui demander un nombre plus considerable. Ma position 
entre ce Prince et M. Popham, dont il avoit deja adopte les plans, 
etoit delicate. L'Empereur est un prince tel qu'il le faut pour la 
salut de I'Europe ; c'est une ame de feu, pleine de noblesse, 
sensible a I'honneur et a la gloire, et n'ayant en vue que de faire 
triompher la cause dont il a embrasse la defense ; mais ces 
sentimens veulent etre menages ; un mot, une expression incon- 
sideree, la moindre contrariete dans sa volenti, cette volonte 
prevenue ou trop pressee, peuvent tout-a-coup arreter chez lui 
les resolutions les plus importantes. II souffre I'observation 
quand elle est juste et il se rend ; mais il faut une grande 
delicatesse pour oser la lui presenter, et pour qu'il n'en soit pas 
blesse au debut. 

" J'ai rencontre dans M. Popham un homme plein de zele, 
de talents et de connoissances. II me paroit ne avec ce courage 
qui ne doute de rien, et a qui les choses les plus difficiles 
paroissent aisles; mais j'ai tout de suite pu m'apperce- 
voir qu'il joignoit a ces qualit^s ce d6gre d'ambition qui porte 
I'homme qui en est doue, et qui se voit charge de quelque entre- 
prise, a vouloir seul en recueillir toute la gloire. Je devois par 
consequent le menager, et surtout ne lui donner aucun ombrage. 
Au lieu done de chercher a lui faire adopter mes idees, je me mis 
a examiner attentivement les siennes, et trouvant que d'apres son 
plan les principaux efforts seront tournes contre la Zeelande, ce 
qu'il vaut peut-etre mieux que s'ils I'etoient contre la Frise et la 
Groningue, j'y aquies9ai sans la moindre contradiction, en lui 
observant simplement, ainsi qu'a M. Whitworth, qu'il est d'un im- 
portance extreme d'user de toute la prevoyance possible, pour 
eviter les cas ou Ton seroit oblige de sacrilier un grand nombre de 
troupes. Ce qui m'a paru avoir fait sur M. Popham I'effet de lui 



141 

faire examiner de nouveau son projet d'attaque, et d'y faire de tres 
excellens changemens, qu'il a eu la bonte de me communiquer hier. 
" Mon depart va etre retarde de quelques jours encore, M. le 
Vice-Chancellier m'ayant fait dire que I'Empereur se proposoit 
de me charger d'une lettre pour le Prince d'Orange. Si je la 
re^ois aujourd'hui, comme je I'espere, je partirai sans faute 
demain." Copy. 

Enclosure 2. 

EsQuissE Seconde d'un Projet d'Articles, de 
M. de Haugwitz. 

1799, July 10. Berlin. — Article 1. "Le Roi s'engage a co- 
op6rer avec la Russie et 1' Angleterre a la d^livrance da la Hollande 
et des pays limitrophes. 

Article 2. "S[a] M[ajeste] accepte pour cet effet I'offre 
amicale que lui a faite s[a] M[ajest6] I'Empereur de Russie de 
concourir a cette expedition, en y employant un corps de 45,000 
hommes. / 

Article 3. "A mesure que les troupes Russes avanceront vers 
les frontieres de I'empire Germanique, le Roi de Prusse 
pr^parera, et rassemblera de son cote, les moyens necessaires 
dont il aura besoin pour I'entreprise qui fait I'objet de sa 
co-operation. 

Nota Bene. " Ici Ton exprimera la force de I'armee Prussienne 
qui doit agir, proportionnellement aux arrangements p^cuniaires 
dont on sera convenu. 

"Du moment que les troupes Russes auront depasse les 
frontieres de la Franconie, et seront arrivees dans la partie de 
I'empire qui est situee entre le Mayne et le Rhin, le Roi s'engage 
d'adresser a la Republique Francaise une declaration peremptoire 
pour la sommer d'evacuer, dans un delai donne, le territoire des 
Provinces-Unies et des pays limitrophes. Si cette sommation 
n'est pas suivi d'une reponse completement satisfaisante, et du 
prompt effet qui doit en resulter, le Roi combinera des lors ses 
operations militaires avec celles des troupes de s[a] M[ajeste] 
I'Empereur de Russie, et poursuivra, dans un concert ult^rieur, 
I'expedition projetee contre la Hollande et les pays limitrophes 
qui fait le but de la presente convention. Mais avant d'en venir 
a I'execution meme de cette enterprise, le Roi presuppose que les 
troupes Russes seront deja parvenues a former le blocus des 
forteresses de Mayence et d'Ehrenbreitstein, pour couvrir le flanc 
gauche de I'armee Prussienne. 

Article 4. " L. 'Angleterre s'engage a fournir a la Prusse les 
secours pecuniaires dont elle aura besoin pour sa co-operation, et 
a les continuer jusqu'au terme ou elle finira, sur le taux et 
d'apres les repartitions qui seront r^gl^es dans une convention 
particuliere a conclure entre les deux Cours. 

Article 5. " Des qu'on sera parvenu a delivrer la Hollande et 
les pays limitrophes de la dependance dans laquelle le Gouverene- 
ment Fran9ais les retient pr^sentement, et qu'on aura procure a 
ces pays une frontiere solide qui les mette a I'abri des entreprises 



142 

futures de la K^publique Fran9aise, la Prusse se bornera des lors 
a des mesures purement defensives, et telles que I'etat des choses 
les exigera, sans etre censee liee par la presente convention a 
s'immiscer ulterieurement dans les affaires interieures de la 
France. 

Articles. "Dans le cours de la guerre, et surtout vers 
r^poque de la paix g^nerale, les trois Cours se concerteront entre 
elles sur les affaires qui regardent I'ltalie et la Suisse, mais 
particulierement sur I'ordre des choses a retablir dans la 
r^publique des Provinces Unies, et sur les affaires qui se rapport- 
ent a I'empire Germanique. Et a Tegard de ce dernier, elles se 
chargeront d'une garantie mutuelle, tendante a maintenir intactes 
les principautes ou possessions hereditaires en Allemagne." 
Co^pie. 

Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 12. Harley Street. — " Je vous prie de me faire 
I'amitie de m'envoyer un iDillet avec lequel Bogerson et moi nous 
puissions entrer dans votre chambre des Pairs pour voir la pro- 
rogation du Parlement. 

'* Je suplie de vous souvenire de la notte que vous m'avez 
promis de m'envoyer, pour que je puisse ecrire par le courier de 
ce soir, en conformite de ce que vous ecrirez vous-meme." 

Intelligence Respecting Holland. 

July 12. Bremen. — "On assure, a n'en presque pas douter, 
que le corps Busse qui descend en trois colon nes de la Boheme 
et d'Hongrie vers le bas Bhin est destine en partie a appuyer les 
mesures d'insurrection dans les Provinces-Unies. II n'est presque 
pas douteux que, du cote de la Prusse, on n'entre de cette maniere 
incidemment en lice, soit pour ou contre. II semble qu'on medite 
a Berlin de jouer le role de Mediateur, et Ton voudra, peut-etre, se 
faire valoir dans cette qualite au moment ou on le jugera 
convenable. 

" Lorsqu'on en sera venu au moment de delivrer la Hollande 
la bombe eclatera. Ton se declarera, et Ton voudra prevenir que 
la Bussie et I'Angleterre seules ne retablissent le Stadhoud^rat 
en Hollande." Extract. 

Secret Report from France. 

[1799] July 13. — " Le nouveau Directeur Goyer [Gohier] a 
quelqu'esprit, quelques-uns des talens qui caracterisent I'avocat, 
aucun de celles qui sont n^cessaires a I'homme d'etat, aucune de 
connoissances que sa place exigerait. II est Jacobin ; il etait avant 
a B^volution avocat a Bennes; il fut connu particulierement par 
un memoire qu'il fit pour un M. Desgrees du Coup, contre M. le 
Due de Duras. Le verite est que Goyer n'avait fait qu'y donner 
son nom, et que ce memoire avait 6te fait par un autre avocat. 
Roger Duclos lui ressemble a tous les egards, il est plus eloquent, 



r 



143 

mais il a moiiis d'esprit. Le general Dumoulin est jacobin sans 
talent, sans aucun esprit. Tout depend des armees, si elles 
continuent a etre battues tout achevera de desorganiser. Le 
decouragement et I'indiscipline se portent a leur comble ; le 
Gouvernement n'effraye plus. On cesse de payer, le credit acheve 
de se detruire, et les armees restent sans approvisionemens ; 
mais si la victoire revient aux Franyais, les conscripts marcheront 
aux armees, les fournisseurs feront des avances, et la resistance 
pent se prolonger. Mon ami chargea I'liomme dont on a parle 
d'aller chez Brune, et de lui faire des questions sur la situation 
presente, et voici leur conversation. ' He bien, g6n6ral, ou en 
sommes nous ? tout va fort mal. — est-ce qu'il n'y a pas quelque 
esperance de ramener la victoire? ' ' On n'en remporte pas — avec 
les soldats decourag^s qui ne veulent plus se battre. — II est vrai 
qu'on va former un camp sur le Bas Rhin ? — et avec quoi voulez- 
vous qu'on le forme, quand on n'a pas meme de troupes pour 
renforcer les armees qui agissent?' — 'On dit qu'on veut vous 
donner le commandment d'une des armees en activite ; je le 
desirerais beaucoup ; vos talens . . . .' ' Et moi, j'en 
serais fache; qu'est-ce que je ferais de soldats qui, comme je 
vous I'ai dit, ne veulent plus ni obeir ni se battre ? ' — L'ofificier 
de garde entra, la conversation changea, mais comme bientot on 
reparla des armees, cet officier ne craignit point de dire devant 
le general qu'il y avait assez longtems qu'on se battait, et qu'il 
fallait la paix, et le general ne repondit rien. — On a copie 
litteralement cette conversation, parce qu'elle met a portee de 
connoitre I'opinion que les gens les plus instruits de I'etat des 
armees ont aujourd'hui des forces de la France. 

"II est Evident que Syes, en faisant ou consentant a la 
revolution qui a deplace les trois Directeurs, a ete d'accord avec 
les deux partis qui divisent les conseils, mais il est tres difficile 
de croire qu'il consente a laisser dominer les jacobins, qui ne 
veulent point de Directoire. II ne reste qu'a savoir si c'est lui 
qui joue les Jacobins, ou qui a et6 leur dupe: plusieurs decrets 
tendant a diminuer la puissance Directoriate, I'etablissement de 
la commission des onze, semblant annoncer que c'est 
Syes qui a ete trompe. L'on aura bientot le mot de 
I'enigme ; si cette commission se maintient, elle culbutera le 
gouvernement. Les papiers publics le disent dissident, et les 
nouvelles du 2 Juillet de Paris parlent de la creation d'une 
nouvelle commission de six membres, pour faire un rapport 
prochain sur I'etat actuel, et sur les moyens d'y obvier, et de 
rendre a la France la superiorite. Pour peindre tout ce qui 
tient au gouvernement il suffit de dire — qu'il n'y en a pas un 
seul qui ne soit a vendre, et qui ne se donnat au premier qui lui 
assureroit, sous un autre gouvernement, de I'argent, ou un equiva- 
lent de la place qu'il perdrait; et qu'a I'instant ou I'approche 
du danger commencerait a leur inspirer des craintes, tous, sans 
excepter les Directeurs, se laisseraient aisement gagner, si on leur 
donnait une garantie de leur vie, de leur fortune, et un azile dans 
quelque partie de I'Europe ; on est de meme persuade que si les 
craintes que les Jacobins leur inspirent devenaient plus vives, il 



144 

ne serait point impossible de traiter avec eux. Yoila les details 
que la personne qu'on a proposee pour etre instruit de toutce qui 
se passe en France, a donne a mon ami, il y a huit jours. 

"Voici les nouvelles qui m'arriventde Hollande par ce courier. 
Le parti Jacobin parait prevaloir, et s'est etaye de Daendels, qui 
jusques hier avait ete leur antagoniste. II passe pour certain que 
c'est Brune qui a fait cet arrangement : on le juge par les 
liaisons exterieurs des deux generaux. Ce nouvel ordre de choses 
deplace les Directeurs ZaarsoUen et Emmerens qui demandent 
leurs demissions. Van der Goos, ministre des affaires exterieurs, 
a donn^ la sienne. On croit que Daendels pourrait etre nomm6 
Directeur ; le general est vain et presomptueux, et pourrait bien 
donne dans un piege qu'on lui tendrait en I'eloignant du 
generalat, ou il n est pas aise de faire de lui ce qu'on voudrait, 
parceque les troupes Bataves lui sont attachees, c'est a dire, les 
officiers qui lui doivent en plus grande partie leurs places, et 
leur avancement. Le ministre Fran^ais Lombard a ete rappelle 
subitement sans avoir eu le tems d'emmener avec lui sa famille. 
On I'accuse de liaisons avec les Anglais, d'accord avec le ministre 
de la marine Batave, pour livrer le pays aux Anglais, et leur en 
faciliter I'entree. 

"Le gouvernement Batave vient de donner I'ordre aux com- 
mandants et municipalites des villes de Breda, Bois le Due, 
Steenberg, et BergojDzoom d'approvisioner leurs places dans 
I'espace de deux mois. 

"L'homme de la Haye 6crit un seul petit billet, ou il dit que 
Ton est inquiet a Paris pour les provinces de Bretagne et de 
Poitou, ou on craint qu'il n'eclate des troubles, lorsqu'on voudra 
mettre a execution la loi qui rassemble ou fait marcher les 
classes, et prelever le contingent de I'emprunt force de 100 
millions. J'ai eu quelques details hier sur le Brabant: grand 
decouragement parmi les habitans, et tout prepare pour un 
soulevement, s'il parait de troupes. Les conscripts desertent 
tant qu'ils peuvent ; il y a huit jours, trois postes qui gardaient 
les portes de Malines ont deserts en entier. Les conscripts du 
pays n'ont pas meilleure volonte: les gendarmes n'osent penetrer 
dans les villages, ni dans les bois, retraite des fugitif s, parcequ'on 
les fusille." 

Lord Grenville to Count Woronzow. 

Note de Vohjet dont nous avons paiie ce matin, 

1799, July 13. Dropmore. — "La Cour de Yienne ayant temoign^ 
au Lord Henley son desir qu'il fut envoy6 au quartier-g^neral 
de I'Archiduc un officer-general de la part du Roi, ainsi que de 
celle de I'Empereur de Russie, pour concerter les operations 
futures des deux armees, Sa Majesty a accede a cette demande, 
et Sa Majeste desir eroit que le General Korsakoff' fut autoris6 
d'entrer dans cette discussion, et d'appuyer les plans qui seront 
proposes de la part du Roi en conformity aux idees qui ont deja 
6te communiquees et approuv^es a Petersbourg. Files consistent 
en faisant joindre aux 45,000 Busses sous le G6n6ral Korsakow, 



145 

les troupes Russes servant actuellement en Italie — mettant le 
tout sous les ordres du Marechal Souvarow, et les faisant 
marcher en France, et particulierement sur Lyons. A cette 
armee on joindroit les Suisses que Ton pourroit lever, et les 6,000 
hommes cle Wurtemburg. 

" Mais pour le succes de cette operation on le croit absolument 
n^cessaire qu'elle soit soutenue a droite et a gauche par les 
armees Autrichiennes, et cela d'assez pres pour que les armees 
puissent, en cas de besoin, se soutenir reciproquement, ou meme 
se reunir. 

" On regarde done le projet (annonce a Lord Henley par M. 
Thugut) du siege de Mayence comme etant aussi imcompatible 
avec ce plan qu'avec toute autre vue d'attaque vigoreuse contre 
la Republique. Et on desire vivement d'etre appuye par la 
Russie en protestant contre cette mesure." Coinj, 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 
Pncatc. 

1799, July 14. Berlin. — ^"The enclosed packet arrived here 
this morning from Vienna by estafette. I profit of the departure 
of M. De Luc, who quits Berlin this evening, to forward it to 
you ; he means to travel night and day, and therefore you 
will soon be in possession of the agreeable news concerning 
Buonaparte ; I shall have an additional pleasure if his defeat 
and discomfiture shall have been brought about by Sir Sidney ; 
I do not care how much he vapours about it, provided he does 
the thing, and I do not agree in any respect with those who are 
fastidious enough not to admire his spirit of activity and enter- 
prise because he dresses like Charles the Twelfth, and talks more 
of himself than is consistent with perfect modesty and discretion. 
The last of my letters by Johnson was written in so much hurry 
and after so much fatigue that I am not sure it will have been 
quite intelligible to you. I have however sent to you by a short 
official despatch my letter to Captain Popham, by which you will 
see that I not only entirely agreed with you in the project of an 
immediate attack by the two divisions, but, knowing the import- 
ance of time, I have already suggested the same project to 
Captain Popham, as one which may very probably be approved 
by the Government and acted upon ; he will certainly feel bound 
to wait for your orders, and it is absolutely necessary that he 
should receive your directions as to the time and means of 
co-operation in the attack from England ; but, at all events, if 
you ultimately pursue this plan, it will be useful that Popham 
should have been thus early apprised enough of it to turn it in 
his thoughts, and to consider of such arrangements as may be 
necessary to the execution of it. I shall expect to-morrow or 
next day to advance with M. de Haugwiz in the discussion of the 
pecuniary convention. 

"The more I consider the whole subject, the more I 
am persuaded that, if possible, I must pursue my project 
of engaging the Prussian declaration by the march of our 
enterprise, and making them agree to act openly so soon as our two 

6802 K 



146 

divisions shall have set foot in any part of the United Provinces. 
The advantage of this agreement will be that it can be concluded 
at once, whereas the condition of the Russian march may meet 
with great doubt, delay, and difficulty at Petersburg. I see no 
reason why we should not pursue in one treaty the epoch of the 
Eussian march if it can be obtained, but I shall care little about 
the success of that if I can accomplish the other treaty, and bind 
them by that to act as soon as we shall act in Holland. It is not 
the part of a good politician to feed you with these good hopes 
upon grounds which I see perhaps with too sanguine an eye : 
but provided these hopes do their duty in England, they will tend 
rather to redouble the activity of your measures than to suspend 
or relax them. 

" We begin to hear much of magazines forming by Prussian 
commissaries near Wesel ; the Duke of Brunswick has sent 
to the Prince of Orange for two or three confidential officers, 
and the expectation of the public begins to grow alive upon the 
appearances of Prussian co-operation. You will perhaps wonder 
that I have spoken so slightly at Petersburg of my hopes here, 
but I am afraid of diverting the Emperor from the great project 
which he is now engaged in, to the little calculation of Prussian 
hopes, and I wish him still to think, as I do, that our only sure 
hope is in our own exertions." 

Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville. 

1799, July 16. Dropmore. — " The despatches which this 
messenger carries to Sir Charles Whitworth will put you au fait 
of our present projects which are much more forward than I 
ventured to flatter myself they would be by this time. Knowing 
as you do how much I am attached to operations en masse 
preferably to diversions, you will naturally imagine that I fell 
in very readily with the opinion expressed by our military 
advisers here in favour of bringing so large a proportion of 
our force to the westward, and making the other operation 
serve rather as a point cVappui for insurrection than as a 
serious and principal attack. I only hope the change will not 
discourage Stamford, nor disminish the zeal of our Emperor 
who conducts himself as an Emperor should. A letter from 
Lord R. Fitzgerald informs me, on the authority of his Russian 
colleague, that we have got our Swedes, so that there can 
now be no doubt of our force being amply sufficient for the 
progress of the enterprise, provided it is so for its beginning, 
and on this point I do not find that the person who is to 
execute it entertains the smallest doubt. We have taken all 
the means we can think of to alarm the Dutch Government 
for Walcheren ; but it is unlucky that we cannot spare ships 
or men enough to make a show of landing, though without 
really doing so. 

"The business of transports is also advanced much beyond 
any hopes that I had allowed myself to entertain, and within 
these few days we have obtained an additional aid in East India 



147 

ships which seems to put the thing out of all doubt. If we our- 
selves are not too late, the lateness of the season will operate in 
some respects in our favour, for once in possession, it will be less 
easy to undertake any operation to dislodge us. 

" We are waiting with much impatience for yoiir next despatch 
which is to bring us the explanation of Haugwitz's enigmas. I 
have, however, little expectation that this explanation will be such 
as, in the increased state of our own preparations, and with the 
additional expense which they must of course bring upon us, we 
shall think it prudent to accept. In truth they have not only let 
our opportunity pass by, but their own also. We shall now do, 
by great exertion and expense, what they might have done for us 
at much less than the million we offered. But in standing by as 
lookers on of this operation, they will lose a great part of their 
own consideration and weight, both present and future. 

" The thing that perplexes me most in this and in every other 
part of my business is the conduct of Thugut. If he were paid 
to thwart all our measures, and to favour those of France, he 
could not do it more effectually. I have desired a copy to be sent 
you with this of Lord Henley's despatch No. 75, because I doubt 
whether he will have done so. My answer to it, as far as it can 
yet be answered, passes also through Berlin, in order that you 
may see it and write to Lord Minto upon it. 

"I construe the whole thus. Thugut now thinking the Italian 
acquisitions secure, and the Milanese reconquered, and the 
Novarese in his hands, looks back to the Low Countries as 
the next object of scramble. For the success of our forward 
move into France, and for the effects which that is to produce 
on the internal government of that country, the real root and 
origin of all its wickedness, he is not in the least degree anxious ; 
and considers it only as a diversion which will put Mayence, the 
Netherlands, and the left bank of the Rhine into the hands of 
Austria to cut and carve as she thinks proper. 

•' With regard to the Netherlands we may perhaps be before- 
hand with him, as far as relates to driving the French out of the 
open country, and organizing a government of the Braban^ons 
and Flemings themselves ; because, even if he executes his plan, 
the siege of Mayence will occupy him till winter ; and if we 
execute ours, there is little reason to believe that any of the towns 
of the Dutch frontier will hold out as long as that, unless perhaps 
Maestricht. 

" But the real difficulty of the whole is this, that unless we can 
get the Archduke's army to co-operate directly (not by diversion) 
with the Russians, the force of the latter cannot be sufficient to 
to produce real impression on France. Korsakow's is called 
45,000, say 40,000. Suwarrow's Russians, taking both bodies, 
cannot at the end of the campaign be put at more than 15,000 
the one and 10,000 the other. It would be safer to calculate the 
whole at 60,000 Russians; add 6,000 Wurtemburghers, and 
14,000 Swiss (if we get them) and the whole is 80,000 men. A 
formidable body for any one line of attack, or for a narrow 
country like Lo'mbardy and Piemont, bounded by Alps on one 



148 

side, and sea on the other. But it is nothing for advancing into 
France, where your base is of no greater [less ?J extent than from 
Basle to Geneva, and where every step you go lengthens both 
your flanks. The siege of Mayence would, in fact, be no diversion 
at all with a view to this operation, for the French would neglect 
it, leave the place to occupy the Austrians as long as it could, and 
would bring all their force to bear on the advancing army. 

"We must therefore, if we are persuaded as I am that nothing 
will terminate this war but such success in France as enables us 
to restore the monarchy, take some measures to dissuade the 
Court of Vienna from this ruinous or insidious project. How to 
do this is the difficulty. When they have once set their hearts 
upon the recovery of the Netherlands, and have the means 
pretty much within their own power, will anything make them 
abandon this object except the assurance that we will take care 
of it for them? Can we give them this assurance? Could we 
do the thing, and, if we could, what will Russia say to it ? The 
only thing that seems at all distinctly stated in Haugwitz's 
riddles is the idea of giving a better frontier to the U[nited] 
P[rovin]ces, which means, in other words, giving them a part or 
the whole of the Netherlands. 

"I had formed a project within these few days of proposing 
both to Berlin and Vienna some compromise on this subject, by 
which Austria should enjoy, perhaps a nominal sovereignty, but 
certainly an annual payment equal to the greatest surplus 
revenue that the Vienna treasury ever drew from Brussels ; 
while, as to real government, those Provinces should be placed 
under the direction of Holland, and should unite in some federal 
compact with that country. Complicated as this seems, it is not 
much more so than the present state of the sovereignty of 
Neuchatel as with respect to Prussia and Swisserland, nor would 
it be difficult to find a mode of executing it, partly on the 
principle of the barrier treaty, and partly by applying that of 
mortgage for the Imperial loans here, and acting on that 
principle according to the practice recognised in the Empire. 
But the solid objection is found not to the mode of executing it, 
so much as, in limine, to the thing itself. It does not, I fear, 
hold out inducement enough to the Austrians to acquiesce in it 
for the present, and it would undeniably be a state of things 
that could not last, and that must be the seed of future wars, in 
which this country, both from her engagements, and her interest 
in the subject, would be compelled to bear her part., 

" We have therefore resolved to suspend our decision till your 
next letter arrives, because that will give us a little more insight 
into the views of Prussia. If the result is (as I rather expect) 
unfavourable, or at least not sufficiently decisive to induce us to 
close with it, the present tendency of my opinion would be to 
take Austria at her word, and to offer to her that, if she will 
abandon this project of Mayence and the Netherlands, and suffer 
the Archduke to act towards Basle, Belfort and Besancon, we will 
send our Russians to Lyons, and having re-established royalty 
in those provinces during the winter, proceed in the spring as 



149 

far as our success will carry us, giving to the Court of Vienna 
the guaranty of Great Britain and of Eussia that no peace shall 
be made which does not restore the Netherlands to them. 

" This you see is a large project, and requires being deliberately 
and maturely considered. And the quarter in which it presents 
most difficulty is on the side of Prussia. It can hardly be hoped 
that Berlin could be a tranquil spectator of such a result, and if 
they were, without acting, merely to draw together an army in 
Silesia, the whole plan might be deranged. 

" In like manner if we refuse, or if Kussia refuses, to accede to 
Thugut's plan it is impracticable, for unless Swisserland and the 
Upper Khine be protected by Korsakow, there can be no question 
of the Archduke's going to Mayence. 

" Any one of the four Powers might, if it pleased, destroy even 
the brilliant prospects that w^e have now before us, but how to 
make them draw together for one common object, and with one 
combined plan, is still, as it always has been, our great difficulty. 
The unbounded influence which we have just now at Peter sburgh 
offers us for this purpose better means than we have yet had, 
and you see I do not neglect to avail myself of them. 

'' We leave you, as you see, but little time for what is to be 
done in the Dutch Provinces by the Hereditary Prince of Orange, 
but the thing presses ; and you will, I kno\V, as far as depends on 
you, rather push it on than let it be retarded by any cause which 
you can either remove or diminish." Cojyy. 

W. Pitt to Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 16. Downing Street. — "I think the mail of to-day, 
as far as relates to Berlin, a little less encouraging than your 
brother's preceding dispatch of the 6th. Neither seem to throw 
any clear light on the question what Prussia aims at respecting 
the Netherlands ; but I suppose the expression of ' Holland and 
the neighbouring Provinces' must be supposed to include the 
Netherlands. If so his operations, if they take place at all, will 
make him nearly master of the Netherlands for the time, how- 
ever he may mean to dispose of them afterwards. I believe, on 
the whole, this is the best thing that could happen, provided he 
acts in time to prevent Russia diverting its force to the same 
quarter. In this view the great objection to the proposed or 
rather expected convention is the clause about Mayence and 
Ehrenbreitstein, as I suppose this fourth army of the Emperor 
Paul is so far from those quarters that, if Prussia still waits for 
its arrival, Austria may hope to reach the Netherlands before 
him, our great object being to prevent Austria from acting on 
that side this year. We seem still to be in as great a difficulty 
as ever to decide what is the best line for that purpose. What 
instructions do you incline to send either to Berlin or Vienna 
under these circumstances? The prospect of concluding with 
Prussia seems near enough to leave us no subsidy to transfer to 
Austria. The chance of Prussia's occupying the Netherlands 
seems to make any offer on our part to co-operate with Austria 



150 

for recovering them another year nugatory. There are, at the 
same time, pressing, and I rather think, decisive reasons for con- 
cluding with Prussia, if they will close on the terms your brother 
expects. But then I see no inducement left to bring Austria to 
concur heartily in our plan for the remainder of this campaign, 
except good argument, and the chance of the influence of Russia ; 
and I much doubt whether these alone are sufficient to make 
them act rationally." 

W. Windham to Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 16. Park Street, Westminster. — " The change of 
things which has brought us back to the same hopes as at the 
beginning of the war, seems to have brought us likewise to the 
same errors. We are proceeding equally without regard to those 
allies who, if not in the first instance, must in the last be the 
most necessary of all ; and are letting loose upon the Royalists 
in the interior all those whom the successes of the allies have set 
aside from combating upon the frontiers. The garrisons of 
Milan and other places are now about to do the same thing 
that the garrisons of Mayence and Valenciennes did at the 
beginning of the contest. They are to be employed in garrison- 
ing Brest, and keeping in order the Royalists of those provinces. 
Surely it is necessary that something should be done with a view 
to this evil. My idea is that, in the case of any future prisoners 
taken upon capitulation, one of the conditions should be that 
they should not serve (either against the allies or) against any 
party in France acting in the name of Louis XVIII. It is perfectly 
possible, and most likely, that such a condition will produce no 
effect in the use that will be made of any prisoners so surrendered ; 
and that not a man the less will be employed against the Royalists. 
But the same may be said probably in the case of any condition 
made in favour of the allies. The chief advantage will be in the 
impression made upon the Royalists, and in its furnishing the 
most safe, and possibly the most efficacious, of all modes of 
manifesting to the well affected in France the sentiments with 
which the allies are actuated. If this opinion should be adopted, 
you will probably think that no time should be lost in communi- 
cating an instruction to this effect to Wickham and Lord Minto 
and others who may be in the way to dispose the Austrians ; for 
the Russians, I hope, will need no persuasion to adopt this 
measure. The want of it will produce no small degree of 
distrust and discouragement. 

" It appears by accounts from all quarters that a considerable 
tendency to insurrection is showing itself throughout the whole 
extent of the Royalist provinces. It is certain, indeed, that it 
must be so. The disposition has never ceased to exist, and 
having only been kept down by the strong hand of military 
force, is sure to rise the moment that pressure is removed. Do 
we mean to leave this spirit wholly unassisted ; and, while we 
are seeking and relying upon insurrection everywhere else, to 
reject it in the quarter where we are sure to find it in its highest 
degree of intensity, and where it can alone prove directly and 



151 

completely effectual ? If we do not, it is high time that means 
should be taken to co-operate with these dispositions ; and that 
we should not be to seek at the moment when some successful 
operation on the part of the Royalists may call upon us for 
immediate assistance. The first thing to be done is by counten- 
ance, and communication, and reasonable assistance to show that 
at a proper time we mean to co-operate with them ; and thus to 
endeavour to gain their confidence, and acquire in some measure 
the direction of them. It is by these means that we may hope 
to hold them back ; which may be more important and probably 
more difficult than to bring them forward. I am the last person 
in the world for wishing that at this moment the spirit of 
royalism in these provinces should break out into any acts of 
open violence. But this is the moment when a secret organiza- 
tion should be going forward, and means be taken for preparing 
them for what may be desirable, or what may be necessary for 
them to do at a period of which we cannot tell the exact distance. 
" Sir S. Warren is, I understand, likely to employed soon. If 
he is allowed to take on board with him a proper supply of arms 
and ammunition, his zeal and intelligence in this service will 
find the means of conveying them into the country without 
exciting any dangerous attention. An application has lately 
been handed over from me to Frere, with a note from me recom- 
mending a compliance with it. It is a matter of small amount ; 
but in the spirit of economy which I have always acted upon in 
these concerns, I should, upon second thoughts, recommend a 
more limited compliance even with that request. I w^ould 
willingly save a hundred pounds in the quality of the arms, 
to have a hundred more to lay out on the pressing exigencies of 
individuals here, or on the other side of the water, who may 
want it for shoes and stockings. Means should likewise be taken 
for increasing the supply of arms from Jersey and St. Marcouf. 
Though each cargo is small, the quantity thus introduced into 
the country may be made to become not inconsiderable ; and if 
the insurrection shall break out, every firelock gives a soldier. 
When matters are more advanced, and the allies shall be certain 
of entering France, I should clearly be of opinion for taking 
possession of Haedick and Houat, and protecting them against 
sudden attacks, during accidental absences of the naval force, by 
a blockhouse. The force which Sir S. Warren should have with 
him should not be less, and I don't know that it need be more 
than two or three ships of the line in addition to his frigates. I 
have the best reason for saying that, with the most trifling 
preparation, the ships may be made perfectly independent of this 
country in respect of water. One of the reasons for taking 
possessions of these two islands is that they may become safe 
depositaries for stores to be left there, which now are always 
liable to be discovered and seized by the enemy. I shall be 
much surprized if, with a force stationed in Quiberon Bay, we 
shall hear any more of convoys continually passing into Brest ; 
of which, in the course of the present summer, I doubt whether 
there have been less than four hundred sail." 



152 

Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 17. Harley Street. — "La quantite de troupes que 
vous donnez pour I'expedition faira grand plaisir a I'Empereur, 
parceque mes amis Kotchoubei et Eastopchin me marquent qu'il 
a desire que vous en donniez, car il a une grande opinion, et 
come de raison, de la valeure des Anglois, et il s'est servi de ces 
mots, fai autant de conjience dans leurs troupes qiCils en ont 
dans les mienes ; et comme vous en donnez plus qu'il n'esperait, 
il en sera enchante. Par une lettre que je re^ois dans ce 
moment de Sievers, notre charge d'affaire a Berlin, je vois la 
confirmation de esperence que vous m'avez donne par votre 
billet d'hier. Ainsi je me flatte que vous viendrez ici, et que 
j'aurai le plaisir de vous voir." 



W. Pitt to Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 18. Downing Street. — " On considering the doubts 
you state, and all the circumstances suggested in your brother's 
letter, I incline to think still that it is very desirable that the 
Prussian convention should, at any rate, be completed on the 
conditions he mentions without delay ; and I should be much 
afraid of the effects of now desiring any fresh reference hither. 
Indeed it is more than possible that any instruction to that effect 
will be too late, as your brother will, I think, have signed the 
convention in the meantime. But there is certainly great 
awkwardness, at least, in withholding, in that case, the know- 
ledge of the measures we are ourselves taking ; and there might, 
I think, even be great advantage, and at all events could be no 
harm, in communicating them. We shall be so near the very 
moment of acting, that we shall at most be only telling our secret 
a few days before it will tell itself, and too late for Prussia to 
oppose us, even if so inclined. We shall have the chance by a 
frank communication of bringing them to accept our operations 
as a substitute, either in the w^hole or in part, for the aid of 
Russian troops on their left ; and may induce them, if they are 
really in earnest, to act immediately, destining, if necessary, a 
part of their force (which our support on the other side will 
enable them to spare) to watching Ehrenbreitstein and even 
Mayence. By their acting immediately w^e shall secure the point 
which I mentioned in my note last night (and which still seems 
to me very important) of their occupying the Netherlands (if 
that is part of their plan) so soon as to put the march of the 
Austrians to that quarter out of the question. By the other 
plan of waiting for a reference hither and to Petersburgh, we 
should, I fear, give such notice to Austria of the Prussian 
schemes as would induce them to quicken their march towards 
Mayence, both for the purpose of occupying the Netherlands as 
soon as possible themselves, and of making it necessary for the 
Emperor of Russia to march all the further force he can spare to 
supply their place on the side of Switzerland ; and by this means 
making it impossible for him to fulfil his condition with Prussia, 



153 

and so retarding, if not finally preventing the advance of the 
Prussian trooi^s. Under all these circumstances I rather think 
the right instruction to your brother would be that, if the treaty 
is not already signed, he should, as soon as the Prussian 
Ministers declare themselves ready to sign it (but not till then) 
state to them confidentially our plan, and endeavour to insert an 
article substituting this co-operation for the proposed blockades. 
And if it should have been signed, that he should, immediately 
on receiving the instructions now sent, make a similar communi- 
cation, and endeavour to sign a similar article as an additional 
and separate article to be made part of the convention. This is 
the result of the best consideration I have given the subject. But I 
should like so much better to talk with you upon it that I would 
come down to you to-morrow if I did not feel that, on the whole, 
so much seems to turn on the present decision, as to make it 
almost indispensable to have a Cabinet upon it. If you agree 
with me in thinking so (which I believe you will) it will probably 
suit you best to have it as early as between eleven and twelve to- 
morrow. You will probably find no difficulty in being in town 
by that time, and may easily return by dinner. To save time I send 
this without waiting for your answer to my note of last night. I 
have always forgot to say anything about Sir Charles Whitworth's 
Irish peerage, which I think he has very fully earned." 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, July 18. Berlin.—" On the night that M. De Luc 
quitted Berlin I received from him a short note respecting a 
conversation which he had just had with Count Haugwiz, by 
which I was led to imagine that new and great difficulties had 
arisen in the Minister's last conference at Char lotten burg. I 
cannot however say that I perceive any other new difficulty 
except in relation to the number of men whom the King wishes 
us to subsidise, and they are now waiting at Berlin for the 
military opinion of the Duke of Brunswick upon this question. 
I am sick of his name, because I never hear it but that I know^ it 
is to be the prologue of some new imaginary danger, and the 
Duke seems to have conceived the extraordinary project of 
requiring for the military operations w^hich he is to direct, a 
security which human arrangements cannot furnish ; which, if 
furnished, might be acted upon by an infant as well as a general, 
and which in the present moment is more completely produced 
by the events of the campaign than the most sanguine hopes 
could have led any man to expect. With this difficulty on the one 
hand, on the other we to have cope with the natural indolence of the 
King's character, the reluctance which he has to active measures, 
partly from a diffidence of his own capacity to engage in them, 
and partly from his mind having been already prepossessed with 
the imaginary advantages of that negative system which has so 
long prevailed here. Great as this difficulty is it might have 
been overcome if there had been a real efficient minister here, 



154 

with talents, influence, and energy of mind ; but none such is to 
be found here, and I am placed in the extraordinary situation of 
having obtained a complete concurrence in the opinions and 
wishes of the leading minister and the public, without being able 
to secure any of the advantages which ought to result from such 
a state of things. Count Haugwiz talks to me without reserve of 
the difficulties which he finds in combatting the King's preposses- 
sions, but his difficulties offer at least to him an object of con- 
tention, whereas with me I have the mortification to find that, in 
having gained everything, I am not much more advanced than if 
I had gained nothing. The truth is that the frame of this 
Government was constructed for the strong hands of Frederick 
the Great, and was accordingly so arranged as to bring personally 
to him the effective control of all real business ; the march of this 
machine continues, but without system, alacrity, or decision, for 
the King is afraid of business which he does not understand, he 
is diffident of himself, and there is no minister who has enough 
of his confidence to work roundly and fairly for the advantage of 
his Government. At the end of this description you will expect 
to be told that there is no longer question of our treaty ; yet you 
must make no such conclusion ; the treaty will go on, and, if the 
idea which I suggest in my despatch be adopted here of taking 
the Russian 18,000 in part of the 45,000 offered to Berlin, I think 
it will probably succeed ; nor am I without some hope of our 
naval enterprise accelerating the co-operation of the King of 
Prussia ; but to obtain a positive engagement from him I know 
not how I can speak with any confidence, when I see that such 
an engagement could probably only be obtained by the decision 
of a military opinion, and by the energy of an active minister, 
and when I recollect that I am to look for these treasures at 
Brunswick and at Berlin. Yet I am content to look on as long 
as I can rely upon our pursuing those measures in England 
which make us in some degree independent of all that we have 
to complain of here. 

"You will see that I have almost stated it as a matter of 
doubt whether we ought to give to Prussia the advantage 
of stepping in with a claim to a subsidy when we have 
actually done the business which was the chief object of it ; and 
if I could once satisfy myself that, after landing our Russians, 
Swedes, and English, we could secure Holland upon terms any- 
thing like as cheap as Prussian subsidy, I should be the first to 
deprecate the idea of gratifying them with one farthing; but 
upon these questions one must not suffer even a just indignation 
to prevail over a solid interest, nor will political arrangements 
admit always of strict poetical justice being done by them. If 
the Duke of Brunswick, however, condescends to consider 60,000 
men as able to take the field against 6,000 I shall have to proceed 
in my bargain with Count Haugwiz ; he dropped a word or two 
yesterday by which I should conceive that he meant to propose 
the subsidy to be extended beyond December, if the monthly 
payments were adopted ; I do not yet quite see his object, but I 
shall not think myself authorised to exceed the sum of one 



155 

million for subsidy, and two hundred thousand pounds for 
mohillti', and I shall fight hard before he shall obtain the latter, 
though I see you have properly directed that it shall not 
absolutely go off upon that point. I should like, if it were 
possible, to average the fndx tie mohilite at so much per 
monfeh; but it is evidently impossible to do so, because to a 
small average they will not consent, lest they should be left 
in the lurch in two or three inonths; and a large average 
would too much increase our expense if the treaty should be of 
any duration. In Lord Malmesbury's treaty the 62,400 men at 
1/. 12s. Oil. per man, bread, and forage, cost - 99,840/. 
monthly subsidy was - 50,000/. 

62,400 men. Total monthly - - 149,840/. 

If from these 62,400 you deduct the 27,000 contingent, you find 

¥5,m nien at 1/. 12s. Od., bread, and forage, cost 56,640/. 

and at 1/. 8s. 2^d. by monthly subsidy cost 50,000/. 



35,400 men then at 3/. Os. 2i(/. total monthly - 106,640/. 

If the same proportion be adopted now and applied to the same 
number, the 62,400 men would cost above 187,200/. per month, 
besides the fraU de mobility. This large scale is probably the 
reason of Count Haugwiz's preference to it upon the only 
occasion on which I could draw him into any detail upon the 
subject ; as soon as I can discover his ideas I will explain them 
to you, but in the meantime, the principle by which I shall be 
governed will be not to incur a larger expense than that of a 
million subsidy by monthly payments between the first of August 
(if they then begin to march) and the 31st December, and I shall 
only avail myself in case of absolute necessity of the latitude 
given of 200,000/. //uk" de mohilite. 

"I have made an advance to the Prince of Orange of 1,000/. for 
lesser expenses which he requires in the directions given by him, 
but he is very impatient to know what system can be adopted for 
raising a military force in Holland, and what arrangements Great 
Britain intends to furnish towards that object. I presume that the 
importance of some speedy arrangement upon this point will 
already have occurred to you, and it should seem to me that no 
time should be lost in preparing the means for enabling the 
Hereditary Prince to head a certain number of his own countrymen, 
and make the }ioijaii of a Dutch army; this subject presses the 
more because, till your decisions are known upon it, no directions 
can be given to the many Dutch officers who now expect to receive 
them. I am impatient to hear what has been done in this 
insurrection on board the Dutch fleet, but I have as yet no 
particulars. I expect Lord Minto in a day or two from Bruns- 
wick, and General Stamford about the 23rd instant. I write to 
Mr. Hammond to desire him to tell me from what day I must 
draw on the extraordinaries for Mr. Fisher's allowance ; you 
recollect that it was promised to be paid in that shape, as the 
fees of ofiice would otherwise tell heavily on it. 



156 

"Our last accounts are that the Archduke was waiting the 
success of a march of General Haddick with 15,000 men to turn 
the position of Massena; a report prevailed on the 5th at Zurich 
that Moreau had been beat, but I suppose you have more 
authentic intelligence from Moreau." 

H. Fagel to Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 19. — " The enclosed is my brother's last letter to 
me with an accurate translation of his report to the Hereditary 
Prince, which was originally written in Dutch. The memoire 
mentioned in both these papei's, was a sort of instruction given 
by the Hereditary Prince to my brother before his departure ; he 
was directed by it to endeavour to engage some old friends of two 
officers of the ancient navy who had taken service under the 
present government [Van IBraam and Capellen] to remonstrate 
with them on their conduct, and to give to them assurances of 
suitable rewards if they would contribute towards bringing the 
fleet back to its duty. I cannot say that I think this report so 
satisfactory as I could have wished, nor Van Braam's assurances 
so positive as I was led to believe from my brother's first letter, 
which was sent by Mr. Grenville, and which your Lordship 
delivered to me the day I saw you, Mr. Pitt, and Lord Spencer in 
Cleveland Bow. What I do not understand is the time when 
Van Braam's project is to be executed. He will not effect a 
change on board the fleet as long as it remains within harbour, 
on account of the batteries at the Helder. But then he objects 
equally to sailing, and will use his utmost endeavours with the 
present Government to prevent the fleet from sailing. This 
seems to be contradictory. I shall be happy to know your 
opinion on this subject." 

Enclosure 1. * 

B. Fagel to H. Fagel. 

1799, July 6. Schoenhausen. — " Jai fort bien re9U votre 
lettre du 24 du mois passe, et pour y repondre tout de suite 
par le courier qui part aujourd'hui, et puis rectifier tout ce qui 
doit y avoir eu de louche dans un rapport fait a la hate, 
au moment ou je m'}^ attendois le moins, et echaufife d'un voyage 
de sept jours et sept nuits; quand a la chose meme, je vous 
envoy e la copie exacte du rapport que je mis par ecrit le jour 
meme de I'entrevue avec M.M. d'Enghuysen et VerJieul, 
I'homme en question. La parole que je lid avois donnee de no le 
point nommer, et le danger reel qu'il y a pour liU d'etre connu, 
m'ont seuls engage a cacher son nom. Fran9ois, qui m'avoit 
accompagne d' Amsterdam chez Job May, auquel j'etois addresse, 
a ete temoin du refus qu'a fait celui-ci de se charger de la com- 
mission dont il etoit question dans le memoire que j 'avois pour 
lui, fonde sur ce que cela le compromettroit aupres de ses anciens 
camarades, en ce que, disoit-il, ils me jetteront la pierre d'avoir 
termine a leur desavantage et au profit de leurs ennemis une 



157 

affaire qui, en elle-meme, peut avoir des d^sagr^ments pour le 
Prince meme. Vous avez done bien jug6 que Francois 6toit 
instruit de ma commission ; ne nous ayant pas accompagn^ a 
Aanholt, ce n'est pas [de] moi qu'il S(;ait les details ulterieurs. 

" J'apprends par une lettre de lui que May les lui a donnes. II 
y a done sur a parier qu'il remettra a Verheul I'ordre que vous 
lui avez envoye : soit que cela ait tenu a la maniere dont je me 
serai explique, il paroit qu'on n'a pas compris comme il faut le 
projet de Van Braam, quand au pilote et a I'officier a envoyer a 
I'amiral Anglois. Vous sentes fort bien qu'il lui est impossible 
de se mettre sans le plus imminent danger en communication 
directe avec lui, et que meme on ne doit point I'essayer de votre 
cote. Van Braam m'a semble desirer tout simplement que le com- 
mandant Anglois S9ut a quoi s'en tenir quand il verra venir a lui 
les deux personnes designees. II n'a d'autre raison de vouloir 
d'empecher la sortie de la flotte que la crainte et la presque 
certitude, ou il est, que son plan ayant reussi, comme nous 
le desirous, n'occasionne de la part du parti revolutionnaire 
un mouvement qui culbuteroit le Gouvernement modere 
d'aujourd'hui, et exposeroit nombre de personnes au plus 
grand danger, et, surtout, extorqueant le peu d'argent qu'il y 
a encore." 

Enclosure 2. 

K. Fagel to the Hereditary Prince of Orange. 

June 6. Coesfield. — " Conformement a mes instructions je 
devois communiquer a M.M. d'A. et d'Enghuisen le memoire 
relatif a la flotte : d'apres cela ce dernier m'en demanda une 
copie pour la faire voir a un ancien officier de la marine, des 
sentimens duquel il repondoit. Sachant que ce dernier etoit 
M. Verheul, ami de M. J. May, je crus ne pas devoir refuser 
cette demande. Cependant n'ayant point re9u de reponse satis- 
faisante de M. J. May, j'etois sorti du pays assez mecontent, 
lorsqu'a mon arrivee sur la frontiere, M. d'Yvoy y re9ut une 
lettre de M. d'Enghuisen qui me fit differer mon depart jusqu'au 
jeudi, 6 Juin. Ce jour-la M.M. d'E [nghuisen] , Verheul, et 
d'Yvoy se rendirent a A [Anholt] et M. V[erheul] fit, pour 
autant que je m'en rappelle, le rapport suivant. 

"Des la premiere communication du memoire du Prince 
Hereditaire, M. V[erheul] y avoit trouve les memes difiticultes 
que M. J. May avoit remarquees, relativement a la proposition 
a faire par un des officier s de I'ancienne marine, II pref^roit 
effectuer une revolution a bord des vaisseaux, sans qu'on fut 
dans le cas de la devoir aux officiers actuels, et afin de.pr^venir 
toute espece d' engagement du Prince Hereditaire, ou de sa part, 
avec les dits officiers. Plein de zele pour la bonne cause, 
M. Verheul etoit parti pour la Hollande peu de jours apres la 
communication que M. d'E [nghuisen] lui avait faite, afin de 
s'aboucher avec Van Braam. Ce qui lui reussit complettement. 

" Apres que ces deux Messieurs se furent entretenus quelque 
temps sur la situation actuelle des affaires dans la R^publique, et 



158 

que Van Braam eut clairement donn6 a connoitre combien sa 
position etoit facheuse, et combien il seroit charme de contnl)uer 
a un ehangement dans I'etat des choses, M. V[erheul] lui dit 
enfin, qu'il n'y avoit pour lui qu'un seul moyen de retablir son 
honneur, et d'effacer la tache qu'il avoit contractee en se laissant 
employer par la republique Batave. M. V [erheul] ayant assure Van 
B [raam] des bonnes intentions qn'oii avoit a son egard et a celui 
de M. de Cappellen, et lui ayant represente, en meme temps, qu'il 
pourroit rendre le service le plus important a sa malheureuse 
patrie, proposa la mesure suivante comme la seule chose qui 
restat a faire a ces Messieurs. II faut, dit-il, effectuer une 
revolution a bord des vaisseaux, et cela de la maniere suivante. 
Van B [raam] inviterat certain jour ses officiers a bord de son 
vaisseau, et apres un repas cordial et gai, il se levera de table et 
rentrera tout d'un coup, une paire de pistolets a la main. Alors 
il leur donnera ordre du ton le plus serieux de I'ecouter sans 
donner aucun signe de mecontentement. II declarera ensuite 
que le moment est venu de se soumettre de nouveau, ainsi que le 
pays entier, au souverain legitime, et d'obeir aux ordres qu'il 
leur donneroit en son nom. 

' ' Le premier qui ne voudroit par contracter cet engagement 
devroit etre, tout de suite, arrete, ou meme tue. Pendant que ceci 
se passera dans la cabine, la meme chose se fera dans le meme 
temps parmi I'equipage, deja prepare au moyen des bas-officiers 
(qui sont presque tons bons). On aura soin de poster d'abord un 
nombre convenable d'hommes aupres des pieces, on coupera la 
figure de la liberte hors du pavilion, et Ton criera Orange haven. 
Le Sieur Van Braam n'h^sita pas un moment a donner sa parole 
dlionneur qu'il I'entprendrat ce qu'on vient de dire, d autant 
plus qu'il ne doutoit nullement que la chose ne reussit tres-bien : 
il ajouta que la plus part de ses officiers (a I'exception de son 
premier officier) verroient avec plaisir un ehangement de choses 
dans la Kepublique. 

" L'Amiral Story, dont le Capitaine de Capellen est I'officier de 
pavilion, n'occasioneroit gueres d'obstacle dans ce projet, vu qu'il 
est regarde par les equipages comme un homme de peu de 
caractere. Van Braam a declare de plus qu'il seroit fort mauvais 
d'effectuer une revolution a bord de la flotte, tant qu'elle restoit 
en rade, vu que les trois batteries a boulets rouges qui ont ete 
construites au Helder, pouvoient en tout temps empecher 
les vaisseaux de sortir ! Aussi longtemps que cela dependra de 
lui, il tachera d'empecher aupres du Gouvernement que la flotte 
ne sorte, mais si elle recevoit ordre de sortir et de mettre en mer, 
il promet snr sa parole dlionneur d'ex6cuter le plan et de se 
joindre aux Anglois. II enverra alors un ^nlote avec un officier 
au commandant de la flotte Angloise ; le tout a condition que les 
vaisseaux Hollandois soyent re9us en amis et allies, et ne soyent 
pas obliges de baisser pavilion, ni d'eproiiver aucun mauvais 
traitement ni menaces, vu qu'il aimeroit mieux se laisser couler 
a fond que de s'y soumettre. 

"II a voulu aussi que M. V [erheul] informat de tout ceci I'Amiral 
liinsbergen, afin qu'il y ait d'abord quelqu'un qui puisse, dans la 



159 

suite, donner des ordres, nommer des officiers, et pr^venir 
tous les desordres qui pourroient ais^ment avoir lieu parmi des 
matelots, gens difficiles a tenir en respect, amateurs de nouveaut^s, 
et qu'il ne seroit pas aise en pareil cas de calmer, a moins qu'il ne 
se trouvat sur le champ un chef qui eut leur confiance, et auquel 
ils fussent dans I'habitude d'ob^ir. 

"Ceci a 6t6 fait et promis a mon insu, et j'en ai temoign6 
mon mecontentement n'ayant point d'ordres a ce sujet. M. 
Verheul dit qu'il n'avoit consulte que son zele, et qu'il se flattoit, 
en consequence, que le Prince Hereditaire ne trouveroit pas 
mauvais qu'il en eut agi ainsi, et qu'il eut fait la proposition ci- 
dessus a Van Br [aam] . II pensoit n' avoir engage par la le Prince 
Hereditaire avec personne d'autre que M.M. Van Br [aam] et 
Capellen, pour lesquels il savoit par moi et par le contenu du 
memoire de Br [aam], que le Prince etoit favorablement dispose." 
Translation. 

Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville. 

1799, July 19. Cleveland Row. — "I congratulate you most 
sincerely on the successful issue of your long and laborious 
negotiation, and I certainly agree with you in thinking that the 
hostility of Prussia must, whatever shape it assumes, be pro- 
ductive of great impression on the minds of people in France. 

"But you will easily have collected from my intermediate 
despatches that the arrangement as it now stands is not without 
its difficulties, and I own myself at a great loss what solution to 
suggest for them. 

" We are so ready with our expedition that there is hardly time 
to apprise Prussia of it before it sails, much less to concert with 
them any part of its political or military details. If we execute 
the thing and it succeeds, it will do so long before the possible 
march of a Russian army (a fourth army from that country) can 
bring it to the Rhine. The King of Prussia may find it less easy 
to summon the French to evacuate Holland at the very moment 
we are attacking it ; and, at all events, there can be hardly any 
question of his marching his army into Holland. Certainly you 
would not recommend that for these considerations, or for any 
other, we should delay our attack for a single hour. 

" Then comes the question, if Holland is rapidly recovered (say 
in the first or second month), what is it we are paying the 
Prussians to do for the remainder of the year? The article 
about not acting with us in any measures respecting the interior 
of France must, as I conceive, admit of some change in the form, 
because, as is now stands, it seems to imply some censure on our 
views, which yet I believe every rational being even in Prussia 
must allow to be those which afford the only prospect of peace 
for Europe. But whatever the form be, we understand by it that 
Prussia means to remain on the defensive and not co-operate in 
our attack on the territory of France itself, which yet affords the 
only means of trying the experiment of the Royal Standard. 
Can we then be paying Prussia for doing nothing, but possibly 



160 

hanging on the operations of the Austrians ; and can we at the 
same moment solicit the f/rafiiifoiis support of the latter in om- 
plans, though calculated for their benefit. 

"But a further question arises. Prussia is to act for the 
deliverance not only of Holland but also oi the ])a is Umitrojjhes. 
Now must w^e not before we begin to pay her army understand 
precisely what these pais Jimitroj^Jws are ? Whether the Nether- 
lands or the German provinces ? And above all what the Eussian 
views are respecting the situation of those countries from which 
she drives the French, whether by force or by threats ? A con- 
sideration the more interesting from the very remarkable phrase 
in the sixth article, of security for the hereditan/ Princes of the 
Empire to the exclusion of all the ecclesiastical states. The 
whole of that sixth article is liable to another and a very serious 
objection. To agree by a public treaty that the three Courts will 
concert about a peace in Swisserland, Italy, and Germany, is to 
say, in other words, that England and Russia will join with the 
Court of Berlin to dictate a peace to Austria, and that at a 
moment when Austria, with all her faults, is however gaining 
victory upon victory over our enemies without our paying her for 
it, and when Prussia asks a million for sitting down armed to 
see Russia and England reconquer Holland and block Mentz. 

"The greatest difficulty of all is that which relates to the 
Netherlands. After many variations in my opinion I have 
nearly brought myself to think that the best thing we could do 
would be to guaranty to Austria the repossession of the Nether- 
lands on some such footing and arrangement as is detailed in the 
enclosed sketch, which I drew yesterday for Mulgrave's perusal, 
and which will, I believe, form the basis of his instructions. Now 
is it not to be feared that this is the very result which the inter- 
position of Prussia is intended to prevent ; and that while she 
pretends to be arming for the deliverance of Holland, which we 
shall deliver without her, and into which she professes not to 
intend to enter, the real object is, to be in sufficient force and 
sufficiently near to overrun those provinces at the first appear- 
ance of an Austrian cockade there. 

" You see that in my despatch I have reserved all these points 
(for it is these to which I refer) for further discussion in Cabinet 
before I write officially upon them. But as yet the only solution 
that I see is in a fresh proposal to Berlin that as we are, as we 
trust, on the point of accomplishing by our own exertions (to 
which their indecision has driven us) the principal, and indeed 
the only distinct object which is proposed in the articles as drawn 
by Haugwitz, we remain equally desirous of establishing a system 
of concert and co-operation with Prussia, and are willing to con- 
tract with that Court the same pecuniary engagements as are 
there specified, provided we can see the means of making their 
force applicable to any other object of- common interest. 

" You will observe that the idea stated in the enclosed 
memorandum of allotting to Prussia the blockade of Mentz 
would perfectly coincide with their defensive plan, without 



161 

the necessity of admitting into any treaty an article of such 
obnoxious import as their 5th article appears to us to be. 

" I am grieved that at the very moment you had with so much 
labour and persevering ability brought these people to the point, 
the total change of our circumstances and situation should 
necessarily plunge you into a fresh sea of discussion, and tliat, 
in many parts of it, by no means of a pleasant kind. But you 
will, I am sure, even before this letter reaches you, have felt that 
it was unavoidable. 

" I send you all these ideas as the best mode of putting you in 
possession of what occurs to me, but I have before mentioned 
that they are all subject to further Cabinet discussion, though I 
believe they are in general conformable to the opinions expressed 
to-day, and on which I was on the point of writing to you officially 
when Johnson arrived. 

" I send you the account of the sailing of the combined fleets. 
I had rather it was otherwise, but so it is. 

" Our militia enlisting goes on well, and will, I trust, give us 
from 15 to 20,000 men. If the enemy land in Ireland we shall 
want them. 

" Might there not be some means, in order to save time, of 
agreeing that the monthly payments shall run for the first two 
months, subject to be then discontinued if Holland is then 
recovered, and if some other operation be not agreed upon by 
common consent." Copy. 



Invasion of the Dutch Provinces. 
Official Minute by Lord Grenville. 

1799, July. — "Mr. Gartshore to proceed first to Gothenbourg 
in the cutter — then either by land or sea to Stockholm — and 
finally to send the cutter to Eiga. He will be the bearer of a 
despatch to Mr. Hailes apprizing him of the business, and of the 
King's intention to accept the 8,000 troops on the same terms 
as the Russians, to act with us or Russia ; but not the ships of 
the line except fitted as transports. That in all events the ships 
for the transport of these 8,000 must be furnished in Sweden 
though at the King's expense. The treaty will probably be to 
be concluded at Petersburg, but Mr. Hailes is to give the fullest 
assurances to the effect above mentioned. 

"Mr. G[artshore] will communicate to him more particularly 
the sentiments of the King's Government on the whole subject, 
and will assist in expediting all the details that may be connected 
with it. He will proceed with the result to Captain Popham, 
and will lend himself to such steps as circumstances may require 
in order to accelerate the whole. 

" Mr. Hailes' instructions to be conformable to the above. 

" Sir Charles Whitworth to be apprised of this — to be also told 
what steps are taken or taking about transports here — and about 
the Baltic ships, there. 

6802 L 



162 

** That on Stamford's arrival he will have learnt that the plans 
in agitation may lead to employ the troops in Groninguen. 

This will not be done without a co-operation here of at least 

men on the coasts of the U [nited] P [rovinces] . 

" That steps will also be taken to send to Gothenbourg, or 
elsewhere, artillery, stores, and cavalry. 

"He is to do his utmost to induce the Emperor to accede to 
these arrangements, without which the measure may fail of 
securing the deliverance of Holland. 

" Transports for 3,600 actually under sailing; 6,000 will go in 
a week or ten days. And the remainder as fast as possible." 

Count Razoumouski, Eussian Minister at Vienna, to the 
Emperor Paul I. 

1799, [July 20.] Vienna. — " L'evenement de I'occupation de 
Naples, precede deja par la soumission de toutes les provinces a 
I'autorite royale, a fait penser au Baron de Thugut que le corps 
destine par votre Majeste Imperiale pour ce meme objet sous les 
ordres du General Pihebinder, pourrait etre employe plus utile- 
ment a I'avantage de la cause commune, et aux intentions 
magnanimes de votre majeste. En me developpant sur cet objet 
ses idees, Monsieur de Thugut a commence par me dire qu'il ne 
pretendrait absolument autre chose que de soumettre ses pensees 
pour le bien commun a la sagesse de votre Majeste Imperiale, me 
sollicitant de lui representer en meme temps que le dit corps 
restera dans sa position actuelle, pret a se porter ou votre 
Majeste Imperiale jugera a propos de le prescrire, jusqn' a ce que 
nous recevions ses ordres definitifs a cet egard. Ce ministre 
presume que I'expedition par la Suisse vers les frontieres de 
France au moyen des corps conjoints des gen^raux Korsakoff et 
Derfelden, ne serait point suffisante pour son important objet, et 
que I'addition de celui du General Rhebinder en consoliderait 
puissamment I'effet. Si votre Majeste Imperiale n'agreait point 
cette proposition, il lui semblerait qu'un autre emploi pourrait 
occuper utilement le general Rhebinder, et ce serait, comme je 
I'ai deja indique precedemment, de le transporter a Malte. 
Apres que cette ile aurait ete delivr^e des Francais, on y 
laisserait la garnison, qui fait partie de ce corps, et le surplus 
formant, a vue de pays, sept mille hommes, pourrait entreprendre 
un debar quern ent en Provence ; on pourrait y joindre 10 a 12 
mille Naj)olitains, ce qui formerait une armee tres suffisante pour 
cette partie de la France, la plus disposee a se soulever contra le 
Gouvernement actuel. 

" Le Comte de Cobenzl recevra aujourd'hui ordre de declarer 
I'adh^sion de I'Empereur son maitre au voeu de votre Majeste 
Imperiale de joindre le corps auxiliaire a celui du Lieutenant- 
General Korsakoff, et les dispositions en seront communiqu^es 
au Mar^chal Souvoroff d'abord apres la prise de Mantoue. II ne 
reste a cet ^gard qu' a regler I'approvisionnement de ce corps 
dans sa nouvelle destination. II sera enjoint au Comte de 
Oobenzl de s'en entendre avec le Chevalier Whitworth. On 



163 

espere ici que ce ministre ne fera point de difficult^ d'^ngager, sa 
Cour a se charger de cet objet. Si cependant elle s'y refusait, 
Monsieur de Thugut propose dans ce cas de porter le dit corps a 
la droite du General Korsakoff, ou pour mieux dire du Marechal 
Souvoroff, efc de le joindre a I'arm^e interm^diaire que agira sur 
le haut Ehin, et qui sera pourvue des restes des magasins 
Autrichiens qui ont et6 formes sur le Danube, et dans la Suabe, 
pour I'Archiduc Charles. Enfin, si aucune de ces deux mesures 
ne pouvait s'effectuer, je pense que cette Cour-ci ne se refuserait 
point a tenir compte aux Anglais de leurs fraix a raison de 
I'entretien qui a eu lieu de sa part jusqu' ici en faveur du dit 
corps auxiliaire. 

" J'ai parle ci-dessus d'une armee interm6diaire. Pour rendre 
cette expression intelligible, je dois indiquer que, sous peu de 
jours, il sera decide a I'egard de la nouvelle repartition des forces 
qu'on emploiera. Ce travail depuis longtemps en instance, et 
qu'on dit avoir ete differe par la marche du General Korsakoff, 
sera fixe de la maniere suivante. L'Archiduc Charles evacuera 
la Suisse a mesure que les troupes de votre Majeste Imperiale y 
entreront. Ce prince filera le long du Rhin pour occuper la 
partie inferieure de ce fleuve. II couvrira par sa gauche 
Mayence, point essentiel par ou I'ennemi pent se porter aisement 
sur I'Allemagne, et forcer les armees Autrichiennes a abandonner 
leurs operations, pour defendre les pays hereditaires. Sa droite 
s'etendra jusques vers les Pays-bas, pour seconder de ce c6t6 
la nouvelle expedition que les efforts genereux de votre Majeste 
Imperiale dirigent vers la Hollande. Sur le haut Rhin sera une 
armee intermediaire, commandee par le Prince Ferdinand de 
Wurtemberg, qui pourra entreprendre les sieges de Huningue et 
de Brisac, pour aider celle de Suisse. Toutes ces dispositions 
feront I'objet d'un courier que le Baron de Thugut se propose 
d'expedier sous peu de jours au Comte de Cobenzl, afin qu'il soit 
a meme d'en transmettre les details au ministere de votre Majeste 
Imperiale. 

"Votre majesty Imperiale en faisant mention dans un des 
dernier s rescrits dont elle m'a honore, de la declaration a publier 
par les allies en commun, m'a ordonn^ de lui transmettre mes 
observations sur la maniere dont le ministere Autrichien 
envisageait cet objet. Le Baron de Thugut s'en est explique 
d'autant plus librement que son opinion se trouvait parfaitement 
d'accord avec le langage qui m'etait prescrit, ayant pour principe 
de differer .cette mesure jusqu'a ce qu'une plus grande maturite 
de circonstances en indique le moment favorable. Ce moment 
serait celui ou les armees, se trouvant sur tonte I'etendue 
des frontieres ennemies, manifesteraient aux habitants de la 
France les intentions bienveillantes de leurs souverains. On 
chercherait alors a se procurer des intelligences qui mettent a 
meme de juger de la disposition des peuples. Ces dispositions 
different indubitablement d'une province a I'autre, et n'ont de 
conformite que dans le mecontentement contre le gouvernement 
actuel ; celui-ci parait evidemment adopter le systeme du 
terrorisme depuis le dernier changement op6r6 par le conseil 



164 

I6gislatif. Les Jacobius les plus outres, investes aujourcV hui de 
I'autorit^ publiqiie, saisiraient avec empressemeDt I'occasion 
d'alarmer le peuple sur I'approche des troupes 6trangeres 
en leur imputant le dessein de demembrer la France et 
de la forcer a reconnaitre un roi. II paraitrait done utile, 
sous ce point de vue, de fixer la declaration aux deux bases 
suivantes, promettre I'integrit^ de la France dans ses anciennes 
limites ; et le r^tablissement d'un gouvernement conforme a sa 
tranquillite interieure, et, par consequent, a un etat de paix 
duralDle avec ses voisins. Get engagement rassurerait les esprits, 
et on serait a meme d'en modifier I'objet relatif a la forme du 
gouvernement d'apres les notions qu'on acquerirait sur la 
majority des voeux des habitants. On est ici d'opinion qu'il faut 
bien se garder d'etre induit en erreur par les pretendues notions 
des emigres a I'egard de I'interieur; on en a ete grandement 
abuse pendant la derniere guerre, et on le serait de meme 
aujourd'hui. Un officier, revenu il y a trois semaines seulement 
par I'echange, et qui a sejourne en Franche Comte et en 
Bourgogne, rapporte que I'esprit n'y est point aussi prononce 
qu'on aurait en lieu de la croire en faveur de la royaute, et surtout 
pour la personne de Louis XVIII. Quant a I'epoque ou Ton 
pourrait esp^rer de mettre pied en France, si les armes des 
coalises continuent comme jusqu'ici a etre couronnecs de succes, 
on ne pense point que cette entree puisse s'eff'ectuer avant le 
printemps. On juge que la saison sera deja trop avancee lorsque 
les diverses armees seront rendues a leurs stations respectives, 
et on presume qu'il serait avantageux que cette entree se fit a la 
fois sur I'etendue entiere qu'occuperont les armees. Celle 
d'ltalie le plus aisement par la vallee de Barcelonette. Les 
Fran^ais ne se meprennent point sur la f acilite qu' ofifre ce point ; 
deja ils I'ont garni de six a sept mille hommes, et probablement 
lis y eleveront quelques ouvrages de defense. L'armee 
Kusse reunie pourra, avant I'expiration de I'hiver, occuper 
la totalite de la Suisse pour se porter par le Franche Comte. 
L'armee intermediaire mettra le siege devant les deux places ci- 
dessus mentionnees sur le haut Ehin, et s'ouvrira sa route de ce 
cote ; tandis que sur le has Ehin I'Archiduc Charles se tiendra 
en mesure d'avancer en meme temps. Telle est I'idee generale 
qu'on se forme ici de I'execution de ce plan formidable, qui 
mettra fin glorieusement a la guerre la plus memorable qui ait 
jamais ete entreprise, et dont les succes, determines par la 
genereuse intervention de votre Majeste Imperiale, seront 
eternises d'age en age par les benedictions et la reconnaissance de 
la posterite la plus reculee. 

" Le Baron de Thugut allegue pour motif du delai jusqu'au 
printemps I'indispensable necessite de procurer du repos a 
l'armee autrichienne, dont on evalue les pertes pendant cette 
campagne a pres de 80 mille hommes, et le temps d'y retablir 
I'ordre et la tenue que la guerre ne manque jamais d'alterer. 
Au surplus ce ministre a ajoute que, dans la supposition ou votre 
Majeste Imperiale voulut faire entreprendre quelqu'expedition 
partielle a ses troupes en Suisse, celles de I'Empereur des 



165 

Bomains concourraient par des demonstrations sur les points 
qu'elles occuperaient, a forcer I'ennemi de diviser ses forces, ce 
qui faciliterait les succes du Marechal Souvorofif." Copy. 

Endorsed by Lord Grenville, " Communicated by Count Woron- 
zow, September, 1799." 

Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph Abercromby to 
Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 21. Jermyn Street. — " I have the honour to trans- 
mit to your Lordship, by Mr. Pitt's desire, the enclosed paper ; 
perhaps it is too long ; your Lordship may make what use you 
please of it, either in whole or in part." 

Enclosure. 

Note on the subject of an invasion of the Dutch Provinces. 

1799, July 20. — "Various plans have been offered for an attack 
on the United Provinces, with the view to recover them from the 
oppression of France. It has been proposed to seize the island 
of Walcheren with a British force. This would have been a 
most important point, should any of the great armies now on 
foot have crossed the Rhine and the Mouse, and have penetrated 
into Brabant. The advantages are so obvious that they require 
no elucidation. Considered as unconnected with any co-operation, 
it could be of no use to Great Britain. It would have required a 
strong garrison, and a considerable naval force, to have protected 
it. And in autumn it is extremely unhealthy. 

"Another plan offered has been to occupy the islands of 
Walcheren, Goree and Ameland, with a view to encourage and 
support an insurrection in Holland. It is apprehended that the 
support which the possession of these islands would have given 
would not have produced the intended effect ; being too super- 
ficial. The intention of landing fifteen thousand men in the 
province of Groningen probably would have produced very 
considerable consequences if put in execution. We may fairly 
suppose that such a force might have rescued from the hands of 
the French, not only Groningen, but Friesland, and part of 
Overyssel. It is doubtful if Coevorden could have been taken 
during the short remains of the good season. It is probable that 
the operations of this body of troops must have been confined to 
the northern part of the United Provinces. The last proposition 
which has been made has been to concenter the whole force now 
assembling, and to attack Holland by the Meuse. The advan- 
tages resulting from this mode of attack, if fairly estimated, are 
very considerable. 

" The possession of the island of Voorn will afford a safe port, 
and a free communication with Great Britain. An immediate 
passage into the province of Holland will be opened. And if the 
whole force should happily arrive before the middle of September 
it is hoped that a very considerable progress will be made in the 
reduction of the provinces of Holland and Utrecht before the 



166 

month of November. At any rate, we shall be in such force as to 
form a corps of observation to act on the Waal and the Khine, 
and to secure us from any attempt on the part of France. We 
should likewise be enabled to open a passage to any power on 
the Continent, who should decide to enter Holland, either on the 
side of Groningen or of Guelderland and of Overyssel, by 
depriving Holland of her defence on that side of the lines of 
the Greb — which we should take in reverse — whilst at the same 
time we should be enabled to facilitate in a great degree the 
passage of the Yssel. The free navigation of the Ehine to 
Arnheim would afford a certain supply of provisions to the army, 
and would save the expense of a heavy transport by land. 

" On a fair comparison of the respective advantages attending 
each plan it is apprehended that the attack by the Meuse is 
preferable under every point of view, whether the attempt is 
made by an army from this country, which is not expected to be 
supported by any of the Continental powers on the eastern 
frontiers of the Kepublic, or whether it is made with the 
expectation of such co-operation. Under this last idea, indeed, it 
is still more to be preferred to any of the others. For the 
assistance we should give to such an ally would be immediate, 
and even operate previously to their attack. We should open 
the way for them by acting in the rear of the enemy which 
opposed them. 

" In the farther prosecution of the war, should it be found 
expedient to carry our operations into Brabant, Great Britain, 
from the augmentation of her force and her naval power, would 
be able in the beginning of the next campaign to seize Walcheren 
in the first instance, and to open the communication by the 
Scheld, and to reduce the remainder of the province of Zealand." 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Pi'ivate, 

1799, July 21. Berlin. — " Courvoisier is arrived here early this 
morning from Petersburg. Sir Charles Wliitworth's letter to me 
contains no addition to his despatch except a stronger intimation 
of his hopes to bring the king of Sweden to more reasonable 
terms, and his intention to conclude if he can obtain them. I 
trust that the delay and demur upon the timber contract will 
vanish with the better assurances given concerning Malta, 
but I cannot help recommending a little more caution in the 
unbounded assurances which we give respecting that island 
(lest their demands should increase with our concessions) and a 
great deal more caution too in the manner in which we press 
our demand of timber, and the degree of necessity which we 
describe ourselves to be under of obtaining that article from 
Kussia. I know that this necessity is very great, but I cannot 
think that it is either prudent or decorous that an English 
Minister should represent at Petersburg that it depends upon 
them * that the English fleet should not be stopped in all its 
enterprises, paralysed in the middle of all its great efforts, and 



16^ 

rendered incapable of pursuing and annoying its naval enemies.* 
I hope Lord Spencer and you will not subscribe to this 
declaration at Petersburg ; I think myself a pretty good Kussian 
in politics, but I cannot consent to make the Emperor consider 
himself as the Man-Mountain who walks up and down the 
beach with the English fleet in the same string that held the 
fleet of Blefuscu. With respect to the Emperor's preference of 
the Prince de Conde, it evidently originates only in a desire of 
his keeping in his own pocket the active and efficient person 
who is to take the lead in France, but I conceive by Whitworth's 
letter that he will in the end give way. 

''Lord Minto arrived here the night before last, and goes on to- 
morrow with the intention of only stopping two days at Dresden. 
He had no important conversation with the Duke of Brunswick, 
who was as usual full of words and civilities to him, but disclaimed 
having any knowledge of the King of Prussia's intentions 
political or military ; yet at this very moment he had 
just sent a courier secretly to Haugwiz and to Yastrow, so 
secretly that I know it only by the chance of the man being seen 
to arrive and to go from hence the night before last ; this courier 
was probably charged with the Duke's opinion as to the number 
of men to be subsidized, and as Panin arrived here yesterday, we 
shall probably see Haugwiz to-night, when I hope to hear some- 
thing more positively from him. The same reluctance continues 
on the part of the King, but I believe it could be surmounted 
without difficulty, if there was not likewise in the minister and 
in the Duke of Brunswick a little paltry intriguing desire of not 
committing themselves ultimately till they have learnt more 
distinctly what is the course of our projected expedition ; but I 
shall leave to Captain Popham and to General Herman to tell 
them that secret in Holland, and certainly shall give them no 
more precise knowledge of it at Berlin. They are meanwhile 
pressing through the Duke of Brunswick upon the H [ereditary] 
P [rince] of Orange for a more complete information of all that 
is intended with respect to the interior of the country, the 
proposed declaration, the intended alteration in the constitution 
there ; but I have strongly recommended to him to be very 
sparing and cautious in all his communications both at Brunswick 
and at Charlottenburg, and to keep in his remembrance that at 
neither of those places is it fit that they should be confidentially 
trusted, until the King of Prussia will openly and manfully take 
the part which belongs to him. I am very glad to have to add 
that I think I can rely upon the discretion of the Prince in this 
respect. I know that he has been considered as entertaining 
originally some jealousy of English politics in Holland, and some 
attachment of preference to Prussia ; but if this is not extremely 
changed, he is a much greater hypocrite than I take him to be, 
for his constant and uniform language to me is as strong and 
vehement a reprobation of Prussia as I could myself express, 
. and as cordial professions of acknowledgment to England as I 
could desire or expect to hear from him. What is, besides this, 
perhaps a more decisive proof is the new marks which he has 



168 

given of confidence in the Grand Pensionary, to whom as 
well as to the Greffier, he is much better inclined than I believe 
in England he is thought to be. I had yesterday a long 
conversation with him and with Mr. James Fagel upon the 
course which it would be the most proper for the Prince to take. 
I thought there would be too great a danger of sudden explosion 
in Holland if the Prince shewed himself on the frontiers before 
we can shew ourselves upon the coast ; and yet it seemed very 
desirable to collect a few influencing persons nearer than Berlin 
to the frontiers, in order to be more immediately present, and to 
furnish more promptly to the arrangements which will be 
wanted ; the Grand Pensioner, I thought, might join them to 
keep them a little in order, and the Prince might go and converse 
with them there without remaining long enough to produce too 
early and active irritation in the country. This measure has 
been adopted. M. Vanderspiegel is desired to come to Varel in 
the Duchy of Oldenburg, 'where he may probably be in about a 
fortnight ; and the Prince may there confer with him and a few 
other leading persons, and may then hold himself in readiness to 
go wherever the ultimate course of the expedition shall make his 
presence the most useful. 

"I am impatient for the arrival of General Stamford, who is 
expected in three or four days, because, although the plan was 
concluded without his ideas having been much previously 
discussed, I take for granted that he will have acquired or that 
he will himself furnish more detail as to the exact and precise 
plan which is to be carried into execution ; and in truth without 
a pretty exact knowledge of the time, the place, the force, and the 
objects to which that force is to be applied, we shall find it diflicult 
to be as useful to you from the land as you will reasonably think 
we might be. Meanwhile I hope you will not overlook the 
necessary object of furnishing some noyau of Dutch army, and of 
giving the means of putting the H[ereditary] Prince at the head 
of a regular force of his own countrymen ; and when you recollect 
that all the well-disposed officers are now expecting his orders, 
you will agree that, if this measure be to any extent adopted, it 
ought to be brought forward without a moment's loss of time. I 
have desired him to prepare a short list of those officers whose local 
knowledge might make it desirable to employ them at any of the 
appointed attacks either of Ameland, Goree, or Walcheren ; but 
though I mention Goree, I still hope that you will persevere in 
beginning with the first Russian division at Ameland, supported 
by the English attack upon Walcheren ; and leave to the second 
Russian division whatever may, at the time of its arrival, be the 
most useful and advantageous destination of it. How far you 
will be able to secure the co-operation of the first Russian 
division for Ameland, and the English division for Walcheren, 
without losing time in bringing the Russian across to Yarmouth, 
I do not know ; if their going directly from the Baltick to Ame- 
land leaves too much uncertainty for ascertaining the co-opera- 
tion of the Walcheren attack from England, to be sure the first 
division must then pass to Yarmouth; but if the direct passage 



169 

could be safely made to Ameland, I think much time would be 
gained, and much more advantage had of surprise upon the 
enemy. I send you some interesting intelligence, the last which 
has been received." 



Enclosure 1. 

Memoire sur l'etat actuel de la Hollande. 

[1799.] — " Quelques soyent les plans et les viies que les allies 
ont sur la maniere de detruire la domination Fran^aise dans la 
Hollande, on croit essentiel de tracer et reunir sous un seul point 
de viie tous les renseignemens qu'on a pu se procurer sur cette 
r^publique : il est possible que la sagesse et I'habilet^ de ceux 
qui dirigent les plans y trouvent encore quelque chose a glaner. 

''Nil doute que tous les partis et tous les esprits se r^unissent 
a detester I'empire que les Fran^ais se sont arroges en Hollande. 
Leur conduite y a ete hautaine et cupide ; ils n'ont menage ni les 
personnes, ni les usages, ni les prejuges. Tous sont persuades 
que la France a voulu usurper, dominer, et piller. Le gouverne- 
ment n'a point dissimule I'opinion qu'il avait des employes 
Fran9ais, puisqu'il leur a retire, depuis pres de deux ans, toute 
espece de disposition de fonds, et qu'il a etabli une Directoire de 
commissaires et d'employes pour surveiller et controler les 
commissaires et employes Fran9ais qui ne sont charges que de 
presenter les etats ; et ce sont les commissaires Hollandais qui, 
apres avoir fait la verification, donnent I'ordre de payement. Un 
changement est done universellement desire, mais aucun des 
partis n'est d'accord sur la maniere. H y a dans la republique 
Batave trois partis tres distincts, les Aristocrates, les Stad- 
houderiens, et les Patriotes. Tous ont des int^rets differens, et 
plus ou moins d'influence dans le pays, et meme dans les 
troupes. La religion influe aussi notablement sur les vues 
politiques des habitans, surtout parmi les Catholiques, qui dans 
le commencement se sont declares les plus zel^s partisans de la 
revolution, et qui en eussent ete les deffenseurs obstines, si la 
France n'eiit point cherche a detruire cette antique religion de 
leurs peres. Les Catholiques jouissent paisiblement de I'exercise 
de leur culte, la revolution a meme ameliore leur sort en 
avouant ce qui n'etait que tolere, et en donnant aux membres de 
cette communion I'entree aux places et aux charges que la con- 
stitution Hollandaise ne leur permettait point. Les Catholiques 
sont nombreux surtout parmi le peuple ; si la Hollande reprend 
son ancienne attitude, ils sont persuades qu'ils perdront leurs 
droits. Si quelque proclamation ne les rassure point sur leur 
6tat a venir, et ne leur donne pas des esp^rances, on n'eprouvera 
d'eux aucun secours, et ils attendront impassiblement Tissue de 
cette lutte. Les patriotes et les aristocrates, quoique divisee 
d'opinion, se rapprochent cependant par la peur qu'ils ont de se 
voir ecart^s des charges et des employs, qu'ils ne doutent pas 
qu'ils ne soyent donnes de preference aux Stadhouderiens. II 
est, sans doute, difficile d'obvier a ces vues personelles, et de 



m 

detruire les consequences individuelles qu'elles peuvent avoir. Il 
est cependant necessaire d'en etre instruit pour tarifer avec 
exactitude le fonds que Ton pent faire sur I'interieur du pays, et 
la maniere d'y negotier. si Ton en a le projet. On dit, et repete 
sans cesse, que les troupes sont bien disposees ; cela est vrai 
jusqu'a'un certain point, mais les officiers, les generaux veulent 
conserver leurs places, et les emigres Hollandois, semblables aux 
emigres Francais, aliennent les esprits par leurs propos incon- 
sideres, par les pretentions qu'ils affichent, par le mepris qu'ils 
affectent pour ceux qui sont en place. On ne peut disconvenir 
que cette conduite ne soit au moins nuisible. 

'' II n'y a en Hollande que deux generaux qui ayent de I'influ- 
ence et de la consideration parmi les troupes : — Daendels et Du 
Monceau. On ne croit aucun des deux accessibles du cote de 
I'argent. Tous deux tiennent a leur etat, et ne pourraient etre 
gagnes que par I'esperance de conserver leurs grades militaires. 
II parait que, jusqu'a present, I'opinion publique ne leur a point 
laisse cet espoir ; leurs caracteres different extremement ainsi 
que leurs talents. Daendels a de I'activite, de I'espece d'intrigue 
necessaire pour le soutenir dans la place qu'il occupe. II ne 
faudrait pas juger de son intrepidite par la revolution qu'il a 
operee le 22 Juin dernier ; il a ete conduit par des circonstances 
imp^rieuses, qui ne lui ont point laiss6 de choix ; la maladresse, 
['irresolution, et I'imperitie des Directeurs lui ont rendu cette 
besoyne facile ; avec tout cela Daendels n'aurait rien effectue s'il 
n'avait point eu Joubert, dont le caractere hardi, entreprenant, 
on peut aj outer etourdi, ne I'avait pousse et encourage. 

" Dumonceau a des talents militaires ; il a une franchise, une 
simplicite qui lui concilie I'amour et la coniiance du soldat; il 
test zele republicain par conviction, et fidele au parti qu'il a 
•embrasse ; il n'est point jaloux de Daendels et a meme pour lui 
de I'attachement et du devouement. C'est lui qui commando 
dans les provinces de Groningue et de Frise et le pays de 
Drenthe, et il s'y est fait estimer. On doit ajouter qu'il est 
actif et laborieux, capable de n'omettre aucune des precautions 
necessaires pour la surete du pays qui lui est confie. Les 
habitans de Groningue lui sont attaches, sont en plus grande 
partie revolutionnaires, et seconderaient les troupes en cas 
d'attaque ; il n'en est pas de meme de la Frise, ou, on assure, que 
I'esprit est excellent. Ce sont les deux seuls generaux Hollandois 
qui valent la peine qu'on s'occupe d'eux. La reste suivra le flot, 
ou la direction que les circonstances ameneront. 

"II existe encore en Hollande un motif de division et d'incerti- 
tude qu'il est de I'interet meme de la maison d'Orange de faire 
cesser. II y est repandu que le Prince d'Orange pere, las 
des troubles de sa patrie, renon9ait a reprendre en main 
le maniement des affaires, et cederait au Prince hereditaire sa 
place et ses droits pour vivre comme particulier en Angle- 
terre. Ces bruits, sans doute denu^s de fondement, nuisent 
a la chose, et on croit essentiel de les faire cesser, pour 
unir et les opinions et les efforts. On en est encore loin 
en Hollande, ou, dans cette calamite publique, aucun parti. 



171 

aucun individu n'a perdu ni ses pr^juges ni ses pretentions. Un 
melange de federalisme et de patriotisme se mele dans tous les 
plans, dans toutes les idees, et rien n'est fixe ni arrete dans les 
tetes. Un ouvrage sage et fait par un homme qui connoitrait 
bien les interets generaux de la Hollande, et les interets et usages 
particuliers des provinces, qui saurait les conseiller et projioser 
un plan qui ferait flechir les abus, serait de la plus grande utilite, 
et fixerait des idees qui sont encore bien confuses. 

"Pour se resumer, on dira que la Hollande desire une revolu- 
tion, que tous les elemens sont prepares, mais c'est encore un 
cahos. II faut savoir, trainer, divisor, rassurer, et si on n'a pas en 
main des forces suffisantes pour tout abaisser devant soi, si le 
concours de I'interieur est necessaire pour la succes du but qu'on 
se propose, il est terns de s'en occuper, et d'embrasser d'un seul 
coup d'oeil les difficultes qu'on a a surmonter et a vaincre ; sur- 
tout qu'on se mefie des personnes qui n'envisagent qu'un seul 
aspect, et jugent de I'ensemble par I'objet qu'ils ont sous les 
yeux. Leurs intentions sont bonnes et pures, mais on s'egarera 
si Ton y met une confiance entiere, et on n'aura pas la veritable 
situation de ce qu'il est si important de connoitre." 

Enclosure 2. 

Voici les details donnes par I'homme dont on a parle dans la 
derniere : — 

" L'armee Batave est forte de plus de vingt mille hommes 
effectifs ; l'armee Francaise en Hollande est du meme nombre, 
mais dans celle-cy, il n'y a pas plus d'un sixieme d'anciens 
soldats, le reste sont des conscripts, parmi lesquels il y a une 
prodigieuse quantite de malades, particulierement en Zelande, a 
Nimegue, et a Groningue. 

" Le General-en-chef Brune, cy-devant prote d'imprimerie de 
Marat, qui a vole beaucoup d'argent en Italie, qui a de la 
Hollande plus de 40 mille florins de revenu, tant pour son 
traitement que pour sa table, sans compter les petites exactions 
qu'il peut faire, et qui est trop diffame pour ne point craindre le 
retour de I'ordre, fera les derniers efforts pour soutenir la 
revolution ; il est aime du soldat, parce qu'il est liberal envers 
lui: il a la reputation d'etre brave, mais on doute qu'il ait de 
grands talents. Le general Keubel, qui commando en second, est 
un imbecile, incapable, et meprise du soldat. 

"Le general de I'artillerie est un ancien officier du corps 
royal, qui a fait la guerre de sept ans. II a des connoissances de 
son metier, mais il est loin d'aimer la revolution, dont il n'a 
embrasse le parti qu'apres une detention de 18 mois, et pour 
sauver sa tete, et celle da sa famille ; on le croyait aise a gagner 
si on lui assurait son grade, et qu'il put se declarer sans se 
perdre ; il a un frere emigre. Tous les ofificiers inferieurs, chefs 
de brigade, capitaines, n'ayant que leur etat qu'ils tiennent de 
la revolution, meprisent le gouvernement, mais combatteront 
pour le deffendre, ou plutot pour deffendre leur existence qui 
s'evanouirait s'il etait detruit. Le Ministre de la Marine Batave 



in 

d^teste les Fran9ais, il ne peut dissimuler sa haine, et ferait tout 
pour les chasser de son pays. Ceux des affaires etrangeres, de 
la justice, et des finances, aiment trop leurs places, leur pouvoir, 
leur traitement pour vouloir un Stadhouder, et il seroit imposs- 
ible de les gagner. Celui de la guerre leur ressemble ; la seule 
difference c'est qu'on pourroit le corrompre ; le Ministre de la 
police est un Jacobin, et en meme terns un des hommes les plus 
vils et les plus bornes qu'on ait jamais mis dans une adminis- 
tration. Les Directeurs sont des hommes assez honnetes, ils 
ont ete patriotes, reconnoissentaujourd'hui leur erreur, detestent 
les Fran9ais, sont incapables de faire le mal, mais trop foibles 
pour ne pas s'y preter engemissant, depourvus de toute espece 
de talens et de caractere. Van Zoof est celui qui en auroit le plus, 
c'est en meme tems le plus attache au gouvernement actuel. Si 
les membres de ce gouvernement voyaient le parti jacobin pret 
de I'emporter, ils jDrefereraient sans doute de voir arriver les 
etrangers, mais ils n'auroient ni assez de courage, ni assez de 
moyens pour les servir utilement. 

"II y a dans ce moment au Texel 8 vaisseaux de 74, 3 fregates 
et 2 bricks prets a mettre a la voile; les commandants et les 
capitaines sont patriotes, mais la desertion regno parmi les 
matelots ; beaucouj) sont malades et tons sont decourages. 
L'apparition de quelques vaisseaux Anglois ont ete cause de 
quelques simptomes de mutinerie parmi les matelots, que les 
officiers ont reprimes a I'instant, mais qui demontrent I'esprit 
et les dispositions des equipages. Les fortifications des places 
de guerre sont en tres mauvais etat, les garnisons tres foibles ; 
on vient cependant d'en renforcer quelques-unes. Les finances 
ne se soutiennent que par I'emprunt force ; il n'y a point 
d'esprit public, les seuls mobiles sont le desir de conserver sa 
fortune, sa place, et la crainte du danger. 

"Le gouvernement Eran9ais n'a pas retire de ce pays la 
dixieme partie des ressources pecuniares qu'il auroit pu lui 
fournir, s'il avait ete aussi habile qu'avide. Les Hollandais ont 
eu I'addresse de se montrer toujours dans I'impuissance, de ne 
rien epargner pour gagner les agens, et les empecher d'y 
regarder de trop pres. La grande ressource du Directoire 
fran^ais est digne de ceux qui gouvernent, et donne la mesure 
de leur genie : ils n'ont su que changer perpetuellement les 
corps qu'ils envoyent ici et de faire habiller par les Hollandais 
60 a 80 mille homme au lieu de 20 mille. Les rescriptions 
Bataves perdent 79 ; les anciennes obligations a 2^ sont toujours 
a 40, les nouvelles a 39, 36. Le Ministre de France, Lombard, 
vient d'etre rappele, mais a eu ordre d'attendre a la Haye 
I'arrivee de son successeur." 

W. Pitt to Loed Grenville. 

1799, July 21. Hollwood.^" It seems desirable, as soon as 
you have any respite from your foreign labours, that we should 
name a day for renewing and bringing to a point the discussion 
respecting the intended Order in Council for restraining the 
importation of slaves into our new acquisition. 



173 

"After Wednesday many of the Cabinet (and probably myself 
among the number) will be absent from London. I shall not be 
out of reach, nor absent in the whole more than a fortnight, but 
my brother will probably be absent on his command, and very 
likely the Chancellor gone for the summer. If therefore it will 
suit you to fix a Cabinet before the levee on Wednesday, it will 
save a great deal of delay ; and we may take the same oppor- 
tunity of settling the point (which in one view is closely con- 
nected with this) of what we are to restore to Holland. 

" The Duke of Portland and my brother and I have already 
fixed to meet on some other Council business at twelve ; but we 
can leave it at any time when the Cabinet is ready. If you have 
any leisure in the meantime pray turn in your mind the form as 
well as substance of the measure, and let me know your ideas 
upon it. I still hope, on reflection, you will not have been 
anxious to keep your brother as much in the dark as you 
intended yesterday." 

Meriwrandwn of Loed Grenville in regard to the intelligence 
conveyed in H. Fagel's letter of July 19, 1799.*** 

1799, July 21. — "As we expect that by the beginning of the 
second week in August at latest our attack may be made, it 
seems very important that no time should be lost in apprizing 
either Admiral Kingsbergen or Captain V [an] B [raam] of it, in 
order that measures may be concerted for a revolution on board 
the fleet as soon as the first account is received there of the 
English having landed in any part of the Eepublic. This may 
be done by a direct communication through Hamburg and Varel 
to the person who was entrusted with the last letter; and, as it 
w^ould not be necessary to name the intended point of attack, 
there would be no danger even in case of treachery on the part 
of those officers, or of any accidental discovery, as the Govern- 
ment in Holland must be well aware that the period of attack 
cannot be very distant." 

Memorandum of Earl Spencer on the same subject. 

1799, July 22. Admiralty.— " On the subject of Lord 
Grenville' s memoir e, it strikes me that, even in the event of our 
effecting a landing, Y [an] B [raam] would not attempt a revolution 
on board the fleet while in port, on account of the batteries ; 
therefore unless he will consent to come out at that time, it 
would not be adviseable to make an eclat, which would only 
expose all the well-disposed people on board to discovery, and 
probably to destruction." 

Lord Grenville to Henry Dundas. 

1799, July 22. Dropmore. — "In the papers lately received 
from the interior of Holland the subject of arms is particularly 
mentioned, and, if our Ameland expedition takes place, it w^ill be 
indispensably necessary that we should be able and ready to 

furnish a supply. 

* See page 156. 



174 

"It seems also probable that we shall soon be called upon to 
send some supply of arms to the Vendee. 

"Will you be so good as to take measures as to the first point, 
so that the expedition that goes to Ameland may have a supply 
with it, and may not have to send back to England for this very 
essential article." 

Postscript, "I directed Taylor to send you yesterday the draft 
of a proclamation for Sir Ralph Abercrombie. It will, I think, 
be also necessary that something should be published in the 
name of the Prince of Orange, and if you think so, I will write 
to him about it. 

"Will it not be necessary, in order to guard against accidents, 
to send orders to the Sound to bring the Russians from thence 
to Yarmouth ? ' ' Copy. 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, July 22. Berlin. — "The picture of shame and disgrace 
which I am obliged to send you in my public despatch, tells its 
own story too well to require much additional comment in a 
private letter. I had certainly rather have died on a dunghill 
than have undergone the humiliating scene which Haugwiz 
had yesterday to pass through in his evening conference ; and, to 
do him justice, he did not appear in any degree insensible to the 
figure which he had to make upon this occasion. He was not, as 
I believe, altogether prepared for the very decisive tone in which 
he was answered, and I saw a considerable impression made 
upon him by the manner in which Count Panin gave him to 
understand that he was asking for what would assuredly be an 
audience of leave. With respect to myself, you will observe that 
I have not been behind -hand in expressing myself with equal 
decision as to the measure ; but I have not thought it expedient 
upon many accounts to seem to threaten as immediate a 
departure. In the present moment more than ever it seemed to 
me that you would all of you wish me to remain here, and in 
doing so it is not for the first time that I put entirely aside every 
regard to my own personal feelings and wishes ; but while your 
present expedition goes on, and it is now more necessary than 
ever, I know that you would be at a loss if I turned my back 
upon these shuffling politicians and indulged myself in shewing 
to them all the contempt which I feel for them. 

"My first care has been to inform the H[ereditary] P[rince] 
of Orange of this new state of things, and to put him upon his 
guard against any overture of this nature which may be made 
to him. I have found in him the same good sense and good 
conduct which I have already so much esteemed in him ; he said 
that he should naturally refer any such proposition entirely to 
the decision of the Stadtholder, and that perhaps he should take 
that occasion to desire to absent himself in order to go 
to England, so that by such permission he may put himself 
at liberty to act without being shackled by his Prussian uniform. 



175 

He is entirely agreed with me in believing that it is the 
Duke of Brunswick who is really the active person in this 
business, and that being afraid to commit his military reputation 
to a war with France, he has conceived this mode of settling 
Holland by Prussian influence without engaging in French 
hostility. What tends much to confirm this opinion is that every 
day brings new accounts of the French troops retiring from the 
country, and brings new instances of the Duke of Brunswick's 
political intrigues with several persons in the United Provinces 
whom the Prince thinks very little attached to the interests of 
the House of Orange ; and I was glad to see the Prince express 
himself determined not to furnish to the Duke of Brunswick any 
means of information, or the assistance of any persons who can 
be useful to the enterprise of the allied Courts. With this 
prudent precaution and reasonable jealousy, I am likewise very 
glad to see that the Prince proposes to avoid all apj)earance of 
breaking in any degree with the King of Prussia, although he 
will give himself as entirely as it can be wished to the military 
operations of which I have given him the knowledge : it is 
chiefly against the Duke of Brunswick that I find him strongly 
indisposed, and in the present moment, I do not wish him to look 
more favourably towards that quarter. I have recommended to 
him great vigilance and attention in tracing all that the Duke of 
Brunswick is doing in Holland, and I am confident that it is with 
him that this rare project has taken root ; if this be true the 
course will be that, whenever they have settled their shameful 
traffic at Paris, the Duke of Brunswick will obtain by his Dutch 
agents an application to the King of Prussia for assistance to 
march in and to settle the country, and this march will by them at 
Berlin be pressed on according to their intelligence respecting 
our expedition, which I conceive they wish to be beforehand with. 
Upon this speculation, however, I do not see any change which is 
to be made in the course that you are pursuing, although 
I see every motive for all possible diligence in the conduct 
of the expedition, and I almost grudge the loss of the 
time which is necessary for Popham to receive his orders 
to sail from the Sound. Meanwhile I have the pleasure 
to tell you that General Stamford is just returned, and 
I delight much in the assistance which he will be able to give 
at a moment so critical and so important. 

"We now approach however so near to the moment where 
there may be a real want of all the Orangists that can be found, 
that I cannot help again suggesting to you the advantage there 
would be in the Greffier's arrival either at Varel, or Berlin, or 
where he pleases, provided he be more within reach. Upon the 
whole although I think the conduct of Prussia more dirty and 
reproachful than it is easy to find words to express, I do not 
know that the deliverance of Holland will be retarded or 
prevented by it. It is not our business to break openly with 
Prussia because they are disgracing themselves in the eyes of 
their own country and of all Europe ; it is not our business to 
go to war with them because they will not go to war with France, 



176 

nor yet because they try to bargain with Syeyes instead of beating 
him from the Rhine and the United Provinces; nor yet is it om- 
business, if we meet the Prussians in Holland, to consider ourselves 
as fighting with them for the possession of it ; but it is our 
business, our first and most important business, to endeavour to 
be beforehand with Prussia in the obtaining firm footing in 
Holland, and in avaiUng ourselves for the House of Orange of all 
the pains, expense, and risk which belongs to the expedition that 
we have undertaken for the deliverance of the United Provinces. 

"Panin is afraid of the Emperor's growing quite furious at this 
low and pitiful Brunswick intrigue, but we must do what we can 
to keep him quiet, for a Russian war with Prussia would not 
mend our situation ; for myself I cannot promise entirely to keep 
down all traces of the disgust which they have inspired me with, 
but I will not let that disgust stand in the way of any real service 
which can be done here. I am not here for my pleasure, and a 
little more or less dissatisfaction shall not prevent me from doing 
any good that may arise, though in the present moment nothing 
good or bad can be done ; we rest upon the diligence of the 
expedition to run this race with Prussia." 

Dutch Affairs. Minute of Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 23rd.— "Mr. F[agel] will write that V[an] B[raam] 
should be apprized that the P [rince] of [range] is decidedly of 



opinion that he shou 



d lose no time in endeavouring to come out, 



and to join L [ord] D [uncan] in the manner already agreed upon, 
"To write to Mr. J[ames] F [agel] that it is extremely desirable 
to prevent any premature explosion in the Eastern provinces till 
the force appears off the island of Ameland, which may be by the 
end of August at the latest. But that everything should be in 
readiness to break out then. And that Helvoet is the best point 
for the correspondence to be established." 

J. H[ookham] Frere to Lord Minto. 

1799, July 23. London. — "I have just received Lord Gran- 
ville's directions for preparing a dispatch upon the subject of 
the capitulations which have hitherto been granted to the French, 
and which, upon the same view of the subject, you will, I am 
sure, join with us in considering as utterly nugatory and 
insufficient ; that most pressing remonstrances have been made 
on the part of the French Royalists, who are apprehensive of 
being exposed to the same hard fate as in the first years of the 
war, when the garrisons of Mayence and Valenciennes were let 
loose upon the inhabitants of Brittany and La Vendue. It is 
now understood that the prisoners returning from Italy under 
capitulation are to be stationed in Brest, and other parts of the 
interior, for the purpose of keeping down those movements which 
are hourly expected to break out. It becomes therefore highly 
important that some system should be adopted which, however 
ineffectual it may prove in point of restraint upon an enemy so 



177 

regardless of conventional obligation, may at least have the effect 
of giving confidence to the well-disposed party in France, by 
putting them upon the same footing with ourselves, and relieving 
them from those apprehensions which a severe experience has so 
strongly impressed upon their minds. Add to this the advantage 
to be derived from an oblique recognition of the King of France, 
strong enough to be understood by the well-affected party in 
France, without giving any hold to Opposition at home. Upon 
this view of the subject Mr. Wyndham has suggested (in a letter 
which is now before me) that the conditions of every future 
capitulation should be not to serve against the allies, nor against 
any party acting in the name of Louis XVIII. I have ventured 
therefore to anticipate the regular dispatch which you will 
probably receive by the next post, considering the extreme 
importance which at a moment like the present may attach to 
the events of two or three days ; and in the confidence that any 
step which you may think it right to take in consequence of the 
unauthorised suggestions which I have taken the liberty to 
communicate, would be fully and entirely approved of at home." 
Copy. 

Lord Grenville to Thomas Grbnville. 

1799, July 23. Dropmore. — "I have just received your des- 
patch and letter of the 14th instant. I have not time to add any- 
thing to the voluminous despatch that I send you, and I trust 
you will find it sufficiently clear and precise to act upon. We 
much wish to get the Prussian declaration, and its effect on the 
present circumstances may be decisive, but we are afraid of being 
involved blindfold in the Prussian politics as to Cologne, and 
still more as to the Netherlands. I trust, however, that now that 
they have once made up their minds to act, you will not find 
much diflQculty in putting the thing on some such footing as we 
propose." Coioy. 

M. Fauche Borel to Monseigneur [le Compte d'Artois]. 

1799, July 24. Hamburgh. — "Si ma presence sur le Continent 
n'^toit pas necessaire dans ce moment pour suivre a la n^gociation 
qui doit etre connue de votre Seigneurie, je me serois rendu avec 
empressement aupres d'elle, pour avoir I'honneur de lui donner 
des details infiniment interessants a ce sujet. Mais devant me 
rendre en dilligence aupres du general Pichegru et de Monsieur 
Wickham en Suisse, je me borne a vous faire parvenir le m^moire 
qui a ete mis sous les yeux de s [a] M [ajeste] Imperiale des Russes, 
et comme je ne puis le mettre en chiffre, je ne crois pas etre 
imprudent que de le remettre a Monsieur le chevalier de Crauffurth, 
qui a bien voulu m'assurer qu'il seroit remis surement dans les 
mains de votre Seigneurie. J'ai dans le temps eu soins de 
toujours faire parvenir a Monsieur Wickham tout ce qui pouvoit 
I'interesser dans cette affaire, que Ton aura, je pense, jug6 de 
quelqu' importance pour que je me persuade qu'il aura 6t6 charge 

6802 M 



178 

d'y donner ses soins. C'est dans cette persuasion que je me 
rends en Suisse pour faire arriver le general Pichegru a un 
nouveau rendez-vous sur le Rhin. On doit se faire I'echange des 
lettres pattentes du Roi, contre la lettre de Paul, conform^ment 
a la copie que prec^demment j'ai fais passer a Monsieur Wickham, 
et qui sera connue de votre Seigneurie, ainsi que le memoire qui y 
6toit anex^. Les 6v6nemens du 16 ont empech6 David de se 
rendre ou le g6n6ral et moi nous etions rendus, mais aujourd' 
hui D[avi]d nous mande de nous y rendre en toute hate, que tout 
a repris confiance, et que le mouvement n'a rien change aux 
dispositions de Paul, mais que nous devons etre en mesure pour 
les fonds, comme il le sera pour tout ce qui a 6te promis par Paul. 
En consequence, pour que tout soit bien entendu, je me suis 
determine a lui envoyer un de mes parents, homme de confiance, 
afin de pouvoir lui faire connoitre plus surement notre marche, et 
convenir du jour du la rencontre se fera. J' ai cru, Monseigneur, 
qu' il 6toit de mon devoir de vous faire parvenir dans cette 
circonstance interessante I'etat ou en est cette negociation, qui je 
I'espere ne pourra avoir qu'une heureuse issue. J'ose esperer que 
votre Seigneurie daignera pour ma tranquilite me faire accuser 
reception de la pr^sente, en me la faisant parvenir par le canal 
de Monsieur le chevalier de Craufifurth. 

" Je ne dois point taire a votre Seigneurie que, pour suivre aux 
d^penses et aux fraix de voyages nombreux qui ont ete n^cessaires, 
j'y ai employ^ toutes mes resources personnelles; et que je dois 
a Monsieur le Chevalier de Crauffurth une somme de 10,500f. 
dont j'ose prendre la liberty de solliciter le prompt remboursement. 
Au surplus, je justifierois dans le temps I'emploi de ce dont j'ai 
dispose, tant mes propres deniers que de la somme ci-dessus. 

" Je re9ois un petit aper^u sur les derniers evenemens qui me 
parroit etre bien fait ; j'ose prendre la liberte de le joindre a la 
pr^sente. II peut interesser dans ce moment. II est d'un 
homme qui connoit bien la marche des affaires, qui le traitent a 
Paris, mais qui est entierement etranger a I'objet de Paul." 
2 Enclosures. 



Enclosure 1. 

[1799, July.] — CopiE du Memoire mis sous les yeux de Sa 
Majeste Imperials, et au quel elle a fait repondre 
officiellement par ses Ministres. 

"La negotiation entamm^e 
depuis plusieurs mois entre 
Barras et Sa Majesty le Roi de 
.France, ayant 6t6 mise dans le 
plus grand detail sous les yeux 
de Sa Majesty Imp^riale et de 
ses ministres, ainsi que sous 
ceux du ministre de Sa Majesty 
Britannique, les d-marches 
faites jusqu'a ce jour ayant 6t6 
approuvees, le plan adopted, I'im- 



179 



Consent est le terme qu'il veut 
employer, pnisqu'il declare y 
avoir 6te provoqu6 par David 
Monnier, qui est I'agent de la 
moiiarchie aupres de lui et non 
celui de la republique aupres 
du Koi. 



Tout ceci est r^pondu dans 
les lettres patentes. 



Eepondu dans les lettres 
patentes. 



portance reconnue, il ne s'agit 
plus que de r^unir tous les 
moyens qui doivent seconder les 
desseins du Directeur, et sur- 
tout en accell(§rer I'ex^cution. 

** Ce Directeur tout-puissant, 
le plus actif, le plus entre- 
prenant des Cinq, consent a 
retablir la monarchie. II de- 
niande, pour y r^ussir, surety et 
indemnite, ce sont ses propres 
termes. Surete, c'est a dire, 
rentier oubli de sa conduLte 
r6volutionnaire, I'engagement 
sacr6 du Eoi d'annuller par son 
pouvoir souverain toutes 
recherches a cet 6gard. Indem- 
nite, c'est a dire, une somme 
au moins ^quivalente a celle 
que pourrait lui valoir deux 
annees qu'il doit probablement 
passer encore au Directoire, 
somme qu'il lvalue a douze 
millions livres Tournaises, y 
compris les deux millions de 
livres qu'il doit distribuer entre 
les co-operateurs. A ces de- 
mandes, qui regardent person- 
nellement Bar r as, il faut 
joindre : 

" 1. Une somme n^cessaire 
a subvenir aux fraix du mouve- 
ment a faire dans Paris. 

"2. Un billet conditionnel 
pour servir d'appas et de frein 
tout a la fois a Bottot, le s6cy6- 
taire de Barras. 

" 3. Une somme moins im- 
portante pour indemniser de ses 
fraix, et r^compenser de ses 
premiers soins David Monnier, 
engage dans ce moment avec 
Bottot et quelques sous-ordres 
qu'il a ete important de gagner. 

*' Sa Majesty le Eoi de France, 
en vertu de lettres patentes 
demandees par Barras lui- 
meme, et accord^es par elle, se 
charge de satisfaire aux deux 
premieres conditions, indemnity 
et surety. Les douze millions 
y sont promis au Directeur, et 



180 



Les lettres patentes ont ete 
remises a Fauche Borel, qui les 
a donn^es an General Pichegru, 
charge de faire I'echange au 
momeiit ou David se rendra a 
un poste convenu. 



Sa Majesty a envoye, le 3 
Juin, un courier a M. le Comte 
de Woronzow. Le ministre 
d'Angleterre en a fait autant, 
en repondant d'avance de 
I'assentiment du Gouvernement 
Britannique. 



II est urgent que Ton satis- 
fasse a cette d6mande le plutot 
possible. Get article est le seul 
qui reste a faire. 



Sa Majesty I'Empereur a fort 
aprouv6 cette disposition. 



la parole royale et sacree de Sa 
Majeste y estengag6e de s'inter- 
poser entre lui et tout tribunal 
quelconque qui voudrait con- 
naitre de sa vie pass^e. Ce qui 
depend done de Sa Majeste Tres 
Chretienne sera execute. Les 
lettres patentes vont etre 
dress^es et scell^es a Mittau; 
elles seront remises a M. de la 
Maison-Fort ; il les porter a sur 
les bords du Ehin a David 
Monnier ; et ce dernier livrera 
en echange I'acceptation 
motivee, ecrite toute entiere de 
la main du Directeur. 

'' Voulant done bien accorder 
sa puissante protection et sa 
haute entremise a cette negotia- 
tion, Sa Majeste I'Empereur de 
toute la Russie est suppliee de 
vouloir bien s'entendre avec son 
genereux allie le Roi d'Angle- 
terre, pour les sommes dont le 
payement doit preceder la 
restauration de la monarchie et 
en devenir la j)rincipale cause. 

" Le Directeur demande 
1,500,000 Tournais a sa dis- 
position'au moment de I'echange 
de sa lettre contre les lettres 
patentes. II est done necessaire 
que, le plutot possible, un credit 
de cette valeur se trouve soit a 
Hambourg,soit dans toute autre 
place de commerce, et soit place 
de fa9on que les agents de 
Leures Majestes qui se rendent 
a Essen le puissent transporter 
(en recevant la lettre de Barras) 
sur une maison de banque de 
Paris,et le mette a sa disposition. 
Tout ce qui a cet egard pourra 
abreger le temps est non seule- 
ment essentiel mais indispen- 
sable. Sa Majesty I'Empereur, 
ayant trouve a propos qu'un 
billet conditionnel de cent mille 
6cus soit remis a Bottot, s^cr6- 
taire a Barras, afin de se 
I'assurer sans retour, il faudra 
joindre cette somme au credit 



181 



II existe des moyens pour cela 
qui ont deja ete indiqu^s par 
David Monnier ; moyens tres 
communs, et que Ton pratique 
journellement dans un pays ou 
tout se marchande, se vend, et 
ne s'obtient qu'aux moyens de 
pareils billets au porteur. 
L'agent qui remettra ce billet 
se charge de prendre toutes les 
precautions possibles a cet 
egard. 



Sa Majeste a approuve que 
cette somme soit remise a David. 

David a un etat dont il a sus- 
pendu les fonctions depuis qu'il 
s'occupe de cette negotiation ; 
il y a huit mois qu'il s'en 
occupe sans relache. 



que Ton formera dans Paris, 
avec cette difference, cependant ; 
c'est que Ton ne pourra en 
disposer que le mouvement fait, 
et 24 heures apresquel'etendard 
de la royaute sera leve dans 
Paris, 

"La somme que reclame 
David Monnier, par ses lettres 
arrivees le 13 et 15 de ce mois 
de Mai a St. Petersbourg, est 
d'environ onze cents louis. 
EUe est indispensable pour 
bien disposer les entours du 
Directeur ; il en a contracts 
I'obligation sous peine de n'etre 
plus cru ni ecoute. Si Ton veut 
bien y aj outer la juste indemnity 
a accorder a I'homme le plus 
habile, le plus intelligent, le 
plus devoue, a celui qui a couru 
seule les plus grands dangers 
pour entamer la negotiation 
avec Barras, qui a fait, au milieu 
de deux hivers, deux voyages 
tres penibles, et qui sort des 
portes du tombeau, venant 
d'avoir une maladie qu'il doit a 
tant de courses, et surtout a tant 
d'inquietudes, on ne trouvera 
plus que juste de la porter a 
1,500 ou 2,000 louis; et on 
chargera de les lui payer celui 
qui fera I'^change des lettres 
patentes avec la lettre de 
Barras. 

"Telles sont les sommes 
contre lesquelles deux grandes 
puissances peuvent jouer la 
paix de TEurope, le bonheur du 
monde, et le sang et les subsides 
que peuvent couter deux cam- 
pagnes heureuses. Moins de 
deux millions pour ce qui 
regarde I'interieur, et peut-etre 
une somme pareille destinee 
non-seulement au voyage du 
Roi de France a I'arm^e, mais 
a payer, pendant les premiers 
jours seulement, I'arm^e 
royaliste destinee au general 
Pichegru. 



18^ 



Accords. 



II est; essentiel que cette 
somme soit effectivement remise 
a David. 



Tout ceci a ^te ex6cut6 et 
remis a Fauche Borel. 



Le General Pichegru ainsi 
que Fauche Borel, qui sera de 
retour de Londres, se trouveront, 
s'il est possible, au rendez-vous 
d'Essen, ou il est essentiel que 
le premier fasse passer a Barras 
le plan dont il s'occupe pour la 
suspension de tous les g6neraux 
suspects, et la reorganisation 
de I'arm^e. 



Ceci a ete execute par M. le 
Comte de Eostopschin, ministre 
de Sa Majesty Imperiale. 



''D'apres les ordres de Sa 
Majeste Imp^riale, les ministres 
charges de traiter avec M. de la 
Maison-fort voudront bien, le 
dispensant de toute autre 
formalite, lui exp^dier le plutot 
possible un passeport pour non 
seulement partir de St. Peters- 
bourg, mais pour sortir de 
Kussie soit par mer, soit par 
terre. 

*'Les precautions une fois 
prises pour la somme principale 
de l,500,000f.destinee a Barras, 
pour celle de 300,000f. a payer 
conditionnellement a Bottot, le 
surplus sera delivre, soit en 
credit, soit en argent comptant, 
a David Monnier. 

'' Aussitot ces dispositions 
prises, M. de la Maison-fort 
partira pour Mittau. II aura 
I'honneur de porter au Roi 
la lettre que Sa Majeste 
I'Empereur lui ecrit, il con- 
fer era avec Sa Majeste Tres 
Chretienne et ses ministres, il 
recevra les lettres patentes 
telles que Sa Majeste Imperiale 
les approuve, ainsi que le 
ministre de Sa Majeste 
Britannique. 

" Sa Majeste I'Empereur 
ayant daigne accorder quelque 
confiance a M. de la Maison- 
fort en lui declarant qu'il 
attachait autant d'interet que 
d'importance a cette negociation, 
il aura I'honneur d'etre mis en 
rapport directe avec Son Excell- 
ence M. le Comte de Woronzow, 
a Londres, et son Excellence 
M. le General Korsacow. Les 
ministres de Sa Majeste 
Imperiale voudront bien 
prendre les precautions neces- 
saires a cet egard. 

"M. de la Maison-fort ne pou- 
vant probablement (I'echange 
une fois fait) s'eloigner du 
theatre des evenements, il est a 
desirer que Ton veuille bien lui 



188 



Cela a ete execute au nombre 
de trois. 



Si M. Fauche Borel pent faire 
le voyage, ce sera lui qui 
probablement se chargera d'une 
commission qu'il m^rite a tant 
de titres. Si sa sante ou d'autres 
cas qu'on ne peut prevoir lui 
empechaient, M. de la Maisonfort 
previent qu'il employera avec 
autant de confiance que de 
tranquilite M. Hermann, qui a 
ete attache au Eoi, et que Ton 
a deja charge de missions 
d^licates. Apres lui M. de 
Coiffier, son ami. II repond de 
I'un et de I'autre de ces deux 
messieurs comme de lui. 



L'Empereur a declare a M. de 
la Maison-fort que s'il priait le 
Gouvernement Anglais de se 
charger des trois sommes pour 
Barras, Bottot, et David, il 
le chargeait de declarer a Sa 
Majesty le Roi de France, qu'il se 
r^servait de fournir a tout ce 
que serait necessaire pour son 
voyage, et son entretien a 
I'armee, et aux premieres som- 
mes n^cessaires au General 
Pichegru en rejoignant I'armee 
Fran^aise. II a ajoute que, pour 
ce dernier objet, le General Kor- 
sacow avait deja ses ordres, et 
prendrait les sommes qu'il faud- 
rait sur sa propre caisse. 



remettre sur sa responsabilite 
un ou plusieurs passe^Dorts, s'il 
est possible, a la charge de n'en 
disposer que pour des renseigne- 
ments importants, et des 
avertissements indispensables. 

"Les ministres de Sa Majesty 
Imp^riale 6tant bien pr^venus 
des difficultes qui naissent aux 
frontieres, et du danger qui 
peut etre attache a un retard, 
sont pri^s d'y avoir egard. 

' ' Sa Ma j este 1 'Empereur ay ant 
bien voulu dire a M. de la 
Maisonfort qu'elle regarderait 
I'^change des lettres patentes 
contre celle de Barras comme 
un gage suffisant, et un signe 
certain de I'existence du plan 
de restauration de la monarchic, 
on expediera, du lieu meme ou 
cette lettre sera remise, un 
courier qui apportera ce titre 
important. 

' 'Le g^n^ral Korsacow en sera 
en meme temps instruit,ainsi que 
le Gouvernement Brittannique. 
Aussitot la communication faite 
a Sa Majeste Imp^riale, le Roi 
de France partira de Mittau sous 
le plus severe incognito, et se 
rendra a I'armee du general 
Korsacow ou il sera reconnu. 

"Le general Pichegru, ainsi 
qu'il en sera convenu plus 
particulierement a Essen, se 
rendra soit a I'armee meme du 
General Korsacow, si elle est en 
presence de I'ennemi, soit, le 
plus pres possible, de I'armee 
Fran9aise que Barras lui 
destinera ; il y sera probable- 
ment avec quelques officiers surs, 
dont il aura fait choix, et une 
caisse militaire suffisante pour 
porter tout a coup I'abondance 
la ou Ton aura eu le soin 
d'entretenir la disette. 

"Lesmoyens de Barras 6tant 
a lui seule, on se contentera pour 
entretenir la confiance, et parler 
a la f ois a Londres, a P^tersbourg, 



1S4 



a rarmee, de signes publiques et 
officiels, tels que celui qui a ete 
lieu pour Badouville. David 
Monnier, le general Pichegru, 
Fauche Borel, et M. de la 
Maisonfort conviendront a cet 
6gard d'une suite des signes 
dont le vrai sens sera d'avance 
communique. Tels sont les 
principaux evenements a pre voir , 
les principales precautions a 
prendre. Ony ajouteraaEssen 
la redaction des premieres 
proclamations du Directeur, 
proclamations qui contiendront, 
le plus possible, les intentions 
du Eoi, et tout ce qu'il peut 
avouer, sans cependant elaguer 
encore tout ce qu'il sera sage 
de conserver, afin de ne pas 
effaroucher d'abord toute une 
nation qui, par une secouse 
inattendue, retournera avec 
autant d'etonnement que de 
joie a la seule constitution qui 
puisse lui assurer et son repos 
et son bonheur." 



Enclosure 2. 



"Les derniers evenemens, quoique tres inopines, ont dus 
paroitre naturels a ceux qui suivent avec attention le cours de la 
K^volution ; ils ont pu etre prevus par ceux surtout qui 
connoissent le personnel des hommes qui etoient a la tete du 
Gouvernement. 

"Les Conseils etoient oprimes depuis 15 mois, toujours 
menaces par Merlin et Eewbel d'etre renvoyes, et plus directement 
menaces depuis quelques terns ; c'est alors qu'ils ont du chercher 
au Directoire un appui dans les hommes qui etoient en opposition 
avec la majorite ; leur resolution etoit unamine, le danger etoit 
commun. 

"Barras conservoit trop d'anciens ressentiments contre cette 
majorite pour ne pas saisir la premiere occasion de la detruire. 
Qu'on se rapelle I'ostracisme des nobles contre lequel il fut en 
oposition avec Merlin ; les mecontentemens de Bonaparte qu'il 
partaga contre Eewbel ; I'affaire de la Caisse du compte courant, 
dans laquelle il se trouva implique pour la soustraction d'une 
somme de l,800,000f.; son eloignement alors du Directoire, et les 
menaces qui lui firent ses collegues de le denoncer, on aura du 
motifs suffisants pour expliquer pourquoi Barras s'est determine 
a seconder les intentions des Conseils. 

" Si^yes, pour qui I'ambassade de Berlin fut presqu'une dis- 
grace, comme celle de Stockholm pour La Marque, ne devoit pas 



185 

conserve!* beaucoiip de bienveillance pour ceux qui I'avoient 
eloigne du Conseil ou on le redoutoit, pour I'envoyer sur un point 
ou il ne pouvait qu'etre utile sans devenir trop dangereux. 

" Voila les causes reelles de cette derniere revolution ; les 
revers des armees, les dilapidations n'en ont 6te que les pre- 
textes adroitement tires des circonstances pour la colorer, et la 
populariser. 

'* Chaque parti co-operant avoit son but particulier ; tres- 
certainement Barras vouloit rester Directeur, et Directeur 
toujours puissant. Sieyes ne pouroit pas avoir d'autres idees. 
Se defaire d'hommes qui formoient contr'eux un majorite unie, 
voila leur but unique. 

" Dans les Conseils on etoit divise sur le but. Les tetes 
ardentes, les Jacobins efrenes, vouloient arriver a la revocation de 
la loi du 22 Floreal. Le renfort que ce parti en auroit re9u, lui 
auroit bientot facility les moyens de poursuivre d'autres projets, 
telles que la suspension de la constitution, du Directoire, le 
retablissement de la terreur et de ses accessoires. Ce parti s'est a 
peine fait remarquer, comme pour vouloir sonder le terrain, mais 
ne jugeant pas le moment favorable pour mettre a decouvert ses 
projets, il les a ajourn^s sans y renoncer. 

" C'est dans ce parti qu'il y a le plus de tactique, d'obstination, 
et d'audace ; il devorera les autres si on lui en donne le temps ; 
il finira par se devorer lui-meme. 

" Au contraire la majorite vouloit seulement reserrer I'autorite 
du Directoire, et s'en approprier assez pour regner avec lui et a 
cote de lui. La commission du onze etoit depositaire de ses 
projets, elle les a trop tot annonces ; c'est un tort qu'elle a eu, et 
cette indiscretion a perdu la majorite. 

" Des ce moment les Jacobins de premiere force, voyant leurs 
esperances decrues, ont recules ; et le Directoire, voyant oii 
Ton vouloit arriver, a sappe et mine de toutes manieres le travail 
de la commission ; de-la les pamphlets, les journaux, les 
inquietudes semees a Paris, aux Conseils, exprimees a la tribune 
et forcant la commission a demander elle-meme sa demission. 

"Ce premier succes du Jacobins et du Directoire sur la 
commission du onze, et sur la majorite des Conseils dont elle 
etoit Torgane, rend en ce moment problematique les resultats de 
cette revolution. Le Directoire, les Jacobins, et les Conseils en 
sont encore aux prises, ils s'observent, et se preparent dans le 
silence a se porter de nouveaux coups. 

"Les Jacobins reussiront a renverser le Directoire, ou le 
Directoire oprimera pour quelques temps les Jacobins par 
quelques grands coups d'autorite. L'alternative est inevitable ; 
mais dans cette lutte la majorite du Conseil ne sera que la 
troupe auxiliaire s'attachant au parti du vainqueur ; elle a 
perdu tous ses avantages, et elle ne peut se montrer en premier 
ligne. 

"L'autorite du Directoire, deja ebranlee, doit infailliblement 
succomber ; il est difficile qu'il n'y ait pas parmi ses membres 
quelque traitre au profit du Jacobins, et en leur accordant I'unite 
d'intention, il est impossible qu'ils ayent I'unite d'action contre 



186 

un parti dont ils ne sont pas egalement enemis. Ces cinq 
hommes sont tons etrangers, les-uns aux autres ; tout oppose a 
ce qu'il s'etablisse entr'eux une harmonie parfaite, dans ce 
moment surtout ou tant de passions agissent autour d'eux. 

^^ Moulin etoit de tous les generaux le plus obscur. On a cru 
satisfaire les pretentions des militaires en I'appellant au 
Directoire, on n'a fait que les revolter par I'indignite du person- 
nage. On a principalement mecontent^ les generaux qui par 
leurs talens et leurs succes pouvoient avoir des droits a cette 
place. Ainsi Moulin, des son avenement au Directoire, se 
trouve condamne a s'y abreuver d'une nullite humiliante, ou a 
chercher de la celebrity en donnant son appui aux Jacobins dont 
il fut toujours le partisan. Tout porte a croire qu'il embrassera 
ce parti, et pour I'y determiner, on lui soufiera I'envie contre 
Barras, et toutes les passions qui caracterisent un homme 
violent et ignorant. 

''Roger Ducos etoit juge de paix dans son village; il fut 
toujours nul, toujours insignifiant dans les crises ou il s'est 
trouve ; il etoit tout au plus propre a rester I'arbitre de quelques 
contestations domestiques, ou a venir remplir une place de 
figurant dans lieu des deux Gonseils. 

" Gohler voudra singer Merlin, il le remplacera meme a certain 
egard ; mais il y a encore loin de Gohier a un homme d'etat, a 
un homme surtout tel qu'il le faudroit dans les circonstances 
pour Her un parti, et le dirriger au profit du Gouvernement. 

''Barras, s'il etoit capable d'application, seroit celui de tous 
qui pourroit se conserver le plus d'influence. Ses profusions, ses 
rapports avec les militaires, 1' accueil qu'il leur a toujours fait, 
une certaine tendance qu' a I'opinion publique vers lui, quelques 
traits de g^n^rosite, quelques services 6clatans, lui donnent 
beaucoup de partisans. II ne manque d'ailleurs ni de courrage 
ni d'audace, et est bien la un homme d'execution dans un parti, 
mais rien de plus. Les Jacobins lui eleveront un rival, un 
emule dans Moulin, et ses differences de caracteres, d'habitudes, 
deviendront le principe des divisions qui doivent pr^cipiter la 
ruine du Directoire. 

" iSie^/^s est encore plus deplace la qu'un autre. S'il trouvoit 
dans le Directoire quatre aides bien fanatiques, bien devoues, bien 
serviles, il feroit de la besogne, mais avec I'entourage qu'on lui a 
donne, il ne fera rien. II est d'un caractere morose, presqu' 
insociable ; il est opiniatre dans ses id^es, incapable cependant de 
les defendre, pour les faire prevaloir, proposant son avis sans 
phrases et le retirant de meme s'il n'est accueilli avec transport ; 
ne sachant jamais ce que c'est que de revenir a une opinion qui 
a echoue, dissimulant I'amour comme la haine. Le petit nombre 
qu'il entretient dans les Gonseils le pr^coniseront vraiment et se 
feront ses echos. Ces petits moyens, bons pour mettre en jeu 
les passions dans une assemblee, ne reussiront jamais a enchainer 
les Jacobins impatients d'arriver a leur but, ni a lui donner sur 
ses collegues I'infiuence dogmatique qu'il aime a exercer, et sans 
laquelle il n'est plus dans les affaires qu'un caustique hypocrite, 
et un censeur enveloppe de dissimulation. 



187 

"C'est done contre ce Directoire degrade dans I'opinion, sans 
influence sur Famine, portant dans lui-meme le germe de toutes 
les divisions, de toutes les rivalit^s, entourre d'embarras, toujours 
responsable des revers des armees, que les Jacobins dirrigent 
toutes leurs batteries. Dans ce moment ils le cernent, ils le 
circonviennent, ils I'animent et I'exasp^rent, pour obtenir a leurs 
Slides les premieres places. Le Directoire hesite, mais il cede, 
et insensiblement toute son autorite s'echappe dans les mains de 
ses plus cruels ennemis. 

" Leurs intrigues dans les Conseils ne sont ni moins adroites 
ni moins directes a leur but. Ils y travaillent sourdement a y 
creer une force d'inertie contre les volontes du Directoire, ils y 
propagent des soup^ons sur ses intentions, ils murmurent que la 
derniere revolution a ete comme etoufee par ses manoeuvres afin 
de conserver la supreme puissance ; ils osent proph^tiser que la 
Dictature se relevera si de bonne heure on ne songe a fortifier les 
Conseils en y apellant les patriotes qui depuis longtems en ont 
ete exclus; et en les rendant le foyer, le centre, et le levier de 
I'opinion publique. 

"Les avantages qu'ils ont obtenus depuis quelques 
jours par cette clovble tactique sont incalculables. C'etoit 
pour eux un coup de parti de faire arriver au Corps 
Legislatif le fameux Antonelle ; ils ont reussi ; voila 
le general, le chef de leur armee ; il n'etoit pas moins 
interessant pour eux d'avoir dans I'ad ministration centrale de 
Paris leur partisan, et encore sur ce point ils ont reussi au-de- 
la leurs esperances. Raisson, Le Blanc, Pottier, tous trois 
impliques dans le proces de Babgeuf, tous trois partisans du 
bonheur commun de la republique universelle d'Anakarsis 
Cloots, viennent d'etre nomines administrateurs ; et Chanlieu, le 
Chanlieu si terrible dans la Convention, arrete par cette meme 
Convention apres la chute de Robespierre, est le commissaire 
pres cette administration. Avec une telle organisation les 
Jacobins ont dans Paris leur arm^e toute prete, et pour cette 
fois I'autorite se trouve placee dans les mains de ceux qui doivent 
la dirriger, la commander. Ils ont arrache au Directoire le droit 
de faire arriver dans Paris des troupes, ainsi nul moyen de 
defense pour lui, tandis que ses ennemis ont contre lui la 
liberte de la presse, les societes populaires ; ils ont contre lui ses 
propres divisions, la foiblesse de la majority du Corps Legislatif, 
et les revers des armies. Avec de tels moyens le succes est 
infaillible, le Directoire doit succomber, il est meme douteux 
qu'il tente la resistance ; il tombera par un dissolution volontaire 
pour ne pas tomber sous les coups des Jacobins. 

" Le Directoire n'avoit qu'une seule ressource pour reprendre 
la superiority ; il a voulu la mettre a profit, et encore dans cette 
occasion il a echoue ; c'est lorsqu'a la suitte de la dissolution de 
la commission des onze, il a adresse aux Conseils un message sur 
la situation de la Republique ; a ce message etoit annexe un 
memoire redige par Threillard qu'on a lu en secret. 

" Ce memoire contenoit quelques verites hardies sur la situation 
de la Republique ; les details les plus afiligeants s'y trouvoient 



188 

sans menagemens, la chute de la Republique s'y trouvoit comme 
prophetisee si les Conseils ne se hatoient de fournir au Directoire 
les moyens de toute espece pour dejouer la Coalition. Les mesures 
de I'emprunt, la levee en masse y etoient formellement indiquees. 
C'etoit a la fois un tocsin d'alarme, et la perspective du plus belles 
esperances si on avoit la bonte de s'en rapporter aux mesures 
sages et energiques qu' avoit deja medite le Directoire, et pour le 
succes des quelles il avoit besoin de toute la confiance des 
Conseils. 

"La majorite des conseils, toujours facile a s'allarmer, eut 
probablement tombe dans le piege, et peut-etre eut-elle remis 
au Directoire regenere le soin de sauver la patrie. C'etoit ce 
que desiroit le Directoire; il n'avoit pas voulu attacher son 
nom au memoire, parcequ'en pareil cas, si la demarche echoue, 
on sacrifie le ministre qui s'est mis en avant. C'est a quoi il se 
verra peut-etre oblige dans tres peu de temps ; a la maniere 
dont on attaque de toutes parts le ministre complaisant, il est 
douteux qu'il puisse se soutenir. Le Directoire, par cet essai, 
s'est meme un peu decolore aux yeux des Conseils, et en se mon- 
trant artificieux pour dissimuler ses vues, il a donne la mesure de 
sa foiblesse. 

"Tel est en ce moment I'etat actuel des choses en France. II 
faut une crise pour que le Directoire puisse dessiner sti veritable 
physionomie. Les symptomes de cette crise se multiplient, 
mais toutes les probabilites du succes sont contre le Directoire. 
S'il parvient a gagner du temps, ce sera au depens de son 
autorite ; mais alors il voguera dans une mer d'incertitudes, il 
marcher a a sa chute, il sera un gouvernement foible et sans 
force, il descendra lentement dans I'abyme que creusent sous ses 
pas les Jacobins. 

"Que deviendra le Republique au milieu de tout de crises ? 
Cette question exigeroit trop de developpement pour la traiter 
aujourd'hui." 



Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 24. Harley Street. — "Permettez moi de vous faire 
ressouvenire sur I'expedition du courier a Monsieur Wickham. 
Vous avez vue ses justes inquietudes, et de tons les bien-inten- 
tiones de la Suisse qu'il est utile de rassurer. Vous avez de quoi 
le faire en lui envoy ent ce que I'Empereur a ecrit au General 
Korssakoif, qui, d'ailleur, serat pret alors d'entrer dans ce pays-la. 
Je profiterois de cette occasion pour ecrire a ce general de se 
concerter en tout avec M. Wickham, et d'avoir aussi confience 
dans r Avoyer Steiguer, car on n'aura pas manque, sans doute, a 
son passage par les etats de la maison d'Autriche d'aporter de 
gens pour lui donner des fausse notions sur le pays ou il vat. Je 
vous prie aussi d'envoyer a Monsieur Wickham, par la meme 
occasion, les papiers r^latifs a la France qui m'ont ete envoye de 
Peter sbourg, et dont vous avez pris copie pour cet efet. C'est 
aussi au General Korssakofif que ces affaires sont confie, et je lui 



189 

^crirai qu'il ne fasse rien sans conssulter votre digne ministre 
en Suisse. Au lieu de partire jeudi, je ne partirai que samedi. 
En attendent, je vous suplie de me faire savoir quand vous 
expedierez ce courier." 

H. Fagel to Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 24. London. — This very moment I received the 
enclosed letter from the Prince of Orange, which I think it 
material to communicate to you without loss of time. When 
you have made use of it, I shall be much obliged to you to let 
me have a copy of it, or to send back to me the original, as I 
have neither time nor assistance to procure one myself. If your 
Lordship would write to me something ostensible in answer to 
this communication I think it would be very useful. 

Enclosure, 

The Prince of Orange to H. Fagel. 

1799, July 24. Hampton Court. — Ayant reflechi sur ce que 
vous m'avez communique hier, je crois de mon devoir de sugg^rer 
quelques considerations, que je soumets comme de raison au 
jugement eclaire du Gouvernement de ce pays, qui, voyant 
i'ensemble du tableau, peuvent mieux juger que moi qui ne vois 
que ce qui m'en est communique. Je dois observer que si la 
descente du corps commande par le General Abercromby r^ussit, 
il sera, je crains, impossible d'empecher une explosion de la part 
des amis de la bonne cause, et de pr^venir que, dans les endroits 
ou les Francois ne sont pas en force, les garnisons qui s'y 
trouvent ne soyent desarm^es, faites prisonniers, ot peut-etre 
massacr^es. Si ceci pouvoit etre soutenu tout de suite par une 
force majeure, ce mouvement pourroit servir la bonne cause; 
mais si ceci ne pent etre soutenu d'abord, je crains que 
les Francois ne reviennent en force dans des endroits 
qui se seront declares, et qu'ils y mettront tout a feu et a 
sang, declarant rebelles ceux qui s'insurgeront contre le gouverne- 
ment actuel et les FranQois. Je desirerois beaucoup que ceci put 
etre prevenu, mais je n'y verrois d'autre moyen que de diff^rer le 
depart du corps commande par le General Abercromie jusqu'a ce 
que les forces destinees a soutenir cette expedition, quant elle 
auroit reussi a s'emparer de la Brille et Hellevoetsluys, pussent 
etre pretes a mettre a la voile d'ici au moment ou ces places 
seroient prises. Peut-etre y a-t'il des raisons majeures que obligent 
a faire partir plustot le corps commande par le G^n^ral 
Abercrombie, et de ne pas retarder cette expedition ; les ignorant, 
je ne puis pas dire a ce sujet, et ce que je dis n'est que dans la 
supposition que Ton peut retarder ce depart sans des incon- 
v^nients d'une importance majeure. Je dirai encore deux 
raisons que me font d^sirer que ce corps, que peut etre 
consid^re comme I'avant-garde du corps qui suivra, ne partit 
qu'a r^poque ou, en supposant un heureux succes des sieges qu'il 
doit faire, et ou les villes se rendroient en moins de huit jours, le 



190 

corps d'armee put s'embarquer et parfcir avec le premier vent 
favorable apres I'arrivee de la nouvelle de la prise de ces places; 
I'une est que je crains que si, apres la prise de la Brille et de 
Hellevoetsluys, il y ayt une stagnation d'operations de quelque 
dur6e, les amis de la bonne cause se croiront abandonnes et 
sacrifies, et que par la leur zele sera refroidi, et meme que cela 
pourroit en engager une partie a se joindre au parti du Gouverne- 
ment actuel et des Francois ; et I'autre, c'est que souvent dans 
I'arriere saison les garnisons de ces places sont sujettes aux memes 
maladies que les garnisons de la Zeelande, ou de la Flandre 
Hollandoise, et qu'il y a des annees ou ces maladies sont fort 
meurtrieres, surtout pour des troupes qui ne sont point accoutum^es 
a ce climat. La ville de la Brille a toujours ete tres zelee pour le 
bon parti. J'espere que Ton I'epargnera autant que possible, et s'il 
est faisable, qu'elle ne sera pas bombardee, ce que feroit la ruine 
d'un nombre d'habitans qui ont toujours montre leur zele pour 
la bonne cause. Je recommande les habitans de cette ville a la 
clemence des vainqueurs quant la ville sera prise. En general 
les habitans du plat pays de I'isle de Voorne et les habitans de 
Hellevoetsluys ont ete aussi bien-intentionnes. J'ai cru de mon 
devoir de vous suppleer ces remarques, et de vous prier d'en 
faire I'usage que vous croirez le plus convenable. 

'* J'ai ecrit a mon fils que je me referois a ce que vous ^criviez 
a votre frere, touchant certain marin dont le nom ne lui 6toit pas 
inconnu; et qu'il falloit qu'il agisse, et ne se contentat pas de 
donner des paroles, puisque Ton ne pourroit sans cela avoir 
egard a sa fa9on de penser, ne pouvant lire dans les coeurs." 

Lieutenant-General Sir Ealph Abercromby to 
Lord Grenyille. 

1799, July 24. Jermyn Street. — " I hope your lordship will 
excuse the delay in returning the enclosed, as well as the rough 
and imperfect observations on it." 

Enclosure. 

Note on combined military operations against France. 

"If the general principles on which the present war should be 
carried on, and terminated, were fixed, it would be less difficult 
to fix the plan of the operations of the different armies. As 
affairs now stand, the armies of Switzerland and of Italy have 
had the most brilliant and solid success. The accession of 
General Korsakow's corps seems to promise a continuance of it. 
A large extent of French frontier has been nearly laid open on 
her weakest side. The temptation to invade her, and to try the 
real disposition of the bulk of the inhabitants, is great. Should 
the Archduke withdraw from the present scene of action, the 
consequences on different points of view might be untoward ; 
at best, the capture of Mayence could not counterbalance the 
weakening of the Russians, and it may be susj)ected that the 
Austrians in Italy may choose to remain on the defensive. The 



191 

whole weight of the campaign may thus fall on the Russians, 
only supported by the Swiss and the Wirtembergers who never 
were reckoned good soldiers. Austria certainly is in a situation 
to afford a corps of observation to watch Mayence, and to act 
between the left of the Archduke's army and the line of 
demarcation. Should the King of Prussia be induced to take an 
active part on Lower Rhine and the frontiers of Holland, the 
attention of the French would be so engaged that the corps of 
observation before Mayence might be augmented, and the siege 
of it formed. If the Archduke shall persist in separating from 
the Russians, and shall undertake the siege of Mayence, and if 
the King of Prussia shall remain neuter, France, in that event, 
will be enabled effectually to assist Holland, and the issue of the 
present campaign may become more doubtful." 

Lord Grenvillb to Thomas Grenville. 

1799, July 25. Dropmore. — " I cannot let this messenger go 
without a few lines to you, though my ofiticial correspondence 
which passes through Berlin will have exhausted all my specula- 
tions. I trust you will still get us the Berlin declaration notwith- 
standing the difficulties we have been obliged to interpose ; and I 
am confirmed in this hope by a very long conversation which I 
underwent yesterday with De Luc. If he has rightly reported 
w4iat Haugwitz has said to him, our plan would exactly coincide 
with that of Berlin. But I too well know that between Haugwitz's 
language and the actions of his Court the conformity is not 
always very exact. 

" The Sun will tell you all I could about Lord Keith. It is an 
anxious interval now till we get some more certain account, but 
I trust it will be a short one, and I am full of good hope. 

" You will see w^hat I have written to Lord Minto. Our whole 
plan depends on making the Emperor of Russia insist resolutely 
on keeping the Archduke and his army in Alsace or Franche 
Comte. I hope I have said enough to Whitworth on this point, 
but still it may be useful that you should again urge it, as it may 
strike his imagination more when stated separately, than when 
involved in all the other things I have to say to him." Coj^y. 

Lord Grenville to Lord Minto. 

1799, July 26. Dropmore. — "My anxiety not to delay this 
messenger makes me confine this letter to a mere acknowledg- 
ment of your private letter of the 9th from Cuxhaven. 

"The points you there mention shall be properly attended to, 
but the most important of them, that of the blockade of the 
ports, will I trust soon be superseded by the effect of our 
expedition. I shall wait with much impatience for your first 
account of Thugut's language, and of the impression which our 
preparations, and their obvious direction may make on his mind. 
The imperfect accounts from the fleet, which you wall see in the 
papers, leave us in a state of much anxiety, but of no fear. Any 
considerable success would be invaluable just now\" Copi/, 



192 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 
Private. 

1799, July 27. Berlin. — "You will havo seen by my public 
despatch that I have spoken my mind pretty plainly at our 
conference here. Count Panin is already returned to Carlsbad, 
and I trust that the humiliating step of a letter from the King of 
Prussia to the Emperor may prevent the only great evil which 
this little and disgraceful business could have produced ; it has 
been intimated to me that a similar letter would be sent to me 
for the King, but I shall not take any step to obtain it, though I 
will not refuse myself to it if it be offered. Count Haugwiz 
yesterday dined alone with Baron Kinkel, and made to him a 
long narrative of this transaction, with every possible appearance 
of shame and regret. He maintains that he has been himself 
fair and open in all this business, and that he had not the least 
suspicion of the King's retracting until two days before Count 
Panin's arrival here ; he says that it was a letter from Sandoz to the 
King which has produced this unworthy retractation ; that when 
the King announced this, and Haugwiz found himself unable to 
change this decision, he had represented to the King the disgraceful 
situation in which he himself was placed, as with respect to 
Count Panin and to myself, by this change of measures, and the 
impossibility of his continuing in office under such circumstances ; 
then comes a long description of the King's importunity to him 
to remain, and his own apprehension that, if he retired, the 
government would grow to be more French ; then again a new 
fit of shame, and a pressing entreaty to the King to give him 
two months' leave of absence rather than condemn him to the 
wretched figure which he w^as to make here with his treaty and 
his conference ; but then again repeated and earnest solicitations 
from his master, and his own zeal for la honne cause prevailed 
over his personal feelings, and he was at last persuaded 
to make himself the martyr of his royal master's most 
unprincely hopes of escaping from the dangers of rupture 
with France by trusting to the fair promises of the Embassador 
Sandoz and the Director Syeyes. I have much reason 
to believe that, with some exaggeration, this is the real 
state of the business. In truth. Count Haugwiz could not 
flatter himself that, by the hopes which he gave, he could 
influence our measures, for I had frequently and frankly told 
him that I would never advise a moment's reliance in England 
upon Prussian expectations until the King of Prussia should be at 
war with France ; he could not mean to gain time, for he would 
better have succeeded in that object by protracting a corres- 
pondence with Panin, than by sending hastily for him from 
Carlsbad, and bringing the matter thus immediately to issue. 
The truth is then pretty much what he has confessed to Kinkel ; 
video meliora prohoqiie, deteriora sequor. 

" Since I wrote to you my last private letter, I am not quite so 
well satisfied with my remaining here as I then was ; I 
mean upon public grounds, for I do not allow myself 



198 

to think of any others ; but upon public grounds, I have 
great doubts both of the propriety and the advantage of 
my remaining here. The declared object of my mission here 
was for military concert with Prussia, and that is now completely 
at an end, nor is it easy for me to stay here without 
seeming to court more from Berlin than in the present circum- 
stances I would even have the appearance of doing ; another objec- 
tion to my-staying is that it makes a stronger contrast between the 
conduct of Great Britain and Eussia than it is prudent or advan- 
tageous to shew, particularly with the quick and captious dis- 
position of the Emperor. Under these circumstances my advice 
to you would be to let me take a civil leave of the King of Prussia 
for the present, by declaring that the negotiation with Paris has 
made the object of my mission here no longer practicable or 
desirable. If this is approved of, I should still then have it in 
my power to give you what assistance I could in my communi- 
cations with the Hereditary Prince of Orange, whose disposition 
to put confidence in me may perhaps, in the present moment, be 
an object of some little importance. If in England you so con- 
sider it, you w^ould do well, I should apprehend, to give me 
immediate permission either to accompany the Prince, or to go 
wherever my presence could make me most useful to your 
present expedition and to the great objects which it is intended 
to promote ; but you will observe that, to make this arrangement 
of any use, it must be speedily done, and I must speedily hear of 
it. In that case if I can return to you before the winter by 
Helvoetsluys, I shall not grudge my absence from you, although 
I shall not upon any account wish to prolong it beyond the first 
struggle for Holland, if indeed there will be any struggle what- 
ever. 

"With respect to your difficulties concerning your future 
Minister at Berlin, I have already said all that I was obliged to 
say to you concerning it ; but I cannot help adding that I see so 
much reason for you to be satisfied with Mr. Garlike's knowledge 
of the Court and of the Ministers here, he has so much good 
sense, prudence, and intelligence, that I cannot help very strongly 
recommending to you rather to avail yourself entirely of him, 
than to run the risk of any new appointment which may at such 
a critical time be inconvenient ; he now acts as charge d'affaires, 
and therefore my going and his staying would make no new 
sensation ; his talents and temper and the estimation in which 
he is held will doubtless already have recommended him to you, 
and my own knowledge of him will well enable me to add all which 
my testimony can add upon his subject. 

"The Prince of Orange, when I last saw him, was 
determined to go on the 29th to Lingen, near Emerick, 
and if your expedition holds good for the first days of 
August, he hopes very shortly to find himself again in 
his native country. I take for granted that you will under- 
stand what I have said respecting a more quick and universal 
effect from your first body of 10,000 men, to depend entirely 
upon the best information which we can obtain from the 

6302 N 



194 

country ; your military plan will doubtless not be much varied 
on this account, and Sir Kalph Abercrombie is too good a 
general to depend upon such uncertain grounds ; I conclude, 
therefore, that he will not and ought not to expose his troops to 
any unnecessary risk upon this information. My chief object in 
it is, first, to shew you how entirely our friends despair of 
restraining the country till your second division arrives ; and 
secondly, to prepare you for the possibility of complete success by 
your first division, in order to lead you to be ready to strengthen 
that one attack as soon as possible, if Abercrombie should find 
the situation of the country promising enough not to lock himself 
entirely up in Goree ; but whatever he may ultimately think wise 
to do, I am sure you will agree with me in thinking that this new 
Prussian negotiation is a strong motive for not delaying one hour 
to make some landing upon the coast, and to be in arms in the 
United Provinces before the new treaty of amity which is sent to 
Paris shall have been ratified, and carried into execution. I grudge 
ever}^ moment that I am waiting for a messenger to send this 
letter, although I expressed the same opinion so strongly in my 
last that I need not fear that this reflection should escape you. 

"I agree entirely in your interpretation of Thugut's views 
respecting the Netherlands. I share with you likewise in 
your judgment of the embarrassment which arises from 
them. If there could have been any doubt after Eden's 
despatch respecting the intention at Vienna of resuming 
there the sovereignty of the Low Countries, General 
Starr ay's proclamation of the 1st July puts it out of all 
doubt; and yet I am persuaded they renew their claim at 
Vienna more for the sake of bringing it to market, than from 
any real desire or intention of retaking it or of defending it when 
retaken. My objection to your project of nominal sovereignty is, 
that it will not secure to the Netherlands the certainty of 
Austrian protection ; if the real sovereignty is not enough 
valued at Vienna to make this possession eligible to them, I do 
not see how a nominal sovereignty, with a rent-charge upon the 
country, could better engage their activity and interest in the 
defence of the country ; besides which it seems to me very 
doubtful whether, with the nominal sovereignty vested in Austria, 
the authority of Holland or any other country could effectually be 
maintained there. I still incline to think that every reasonable 
plan should be pursued first to engage Austria to feel interested 
in heartily setting to work for the restoration of the Netherlands 
to the sovereignty of Austria; and that, not by abandoning 
the attack on France to retake Mayence, but by agreeing with 
Great Britain for complete military co-operation in the war, 
and accepting the guaranty of Great Britain for the Netherlands, 
as you have proposed. I own I have more difiiculty in believing 
that Austria will do this thoroughly, than I have apprehension 
from Prussia if it were done ; Prussia no doubt would like the 
scramble for the Netherlands better than their return to Austria, 
but still I do not teach myself to believe that they would even 
make a military demonstration upon that subject, still less do I 



196 

think that they would step out of their neutrality for it ; if 
however (as I much apprehend) Austria will give us no solid 
security for the protection of the Netherlands, hut means to 
huy hy their surrender a supposed right to strip the King of 
Sardinia or the Elector of Bavaria, or both, then I think you 
must resist that, by endeavouring to hold back from Austria until 
she shall consent to consolidate the Low Countries with Holland, 
an arrangement to which I have no doubt that you may obtain 
the guaranty of Prussia. As to the immediate object of Vienna 
to resume the siege of Mayence, I do heartily hope that you 
will stoutly refuse it ; and I cannot help considering that 
measure as being completely within your reach, by keeping 
them (from the fear of losing their Russian co-operation in 
Swisserland) to the execution of the plan which they had 
accepted ; the only fair plea which Austria can have for changing 
this plan into the siege of Mayence would be that the possession 
of Mayence is an object to all the states of the Empire who are 
summoned to pay their contingent, but it is time enough to talk 
of that when they have furnished their contingents, which 
certainly as yet they have not done. 

' ' Meanwhile the Prince of Orange is impatient to know your 
arrangements for furnishing arms and assistance to the insur- 
gents in Flanders, because he wishes to send some Dutch officers 
into Bois-le-Duc, and I do not like to enter into any new establish- 
ments there which may cross in upon the plan of organization 
which you announce to me. I hope again to see the Prince before 
his departure, for I cannot quite satisfy myself against the danger 
of his presence near the frontier contributing prematurely to 
hasten the explosiorh in the interior. I mean again to recommend 
to him to avoid fixing upon any one quarter, and I have earnestly 
pressed Mr. James Eagel, who accompanies him, to pay the 
greatest possible attention to guard against this evil, which is, in 
truth, the only one that can be of fatal prejudice to us. T enclose 
in this letter the sketch of a proclamation which Mr. Eagel and 
the Prince have prepared for any moment at which it may be 
useful ; they both insist strongly upon the exception of the five 
individuals who are named ; but they have agreed with me in the 
necessity of changing the form of that sentence, so as to make 
the exception bear only upon the names, and not rest upon a 
description which may give alarm to others. 

" I enclose to you my letter to Sir Charles Whit worth, the 
proclamation of Staray to the Beh/es, and a short letter to me 
from Stamford upon your last plan of attack." 2 Enclosures, 

Enclosure 1. 

Thomas Grenville to Sir Charles Whitworth. 

1799, July 24. Berlin. — " On the 21st instant I received your 
letters by Courvoisier, and I forwarded them by him to London 
from hence on the same day. This morning I have received 
despatches for you and Captain Popham by Mason, and I am 
anxious not to lose any time in sending him on to you, which 



196 

circumstance will prevent me from writing to you as much at 
length as I should otherwise have done respecting the strange 
turn which the negotiation here has very suddenly taken. Count 
Panin, however, will write very much in detail by his own 
courier, and I have to request very earnestly that you would not 
speak of the contents of this letter before that of Count Panin 
shall have reached Petersburg. We had for some time been 
advancing in our hopes of inducing Prussia to join the concert of 
measures so happily established between London and Petersburg ; 
the conversation of the public as well as that of the Ministers had 
latterly very much favoured that expectation ; in truth although 
I have known the extreme reluctance of the King to engage in 
hostile measures, and although you will have olDserved that I 
have never expressed any confidence in our prospects here, I had 
begun to have good hopes, for I had succeeded in obtaining that 
Count Haugwiz should draw up the sketch of a treaty for the 
co-operation of Prussia, in which the King engaged to act as soon 
as the Russian troops offered by the Emperor should have passed 
the limits of P'ranconia ; this sketch was shewn to the King of 
Prussia and was approved by him ; upon this fair prospect the 
Prussian Ministers invited Count Panin to return and to conclude 
the treaty, and I did not fail to state to him the new and 
promising expectations which had arisen. Count Panin would 
have had much less zeal and activity than you know in him if 
he had refused himself to these invitations, which included in 
them, as you see, everything short of absolute certainty; he came 
here and we assembled as we thought to discuss and to complete 
our treaty ; you will easily imagine what was our surprise when, 
instead of the project of our treaty, we found ourselves informed 
by the Prussian Ministers that His Prussian Majesty had from 
new circumstances conceived good hopes of obtaining the 
evacuation of the United Provinces, and the re-establishment of 
the Stadtholder, without engaging in hostilities ; that his 
intention therefore was to try to obtain this by negotiation with 
France before he concluded his engagement with the allied 
Courts for the deliverance of Holland. The immediate answer 
of Count Panin and of myself was to disclaim on the j)art of our 
Courts all share or interest in a measure so weak and so disgrace- 
ful; and, in protesting against this measure, we expressed in the 
strongest terms our sense of the dissatisfaction and astonishment 
which this intelligence would i>roduce at London and at Peters- 
burg. In addition to this Count Panin leaves Berlin to-morrow, 
and has asked an audience of the King before his journey, under 
the impression that H[is] I[mperial] M[ajesty] may perhaps 
not allow him to return to Berlin. If I had not some apprehen- 
sions of the bad consequences which may arise from the disgust 
which this will produce at Petersburg, I should see in it nothing 
but the shame and disgrace which attaches upon the wretched 
politics of this feeble and irresolute Government ; we have 
nothing to fear from this paltry and timid policy except the 
sudden resentment which it may produce in the mind of the 
Emperor ; let Prussia do what it may, the deliverance of Holland 



t 



197 

will be effected by the vigour and activity of H[is] M[ajesty'8] 
and H [is] I [mperial] M [ajesty's] councils. We have never relied 
upon any advantage in the assistance of Prussia, we shall have 
nothing to fear either from its neutrality or from its negotiation, 
we have but to go forward and we sjfiall scarcely perceive the 
existence of Prussia in this great scene of splendid and active 
exertion ; and I have the satisfaction of having uniformly assured 
Count Haugwiz that, in our best and worst hopes of Prussia, we 
continued steadily to pursue the same course for ourselves, what- 
ever might be the ultimate determination of Berlin. This view 
of the subject will, I hope and trust, be the only one which will 
prevail at Petersburg ; the proper and just reproach to Prussia 
will be sufficently made in the success of the combined armies in 
Holland, while the Ministers here are still hesitating in the 
timid and fluctuating fancies of the King and of Kocheritz. The 
only real mischief which could arise would be that of a very 
serious rupture between Russia and Prussia, which would indeed be 
to play the game of the enemy and to give them the only possible 
hope of safety which now seems left to them. I have said rather 
more on this subject than my haste should have allowed me, 
because I know the importance of it, and because I know, too, how 
much assistance your influence can give in shewing this matter 
in the light in which, you will agree with me that, it ought wisely 
to be considered. It is the shame and disgrace of Prussia, but 
let it not be the loss of the allies, and, in new wars, the triumph 
of the French Directory." Copy. 

Enclosure 2. 

General de Stamford to Thomas Grenville. 

1799, July 26. Berlin. — " Plus je m^dite le plan d'attaque sur 
la Hollande qui a ete arrete en dernier lieu a Londres, et plus je 
trouve qu'il ecarte une multitude d'inconveniens inseparables de 
tout autre projet qu'on voudroit lui substituer. Ce n'est pas 
qu'il soit tout a fait exempt de difficultes, mais le point de 
perfection se trouve la ou elles sont en moindre quantity. 
Voici celles que j'y trouve. 

" Je suis de I'opinion de ceux qui se persuadent que, des qu'un 
corps de troupes etrangeres qu'on saura destine a delivrer le pais 
de ses oppresseurs, se sera montre sur un point quelconque de la 
Hollande, I'insurrection de la part des habitans, pour accelerer 
cette delivrance, ne pourra plus etre retenue, et qu'elle eclatera, 
si ce n'est dans toutes les provinces a la fois, du moins dans les 
contrees les plus voisines de ce point. Voila done un ^venement 
auquel on devra etre pr6par6 ; je dirai meme, que j' augur erois 
mal des dispositions tant vant^es des habitans, s'il n'avoit pas 
lieu. Un autre point auquel nous devons egalement nous 
attendre, c'est que les insurges du bon parti ^prouveront 
indubitablement de la part de ceux du mauvais, tant dans les 
bourgeoisies des villes que dans I'armee, une resistance et une 
opposition dont on ne sauroit d'avance calculer les effets. II en 
naitra que partout ou la lutte ne sera pas en faveur des premiers, 



198 

ceux-ci demanderont des secours de la part des troupes du 
debarquement, qu'il sera peut-etre aussi dangereux de leur 
refuser que de leur accorder, puisque par un refus on courra 
risque de decourager le bon parti, et que, d'un autre cote, le 
general commandant le debarquement, s'il n'a pas d'abord assez 
de troupes pour s'avancer dans le pais, trouvera risquant de 
s'affoiblir par des detachemens, et jugera convenable de se tenir 
concentre avec ses forces, en attendant qu'il lui en arrive de 
nouvelles. II resulte de la que si les machinations de la Cour 
de Berlin, qui ne sont gueres douteuses, exigent qu'on procede 
auxdescentes projettees avec le plus de celeriteetde promptitude 
possibles, il est tout aussi indispensable qu'on laisse ecouler le 
moins de tems possible entre le premier debarquement et les 
subsequens. II est un autre point encore que je regarderois, 
s'il pouvoit etre obtenu, comme pouvant essentiellement con- 
tribuer au succes de toute I'expedition ; c'est celui ou la 
descente dans I'ile d'Ameland et la descente principale 
pourroient etre efifectuees en meme tems, ou du moins, 
a des 6poques fort rapprochees I'une de I'autre. II naitroit 
de la, a ce que je m'imagine, une diversion tres embarras- 
sante pour I'ennemi, qui ne sauroit ou porter la majeure 
partie de ses forces; la descente dans I'ile d'Ameland mettroit 
probablement les armes a la main a tout ce qui est du bon parti 
dans la Frise et la Groningue ; et si Ton pent soup^onner que 
les Prussiens meditent de jetter des troupes dans ces deux 
provinces, et dans I'Overyssel et la Gueldre, ce projet tomberoit 
tout aussitot, puisque ce seroit entrer en guerre contre les 
puissances alliees que de vouloir porter des troupes dans un pais 
ou elles seroient entrees les armes a la main. Pardonnez moi 
ces reflexions, qui, si elles portent sur des objets auxquels 
il n'est plus tems de rien changer, vous prouveront du moins 
qu'ils font constamment le sujet de mes meditations. Au reste, 
plus je considere I'etat actuel des choses, et plus je me sens 
fonde a esperer qu'avec I'assistance du ciel nous triompherons 
des difficultes qui nous restent a vaincre. Toute entreprise a les 
siennes ; accorder au hazard le moins que Ton pent, mais ne pas 
tout lui refuser, c'est, je crois, tout ce que la prevoyance humaine 
pent faire." Copy. 

Lord Grenville to Henry Dundas. 
Secret. 

1799, July 27. Dropmore.— " I think it right to send the 
enclosed for your consideration, and Pitt's, before I answer it, 
though its arguments have not made the slightest impression on 
me. If they are good for anything it is only to hasten the sailing 
of our reinforcements as soon as possible after the first division 
islanded. And on that point I believe you are both as anxious as 
I am. 

" The more I think over the subject of the Netherlands the 
more I am persuaded that the only right suggestion is that which 
the King made to me on Wednesday, that we should make our 
force sufficient to be quite certain (at least as much so as the 



199 

thing will admit) of occupying that whole country ourbelveb 
before the winter. It is only in that way that we can put 
ourselves in a situation to talk to Vienna in the only style which 
ever succeeds in making them hear reason. 

" If we ultimately decide upon giving those provinces back to 
Austria, it should, I think, only be in consideration of co-operation 
afforded (not promised) for the attack on France. For, if instead 
of this we give them into the hands of Austria during the war, 
suppose at the close of this campaign, we have then put the 
whole game out of our own hands, and we have no other tie on 
the Austrians to make them persevere in the war but honour and 
gratitude, neither of which they rate very high, or the general 
interests of Europe, which they consider still less. 

'' Giving them back to Austria we have still very material 
interests to stipulate for. We were always looked to as the 
guarantees of the constitution of those provinces, which we put 
into the hands of the German branch of the house of Austria 
under an express engagement that those constitutions should be 
secured to them. 

" We were also guarantees of the barrier treaty, by which the 
defence of the Dutch frontier was protected ; the strong places 
of the Netherlands being to be maintained in a state of defence, 
and the garrisons being to be composed wholly or in part of 
Dutch troops. 

" All these stipulations the Emperor Joseph, the first Jacobin 
of his time, violated in the most insolent manner during the 
American war, and during the state of weakness that followed 
here after the peace. 

" We may forget the insult, but the interests remain the same, 
and must be provided for either by a renewal of the same 
engagements, or by some other mode, before we can consider 
Holland as secure. I collect from De Luc's conversation that 
Prussia has some idea of extending the Dutch frontier on the side 
of the Netherlands, without wishing to decide just now on the 
final settlement of the rest of that country. And this proposal 
does, for the reasons I have already stated to you, seem to me to 
be highly advantageous to us. 

" I mention all these ideas to you thus early because you see 
that, if they are just, they lead : (1) to as great an augmentation 
as can be made of our present force destined to act on that side ; 
and (2) to the certainty that we shall not find ourselves at liberty, 
without great reinforcements, to detach in the spring any con- 
siderable force to the Somme or the Seine. 

" Be so good as to return me the Prince's letter. Let me know 
what you have determined about Lisbon, that I may write 
accordingly. My opinion remains the same. In the present 
circumstances I would not leave them one man, British or 
foreign." Copi/. 

H. Fagel to Lord Grenyille. 

1799, July 28. Duke Street, Westminster.—" The Prince has 
sent me to-night his proclamation signed and sealed. I lose no 



200 

time in sending you a literal translation of the original, which is 
in Dutch. I have hardly had time to look it over, and I am 
afraid it is very bad English. However, that is of little import- 
ance, if it only conveys to you the sense of the original. I have 
endeavoured to give to this a Dutch turn, and to employ that 
sort of stile which I know well will best suit the generality of the 
people in Holland. The Prince has adopted my ideas, and made 
but few alterations in the draft I sent him. I am aware that 
this paper in the English dress I have given it makes but a very 
indifferent appearance, but the translation is exact ; the ideas are 
faithfully expressed ; and as to the original it is that sort of stile 
to which the people are accustomed, and which will make most 
impression on their minds. 

" The Prince very much wishes to send a copy of this address 
and of Sir Ralph Abercromby's proclamation to the Hereditary 
Prince ; and it is certainly absolutely necessary that this should 
be done as soon as possible, in order to prevent that any 
publication or proclamation should issue from that quarter not 
entirely conformable to these two. Your Lordship will therefore 
perhaps think it right to send a messenger to Berlin the day after 
to-morrow; and if you should approve of this idea, I beg you 
would have the goodness to let me know it as soon as possible, 
that I may inform the Prince and Princess, who will take 
that opportunity to write to their son. The Prince very 
much objects to give to Count Rlioon the powers he asks for. 
I have not time to-night to enter farther into this subject. The 
first time I have the pleasure of seeing your Lordship I hope to 
be able to do so. If you approve of the Prince's address I shall 
immediately prepare a fair copy of it, that it may be in readiness 
to be printed whenever you shall think proper. If the English 
is to be printed also, it will be absolutely necessary that my 
translation which was only made for you, should be revised." 

H. Fagel to Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 29. London, — I send you an extract of a letter of 
the Prince of Orange on the subject of M. de Rhoon's letter, and 
also an extract of a letter from Emerick. 

[Enclosure ,~\ 

The Prince of Orange to H. Fagel. 

1799, July 27. Hampton Court. — Quant a la lettre de M. de 
Rhoon je dois dire que je ne puis donner un acte tel que celui 
qu'il demande. Les circonstances de ce temps-ci et celles de 
celui ou nous etions en 1794, ne se ressemblent en rien. M. de 
Rhoon n'a jamais et6 commandant-general de toutes les 
bourgeoisies armees, bien moins de troupes de I'etat; mais il 
etoit question de lever dans ces temps-la un corps sous 
le nom de Landzaaten, qui devoient etre une espece de 
corps de fcncibles, qui n'etoient engages a servir que dans 
I'interieur de la Republique, et ne pouvoient marcher hors du 



201 

territoire sans leur consentement volontaire ; cq corps devoit etre 
paye par des souscriptions volontaires, ne regardoit qu'unique- 
inent la province d'HoUande, et ne devoit subsister que peu de 
mois. M. de Rhoon n'a pas ete seul charge de cette besogne, 
mais j'avois nomme une commission de quelques membres de la 
Regence et Pensionaires de villes, avec le general-major Charles 
Bentinck adjutant de mon fils, pour faire les arrangemens 
necessaires pour ce corps; et M. de Rhoon 6toit, en effet, le 
president de cette commission, et n'etant pas bien avec quelques- 
uns de ces messieurs, je crois qu'il a cesse de se meler de ce 
corps quelque temps avant son depart. Ce corps a tou jours et6 
fort foible. Je crois que, dans les derniers huit ou quinze jours 
avant mon depart, on a voulu lever en masse les habitans de la 
province d'Hollande, et qu'alors M. de Rhoon a eu un acte pareil. 
Mais il n'a jamais regarde que la seule j)rovince d'Hollande, et 
n'a jamais concerne les autres provinces, et n'a jamais eu aucun 
effet. Je crois qu'un pareil acte pourroit croiser les mesures 
que mon fils pourroit prendre, et qu'il ne seroit pas prudent de 
le donner, et je me propose de I'ecrire a M. de Rhoon et de lui 
dire mes raisons, et je suis assure qu'il est trop raisonnable pour 
insister de I'obtenir, puisqu'au lieu de faire du bien il ne pourroit 
faire que du mal. Le corps qu'il s'agissoit de lever sous la 
direction de M. de Rhoon etoit independant de I'armee et des 
bourgeoisies, et seulement des volontaires; et, a present, pareille 
autorisation seroit le commandement general de la force armee, 
et, en effet, le faire Lieutenant Capitaine- General ou Commandant 
en chef de la force armee. Je crois que Ton ne pent me conseiller 
de creer un pareil poste, surtout sans stipuler que ce n'est qu'une 
autorisation provisonelle et revocable. 

Du 28. — Je crois que vous jugerez comme moi qu'il est impos- 
sible que je donne a M. de Rhoon pareil acte, et que Ton ne 
pourroit jamais aller plus loin que de lui donner un acte 
provisionel pour organiser des corps de citoyens qui voudroient 
oftrir leurs services dans la province d'Hollande, bornant 
uniquement son autorisation a cette province. Mais je crois 
que le mieux seroit de ne pas lui donner un pareil acte, et de 
lui faire une reponse polie mais declinatoire. 

Enclosure 2. 

M. d'Ivoy to the Prince of Orange. 

1799, July 17. Emmerick. — " Je suis enfin parvenu a etablir 
une correspondance directe avec le chef des insurges dans la 
Campine, ci-joint se trouve son memoire. On s'occupera de 
I'organisation d'un comite semblable a celui dont il est ques- 
tion dans le memoire pour le Luxembourg. 

" On desirerait qu'un officier Hollandois peut etre nomme, afin 
de concerter tous les plans et se mettre en relation avec les 
chefs ; en consequence, nous sommes convenus qu'on admettroit 
a cet effet que ceux qui seroient munis d'un certificat tel qu'il a 
ete concerte entre nous. II paroit que le plan sera generalement 
goute des insurges, et il importeroit, en consequence, d'en donner 



202 

connoissance aux chefs, toutefois avec des menagemens. 
Kelativement au plan d 'union en question, il importeroit de 
connaitre quelles sont les projets au sujet du pays de Liege, 
surtout ce qui a rapport au conllit de jurisdiction avec 
Maestricht qu'il est essentiel de conserver. II est de la derniere 
necessite qu'on s'attache les jeunes Beiges sortis du pays, qu'on 
les assiste, qu'on les sonde relativement a la maison d'Autriche 
aiin de pouvoir les employer lorsque la revolution sera mure." 
Ext rait. 

Thomas Grenville to Loud Grenyille. 
Private. 

1799, July 29. Berlin. — "AsBassett will still equally arrive 
in time for Thursday's packet, if he leaves this place before 
this evening, I do not grudge the delay of a few hours which will 
make no difference in his arrival at Yarmouth. Yet I have little 
to say to you after the unreasonable length of my last letters 
which I despatched early yesterday morning. I have had no 
communication with Count Haugwiz, nor do I see that any is 
likely to arise ; and I am the more satisfied of the necessity of 
my having immediate discretionary leave of absence and return, 
the more I consider the subject. I have explained to you that I 
do not want to slip my neck out of the first risk of Dutch diffi- 
culties ; on the contrary, my first and great object here having 
been the deliverance of Holland, I do not think my task is com- 
pleted till that is done, and I consider my return by Helvoetsluys 
as, what we used to call in arithmetic, the proof of the sum. I 
can conceive no solid reason why you should wish my residence 
here in the present state of affairs ; if you have any apprehension 
of inconvenience from Paget's arrival here, that may, as I think, 
be much better deferred, and the ordinary course may with much 
greater advantage be carried on with Mr. Garlike' s assistance, 
which I am taught, by what I hear of the one and observe of the 
other, to consider as much the most desirable arrangement in 
the present moment. It is likewise possible that you may have a 
hankering inclination to see me discuss with Berlin whatever is 
to be discussed in the case of our military occupation of Holland, 
or of their peaceable negotiation for it ; to this I can only say 
that if it drags on into length, it is out of my contract, and may be 
done by Garlike, or if it was of early question I might still do it 
on my road and in my way to Helvoetsluys ; and whenever I can 
eml)ark from thence I feel myself embarking in triumph, though 
it is the triumph of your alacrity and energy in England, rather 
than of any which I can boast of at Berlin. 

"The Hereditary Prince of Orange has seen Count Haugwiz, 
after he had obtained his military leave of absence from the King ; 
the Minister told him that they had sent their proj)osition from 
hence to Paris on the 23rd instant (the day of our formal con- 
ference), and that he expected his answer on the 11th of August, 
but he spoke as if three weeks more were likely to pass before the 
Prussian troops could, in any event, march into the country ; if 



203 

this Ccilc Illation be just and be not thrown out to deceive us, and 
if you adhere to your first week of August, as I earnestly hope 
and trust you will, all will succeed to our wish, and Prussia will 
be obliged to come into our arrangements for Holland instead of 
proposing theirs to us. Since I last wrote to you, I have found 
that the two Fagels are not as well satisfied as I have been of the 
H[ereditary] P[rince] being entirely cured of his Pruiniouuudc ; 
they have certainly more opportunities than I have of judging the 
Prince's real inclinations, and their opinion naturally leads me 
in some respect to distrust my own ; but still I cannot help 
repeating that, although I see in him a very laudable ambition of 
working out the independence as well as the deliverance of his 
country, I do not see any traces of his wishing for Prussian 
connection in preference to English, and I cannot blame him for 
entertaining the desire, however impracticable, of not depending 
absolutely on either country. Meantime, I cannot suspect him 
of any shabby management with them here, because he not only 
enters heartily into all English discussions with me, but he 
really seeks to direct his conduct b}^ my opinion, and is anxious 
that I should advise him, even in this moment, to join in person 
the Goree expedition; a measure which he would not press so 
much upon me if he really wished to trust rather to Prussian 
than to British assistance for the re-establishment of his country 
and his family. I have, however, determined him to take an 
intermediate course ; he sets out to-night and stops one evening 
at Brunswick in his way to Lingen, w^here he expects to arrive 
on the 8rd of August ; if his presence there should only increase 
the fermentation in the provinces of Groningen and Frieseland 
without an actual explosion, that will embarrass the Batavian 
government, and in some res^xict divert their efibrts and their 
attention; and he has promised the most extreme caution to 
prevent any real and declared rising until the English armament 
shall have landed. At that moment, if the disposition of the 
country and the new circumstances of the interior should be as 
favourable as they promise, it is thought that the Prince may, in 
that case, almost immediately obtain possession either of Deventer 
Zutphen or Campen, from which latter place he may immediately 
have the benefit of the good disposition and assistance of the 
Texel fleet, if at that time they should declare in his favour. There 
is likewise a project stirring for Coeverden, which, as you will 
see, is at no great distance from Lingen on the Ems. These are 
the speculations in the most favourable cases, and these the 
chances of the Prince being able to penetrate into the country 
from the German frontier. If, on the contrary, the first effect of 
the British possession of Helvoetsluys and the Brill has not the 
general influence which we are taught to expect, if the country 
does not in the tirst moment rise, and if the original plan of the 
first division waiting absolutely in Goree for the arrival of the 
Piussians be still found necessary and expedient, in that case, as 
three intermediate weeks will intervene, the Prince then wishes 
to embark at Norderney in an English sloop or frigate and go 
round immediately to Brill, from whence he thinks he can then 



204 

more usefully communicate with the country. If you approve of 
this, you should give discretionary orders for a sloop or small 
frigate to go for that purpose either to Norderney or to Cuxhaven, 
and you may correspond immediately with the Prince by Har- 
ward, as Lingen is only a day and a half or two days from 
Cuxhaven. Sir R. Abercrombie should likewise be informed of 
this mode of his communicating with the H [ereditary] P [rince] 
of Orange on any subject which may be pressing ; from the 
Brill to Norderney is not more than two days, and from Norderney 
to Lingen is not so much. 

"I do not admire their sketch of the proclamation ; but there 
is a good deal of management necessary for me in the mode and 
substance of such criticisms; I do not therefore deem it prudent 
to make any other objection than that relative to amnesty, which 
it is promised to me shall be amended in a better edition ; I can- 
not help smiling when I am told that it reads much better in 
good Dutch, and that it has suffered much in the translation ; I 
do not understand Dutch. 

"I shall this morning make a large advance to the Prince out 
of the 13,000/. which remains of the 15,000/. originally destined 
to him ; for this is precisely the moment and situation in which 
5 or 10,000/. ma}^ be of the most important service to him, and 
to the success of his exertions. I will blame him when I see him 
act shabbily or negligently, but in all that I have yet seen, he 
had conducted himself with great good sense, good temper, 
activity, and intelligence. I do not much lament the loss of Sir 
Charles Whitworth's Swedes ; if you long to lay out your money 
in 10,000 more troops, why should you not deal with the Land- 
grave of Hesse ? you will by that means break into one of the 
strong funds of Prussian neutrality, and I hear so much of his 
good dispositions that I should think it probable the proposal 
might succeed. 

"I have another overture from the Elector Palatine, but 
I do not encourage it ; he talks of writing to the Emperor 
of Piussia on the subject, and that I do encourage. I cannot 
believe in the Petersburg speculations of there being any deep 
plan of intelligence and concert between Prussia and Sweden 
against Russia ; they are much too timid here to entertain 
any such vigorous notions, and i know that it is a confirmed 
opinion of Haugwiz that, although a Prussian war with Russia 
is not to be feared at Berlin in the ordinary comparison of the 
military power of the two countries, yet, in the present circum- 
stances, their war with Russia would certainly end in the 
revolutionizing of all the north of Germany ; and with this 
opinion he would never lend himself to such views as the 
Emperor seems to suspect. I take it that the Swedish pro- 
position arose partly from a desire to partake in the knowledge 
of the Baltick expedition, and partly in the desire of putting 
Sweden into the good graces of the Emperor, but that they were 
not enough in earnest to mean to do the thing unless they had 
found you so much in earnest as to lose sight of all the rules of 
arithmetic in the pursuit of it. The only part of the business 



205 

which I lament is the strong indication it gives of the angry turn 
of the Emperor's mind, and the unfavourable moment which it 
will make for his hearing of our notable conference and our Paris 
negotiation ; yet I flatter myself he will only bully and bluster a 
little, and they will certainly at Berlin have a very Christian 
forbearance of resentment, and endure much pecking from the 
Russian eagle before they turn upon it in hostility. Terror is 
still the order of the day at Berlin. 

" The H [ereditary] P[rince] of Orange and Mr. Fagel have 
just taken leave of me and begin their journey in high spirits ; 
all the accounts which they have just received are of the most 
promising description. Van Braam thinks it practicable to 
assure himself of the Texel batteries and hopes to have com- 
pleted his work within the first week of August ; from Grave, 
Zutphen, and Dorsburg there are very good hopes, and the Prince 
is told that it is highly probable that he may have Deventer as soon 
as the English force lands upon the coast of Holland. But the 
Prince and Fagel have pressed me upon the possibility of my 
assisting them in the first moment ; I have told them that if I 
see anything which I can do by coming I will come, and I j^er- 
ceive that my instructions have given me latitude enough to 
allow of my going anywhere that I thought useful. If therefore 
any striking advantage shall offer by my presence with the 
Prince, I shall not hesitate to go even without waiting- for previous 
communication from you. I know that you will agree with me 
in thinking that forms must give way to substance. The Prince 
is very much bent upon immediately putting a garrison into 
Nimeguen, as the first military ^ct of his new government. Have 
you thought of any arrangement for assisting the first expenses? 
You know that my credit leaves only 5,000/. more for the 
Prince. 

" I need not tell you how anxious I am to hear from you. 

" 2 p.m. — In the instant of sending the messenger I receive 
your letter, memorandum, and despatch of the 19th. I have no 
time to answer them, for, if I did, the messenger would lose the 
packet. You will long ago have seen that my Prussan trcatij will 
not stand in the way of your arrangements. I hope that your 
news of the combined fleet will not retard your Dutch expedition ; 
for God's sake come on, and once in possession of Holland you 
may talk as you please to Prussia. I do not suspect Prussria to be 
so hostile as you do to the recovery of the Netherlands to Austrian 
government ; but we must not even suppose that they will refuse 
themselves to, much less that they will resist it, if we and Russia 
propose it. Adieu or I shall be too late. Your Portuguese 
messenger has come a day after the post. Do not fear Ireland, 
but take Holland first ; and do not fear my dislikes, I will do all 
the good I can." 

Lord Loughborough [Lord Chancellor] to Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 29. Tunbridge Wells. — " I have a great respect 
for Mr. Miller's character to which I am no stranger, and, as I 



206 

should be very happy in any opportunity of testifying my sense 
of his merit, I shall certainly allow (as far as in me lies) no 
promotion to take place to his prejudice. 

"It has appeared to me, however, extremely improper to make 
any addition to the number of King's counsel at present. I have 
the satisfaction to know that this opinion can be of no prejudice 
to Mr. Miller, because he undoubtly stands in the same situation 
upon his circuit that he would do if he had a silk gown, and 
perhaps with more advantage, because he owes it to the public 
opinion alone." 

Henry Dundas to Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 29. Wimbledon.—'' Sir Ralph Abercrombie was 
here yesterday and expressed to me strongly his wishes that a 
few Dutch officers, that may now be in this country, be 
directed to attend him for the purpose of intercourse wdth the 
inhabitants ; and he likewise thinks some person of rank and 
confidence, to be recommended by the Prince of Orange, should 
also attend the expedition on the part of the Prince. He thinks 
this would be decorous to the Prince of Orange, considering the 
terms of the proposed proclamation, and the grounds on which 
the expedition proceeded. Such a person would likewise be an 
evidence of the mode in which the inhabitants were treated. It 
does not occur to me that there can be any objection to these 
propositions." 

Henry Dundas to Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 29. Wimbledon.— " I could not return you the 
accompanying papers sooner, as I never saw Mr. Pitt till this 
forenoon, when he called here on his way to Hoi wood. The 
Stadtholder's letter certainly makes no variation on the subject. 
You may depend upon it there shall be no want of exertion to 
get all the force collected that we possibly can, but I am afraid 
you are too sanguine in your ideas of our getting possession of 
the Netherlands without you take into your calculation the idea 
of a Prussian co-operation. If that comes forward, I think we 
may look forward with fair hopes to a conclusion of the campaign 
as extensive as you suppose ; but, without such a co-operation, I 
cannot help doubting the Dutch coming forward to aid the 
progress of our arms ; and if they do not, the conquest of 
Holland will be more tedious than we calculate upon, and the 
late season of the year is certainly against us. It is ridiculous 
perhaps, when we are looking forward so far, to tell you that 'sve 
have not yet got a person so skilled in the knowledge of that 
part of the coast, as to ensure us in a confidence that there is a 
good landing to be got at the mouth of the Meuse. Sir Ralph 
is gone to arrange his troops at Barham camp. I have wrote to 
the Admiralty this morning, or at least caused Huskisson to write 
a private letter to Nepean to tell the Admiralty that transports 
and ordnance were all at their destined places, and I saw nothing 
to induce a belief that the embarkation might not proceed at the 
time appointed. - 



207 

'' I need not mention to you that all you have stated to me in 
your memorandum does not interfere with our first and immediate 
business, which is to send off Sir Ralph with the first division. 
If, in the beginning of next spring, a competition was to arise 
from a deficiency of troops for both, whether we should go to the 
Netherlands, or to the Somme or the Seine, it would be a nice 
point to decide upon, and would depend upon the circumstances 
of the moment." 

Henry Dundas to Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 29. Wimbledon. — " I agree with you that your 
arrangement of our force would be the best, if the Russians were 
arrived ; but while the wind continues where it is, we have no 
chance of seeing them, and it would be a cruel thing to waste 
the whole season upon Groningen and Friesland alone. Your 
ideas, however, shall be duly weighed, and nothing finally settled 
without perfect knowledge of the grounds on which we proceed. 
If the Russians would arrive, that would make everything eas}'. 
You recollect that it has been stated, and apparently with some 
confidence, that if we would land with a good force, not very 
large, in the Eastern provinces, a body of troops to the amount 
of 20,000 would be immediately formed. Besides, you will 
observe that an attack upon the Helder would be a great relief 
to Groningen and Friesland by the diversion it would make. 
Indeed making both at the same time would mutually assist 
both. I have not time to trouble you more at present, having 
a great deal to do to-day. 

"A bodv of cavalry are actually embarked and ordered to 
sail." 

Lord Grenville to Henry Dundas. 

1799, July 30. Dropmore. — "It is not often that I think you 
less sanguine than myself as to the result of our measures, but 
I really believe that in this case you do not allow enough for the 
situation of the country against which, or rather in which, we 
are about to act. 

"It is very right for a military commander about to undertake 
an important expedition to make his demands upon Government 
as on the most unfavourable calculation that can by any possi- 
bility be made of the resistance he is to meet with. And you 
have seen that, so far from arguing against this, I have always 
urged (in conformity also with your opinion) that our first force 
should be made as imposing [as possiljle] . 

"But this point being now settled, I must on the other hand 
say that Sir Ralph Abercrombie would neither do justice to 
himself, nor to us, if he were to apply the same mode of military 
calculation to his operations, as he has to his demands, and were 
to act in Holland as if he was in a country armed against him, 
and where he was to encounter all the difficulties which the local 
circumstances of the country, considered on military principles, 
and turned to their full advantage by an effective and disciplined 
army, would unquestionably supply. 



208 

"You know that we have, down to this very hour, accurate 
intelligence of the amount of French force in Holland. You are 
aware that it does not amount to 6,000 men, and those too dis- 
persed, as they must necessarily be when our armaments threaten 
every point of attack from Delfzyl to Antwerp, and when their 
fears of Prussia are even stronger than our hopes. 

" The accurate intelligence received last night of the state of 
Walcheren and of the Eastern provinces affords a strong con- 
firmation of the former accounts as to the weakness of the enemy ; 
and proves also, in a very satisfactory manner, that they have not 
yet even turned their attention to our intended point of attack. 

"With respect to the Batave army, as it is called, there can be 
no doubt that we must, on the whole, reckon that more with us 
than against us. I do not say that there will not be found 
among them some battalions who will act against us, especially 
if time is allowed to recover the first impression. But I am 
confident that, in the first moments, that force wdll be a source 
of more embarrassment than confidence to the leaders of the 
French party in that country. 

" You will not suppose that, in saying all this, I entertain a 
doubt that Sir Ralph Abercrombie will push his first successes 
with the vigour that belongs to an operation that is to partake 
much more of a counter-revolution than of a conquest. I am 
confident he will, and difficulties started before the commence- 
ment of an enterprise are certainly much better than difficulties 
which are not found till after it begins. But I beg of you not to 
let either the one or the other weigh an instant in your mind to 
prevent our being found in readiness to avail ourselves of the 
full extent of success to which our present undertaking, if 
executed with the same vigour of mind with which it has been 
planned and prepared, must inevitably lead. 

" Look at the campaign of 1787 ; how little time it cost the 
Duke of Brunswick, with all his doubts, and hesitations, and 
cautions, and precautions, to march with 25,000 men (no more) 
from Wesel to Amsterdam ; and then let any man tell me what 
there is in the present circumstances to stoj) British generals 
and British soldiers, with the country unanimously in their 
favour, and with the threatened if not the active co-operation of 
the whole Prussian army. 

" If this were mere speculation of what is likely to happen, it 
would be a very idle dispute, and would best be settled by the 
event. If our officers go persuaded that nothing more is 
required of them than to make what would, on military 
principles, be considered as a considerable progress in a difficult 
country, guarding themselves at every step against the danger 
of a resistance which cannot exist, they may make a blameless 
campaign, but they will make no counter-revolution. And if we, 
calculating on this visionary resistance, shall, in like manner, 
make up our minds to the slow progress of a regular army 
through such a line of defence, we shall be found unprepared to 
profit of that success which, on a better principle of action, must 
attend our army. 



209 

"Forgive this dissertation. It is not often necessary to animate 
you with more hopes than you form, and I may now he wrong. 
But indeed I do not think your letter speaks of this enterprise in 
its true light. Make your calculations therefore to preoccupy 
the Netherlands, and to do so this autumn. If we are disap- 
pointed no harm is done ; but if it is in our power to do so, and 
we are not prepared for it, we shall have much to regret. 

"I am puzzled what to do about your other letter. No Dutch 
nobles, or persons of much weight, emigrated out of the pro- 
vinces at the revolution. We always discouraged their doing so, 
and it is now well for us that we did, for their influence (though 
not great) will be much greater in their own districts than 
in our army. Count Rhoon, the head of the Bentincks, was 
imprisoned ; but he is now at Varel in Oldenburgh, eager to 
serve, and pressing his services upon me by every post. He has 
considerable influence in the very places to which we are going. 
But he is rash, hotheaded, and totally ungovernable. The Prince 
of Orange has an inveterate dislike and jealousy of him; and he 
has, on the other hand, pretensions which I do not believe the 
most unprejudiced and capable man would, in the Stadtholder's 
place, think it wise to gratify. I have therefore kept him back 
hitherto ; but my intention was, as soon as our expedition had 
sailed and not before, to invite him over to England, and to send 
him from hence into Holland. There is no doubt that his 
vehement ardour and activity may be made of great use there ; 
but I am afraid he will, on the whole, give more trouble than 
benefit to those who command our forces. 

'^ There is no other emigrant of consideration in Holland. 
None at all in this country. Great use may, however, be made of 
the officers of the rassemhlement who are, in fact, the only 
emigrants. But you will recollect that, in the very first con- 
versation at which I was present with Sir Ealph Abercrombie, 
on my starting that subject he expressed a strong desire that he 
might not have them with him in the beginning, I have in 
compliance with that wish kept the business back, and it is now 
too late to write into Germany, and to have an}^ of them here 
before the expedition sails ; except the engineer who has been 
w^ritten for long since, but we have not yet received the answer. 

"Thinking, however, that much advantage will arise from 
bringing forward early a Dutch army under those officers, I will 
immediately write to Berlin, for it cannot be done nearer, and that 
will take ten days going and as much returning, to desire that the 
Hereditary Prince of Orange, who has the direction of this whole 
business, will send over here officers for two or three regiments 
to begin with, taking them from those who have most weight in 
the provinces we look to in the first instance. But this leads to 
a larger question, in which the Hereditary Prince has applied 
for our direction. It is this ; what are we disposed to in this 
respect in point of expense? Such an army cannot be raised, 
armed, maintained, or fed, without great expense. As far as the 
two or three regiments go, of which I have already spoken, I 
suppose the consideration of expense will not be thought 

6802 O 



210 

material, and I will not delay writing to-day for the sake of any 
consultation ; having (I confess) rather reluctantly postponed it 
hitherto, in compliance with the opinion I have referred to. 

"But the large question requires a comparison of means and 
demands which must be more fully considered. On that 
therefore I will, if I see Pitt and you to-morrow, converse 
with you more fully ; or, if we should not meet at St. James's, 
I could come to you at Wimbledon in the evening, supposing 
that to suit you." Co]py. 

H. Fagel to Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 30. Downing Street. — " Mr. Hammond has just 
now given me your letter of this morning, of the contents 
of which I hope to inform the Prince of Orange to-morrow 
morning, as his Serene Highness comes to town, and I am to see 
him after I have" seen your Lordship. I am quite of your 
opinion that it will be impossible for the Prince of Orange to 
appoint any person of the description alluded to in Mr. Dundas's 
letter to accompany Sir Ealph Abercromby, as there is at present 
no person in this country (at least to my knowledge) who answers 
that description. Sontag will do extremely well as far as that 
goes, and afterwards Comte Rhoon, and, 1 hope, the Hereditary 
Prince will do still better. I should think that the Hereditary 
Prince's powers will be sufficient to enable him to do what your 
Lordship desires Mr. Grenville to suggest to him. I am only 
afraid that the employing even Batave officers will be subject to 
insuperable difficulties, as I am quite sure that none of those who 
are attached to the House of Orange would serve with any of the 
Bataves under any shape whatsoever. But I hope to converse 
on this subject with you to-morrow morning. 

" I hope you have received my first letter of Sunday last with 
a translation of the Prince's intended proclamation." 

Postscript. " The Princess has already written to the 
Hereditary Prince to represent to him the necessity of his coming 
without delay nearer to the frontier ; so that I hope Mr. 
Grenville's representations on that subject will soon be followed 
by his Serene Highness's departure." 

Sir James Craufurd to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, July 30. Hamburg. — " The name of the gentleman 
formerly a member of the Council of State in Holland, whom I 
speak of in my dispatch of this date, is Calkoen. His family and 
fortune being still in Holland, one cannot wonder that he should 
be most exceedingly anxious that his name should not be 
mentioned, and that he should not be suspected as communi- 
cating with the enemies of the Republic. He, accordingly, made 
it a positive condition with me that I should not name him even 
to His Majesty's ministers. I, of course, would not withhold 
his name from your Lordship, but I have avoided inserting it in 
the official dispatch. 



211 

" Some persons, I believe, have prejudices against him, but 
none can deny that he is a man of integrity, and respectability, 
and capacity, and well acquainted with his own country. I have 
known him before. He is lately come hither from Holland for 
the express purpose of conversing with me on the present state 
of affairs. 

"Your Lordship, I hope, will pardon the zeal which induces 
me to mention to you a person at Vienna who might be made very 
useful to the British interests, and respecting whom it is perhaps 
ridiculous to suppose that your Lordship is not fully informed. 
But as I have reason to believe that others did not think it 
worth while to make the necessary attempt to gain him, perhaps 
they may never have mentioned him to you. The person I mean 
is Monsieur Pelin, formerly secretary to Mirabeau, the man with 
whom M. de Thugut lives in greater intimacy than with any 
person whatever. 

" He is a man whom I certainly would not trust, but I am 
sure that great use might be made of him ; and I have every 
reason to believe that he would not refuse a handsome re- 
muneration for his services. He is much employed by M. de 
Thugut, and his abilities are of the first cast. I should have 
ventured sooner to mention him to your Lordship had I been 
informed, which I was not till very lately, that the means which 
were held out as likely to gain him had been rather slighted." 

Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville. 
Private. 

1799, July 30. Dropmore. — ** You will have seen by my last 
letter that De Luc had inflicted upon me all his information, 
from which I collected nothing but encouragement, instead of 
hearing from him of any new difficulties. The truth, however, is 
that he is so occupied with the individual importance of De Luc 
and so overwhelmed with the confidence he thinks Haugwitz 
reposes in him, that very little reliance can be placed on what he 
says, though he is full of zeal and good principle. 

" The military opinions of the Duke of Brunswick begin to be 
too ridiculous even for farce, and happily our own exertions 
have enabled us no longer to look upon them as very serious 
tragedy. 

"You will see that, at two days distance of time, 
and many hundred miles distance of space, we were 
writing to each other the same doubts as to the ultimate 
utility of this famous Prussian co-operation which for eight 
months together has occupied so much of our time and 
thoughts. Still, however, I wish we may obtain it, provided we 
do not buy it too dear ; but I should now think any sacrifice of 
political interests, and any considerable sacrifice of that dignity 
which belongs to treating on equal terms and on fair grounds, 
would be too high a price ; the mere money I should not regard, 
because in that light I am sure that the application of a million 
in this way would be strict economy. 



212 

"I do not now think we shall have a Prussian declaration to 
assist our expedition, and I am confident, contrary to what seems 
to be your opinion, that we shall not want Prussian aid to enable 
us to hold Holland ; nay, that we shall do better without it. But 
1 still wish to purchase both the declaration and the assistance, 
in order that the Prussians by occupying the Meuse may enable 
us to occupy the Netherlands, and having those eleven points in 
our favour, then to talk with our good allies as to the ultimate 
arrangement to be made respecting those provinces in the safety 
of which we have, after all, more concern than all the Powers of 
Germany together. 

" I am less struck with the picture you draw of Haugwitz and 
his master because, since I have known anything of foreign 
affairs, I have never known any other state of things at Berlin. 
Sometimes the King was right and the Minister wrong, some- 
times both wrong together, but never both right at the same 
time. And though I have no doubt that much of what you 
collect of the King's timidity, indolence, and irresolution is true, 
yet I am also persuaded that Haugwitz avails himself of these in 
his negotiations, just as we did of our opposition in Parliament 
and sense of the nation, whenever we are pressed for anything 
we do not like to agree to. 

" I imagine that his idea of extending his monthly payments 
beyond December is only this : that he wants to claim the same 
sum for winter quarters that we could have given for summer 
operations, and possibly that he thinks this plan may enable 
him to protract this negotiation on its present footing for some 
months longer; whereas now, if he does not act till September, he 
of course loses one month of subsidy, and of eating our bread 
and forage, instead of consuming his own, or plundering the 
north of Germany of it. 

'' Now to this protraction I should have no very great objection, 
because it pretty nearly supplies the defensive line which I 
want, were it not for a consideration personal to yourself. It is 
this. We are now looking to a counter revolution in Holland ; 
we have in that case the same difficulties to overcome which we 
did not overcome but yielded to in 1787 and 1788. Lord 
Malmesbury was then much more occupied with his own honours, 
than with the permanence of the system he had re-established. 
You know in what hands the direction of foreign affairs here was 
then placed. Everything was left to take its course, and a 
worse course things could not have taken. So far from 
improving the advantages which that revolution had afforded 
him, the Prince of Orange was found in every respect weaker and 
more unprovided in 1794 than he had been in 1786. 

'* This we must now prevent, for you will not think so ill of me 
as to believe that I should like to leave it to my successor to say 
of me what I have just said of the Duke of Leeds. I had for 
this purpose long cherished the hope that you would indeed, as 
you propose, return from Berlin through Helvoetsluys, but not 
without making a longer stay in Holland than you reckoned 
upon. The functions of British Ambassador there at such a 



213 

period would not be unworthy even of your talents, nor could 
your desire of doing real and permanent service easily lind more 
ample gratification elsewhere. 

"Latterly, however, seeing the good you are doing at Berlin, 
and influenced by one consideration only, that of a superior 
personal knowledge of the individuals which Lord Malmesbury 
has, and which you have never been in the way of acquiring, I 
had, notwithstanding my objections to his conduct after the last 
revolution, looked to sending him there pretty soon after 
Abercromby's sailing, trusting that though he had done nothing 
or next to nothing of himself, yet he would well and actively 
execute the instructions he might receive. He is, however, now 
so ill as to put this wholly out of the question, for, even if he 
should so far recover as to be able to bear the voyage, we want 
there the energy of such a mind as yours, not the languor of a 
valetudinarian. 

" I come back therefore to my original idea, and I come back 
to it with much more satisfaction than the other project ever 
afforded me. You must prepare 3'ourself therefore to receive a 
proposal in form that, as soon as any appearance of Stadtholderian 
government shall have been re-established at the Hague or else- 
where, you should proceed there to take upon you the character and 
functions of Ambassador Extraordinary, charged with the whole 
political direction of that shapeless mass which we must, now or 
never, reduce into a form of efficient and permanent utility to 
ourselves, instead of leaving it, as it has been for a century, a dead 
weight on our exertions whenever it has not been turned against 
us. 

" I have attentively considered, as it is my duty, the means of 
doing this. It would be too long to detail them now, and I shall 
have occasions enough of explaining them, as I trust, to his 
Majesty's ambassador at the Hague, because I am confident the 
proposal is one that you cannot decline, and I hope it is one you 
would not wish to decline. 

" Its effect on your Berlin discussions might be useful, because 
it would enable you to bring them (if it was then useful to do so) 
to a definitive issue ; and if you should see it in that light, there 
would perhaps be no harm in yourself hinting to Haugwitz, as I 
have already done to De Luc, that your stay at Berlin could not 
be prolonged indefinitely, that you had undertaken the mission 
only as an extraordinary one, and that it has already far ex- 
ceeded the limits of time and discussion that you had in view 
when you had first undertaken it." 

H. Fagel to the Prince of Orange. 

1799, July 31. — " M. Haugwitz ayant communique de la 
maniere la plus inattendue au Comte de Panin et a Mr. 
Grenville que Sa Majeste Prussienne, en consequence cVaris regus, 
s'etoit determinee a entrer en negociation avec le gouvernement 
Fran9ois, pour obtenir I'evacuation de ia Hollande par les 
troupes Fran9oises, les deux ministres temoignerent au Comte de 



214 

Haugwitz, dans les termes les plus ^nergiques, leur extreme 
surprise de cette communication, et lui declarerent en meme 
terns qu'elle mettoit un terme a leurs negociations avec le Cabinet 
de Berlin, et obligeoit leurs Cours r^spectives a poursuivre de 
concert, et a I'exclusion de la Prusse, les mesures precedem- 
ment arretees entre elles relativement a la Hollande. 

^' Dans cette conjoncture je suis charge de la part de Lord 
Grenville de declarer a s'altesse serenissime Monseigneur le 
Prince d'Orange, que le gouvernement de ce pays, n'entendant 
point prejuger de la decision qu'il conviendra a s'altesse 
serenissime de prendre sur cet important objet, souhaiteront 
cependant de savoir si Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange seroit 
dispose a acceder a la negociation que le Cabinet de Berlin a 
entam^ avec le Directoire, et si s'altesse serenissime consente- 
rait au retablissement de sa maison tel qu'il pourra lui etre 
propos6 a la suite de la negociation. Dans le cas ou s'altesse 
serenissime (ne jugeant point de son int^ret de s'en remettre a 
la negociation susdite) pr^ferat de seconder les mesures que 
Sa Majeste Britannique, de concert avec ses allies, est occupe a 
prendre pour effectuer son retablissement et celui de son illustre 
maison, il y a deux points sur lesquels milord Grenville m'a 
prie d'inviter s'altese s^renisseme a prendre une determination. 

1. "II paroit indispensable que I'expedition projettee dans ce 
pays, et qui va faire voile dans peu de jours, soit accompagn^e 
d'une persoune de marque nommee par s'altesse serenissime, 
ayant sa confiance, et munie d'une autorisation de sa part, 
et qui puisse attester aux habitans des Provinces-Unies que 
I'expedition en question se fait du S9U et avec I'agrement et 
assentissement de Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange; et qui 
puisse etre temoin d'apres cela de la maniere dont les troupes 
Britanniques agiront vis a vis des habitans des Provinces- 
Unies. 

2. "On souhaite que s'altesse serenissime veuille bien 
donner une declaration formelle qu'au cas ou elle sera retablie 
dans ses hautes dignites, moyennant la puissante intervention 
de Sa Majeste Britannique et de ses allies, s'altese serenisseme 
employera toute son influence pour que la republique des 
Provinces-Unies, ainsi retablie, prenne partie en commun avec 
la Grande Bretagne (conformement au traite d 'alliance qui 
unissoit les deux etats avant la revolution de 1795) a la guerre 
contre la France ; vu que Sa Majeste Britannique, apres les 
efforts qu'elle aura fait pour le retablissement de la Republique, 
ne sauroit en aucune maniere consenter qu'a la suite de ce 
retablissement, la Republique rentre a I'egard de la France dans 
un etat de neutralite, dont les suites pour la Grande Bretagne 
et ses allies seroient pires que celle de I'etat de la guerre 
actuelle entre ce pays-ci et la Hollande." Co2^y. 

Henry Dundas to Lord Grenville. 

1799, July 31. Holwood. — " I received your letter, together 
^yith the despatch from Mr. Grenville, here last night on my way 
to Kent. The enclosures in that despatch are the most accurate 



215 

information with regard to the places they refer to than any other I 
have seen, and therefore I have thought it right to send the perusal 
of them, and likewise your letter to me, to Sir Ralph Abercrombie. 
He is at Barham camp with his troojjs. I will see him to-morrow 
or next day, and will then return the papers to you. I have kept 
back one of them, and return it to you, as it has nothing to 
do with the points on which it is proper to inform him. 

" Upon the subject of your letter and the observations you offer 
to me on the subject of our expedition, I subscribe very willingly 
to all you state ; but I confess I am not without considerable 
anxiety on a measure where so much is at stake. I am noways 
afraid of the military part of the subject, nor do I entertain any 
apprehensions of our officers acting up to our expectations, so 
far as depends on the utmost exertions that can be made. My 
anxiety rests on another point. Unless the Dutch co-operate 
with us cordially and actively, I do not believe it possible to do 
as much by the mere force of arms during this campaign, begin- 
ning at so late a season, as we flatter ourselves ; and if there is 
anything in which I may perhaps think you more sanguine than 
me, it is in the confidence you have on that point. I cannot 
forget the American war, where we were so miserably disappointed 
in the promised and expected co-operation. Even in this war, 
with all the disgust entertained both in France and Holland 
against their oppressors, how little exertion have they made to 
relieve themselves. And in our present project you must 
recollect that, whatever the dispositions of the country may 
be, the power of the country is in the hands of those truly hostile 
to us ; and who, so far as they can, will meet us in landing and 
everywhere else with all the resistance in their power. Perhaps 
any shade of difference [that] may be between us on this view of 
the question, may be accounted for by the superior knowledge 
you have upon it. You are in the daily habit of receiving the 
intelligence, and of combining it, and drawing your conclusions 
from it. I am therefore very much disposed to think that your 
ideas are more just than mine ; and you may rest assured that I 
am decided to act upon your ideas (in which Mr. Pitt perfectly 
concurs) rather than upon any doubts of my own. Upon this 
ground it is my intention to give a final instruction to Sir EaljDh 
Abercrombie before he sails ; encouraging him, even if it should 
be contrary to mere military ideas, to act upon the reasoning of 
your letter ; looking upon himself as going not to conquer a 
country, but to aid the counter-revolution ready to burst out in 
it. I think it fair to give him additional instruction founded upon 
that principle, because, if he should be led to dash more than 
military rules and tactics would warrant, he may do it upon my 
responsibility rather than his own. 

"I shall not give them an hour's quiet when I get down till 
they sail. I have heard surmises of some delays being hinted at 
the War Office, but be what they may, I will resist them. The 
enclosed letter from Huskisson will show you what I refer to. I 
am afraid from Mr. Morland's letter to me, to which he refers, 
we shall soon have the Freneh prisoners thrown on our hands. 



216 

Baron de Thugut to Count de Cobentzl, at St. Petersburgh. 

1799, July 31. Vienna. — "Monsieur le Comte de Eazoumousky 
a fait connaitre ici, d'ordre de sa Cour, que Monsieur Wliitworth 
avait fait a Petersbourg des offices dans le but d'obtenir que le 
corps auxiliaire que Sa Majeste Imperiale de toutes les Russies 
avait bien voulu nous accorder en vertu du traite de 1' alliance, et 
qui jusqu' ici a ete employe en Italie, fut joint a I'armee Russe 
destinee a agir par la Suisse ; et que Monsieur le Marechal de 
Souvoroff, mis a la tete de la totalite de ces forces Eusses, put 
conduire lui-meme I'importante expedition qui, apres I'expulsion 
totale de I'ennemi de la Suisse, devait frapper les grands coups 
dans I'interieur de la France ; Monsieur le Comte de Eazoumousky 
ajouta, que son auguste maitre approuvait la proposition de 
I'Angleterre, et verrait avec plaisir que Sa Majeste y accedat de 
son cote. 

" Ay ant rendu compte a I'Empereur des ouvertures de Mon- 
sieur le Comte de Eazoumousky, Sa Majeste m'ordonna de 
declarer a cet ambassadeur, que quoique nous ne meconnaissions 
nuUement I'appui precieux et le secours efficace que nous avions 
trouv6s dans la bravoure du corps auxiliaire Russe pour nos 
progres en Italie, et quoique nous sentions pleinement la part 
decisive que nous devions dans nos succes a la valeur signalee 
et aux grands talents militaires de Monsieur le Marechal de 
Souvoroff Eymniksky, Sa Majeste n'hesitait cependant nulle- 
ment d'adherer a I'arrangement propose par I'Angleterre, et 
agree par I'Empereur Paul premier ; cette resolution de Sa 
Majesty 6tant fondle sur sa deference pour I'avis et les desirs 
de son alli6 ^galement, et sur la consideration de I'influence 
majeure que pourrait avoir sur tout le sort de la guerre I'expedi- 
tion par la Suisse, dont il est, par consequent, de I'interet 
commun de faciliter et d'assurer la reussite par i'avantage si 
essentiel d'une masse de forces, composee de troupes de la meme 
nation, sous le commandement d'un chef aussi celebre que Test 
Monsieur le Marechal de Souvoroff. Comme nous esperons que 
la prise de Mantoue va tres prochainement consolider notre 
situation militaire en Italie, il ne dependra alors que de Monsieur 
le Marechal de Souvoroff, ainsi que Sa Majeste le lui fera connaitre, 
de placer immediatement le corps auxiliaire sur les frontieres du 
Valais, en y faisant relever un corps Autrichien d'une force a peu 
pres egale, porte actuellement en observation de ce cote-la sous le 
General Haddick. Au moyen de ce revirement tres aise, le corps 
auxiliaire se touvera tout poste en Suisse, et pourra attendre 
dans cette position I'arrivee du gros de I'armee Easse en Suisse 
du cote de Schafhouse, sous la conduite de Monsieur le General 
de Korsakoff, pour entrer sans delai en pleine communication 
avec lui, et s'y joindre, ou cooperer en telle autre maniere que 
Monsieur le Marechal le jugera necessaire. 

"Mais comme la saison, deja fort avancee, rend le temps 
desormais precieux, Sa Majeste recommande aux soins de 
V[otre] E[xcellence] de solliciter 1' envoi le plus prompt des 
ordres requis a Monsieur le Marechal de Souvoroli" sur ces 



217 

differents objets. Sa Majesty va de son cote fixer la nouvelle 
repartition dans nos troupes, et les projets d'op^rations que 
I'extreme difficulte des subsistances en Suabe a I'arrivee du corps 
d'arm^e Eusse et, d'une autre part, I'entreprise nouvellement 
resolue entre les Cours de Petersbourg et de Londres d'une 
expedition contre la Hollande, vont rendre necessaires de notre 
cote ; et dont, aussitot apres les dernieres determinations prises 
par Sa Majeste, vous serez informe." Copy. 

W. Pitt to Lord Grennille. 

1799, August 1. Teston. — "The conduct of the Court of 
Berlin is worthy of it, and ought not to surprise us. But it leads 
to so much new consideration, that Dundas and I most anxiously 
wish to see you. I must earnestly beg you, if possible, to be at 
Walmer in the course of to-morrow or Saturday, as there is not 
a minute to be lost in our final decision, which we shall be 
unwilling to make without you. You will be sure of a bed. Our 
generals would at all events have been for waiting, at least for 
the Russians." 

William Wickham to Lord Grenville. 
Private cuicl confidential. 

1799, August 1. Zurich. — "When you shall have read my 
despatches, you will certainly agree wdth me that I came here for 
my sins. All the rest I could have managed with tolerable ease, 
but this dispute between Craufurd and Hotz6 has placed me in a 
situation from which, I am persuaded, I shall not escape without 
making enemies of both. 

" There is nothing that I have said in Craufurd's favour in my 
public despatches that is not perfectly true ; but his manners 
are sometimes very offensive to the Swiss, and quite intolerable 
to the Austrian staff-officers, who are used themselves to treat a 
colonel in their own army as an English officer would not behave 
to a sergeant. 

"Plunkett justifies Hotze's first note only on the ground that 
it was written to a colonel ; and that the language it contained 
was such as the general used every day to colonels under his 
orders. 

" Whatever decision your Lordship shall take, I trust you will 
feel the absolute necessity of not leaving these two men together 
in any situation where the one shall not be entirely subordinate 
to the other. 

" If Craufurd is continued as commissary, Hotze must not 
have the command ; but if Hotz^ had the command on his own 
terms, he told me himself that nothing would give him greater 
pleasure than that Craufurd should serve under him, provided 
his Majesty would give him local rank. Plunkett also told me 
that the Arch-Duke would, with pleasure, give Craufurd a 
command, having a very high opinion of his military talents in 



218 

the field, provided he had the rank of major-general, and a 
commission from the King to serve in the Swiss army. The 
Arch -Duke told me himself he thought Craufurd's talents were 
quite misemployed in buying shoes and firelocks for an army, 
instead of leading a division into the field. 

"I have not ventured to say anything on the subject in my public 
dispatch, but, if Craufurd be left here in any situation whatever, 
I would strongly recommend that he should have local rank ; 
and, if General Hotze have the command on his own terms, then 
Craufurd must be nothing but a major-general, and you must 
send out another commissary. I consider this last point as of 
absolute necessity. I have formed my judgement from seeing 
the two men together ; and your Lordship may rely upon it that 
there are no human means of making them settle an account 
where there shall be any difference between them, either about 
the sum total or any of the items. 

"It is quite impossible for me to give your Lordship anything 
like a notion of the scene of disorder and confusion I found on 
my arrival. All that I can say is that, had I not arrived when 
I did, this explosion would long since have taken place; and, had 
I not been present when it happened, it must have had very 
unpleasant consequences ; Craufurd having considered the 
general's note as a personal affront, and being determined to 
treat it as such without my interference. He even told the 
Arch-Duke that, though he had been over-ruled in his opinion, 
yet that he must ever consider Hotz6s conduct as personal. 

"From all that has happened your Lordship will, I trust, see 
the necessity of sending the person, whoever he may be, that you 
destine for my successor, to remain here a month or two with 
me before my return, in a private character. 

" With respect to this country, I think I can answer for form- 
ing all the old governments, and sending a deputation from each 
to the Diet ; but there they must be delivered, hound hand and 
foot, into the power of the foreign Minister whose master shall 
have the greatest influence at that moment in the affairs of the 
Continent. They cannot have any will of their own, and, if they 
had any, they have no force wherewith to support it. So 
that the great Powers of Europe, if they are unanimous, may 
make of those states whatever they please, almost without 
opposition. His Majesty's influence is at this moment very great 
and, I trust, will soon be still greater among the people of the 
country ; but, I am truly sorry to say, this country is no longer 
to be reckoned among the nations of Europe, and must necessarily 
belong to the strongest. 

"Your Lordship may take for granted what I have here laid 
down. What consequences are to follow this state of things, and 
what plans or what system may be formed upon it is what I cannot 
pretend to say ; nor do I believe as yet that the Court of Vienna 
has formed any determinate system for this country. But it 
seems most material that his Majesty's Government should have 
early information of the fact, and that your Lordship's attention 
should be directed to it, as I am persuaded that, in some shape 



219 

or other, this country (that is the number of square miles and 
acres of which this country is composed) will be made to play an 
important part in any scheme of general pacification. 

*' I shall make this the subject of a public despatch immediately ; 
but my time has been so wholly taken up by this confounded 
dispute between our two military men that, since my return from 
the little Cantons, I have not known where to turn myself. 

** As I cannot bring my ciphers so near the enemy, and as my 
despatches must generally contain matters of delicacy, if not of 
importance, I wish your Lordship would consider whether I ought 
not to have a couple of messengers constantly on this station, 
whom I might send to Cuxhaven, and no further. 

" I have had real difficulty in procuring one to convey these 
despatches. 

" I expect Pichegru every hour. I have seen d'Andre and made 
all the arrangements necessary for carrying on the corre- 
spondence. De Pr^cy is ill and cannot join me, but I have 
entered into correspondence with him, and expect soon to have 
a good communication with Lyons." 

Count Starhemberg to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 1. London. — " Je recois a I'instant votre billet, 
et quoique certainement Lord Mulgrave n'ait pas besoin de 
recommandation, je lui donnerai un mot pour I'Archiduc qui 
pourra peut-etre lui etre de quelq'utilite. 

" Les lettres que j'ai re^u hier portent toutes I'impreinte de la 
meilleure volonte dans nos troupes et notre Cabinet. Vous savez, 
de vous a moi, que je ne parle pas facilement ainsi. Mon pere 
me temoigne son etonnement de ce que je n'avois point encore 
mande le depart de M. Eden, tandis que ce ministre le disoit 
deja depuis quinze jours a ses afnis. Mon bon pere en conclut 
que vous avez moins de confiance en moi. J'aime a me flatter 
qu'il se trompe. J'en serois desole, parceque je ne Tai pas 
merite, et parceque je vous suis tendrement attache. Permettez- 
moi, neanmoins, de vous prier encore de me mander toujours 
avec bonte tout ce qui pourra vous deplaire en moi, et si j'ai 
jamais le malheur de vous deplaire moi-meme. Autant je suis 
heureux d'etre ici, me croyant aime et estime de ceux que j'aime 
et venere, vous pardessus tout, autant serois-je malheureux si 
jamais ces sentimens, qui font mon bonheur et ont fait ma 
consolation les deux dernieres annees, venoient a changer. 

"Je ne suis pas assez indiscret pour vous rien demander 
sur tout ce qui se prepare, et que mon metier est de diviner. 
J'aime a croire que si Lord Grenville I'avait confie a quelqu'ami 
hors du ministere, cet ami eut ete moi, et qu'il me connoit assez 
pour etre convaincu que le dire a Starhemherg, s'il I'eut voulu, 
n'est point 6t6 le dire au ministre de la cour de Vienne. La 
seule grace que je vous demande c'est de m'en dire autant 
que vous en ferez confier a Vienne. Vous jugez bien 
que si on alloit y appercevoir que j'en sais moins que vous ne 



220 

voulez qu'on en cache chez nous, on en infereroit ou que je vous 
suis suspect, ou que je suis un imbecille. Assurement mon 
devouement a la bonne cause, et par consequent a vous, et ma 
conduite ne I'eut point merite. Agreez mes hommages les plus 
vrais et les plus tendres." 

The Marquis of Buckingham to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 1. Stowe. — " I am vastly hurt at finding the 
combined fleet safe out of the Mediterranean ; where I fear 
(from a very detailed account sent to me) that the wretched 
state of poor Lord St. Vincent's imbecility, and the natural 
incapacity of his successor, have lost the greatest opportunity 
that ever presented itself. Perhaps you do not know all the 
details ; but they are shocking. I fear that one painful result of 
all this is the necessity of locking up some of your regulars in 
Ireland, who ought to be on board and more usefully employed. 

"I enclose to you a paper which the Bishop of St. Pol gave me 
in consequence of the letter I wrote to him at your desire, and that 
of Mr. Pitt. The names marked with a cross are known to him, 
and ought to be sent to France as soon as possible ; the others 
may be equally useful, but are not personally known to him, 
though they are known to his priests at Portchester, from whom 
he received the lists under the most solemn assurances of their 
exactness. But these lists are obtained with the greatest 
difficulty, as every obstruction is still thrown in their way by 
the keepers of the prisons ; so that, if you expect any number 
of these names, orders must be given that those priests who 
have the Bishop's certificate for visiting the sick, may be 
permitted to enter the prisons and to see the prisoners alone.'' 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, August 1. Berlin. — " 1 have been obliged to discuss a 
little more largely than you may think either prudent or 
necessary for me the extensive subject of your dispatch, 
because, although I might have rested entirely upon that change 
of circumstances which annuls here my share of the execution 
of your last orders, I did not think a single word or two a 
sufficient answer to the many important considerations which 
you had brought forward to me. With respect to Berlin, the 
foundation of your hopes rested upon extending the effects of a 
Prussian co-operation by a position of a defensive description 
enough to satisfy them, and of a nature sufficiently menacing to 
Mayence, to set you free from thence ; but the last new 
tergiversation (to take my friend Thugut's word) has absolutely 
cut across all present hope here, and does not leave much 
in future ; for if the real interest which they take here 
in Holland will not lead them even to hostile demonstration 
for that great point, I think it manifest that they are determined 
not to engage in war. I see by your private letter that you have 



221 

some remorse in arresting me in the full march of my prosper- 
ous treaty. I do assure you that I have no parental partiality to 
it ; the unlicked shape in which you saw it was most entirely 
the precious work of Haugwiz, and sensihle as I was of the value 
of Prussian declaration at this moment, I was anxious first 
to see what the King would consent to, and afterwards to 
discuss what we might bring him to consent to ; but in Sandoz's 
letter the King and his little confidential circle have seen 
again their precious neutrality ; and the King was not ashamed 
to recall his consent, nor had Haugwiz enough of the 
spirit of a man to refuse himself to the disgrace which his 
Prussian Majesty has heaped upon him. I think you cannot 
but agree with me in the impossibility of our making a 
new proposition to them now, other than the proposition 
which Abercrombie is, I hope, on this day carrying with 
ten thousand British troops to Goree. 

''You will be surprised to see me recur again to the idea of my 
being obliged to go suddenly to the frontier without waiting for 
previous advice from England ; the truth is that the Hereditary 
Prince of Orange so strongly pressed me on this subject, and stated 
so earnestly his wish that if I were really wanted I would come to 
him, that I did not choose to shelter myself from any risk which 
it may be useful that I should incur ; and I am, upon similar 
occasions, more disposed to pursue the spirit of my instructions 
than the letter or the forms of them. If therefore I see that I 
can be useful in giving to him the person and countenance of an 
English minister, I shall go without scruple or hesitation; 
desiring you only to recollect that my contract expires with the 
deliverance of Holland, and that as soon as the intercourse 
between Helvoetsluys and Harwich is re-established, I shall 
claim my fair right of putting an end to my exile, and being 
among the first passengers of the renewed intercourse with 
England. When I recollect that T am writing on the very day 
which you announced for the commencement of this enterprise 
you will easily believe that my spirits run high, and that I tread 
with exultation even upon Prussian ground. A momentary fear 
once shot across me that your doubts, your ignorance, or your 
information respecting the combined fleet might lead you to 
suspend the expedition which I am now looking for on tip-toe, 
but I will not think so ill of your spirit and resolution at home 
to believe that you will give up to the apprehensions of the 
moment a sure and important conquest which grows more valu- 
able in proportion to the increased danger of the combined 
fleet ; and surely, as a mere naval measure of defence, you 
can take none which will be of more effect than the conquest of 
Holland, by which you give yourself at one stroke the free use of 
all the fleet that blocks the Texel and all that is within it. But 
I do you wrong to press this subject, or to suspect that the 
British Cabinet will hesitate to take possession of Holland 
because the Lisbon paper announces the sailing of the combined 
fleet from Carthagena ; and we, too, have w^e not a fleet ? 



222 

"You will observe that I have not discussed the military part 
of your plan, because, as I have said already, I consider the 
Berlin share of that plan as being completely out of discussion, 
and as I do not believe in any Prussian co-operation for obtaining 
the deliverance of Holland, still less do I believe in any when 
that object shall have been obtained. I should, however, still be 
inclined to think that you would do well to continue your former 
plan of the Russian attack, and to continue to keep Austria 
rather to the support of that attack than to their new 
project of the siege of Mayence. Whatever be the issue of 
the Prussian negotiation at Paris, there still will be a real 
assistance to the allies upon the Lower Rhine without any 
formal treaty or convention for that purpose. If Prussia has 
demanded the left bank of the Rhine, or rather the evacuation of 
it, in the case of that cession you will have nothing to fear on 
the side of Mayence or Ehrenbreitstein ; if, as is more likely, 
France refuses that evacuation, then Prussia will still have 
enough to fear for themselves on that side, and their measures of 
defence, combined with Hesse and Saxony, will still be a powerful 
check upon French attack on that side. Still, therefore, I should 
conceive that in every case you will continue your Russian 
attack ; although it is subject to the remark that you over- 
calculated the force of Korsakow in calling it 40,000 men, that 
part of your Swiss leviea will probably be obliged to remain 
in that country, and that the army of Massena is, I believe, daily 
augmenting in larger proportions than that of the Archduke ; 
but if these considerations hang upon the project of incursion 
towards Lyons, they are additional motives against breaking the 
combined force by the detached operation of the Austrian siege 
of Mayence. 

*' The point against which this cursed Prussian tergiversa- 
tion tells most is that of the destined command of the Duke 
of York, because, without Prussian demonstration at least in 
this quarter, although you may succeed in assisting the 
insurrection in Flanders, you will scarcely be strong enough to 
pursue that effort to the good effect which you propose. In 
truth I very much suspect that you will find another difficulty, 
perhaps, in the desire which the United Provinces may have 
to obtain a momentary tranquility by adopting the inactive 
neutrality of Prussia; and it cannot escape your observation 
that the partisans of Prussia will speak powerfully for 
their system in Holland. If their system brings peace, 
while ours demands from them a continuation of the dangers 
and expense of war, there are few Dutchmen, I fear, who 
would long hesitate in this comparative calculation ; how- 
ever promising the prospect of war might be shewn to them to 
be, and however insecure and insufficient the nominal peace 
proposed by Prussia, yet, after the long and vehement agitation 
of that country, there would be found in all parties within it a 
strong and passionate inclination for cessation from war. 
Against this inclination you will struggle, and probably have a 
difficult struggle, but it may be one that will lessen your means 



22B 

of efficient attack from this side. The Hereditary Prince of 
Orange is gone through Brunswick to Lingen, where he will be 
on the 3rd instant." 

Enclosure. 

Thomas Grenville to Str Charles Whitworth. 

1799, July 29. Berlin. — "Your letters and dispatches by 
Bassett arrived here yesterday and are on their road to London. 
I was sorry to perceive in them some disposition to irritation 
against the Court of Berlin, because that disposition alarms me 
for the impression which is likely to be made upon the Emperor's 
mind by the unexpected narrative of the project of treaty, of 
the conference with the ministers of the allied Courts, ending in 
a negotiation with Paris. 

' ' I am sure that it is unnecessary for me to remark upon the 
extreme mischief which would arise from any serious hostility 
between the two countries of Kussia and Prussia in this impor- 
tant moment; and, if I take the liberty of recurring to the same 
topic, I do so only to express, with my sense of the importance of 
it, my confidence in the measures which you will take to 
prevent the fatal consequences which are to be feared from any 
open rupture. The true punishment of the doubtful and timid 
politics of Prussia will doubtless be best found in the state of 
insignificance which it will exhibit under the shock of these 
great events. The triumph of the allied arms will be the best 
lesson to Prussian neutralists. 

" I am happy to see how well Captain Popham's authority has 
seconded your zeal and ability at Petersburg. 

•' The Prince of Orange leaves Berlin this evening in order to 
approach nearer to the Dutch frontier so as to enable himself to 
profit of the circumstances as they arise ; we shall not, as I trust, 
be distressed by the loss of our Swedish auxiliaries ; I do not 
suspect either them or Prussia of any very profound or vigorous 
political arrangements. 

"I have no news from England except a belief that the 
combined fleets are in Carthagena, and there is a report, not 
confirmed, of their having sailed on the 30th ultimo." 

Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 2. Downing Street. — " Je vous ecris ces peu de 
lignes de votre burau ou je suis venu pour m'infoimer s'il y a 
des nouvelle du Vice-Amiral Michell. En attendant j'ai re9U 
ces deux lettre de Mr. Wickham que je vous envoi. Je vois que 
les choses vont mal en Suisse, mais je ne comprent pas les 
details que Wickham n'avait pas le tems de m'expliquer. Je vous 
suplie done de me dire quelle etait I'entreprise de I'Archiduc, et 
pourquoi a-t-il echou6. 

" Je suis perssuade que ce brave Prince est dans la dependence 
abssolue de Thugut, et celui-ci veut decidement miner la bonne 
cause. C'est lui qui pendant quatre mois a forc6 I'Archiduc de 



224 

ne pas pousser en avant, ce qui a empeche la mine abssolue de 
Tarmee de Massena, la delivrance de la Suisse, et qui a donn6 le 
terns au general Fran9ais de recevoir des secours immensses. 
C'est pourtant dans cet etat des choses que Thugut veut que les 
Autrichiens quittent la Suisse, pour que les Busses soient 
extermines. Vous aurez beau vous plaindre a Vienne. C'est 
inutil, c'est a Petersbourg qu'il faut voir toute la perfidie de 
Thugut, et si on prouve cette verite a Paul, il est capable, avec 
sa chaleure dans les bons principes, d'exiger le renvoi de Thugut. 
Je vous conjure d'ordoner a my lord Minto, a Wickham, et a 
Eamsey, d'informer de tout le Chevalier Whitewort, afin que, sans 
perte de terns, celui-ci puisse agire chez nous. Paite moi le plaisir 
de me renvoyer les deux incluses, et d'avoir la bonte de m'expliquer 
ce qui c'est passe dans I'attaque 6chou6 de I'Archiduc." 

W. Pitt to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 2. Teston. — "I am very happy to be able to 
answer your letter shortly and satisfactorily. All military 
ditficulties are completely overruled, and every step will be 
instantly taken for the immediate embarkation of the troops, 
which we hope will take place in the course of Sunday or 
Monday. There seems every reason to hope that a further force 
of from eight to eleven thousand men will be assembled at 
Barham by the 12th of this month, and ready to sail by the first 
opportunity after that day. The decision being finally taken, I 
have no doubt it will be acted upon with alacrity, and that we 
shall now hear no more of difficulties. I had a good deal of 
conversation in the field yesterday with the Prince of Orange, 
whose sentiments are exactly what one could wish. I hope you 
will have settled with him the form of a Declaration in his name, 
expressing his concurrence in our enterprise, and disclaiming all 
other plans for his restoration. You will probably agree with 
me that Abercromby ought to be furnished with such an 
instrument to be published as soon as he lands, in addition to our 
own manifesto. 

" Does not the present state of things remove all question as 
to the language to be held at Vienna on the subject of the 
Netherlands? I am sure w^e need have no tenderness now 
about Prussia, who can henceforth be managed only through 
their fears ; and on them, by the help of Bussia, we may operate 
to any extent. We ought, therefore, as it seems to me, to offer 
to Vienna distinctly the guarantee of the Netherlands at the 
peace, provided till that time they continue to act in military 
concert with us and Bussia in pushing into France ; and I 
should be inclined also, on the same condition, and provided 
they also furnish an additional army either to relieve ours in 
the Netherlands next spring, or act elsewhere, as circum- 
stances may require, to hold out to them the prospect of the 
subsidy we had before destined to Prussia. The place of 
the Swedes whom we have lost will, I hope, be much better 



225 

supplied by an additional division of Kussians, which I am 
glad to find you have applied for. I see you have fixed on an 
officer for the Netherlands, but, as the business advances, more 
than one will probably be wanted. O'Connell, who served in the 
Irish brigade, is, from what I have heard of him, a person likely 
to undertake such a commission, and to be very useful ; but you 
may easily learn more about him. Windham has also mentioned 
to me a Captain Jarningham [Jerningham] , son of Sir W. 
Jarningham, and who has himself been in the Austrian service; 
and a Colonel O'Mahony, who was in the Irish brigade in the 
French service, who may both, as he thinks, be useful in subordi- 
nate capacities. I imagine, however, that no more can be done 
at present with respect to these or any others than to hold them 
in readiness ; as it would hardly be safe to send them into the 
country till everything is ripe for general insurrection, and till 
we can have a force at hand to support it." 

Postscript. "I suppose our good ally Paul will want no 
prompting to assemble, as he certainly ought to do, a threatening 
army on the Prussian frontier. It may perhaps be more neces- 
sary to warn him against an intemperate and precipitate use of 
it. 

" Our military congress is just breaking up, and I am proceed- 
ing by sea from Rochester to Walmer, where I shall arrive 
to-night or early to-morrow morning, and mean to stay till the 
12th or 13th, if you think I can decently excuse myself to Mon- 
sieur. The question seems merely one of ceremony, as his 
seeing you will certainly answer every purpose, and you can 
speak in my name as fully as in your own." 

The Makquis of Buckingham to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 2. Stowe. — '' I received a letter this morning 
from the Baron de Rolle informing me, by your desire, that the 
Count D'Artois will be here on Wednesday next, and that he 
goes to Dropmore on the 9th. This will of course derange your 
ideas of coming to Stowe or Wotton until he has left you, but I 
hope and trust that you will remember to redeem your promise, 
particularly if your expedition sails as soon as tve military 
men understand that it is to move. I am delighted to find in 
my Hamburg paper the days fixed for the move of the Anglo- 
Russes to Constance and Schaff hausen, as I fear that the Switzer 
will not put his confidence in the Austrians, whom he may 
suppose very capable of retaining some cautionary towns after 
the French are driven out of them ; and I trust I shall be equally 
delighted in hearing of Captain Popham's Russians and Swedes, 
though no wind can be more foul for their possible destination 
than that which is now drowning us from the south-west." 

Lord Mulgrave to Lord Grenville. 
1799, August 2. Harley Street. — " If I had been aware of your 
going out of town I should have wished to have seen you, after 
a very long conversation I had with Starhemberg this morning. 

6802 P 



226 

He appeared to me very zealous in the cause, and as open as his 
situation would admit of ; through which I thought I could 
perceive some strong Austrian objects, particularly a jealousy of 
the Russians, and an eagerness about the Low Countries, the 
circumstances and detail of which are too long for writing. Tw^o 
points, however, appeared to me of importance, and worth 
mentioning to you ; the first w^as an earnestness that he seemed 
to feel for my going to Vienna at all events, as if no active and 
combined efforts could be relied upon unless I should prevail 
upon Thugut to enter into the plan of concentrated efforts ; a 
principle which he personally seemed to have entirely and 
cordially adopted. Another point he touched upon as essential, 
namely, that the two powers should be bound not to make peace 
but in conjunction and by agreement. To this, as a principle, I 
had no difficulty of acceding ; as I consider it to be the ground- 
work and foundation of sincere alliance and hearty co-operation. 
The second important point to which he alluded, or rather urged, 
was that I should, in case of necessity, have the power of 
advancing a few thousand pounds to enable the Austrians to 
act. On this point I told him I had no authority, nor had it 
ever entered into my contemplation ; but I added that, although 
this was merely the conversation of old friends, and perfectly 
extra-olificial between us, I would certainly mention to you what 
he had said on that head, and take your directions. Upon 
reading over my instructions this afternoon it occured to me 
that, upon the Austrian system of adopting measures which 
should not hazard nor weaken their army, they w^ould be likely 
to urge the operations towards Mentz from the very force of our 
argument against them, on the ground of their not being likely to 
draw any proportion of the French army to that quarter. This, 
of course, will be the influencing, and not the ostensible ground 
of their argument. "Whether the application of money to the 
other line of operation would be likely to turn the balance in its 
favour or not, you must judge ; but an additional instruction 
will be necessary to give me that power if Mr. Wickham has it 
not already ; and I shall be very happy to see the disposal of 
money in any other hands than mine. Amongst other things he 
let out a wish that the disposal and direction of the Eussian 
force should be in the hands of the Court of Vienna, but, as our 
conversation was private and confide7itial and not official, I j^assed 
that over without seeming to attend to it ; as an expression of my 
sense of the absurdity of the King's subsidiary troops being at 
the disposal of any power but his Majesty might, by being 
reported, have interfered with my endeavours to conciliate the 
two commanders, and guide the operations to the objects which 
the King has in view^ Stahremberg urged very much his 
opinion of the advantage of employing the Prince de Ligne in 
the Low Countries, from his popularity there and from his 
talents ; and said he thought I might influence such an appoint- 
ment at Vienna. I said I had a high opinion of the Prince de 
Ligne from my acquaintance with him ; but that I should think 
I went very much out of the line of my employment, and should 



\ 



227 

incur the disapprobation of M. Tliugut, if I were to begin my 
acquaintance with pointing out to him the officers he should 
recommend to the Emperor to employ. 

"I think, however, that next year when the King's forces 
shall be employed elsewhere, the Prince de Ligne would be 
the most likely person to keep the Brahanc^ons together, 
and to hold that country against the French. I think 
Stahremberg candid and zealous in the right way, not- 
withstanding the points of Austrian policy which he lets out ; 
and I should have been well pleased to have conversed 
at large with you upon the subject; but I have written 
a dispatch from London, rather than give you any avoidable 
trouble. The discretion left to me I shall exercise to the best of 
my judgment, but I fear nothing will be concluded and resolved 
without my going to Vienna. The term of Thugut being ' le 
vrai general ' which escaped from Stahremberg, and his earnest- 
ness for my going there convinces me of it. This conversation 
was entirely on the score of old friendship, and therefore must 
not be officially considered, or brought into discussion with 
Stahremberg. I was on that account, perhaps, more guarded 
than I should have been with a mere minister. He was anxious 
to know whether I should have authority to inform the Arch- 
Duke of the object of the depending expedition from this country. 
I told him I had not yet received my instructions, but 
that I had no scruple of saying I could not propose a 
plan of operations to the Arch-Duke without entering upon 
the objects of this expedition. This, I think, is the sub- 
stance of our conversation. He gave me every information 
I required about the Arch-Duke, and pointed out the conduct 
he thought most likely for me to gain his friendship, and obtain 
an influence over his conduct ; and was very urgent that, if I 
found any little diffidence or jealousy of me in the Arch-Duke, I 
should rather write about it to him (Stahremberg) that he might 
do it away, than make a complaint to the Ministers here which 
might lead to asperity or contention. 

"I shall see the Duke of York at eleven to-morrow. I have 
not yet received the cypher and the papers mentioned in my 
instructions ; if they come to-morrow, I do not see any obstacle 
to my setting off on Sunday, unless any of the subjects opened in 
this letter should induce you to desire to see me again." 

Sir C. Whitworth to Lord Grenville. 

1799, x\ugust 3. St. Petersburgh. — "The messenger Hunter 
arrived on Wednesday the 31st ultimo with your Lordship's 
despatches of the 15th, and in order to remove from 3^our 
Lordship's mind as soon as possible any doubt of the Emperor's 
consent to adopt the alterations which it has been judged 
necessary to make in the original plan of operations, I lose not 
a moment in conveying to your Lordship his Imperial Majesty's 
entire acquiescence in everything which is now proposed ; and 



228 

orders are actually sent after the first division, should it have 
left Revel, and it was ready to sail on Friday last, to proceed 
immediately to Yarmouth Roads, from thence to be employed in 
any manner which may then be judged expedient. 

"The second division will follow to the same place of rendezvous 
as soon as the English transports already arrived shall be filled, 
without waiting for those who, for want of vessels, may be detained 
at Revel till fresh transports shall reach that port from England; 
so that about 8,000 men may be expected to follow the first 
division in the course of a week, and soon after the whole body 
of Russians will be on its way to the place of its destination. 

"There exists not the smallest difficulty here respecting the 
nomination of his Royal Highness the Duke of York to the 
command of this army ; it was always understood and stipulated 
in the treaty that the senior officer should command the whole ; 
and his Royal Highness was particularly alluded to in this 
arrangement. The same may be said of the officer commanding 
the first division, who, being only Major-General, will be of course 
commanded by Sir Ralph Abercrombie. For the rest, I can only 
repeat, what I have had the honour so frequently to state to 
your Lordship, that all plans proposed or adopted by his Imperial 
Majesty are acknowledged to be subject to such alterations as his 
Majesty may think expedient, or as the nature of existing 
circumstances may require. I trust that this will set your 
Lordship perfectly at ease with respect to this Court. The 
Emperor has expressed a wish that Captain Popham should be 
authorised by his Majesty, and by the Commander in Chief, to 
correspond with me for his Imperial Majesty's information; and 
for that purpose that he should keep me fully informed, and as 
expeditiously as possible, of all circumstances during the progress 
of the campaign which may be interesting to his Imperial 
Majesty, and which he may be supposed anxious to learn 
correctly, and without delay. His Majesty's sanction to such a 
correspondence would be very agreeable to the Emperor, if your 
Lordship should see no inconvenience in it. 

" I beg leave to refer your Lordship for every farther particular 
to my co-operator, whose activity and intelligence cannot be 
sufficiently commended. I enclose to your Lordship the proposi- 
tion of his Swedish Majesty, such as it has been communicated 
by that Court to the Russian Ministers, and by them to me, 
accompanied by the enclosed letters from Count Rastopsin. 
Your Lordship will perceive that the ground of the negotiation 
is entirely changed ; from what motives, or with what views, I 
cannot pretend to determine. The question is now no longer 
whether His Majesty will consent to take into his pay 8,000 
Swedes, for the express purpose of employing them against 
Holland in the present expedition, as was originally held out ; 
but whether his Majesty is disposed to make any sacrifice for 
the purpose of gaining the accessien of Sweden to the cause, and 
to subsidise that number of men, to be employed in the first 
instance in Pomerania, as a demonstration which the Emperor 
thinks will have the most beneficial effect upon the Courts of 



229 

Berlin and Denmark. This being a perfectly new consideration, 
his Majesty will best judge how far it may affect the general 
cause ; it remains for me only to observe that it is a measure 
which his Imperial Majesty has much at heart, so much so, that 
I have scarcely ventured to raise any strong objection, although 
many present themselves to my mind and will doubtless suggest 
themselves to your Lordship. I have, however, pointed out to 
Count Kastopsin not only the reluctance which his Majesty 
would feel, but also the difficulties which would be encountered, 
before so large a sum could be appropriated for an object totally 
unconnected with that towards which our present exertions are 
directed, and one which promises less solid advantages to the cause ; 
particularly as the demand for preparation money so much exceeds 
the proportion paid to his Imperial Majesty on the same account. 
In answer to this I was assured that the original demand would 
be insisted upon if his Swedish Majesty's troops could be in readi- 
ness to join those of his Majesty and of the Emperor against 
Holland ; and that as all hopes of their co-operation are given up, 
the measure now proposed is the only one that remains to bring 
forward the Swedes at all, and that it is referred to his Majesty's 
consideration how far that object is desirable at the expense at 
which it must be purchased. I beg leave therefore to submit this 
proposal in the shape in which it is now brought forward, candidly 
acknowledging that I see no other advantage to arise from it but 
that of acquiescing in the wishes of a faithful and zealous ally. 
"Your Lordship will observe that the whole transaction is to be 
negotiated between the Courts of St. Petersburgh and Stockholm, 
his Majesty appearing no farther in it than as covering the 
engagements which his Imperial Majesty may contract. It is 
needless for me to animadvert on this reluctance on the part of 
his Swedish Majesty to negotiate directly with his Majesty ; it 
is, however, impossible not to lament that, at a moment when it 
is so highly important that all personal considerations should 
give way to the public good, such rancour should exist to impede 
its attainment as is manifested in the conduct of the Court of 
Stockholm. It has even appeared in the presence of the Russian 
Ministers whilst we were discussing the business for which we 
were assembled ; the Swedish Minister continually adverting to 
the subject of the confiscated convoy, in terms too of more rancour 
than might have been expected on such an occasion. I did not 
deviate in the smallest degree from the language which I have 
uniformly held ; — the arguments we have to urge are unanswer- 
able, and they remain, of course, unanswered." Copy. 

Enclosure. 

Baron de Stedding, Ambassador from Sweden, to 
Count de Rastopsin. 
1799, July 20. St. Petersburgh. — " Le roi fera passer en 
Pomeranie sur ses propres batiments, etdans le plus court espace 
de temps qu'il sera possible, 8,500 hommes ; y compris 700 hommes 
de cavallerie, et les canonniers necessaires pour le service des 
pieces de campagne. 



230 

'' Le roi etant decide de faire les dernier s efforts pour contribuer 
au succes des vues de sa Majesty Imperiale, renonce a toute 
indemnisation des fraix deja faits, tant pour rengagement des 
hommes, que pour leur equipement, armement, et cetera ; et se 
borne a demander, pour rendre ce corps mobile et le transporter 
en Pomeranie, 125 mille livres sterlings payables a I'echange 
des ratifications. 

" Les subsides que I'Angleterre s'est engag^e de payer a Sa 
Majesty Imperiale pour les 17 mille hommes destines a 
I'expedition de la Hollande, qui sont de 44 mille livres 
sterlings par mois, sont acceptees par le roi pour les 8,500 
hommes ; ce qui fait 22 mille livres sterlings par mois, sauf a 
s'arranger pour I'article des fourages. Le payement de ces sub- 
sides se fera toujours d'avance de trois mois en trois mois, et Sa 
Majeste le roi de Suede souhaiterait d'avoir une bonne maison de 
commerce designee a Hambourg, sur laquelle elle pourrait tirer 
a r^poque des echeances. 

*' Dans ce corps auxiliaire de troupes Suedoises sera compris le 
contingent du roi pour I'empire, et les deux souverains contractants 
s'arrangeront sur la maniere de le faire agir. 

"Le roi est dans I'intention de fournir les chevaux pour la 
cavallerie, I'artillerie, et pour les bagages." Certified copy. 

Sir C. Whitworth to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 3. St. Petersburgh. — " In addition to what I 
have said in my preceding despatch on the subject of the 
Swedish proposition, it is necessary, in order if possible to 
render this transaction less exceptionable, to mention that his 
Imperial Majesty has assured me in a conversation which I have 
had with him since it was written, that it is his intention, in any 
engagement which he may contract with his Swedish Majesty, 
to have it plainly understood that the corps to be assembled in 
Pomerania shall be at his Majesty's disposal as soon as it shall 
be seen what effect such a demonstration will have upon the 
Court of Berlin ; and march from thence towards Holland or the 
Low Countries as may be judged most beneficial, provided the 
Court of Berlin can be induced by any means to acquiesce in 
such a measure. This I had from his Imperial Majesty him- 
self, and it is obvious that he mentioned it in order to render 
this measure, to which he attaches the greatest importance, 
more palatable to his Majesty. 

" His Imperial Majesty, at the same time, informed me, 
upon condition that I should mention it only to your Lord- 
ship, that the conduct of the Court of Vienna appeared to 
him so unaccountable, and so liable to suspicion, that he had by 
way of precaution already taken every measure for bringing 
together the whole body of Kussian troops, should he find a 
disposition (which he had some reason to apprehend) in that 
Court to abandon him and the cause together. I cannot but 
think this alarm infinitely exaggerated ; it is however sufficient 
to have excited the Emperor's uneasiness to an extraordinary 



231 

degree. In such an event the corps m Italy, including that of 
General Kebindar, amounting at the least to 25,000 men, would 
be joined immediately to that of General Korsakoff and to that 
of the Prince de Cond^, and the whole, forming an army of 70, 
or 80,000 men under the command of Marshal Suwarrow, would 
continue the war in the sole name of the Emperor of liussia with- 
out any concert with, or assistance whatever from, the House of 
Austria. Your Lordship will not suppose from this that such 
an order of things, which might indeed be considered as a real 
misfortune, is likely to take place ; it is meant only that your 
Lordship should understand that his Imperial Majesty is 
prepared for every contingency ; and it is determined, let what 
will be the ultimate decision of the Court of Vienna, to prosecute 
the war which he has so zealously begun, upon his own account. 

"This his Imperial Majesty has done me the honour to impart 
to me himself this evening at the ball at Peterhoff, on my 
positive promise to communicate the matter to no one but your 
Lordship. 

" Should the jealousy now conceived against the Court of 
Vienna be productive of such consequences, it is possible that the 
execution of his Majesty's view^s of carrying the war into the 
interior of France may be considerably facilitated. Some ideas are 
entertained by the Emperor, on what ground I know not, that 
this important object, from which such beneficial effects may be 
fairly expected, does not meet the approbation of the Austrian 
Cabinet ; and that the employing their army either in the siege of 
Mentz or some other equally tedious operation would be preferred ; 
at all events it most certainly would, according to the notions 
entertained here, prefer penetrating into the Low Countries 
with the hope of recovering its former possessions, and thus 
furnish one more instance of the constant policy of that Court 
in sacrificing on every occasion the public good to its own 
interests. Without entering into any minute detail on a subject 
which is not yet become a matter of discussion, I think I can 
venture to say that the restoring the Low Countries to the 
House of Austria would be made to depend on the extent of 
possessions which it might arrogate to itself in Italy ; and 
should their ideas of aggrandisement, as there is but too much 
reason to presume, be very extensive on that side, that then it 
would be deemed good policy to assign a part at last of the Low 
Countries to the House of Orange. I mention this however 
entirely as a notion on which I cannot yet speak positively. ^ I 
can only in general state that the possession of Brabant will 
depend, as far as this Court has any influence in the decision, 
on the degree of extension which the Court of Vienna may give 
to its views in other quarters ; and that the disposal of that 
country in favour of the Stadtholder (in the reinstating of whom 
in the full extent of his authority, his Imperial Majesty's views 
coincide perfectly with those of his Majesty), would wdllingly be 
acceded to upon a principle of its being necessary to strengthen 
that Government by extending its territory, and to assign it a 
strong barrier on the side of Flanders. 



^32 

"His Imperial Majesty, upon Captain Popham's taking leave 
of him 3^esterday, suggested the possibility of the Court of 
Copenhagen's being tempted to resist the passage of his troops 
through the Sound, and ordered Captain Popham to tell him 
what he conceived would be necessary to do in such an occurrence. 
His reply was that such an event could be considered in no other 
point of view than as a declaration of war, and consequently 
that it would be expedient to retaliate immediately. The 
Emperor closed with his idea, and has entrusted Captain 
Popham with eventual orders to that effect, to be communicated 
by him to Admiral Hannikoff and General Hermann, should it 
be found necessary to come to extremities. There cannot exist 
the smallest possibility of such a determination on the part of 
Denmark, but it is certainly as well to be prepared at all events ; 
and it may be considered as a mark of confidence in his Imperial 
Majesty towards Captain Popham, and of that zeal for the cause 
which leads him to anticipate and to overcome every difficulty. 

" Your Lordship will observe in the Swedish proposition that 
it was intended to include his Swedish Majesty's contingent to 
the Empire in the 8,500 men to be sent into Pomerania. This 
point was however immediately given up. 

" I propose setting out for Revel the day after to-morrow, at 
the Emperor's particular request, to be present at the embarka- 
tion of the second division, and I shall return to Petersburg in 
the course of seven or eight days. Whatever orders I may 
receive in the meantime will be forwarded to me there." 

Copij. 

W. Pitt to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 3. Walmer Castle. — " My letter of yesterday 
will have shewn you that neither your first or second remon- 
strance were necessary ; and, on arriving here this morning, we 
find things in great forwardness, and the remaining transports 
expected, so as I trust to ensure the embarkations beginning on 
Tuesday, and being completed by Thursday. I do not wonder if, 
under all the circumstances, counting by minutes you think 
this tardy ; but I really believe there never was more exertion, 
nor ever any expedition so nearly punctual to its time. It will 
be some relief to you to see that the language of the Jacobins 
respecting Holland will not tend to smooth the way for the 
Prussian negotiation at Paris. I think you may now venture to 
look at the Downs, which are at this moment as beautiful to the 
eye as to the imagination, being crowded with transports on 
which the sun is shining, as if they had already ensured our 
success." 

Lord Grenville to Lord Mulgrave. 
Private. 

1799, August 3. Dropmore. — " I have just received your 
letter. I was perhaps to blame in not having mentioned to you, 
before you saw Starhemberg, that all conversation with him was 
a pure perte, except as far as goes to mere civility. Thugut 



233 

hates his father, and is jealous of him, and keeps him in utter 
ignorance of all that is done, doing, or to be done : and if one 
succeeded in interesting him in any of the objects we have in 
view, his recommendation of it would be much more likely to do 
harm than good. He will, therefore, have learnt much more in 
the conversation than he knew before ; and, I am sorry to say, 
I am by no means convinced of his disposition to make 
a good use of what he learns, even if he had the power to 
do so. 

" The question of your going to Vienna is a very delicate one, 
^and his judgment is by no means to be trusted upon it. When 
it was proposed to us to send an officer in your situation, 
Thugut mentioned that we should send him either to Vienna 
or to the Archduke's headquarters. He would obviously have 
preferred the former, and we had strong reasons to prefer the 
latter, and therefore took him at his word without further dis- 
cussion. We have an interest in thwarting that system of 
directing military operations from Vienna, because it has never 
been employed but to our disadvantage ; and we were very 
desirous of engaging, as a party in our measures, the person 
who is to execute them. We have, besides, a much more 
advantageous situation with respect to Eussia, by treating on 
this subject at the army, than by discussing it at Vienna. 
Korsakow is in a manner placed under our orders by those which 
he has received from Peter sburgh, and this gives us two voices 
out of those in the concert. At Vienna the Kussian Minister 
would feel himself quite independent of us, and the present 
Russian Minister there is completely in Thugut's hands. 

" My wish is, therefore, very strongly that you may not find it 
necessary to go to Vienna, and I am inclined to think you will 
not ; but I thought it right not to confine your discretion too 
much in that respect, because cases may undoubtedly arise that 
would require it : but you must always remember that by doing 
so you will incur great risk of disobliging the Arch-Duke : and 
that the private interests of the latter lead to his pushing this 
campaign actively, while all Thugut's jealousy inclines him the 
other way. 

"The question of not making peace but by common consent 
has been bandied about in all the correspondence between 
London and Vienna till there is no more to be said upon it. The 
great objection to such stipulations is that they do bind us 
because we perform our treaties, and that they do not bind 
Austria, who broke its engagements with us on this very subject 
at Campo Fornio, at Leoben, and at Rastadt, or rather at 
Seltz. 

" It belongs however to a more extensive concert than 
there is yet a prospect of. We may combine our military 
operations, without having combined our political system ; and 
perhaps, after all that has passed, the former is the best course 
to be pursued for attaining the latter ; but if we delay the one 
till we get the other, Thugut has at once attained his object, if 



284 

that be delay and inactivity. If, therefore, anything is said to 
you by the Arch-Duke on that point, I am sure you should put 
it by as belonging to Lord Minto's mission at Vienna, and by no 
means to the discussion of a mihtary concert for this campaign. 

" The idea of a power of advancing money to them could have 
been mentioned by Starhemberg only to pump. He knows that 
it is out of the question. The short fact on that subject is, that 
he signed a treaty with me here, on the faith of which we 
advanced them money ; after which they refused, and still refuse 
to ratify his treaty, though they took the money. Fifty dirty 
tricks have been tried to make us acquiesce in this state of 
things, and give them more money. We have always refused, and 
point de ratification jmint cV argent has been dinned into his ears 
and Thugut's, till we are tired of repeating it. 

" This determination cannot, however, on any account, or by 
any pretence or subterfuge, be departed from or eluded, and he 
knows that as well as I do. No power therefore is given to 
Wickham in this respect. So far from it that, even when 
authority was given to Craufurd to expend money in raising 
Swiss troops, he was directed to do so on an express statement 
that those troops were not to be under the Austrian orders or 
command, otherwise than as the King might put them so for the 
moment. 

"You certainly judged quite right in not giving him any 
reason to think that we would interfere in recommending to the 
Court of Vienna to employ a general of his choice. His only 
object in this, which he has tried very often before, is to find out 
whereabouts we are with respect to the Netherlands; and he will 
certainly write something or other to his Court as a discovery 
which he has made through you of our intentions in that 
respect. But as we do not yet quite see our own way through 
that difificulty, it will not be easy for him to foretell what path 
we shall follow. 

"I wish I could agree with you in thinking him candid. I 
have known him too long, and have had too much dealing with 
him to think so : and I rather regret I did not put you more on 
your guard against him ; though I do not see that any harm can 
arise from what has passed, provided one was sure that he would 
faithfully report it. But let me intreat you on no account to 
think of writing anything to him from the army but mere 
compliment. 

" 1 trust you will receive the cyphers and enclosures to-day, 
and I am not aware of anything that can make it necessary that 
we should meet again ; though, if you wish it, I am at your 
orders at half an hour's notice. 

- "You may easily conceive how delighted I am at this 
beginning of the Indian war, and at the infinite honour which 
Mornington must acquire from his able and decisive conduct, 
which has placed us in such a commanding situation in India." 

Postscript. "I am not quite sure that I have enough 
explained above what I mean as to the Netherlands. It is this. 
Austria has no right even to enquire, much less to learn what 



I 



our ultimate designs may be as to her recovering the Nether- 
lands, unless that discussion is included in the extensive 
consideration of measures and objects for the prosecution and 
ultimate termination of the war, into which Lord Minto is, by 
the instructions to him which you have seen, fully empowered to 
enter. 

" Till then it would, perhaps, be premature even to form our 
own determination on this point; but it would certainly be very 
much so to let them know it. 

"Even if we had resolved (and such I incline to think will 
ultimately be our resolution) that it is best for us to replace 
Austria in the possession of those countries, there will be points 
of much difficulty to arrange with that government as to the 
mode of its possessing them. We conquered them, and defended 
them (that is England and Holland did) with our arms and money. 
We (jave them to the German branch of the House of Austria, 
who had a doubtful title, and no means of enforcing it but b}' 
our aid. We gave them on certain conditions, all of which 
Austria has broken. W^e were guarantees of the constitutions of 
those provinces, and had a strong interest, commercial and 
political, in maintaining them. Austria violated those con- 
stitutions and by so doing lost the provinces, and ceded them to 
France by a definitive treaty of peace, which she had no power 
to do, without our express consent. We were guarantees of the 
Barrier treaty, on which the defence of Holland rested ; Austria 
dismantled the barrier, expelled the Dutch troops, and thereby 
lost Holland to us. 

" The mischiefs must, in any case, be guarded against in 
future. How this may best be done must depend on events 
which are still uncertain, but it plainly will not be done by 
replacing Austria in the state in which she stood in 1794, 
disengaged by her breach of treaty from those engagements 
which we had required for our safety when we gave the country 
to her. 

"Eecent events, and particularly the conduct of Prussia, may 
make it proper to enter into earlier and fuller explanations on 
these points than I thought likely four days ago ; but, till they 
are fully explained, we must be cautious not to commit this 
country either way upon them ; and you will see how very 
cautiously your instructions on this point have, for that reason, 
been worded." Copy. 

Lord Minto to Lord Grenville, 
Private. 

1799, August 3. Vienna. — "I must begin by wishing your 
Lordship joy of the surrender of Mantua, with the particulars of 
which Lord Henley will acquaint you. 

" I arrived here on the first instant, and have met with the 
kindest and most cordial reception from Lord Henley, who 
affords me every assistance which our common duty can require, 
or which private friendship can suggest. He presented me to 



236 

Baron Thugut yesterday, and I delivered copies of my credentials, 
as is usually done on such occasions. This visit being merely 
formal, nothing passed which it is necessary to relate ; and, 
indeed, as I cannot present my letters of credence to the 
Emperor and Empress till Tuesday the 6th, I feel it to be 
more becoming that I should defer till that is done the 
commencement of my official correspondence, which it is the 
less necessary to begin to-day as Lord Henley's dispatch by 
this messenger will bring the affairs of this Court down to 
the latest date. I have however thought it necessary, by 
Lord Henley's desire, to acquaint Lord Mulgrave with the 
resolution expressed by Baron Thugut not to authorize the Arch- 
duke to concert with his Lordship the future operations of the 
campaign, and with his proposal that Lord Mulgrave should 
come to Vienna for that purpose. Lord Mulgrave will naturally 
judge whether it is expedient, or agreeable to the instructions 
which he bears, to comply with this proposal. A very well- 
founded diffidence in my own views on military questions, added 
to the high opinion I entertain of Lord Mulgrave' s talents and 
judgment, would render his assistance on that great branch of 
the affairs of the present period most acceptable to me, and I 
shall take the liberty of expressing this sentiment to him. At 
the same time I should think it likely that he should wait for 
instructions before he came to Vienna, and I mention this 
conjecture that your Lordship may take the steps you thinji 
proper for expediting those instructions." 

Count Woronzow to Lord Grknville. 

1799, August 4. Downing Street. — " J'ai reyu votre billet 
ecrit hier, avec les incluses, c'est-a-dire les deux billet que Mr. 
Wickham m'a envoye, et la lettre de Kalitcheff, ainssi que celle 
que Mr. Wickham vous a adresse sur la miserable affaire de 
I'Archiduc sur I'Aar. 

" Je remi cette derniere a Mr. Hamond, en vous remercient de 
cette communication. 

" J'ai vue celle que vous avez eu la bonte d'ecrire a ma priere 

a Mr. Walpole a Lisbone en faveure de B Mattiz, et j'ai 

bien reconu toute votre bonte pour moi. 

" II est inutil d'envoyer un cutter, a ce qu'il me semble, car, si 
c'est pour trouver nos transports a Elsseneur, il ne les trouvera 
plus la. lis doivent etre deja entre le Categat et la cotte d'Angle- 
terre. Les croiseurs de votre flotte devroient etre muni d'ordres 
de I'Amiral Duncan au notre Amiral Whitchagoff, pour qu'il 
aille au Texel, et le premier qui le rencontrera lui signifiera ces 
ordres, qu'il suivra tout de suite. 

" Si vous vouliez envoy er votre courier a Petersbourg par ce 
cutter, je vous suplie de considerer que nous avons eu constament 
des vents de ouest depuis pres de six semaines. lis doivent done 
changer, et des qu'ils se mettent a Test, ce cutter sera plus d'un 
mois en routte, tendis qu'un courier ne met que quatorze jours 
entre Cuxhaven et Petersbourg. Je vous reitere ma priere de 



h 



237 

d^ff^rei^ Texp^dition de votre courier jusqu'apres demain, 
vendredi. J'ai besoin d'^crire a fond a Rastopchin sur les 
intrigues et I'ambition de I'Autriche. 

" Kotchoubei, qui comprent bien les affaires, n'est plus probable- 
ment en place ; sans credit malgre ses grands talents et sa 
probite, il 6toit r^solu de quitter sa place les premiers jours du 
moi pass6. C'est un malheur d'autant plus grand qu'il voyoit 
come vous et moi les perfidies Autrichiennes, et avoit I'habillit^ 
de les dejouer ; mais Rastopchin, quoiqu'il connoit et n'aime pas 
la politique tortueuse de Thugut, il est trop naif et ne comprent 
pas ass6 les affaires. II faut done lui expliquer tout et en grand 
detail. J'^tois venu ici pour lire votre lettre a mylord Minto, 
mais le Due d'Yorck m'est fait chercher pour que j'aille chez lui. 
Je viendrai ici demain, et Mr. Hamond me lira ce que vous avez 
permis qu'il me lise. 

" Je ne demande pas mieux, et c'est avec un bien grand plaisir 
que je viendrai a Dropmore avec ma fille, Mademoiselle Jardine, 
et monfils, si cela vous conviens samedi, et nous y resterons jusqu'a 
lundi matin, car ma fille doit aller mardi aux bains de mere." 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, August 4. Berlin. — "You will easily have seen that in 
the present state of things your side of the water is more interest- 
ing than mine ; if there is any truth in the assurances of 
Haugwiz respecting both the shape and progress of their negocia- 
tion, we have no great reason to fear that Sandoz will move 
faster than Abercrombie, and I see that our Prussian Minister 
would give me to understand that the business will not find 
much activity or success by the assistance given to it at Berlin. 
I am daily more and more convinced that my present residence 
here does much more harm than good in the moment ; I scarcely 
believe that anything can be done with our Prussian politicians 
under the strange mis-shapen shadow of government which pre- 
vails here ; but if there is any chance of amending their conduct 
and measures, it is by fear only that this change can be made, a 
fear arising from their seeing themselves reduced to the solitary 
position in Europe which they have so industriously carved out 
for themselves ; a fear that the allied Courts will at last abandon 
the vain effort of active connection with them, an unquiet fear of 
the dissatisfaction at Petersburg, but more than all a fear that 
Great Britain will not give itself to a concert of general arrange- 
ment with them, now that they shall have suffered Holland to 
have been re-established without them. 

" Their present only confidence arises from a strong persuasion 
that, however the United Provinces be recovered from France, 
Great Britain must still come to Prussia for security and solidity 
to its re-establishment; and that sentiment is as strongly planted 
in the mind of Haugwiz as any which can take root there. Now, 
however true it may be that we do want, or rather that we 
should prefer to any other, the assistance of Prussia for the 



238 

security of Holland, it is not perhaps true that we want that 
assistance more than Prussia herself wants to give it, because 
without doubt, their frontier is more immediately concerned than 
ours in securing against France the independence of Holland ; if 
this is so there is no reason why we should be governed by a 
view of our interest to court them, pay them, or solicit them to 
do what is felt by them to be as much their own interest as ours. 
The little and crooked hope of Haugwiz is that we shall eagerly 
act upon the direct principle of our own interest, and that what- 
ever be the blame which we are intitled to reproach to Prussia, 
he still thinks that we shall want them so much as to make it 
necessary for us to come to them cap in hand, although he is 
almost ready to acknowledge that we should serve them 
right if w^e rather came with a good oaken stick in hand ; 
he is however confident that, in spite of all their bad 
behaviour, present and future, we must come and beg of 
them to help us to keep Holland. It is for that he now 
considers me as waiting here, and I do not think it is of little 
importance to shake this confidence of his, and to shew them 
that there is a real danger of their being left completely in the 
lurch by us ; at least I feel sure that it is your business to give 
them enough of this alarm to set the balance even before your 
general discussions begin. Without this, we shall be placed in 
the disadvantageous situation of having to court and to crouch 
to Austria in order to engage them to keep their own Nether- 
lands ; and to be in a similar state of dependence upon Prussia, 
in order to obtain from them that security for Holland which is 
still more necessary to them, if possible, than to us. I own that 
I am myself so strongly impressed with this view of the subject, 
that I should have been tempted to avail myself of the opportunity 
which their Paris negociations gave me of asking to accompany 
Panin in his audience of conge to the King, and in some respects this 
would have been useful by very much increasing their fears here. 
I was restrained from doing so, partly because I thought it 
would have too much the appearance of sudden ill humour, 
partly because it would have given to France the appearance of 
full and undisturbed possession of Prussia, and partly because it 
was not then easy to determine whether I might not better assist 
your Orange expedition by remaining here than by moving to 
any other place. 

" This last, which was the main reason, no longer subsists ; 
the Hereditary-Prince of Orange is gone, and I trust will in 
a few days be on his road to the Hague ; and of course his 
departure from hence has removed the only material point 
of communication which I could assist. If any wish of his, 
or any reasonable expectation of advantage to the common 
cause should seem to demand me with him for a very short 
time, 1 could in that shape perhaps give a temporary assistance 
there before I took my new road back by Helvoetsluys ; my 
absence in that case would here do good for the reasons which 
I have stated ; my presence can do no good, as every reasonable 
person would now, I think, acknowledge. 



239 

" It is only after having satisfied myself completely of the good 
public grounds on which I should desire to return from Berlin 
that I allow myself to add any of private and personal considera- 
tion ; you will, however, confess that I have fairly gone through 
the business which I had undertaken, and that I have worn to 
a thread the Berlin negociation for co-operation against France. 

" I think nothing more can be done here now to obtain that 
object, and you know how distinctly I contracted not to engage 
in any durable residence, and therefore how unwillingly I should 
see any new business proposed to me here, now that the business 
which I had to do is fairly worn through. I am not, as you see, 
quibbling about words, for I fairly acknowledge that I considered 
the deliverance of Holland as the object which I had to seek at 
Berlin ; and, one way or other, by your help more than by mine, 
that will have been accomplished. Whatever remains to do 
towards the first accomplishment of that great object, I am still 
ready to do if I can give any assistance to it ; but I trust that you 
will understand me well concerning it, and feel with me that no 
point of duty or obligation on public grounds can demand from 
me more than to give myself to such risk or such trouble as really 
belongs to the first act of the Deliverance of Holland; to that I 
will freely and heartily give, in every possible shape, the 
best assistance that I can, if there seems any shape in 
which I can be useful ; but that once done, I must fairly 
say that I think I have worked my passage back to 
England, and to you, and must send my sommation to 
you not to engage me in any new discussions in Prussia or in 
Holland. My limit here is providentially marked, for the master 
of the house in which I write comes into it on the 1st of 
September, and no human consideration could induce me to look 
out for another when I have outlived this. I have written, as 
you see, in the same sense with you to Lord Minto and to 
Whitworth ; it is by Stamford that I hope to learn something of 
the Landgrave of Hesse Cassell, at his return here from 
Brunswick. Eh viva Ahercronihie.'' 

Postscript. "I add one line of postscript to tell you that I am 
just now informed of Haugwiz having said to the Austrian 
Charge iV Affaires here that, as he observed the Court of Vienna 
was looking for a more sure frontier, and as Mr. Pitt had 
announced the intention of some indemnities for England, he 
should think Prussia would likewise require a more sufficient 
frontier against France. If they have this object, the next thing 
to know is whether they will negociate it with France, or state 
it to us as the condition of their defence of Holland ; but I 
cannot yet believe they will venture to stand out about the 
Netherlands, if Great Britain and Russia pronounce themselves 
decidedly upon that subject. Mantua has ofl:'ered to surrender 
upon terms which are sent to Vienna, but will probably be 
refused, because they think it cannot long hold out. A person 
just arrived from Prague assures positively that the Russian 
corps does not exceed 33,000 men, and that they cannot be at 
Schaffh^usen before the 20th instant," 



240 

Lord Mulgrave to Lord Grenville. 
Private, 

1799, August 4. Harley Street. — " I cannot regret having had 
the conversation with Starhemberg, as it has been the occasion 
of my receiving your letter, which came last night after I was in 
bed ; and the more especially as I cannot, upon my best 
recollection, recall anything said by me that could be perverted 
to any purpose w^hatever at Vienna. You are already acquainted 
with the substance of the few answ^ers given by me; the conver- 
sation was mostly on his part. I told him that I had not 
received my instructions, and w^as only generally acquainted 
with the object of my mission ; namely to concert measures 
when I should arrive on the spot. You might be very well 
assured that I should enter into no confidential correspondence 
with him, but under your directions ; and I mentioned his 
proposal to you (not knowing your opinion of him, or his 
situation with respect to his own Court,) upon the 
possibility of your being able to make use of him to clear 
away difficulties that might not be proper matter of official 
representation. However, in the light in which you have 
discovered him to me, that is out of the question. One of my 
reasons for thinking him candid and even indiscreet was his 
having stated fully to me the circumstances of the pecuniary 
transaction you allude to, with the highest praises of Pitt's bold 
and liberal conduct on that occasion, and, at the same time, 
with expressions such as you w-ould have used of the failure on 
the part of Thugut, after having authorised him (Starhemberg) 
in repeated letters to sign. His attempt to pum]) out upon these 
grounds whether money would be advanced after having 
discussed the subject with you, appears rather weak ; as I could 
only do what I did, assure him that I would mention to you what 
he had proposed. 

" I am particularly happy to have my mission confined as 
much as possible to military concert, and that with the Arch- 
Duke. I have no stomach for the journey to Vienna, because 
the objects of the different operations proposed by the King and 
by that Court are so obvious, according to my conception of them, 
that I do not think they can be disguised by any military 
arguments ; and the adoption of one or the other will depend in 
a great measure upon the extent of the influence which his 
Majesty and his allies have over the conduct of the Court of 
Vienna. Lest I should have misconceived the real state of the 
case, I will explain my apprehension of it, which I did not think 
necessary before, conceiving that I had only to state to you the 
best military arguments I could collect for the adoption of the 
King's plan of operations, and such as I should propose to make 
use of to the Arch-Duke. The result of the adoption of one or 
other of the proposed plans, I conceive to be as follows. 

" If the Arch-Duke agrees to support the attack upon Lyons 
by besieging Huningue, Belfort, and Besancon, he employs his 
army to the great object of the common cause, and Austria rests 



I 



241 

satisfied with her Italian acquisitions by this campaign ; Great 
Britain, by the operation of the Duke of York's army, holding 
in her hands and at her disposal Holland and the Low Countries ; 
the French remaining in possession of both Ijanks of the llhine 
from Brisach, with the power of again invading Germany, in 
the event of the operation on the frontiers of Tranche Comte 
being unsuccessful ; this, in the supposition that Prussia does not 
come forward. In case a Prussian army should march for the 
reduction of Mayence and Ehrinbreitstien (Holland and the Low 
Countries being disposed of as above) the northern part of 
Germany would remain in the possession and under the protec- 
tion of Prussia, and Austria would thereby see the Low Countries 
and a great part of the Empire in the hands of the powers of 
which she appears to be equally jealous. On the other hand, 
should the last proposal of Thugut, that the Arch-Duke should 
march against Mayence, be adopted, it is equally obvious to me 
that His Royal Highness would afford no assistance thereby either 
to the Russians under Suwarrow, or to the Duke of York ; but 
would possess himself (without risk to his own army, or any 
opposition but that of the garrison) of that fortress ; and perhaps 
of Luxembourg also ; and by approaching the Low Countries 
might have an opportunity of stirring up Austrian partisans in 
that country to demand the restoration of the Emperor to his 
territories there, in the same manner as the Kings of Naples and 
Sardinia have been restored to their dominions. If this should 
succeed, the operations of the Duke of I'ork's army in the Low 
Countries will have been purely Austrian ; whilst the Russian 
forces in his Majesty's pay will have been only employed to cover 
the Arch-Duke's operations, by keeping the French in check 
upon the southern frontiers, and at the same time to guard and 
secure the acquisition of the Austrians in Italy. Whether the 
measure of endeavouring to get the Emperor proclaimed in 
the Low Countries is one that could be undertaken with a 
prospect of success; whether it would be so plausible, under 
all the existing circumstances, as to make it difficult to 
resist or elude the execution of it, are political questions which I 
have no business to discuss ; but they are so involved in the 
negociation of military operations that it is impossible entirely 
to omit the mention of them, whilst I am stating to you the 
objects which occur to me as likely to influence a resistance on 
each side to the measures proposed by the other. Considering, 
as I do, the balance of advantage and the weight of influence at 
at the close of the campaign to depend so considerably (if not 
entirely) upon the adoption of one or other of the measures to be 
discussed at the Arch-Duke's head-quarters, I should very 
reluctantly agree to the march of the Arch-Duke's army to 
^Mayence after the deliverance of Switzerland, as the Russians 
would thereby be, of necessity, put on the defensive. The weak- 
ness of the Arch-Duke's army will not, in fact, be an obstacle, 
nor, even in argument, a prevailing objection to that measure, for 
the reasons already mentioned. 

6802 Q 



242 

" I state all these circumstances thus urgently to you that you 
may be aware of the difficulties I am likely to meet with if the 
Arch-Duke should not have the power to determine, and act at 
once upon consultations to be held at his head-quarters. I am 
informed by Starhemberg (for what purpose if not sincerely I 
cannot guess) that, ' excepting his courage, and his couj) (V(eil 
niilitaire , I am not likely to think the talents of the Arch-Duke 
equal to his reputation, but that by endeavouring to gain his 
friendship and goodwill, he will be easily disposed to concur 
with me in the measures that may be proposed, if he has 
authority to act ' ; and then followed his proposal of going to 
Vienna. I have recurred again to Starhemberg from a wish to 
put you in possession, as much as possible, of everything that 
passed ; as you appear by your letter to be under some 
uneasiness lest any mischief should arise from that conversation. 
I hope, however, that you will find that no harm has been done, 
and that I have not compromised either you or myself, as yet at 
least. 

"I shall, of course, take Mr. Wickham's opinion of the Arch- 
duke's character, and be guided by that, till I have an opportunity 
of forming my ow^n. If the Archduke should say that he has no 
authority to act upon the result of our consultation, but must 
write to Vienna, do you wish I should go thither in case the 
Archduke shoidd concur with me in the plan of operations I 
am directed to propose? You have already instructed me to 
endeavour to procure an order from Vienna for the execution of 
it, in case I should find the Archduke disposed rather to adopt 
the plan of marching against Mayence. 

" I have not yet received the cipher or my passport ; I do not 
know whether it will be necessary to name Captain Foster in it 
as my aide-de-camp), or whether la suite will be sufficient for him. 
Not any of the other paj^ers mentioned in my instructions are 
sent to me ; I only wait for them to set off. 

" I felt much gratified, though not at all surprised, at the wise 
and vigorous measures of Mornington's government; I trust 
and hope they will lead to our entire relief from the turbulence 
and dangerous power of Tippoo in India. Mornington has 
shown great kindness to a person in India with whom I am 
nearly connected ; I beg you will have the goodness to send him 
my thanks which I enclose, when you have an opportunity of 
sending letters to him. I write in great haste that I may receive 
your answer to-night or early to-morrow morning, particularly on 
the point of my journey to Vienna." 

Lord Grenville to Henry Dundas. 

1799, August 5. Dropmore. — " I send you a list I have 
received from the Bishop of St. Pol of royalists in the prisons, 
whom he wishes us to send to France. As we shall probably 
have to maintain them now if they remain where they are, I 
conceive there would be no objection to release them provided 
means could be found of being certain of sending them back to 



I 



243 

France. If you see no reason to be of a different opinion, and will 
send the necessary orders to Huskisson, I will instruct Frere to 
settle with him and Woodford the means of doing this." Coivj. 

Lord Grenville to Lord Mulorave. 

1799, August 5. Dropmore.— '* I found your letter here last 
night on my return from Windsor. I think your view of the 
result of the two different plans a very just one, and it certainly 
leads to our urging in the strongest manner the adoption of that 
which we have proposed. The best argument to be used for that 
purpose seems to me to be the evident insufficiency of Thugut's 
plan to the main object, to which every rational man must look 
for the termination of the war, and the security of Europe. The 
Austrians themselves must feel that whatever may be the tnim 
on which they must conclude a peace with the Directory, that 
peace can only be an armed truce ; and that Europe can never 
be really restored to tranquility but by the restoration of 
monarchy in France. Now the operation against Mayence has 
no tendency to produce that restoration, whereas the success of 
that against Lyons affords the best hope for it. 

"But it may, I think, be questioned whether the operation 
against Mayence be one which, in the present state of the 
Austrian army, it would be safe to undertake. If it be (as I fear 
it is) certain that, without a very powerful co-operation to the 
southward, the Russians cannot advance into France after the 
Archduke is withdrawn to Mayence, the Directory will, after a 
certain time, find themselves at their ease on that subject ; and 
would, in that case, either move directly to the attack of the 
besieging army, or would, more probably, make so powerful an 
attack across the Upper Rhine as would oblige the Archduke to 
divide his force in such a manner as to render it weak in every 
point, and by no means equal to the siege of such a place as 
Mayence. And the result would be, what we have so often seen 
in the course of this war from divided operations, that neither 
would succeed. 

" Certainly a great deal of this difficulty will be removed if we 
can come to a satisfactory understanding with Vienna about the 
Netherlands, which seems every hour to grow more and more 
probable. 

"When you are at headquarters you will, of course, learn 
from Lord Minto what impression the representations he has 
already made on this subject have produced ; and your going to 
Vienna must be in some degree regulated by that. If the Arch- 
duke is himself adverse to our plan, there remains nothing but 
to push it at Vienna by every possible exertion ; but, if he accedes 
to it, or professes indifference, or ignorance of the views of his 
Court, and Thugut hesitates or refuses, the question of delicacy 
arises. I should, in that case, incline to think that more may be 
done by your remaining with the armies to urge it there, and 
trusting to Lord Minto's exertions to press it at Vienna, than by 
your going to assist in this task at Vienna, leaving it to the 
chance of some intrigue to spring up in your absence at the army. 



244 

"This is, however, a point on which it is really impossible to 
sj)eak with precision beforehand. Supposing the Archduke 
strongly impressed with the plan and eager for it, he may 
urge your journey to Vienna in a way very difficult for you to 
resist. Other motives, which it would be too long to enumerate, 
may lead to the same decision. Lord Minto who, I believe, 
would speak quite candidly on such a point, may him- 
self desire it of you ; and, on the whole, I have no doubt of your 
making a right decision upon it according to the circumstances 
of the moment ; though I wish you to bear in your mind the 
reasons which I have mentioned to you for my wishing 
that the course of the business may be found such as to 
admit of the arranging it at headquarters, rather than at 
Vienna. 

" I hope there will be no more delay in your having your 
papers. I have written again about it, but if there is any fresh 
difficulty, have the goodness to see Frere, whom I have directed 
to do everything that is necessary." Copy. 

The Hereditary Prince of Orange to the 
Prince of Orange. 

1799, August 5. Lingen. — " Conform^ment a ce que je vous 
ai marque dans ma derniere, je suis parti de Berlin le 29 du 
mois passe, pour me rendre a Lingen, ou je suis arrive avant hier 
au soir. A mon passage a Brunswic, ou j'ai passe quelques 
momens avec le Due, j'ai eu occasion de me convaincre que la 
tournure que les negotiations avec les Cours de Petersbourg et 
de Londres avoient prise I'avoient profondement affiige, et qu'il 
etoit penetre de tout ce que cette conduite renfermoit de peu 
honorable pour la monarchie Prussienne. Ce que le due m'a dit 
ace sujet m'a persuade entierement qu'il n'a eu aucune parte 
directe a la determination du Roi, et qu'il regrette vivement de 
voir ce monarque adopter un systeme qui ne pent qu'affoiblir 
la gloire et I'iniluence dont la Prusse est en droit de jouir. 
Les informations qu'on m'a donnees a mon arrivee ici relativement 
a I'interieur de la R^publique continuent a depeindre les 
dispositions des habitans comme tres bonnes, et n'indiquent pas 
que le Gouvernement fasse de grands efforts pour opposer de la 
resistance aux troubles qui pourront eclater a I'approche d'une 
force ennemie. II y a eu dans la nuit du premier au second de 
ce mois quelques mouvemens dans la province du Groningue, 
mais de peu de consequence, et qui n'ont point eu de suite. Je 
n'ai point encore re^u de nouvelles de M. V^an de Spiegel, mais 
a mon arrivee ici. Ton m'a assure qu'il avoit et6 atteint, il y a 3 
ou 4 semaines, d'une attaque d'apoplexie; j'ai tout lieude croire 
cependant que c'est un faux bruit, personne n'ayant rien appris 
d'ulterieur a son sujet. 

" J'ai trouve ici M. de Suyderas; M. de Rhoon, et son frere M. 
Charles Bentinck, y sont arrives hier ; ces messieurs repartent 
probablement demain pour Varel," 



245 

[Enclosuir.l 

Memoire sur l'insurrection du Brabant. 

"On a pour la Campere un chef ^tabli a Lommel, dans la 
mairie de Bois le Due, appelle Klerke, qui dit pouvoir disposer 
de 4,000 hommes, et, avec le terns, de beaucoup d'avantage. II y 
a I'espoir assure de sa part d'avoir 7,000 fusils a raison de 
6 florins d'Hollande par piece, autant de poudre qu'il voudra a 
raison de 30 sols d'Hollande la livre, une imprimerie a raison de 
1,000 florins. 

" On demande pour chaque recrue 1 couronne de Brabant; pour 
paye du fantassin 1 escalin de Brabant, pour le cavalier 1^ 
escalin de Brabant par jour ; les bas officiers payes comme en 
Hollande. 

"M. Martens s'engage d'insurger le Brabant. Les Braban9ons, 
Flamands, ne se leveront en masse que quand ils se verront 
soutenus par des troupes etrangeres, dont le nombre soit respec- 
able, et qui aportent du canon, des obus, des munitions, 40,000 
fusils. 

" On a pres de Bruges un camp de 6,000 Francois ; sur la cote de 
Flandre,y compris ce camp, 8 a 9,000 hommes, pour la plupart 
conscrits. 

"A Lille 700 hommes, a Bergen-op-Zoom 150. D'apres 
les renseignemens, on donnera un plan pour surprendre cette 
ville des qu'on aura des details plus circonstancies et av^r^s. 

"On a etabli une correspondance avec ceux de Flandre, au 
moyen de quoi on sera instruit exactement de I'etat des choses 
dans cette partie-la, et des forces Francaises sur la cote. 

" On s'est dit assure des villes de Louvain, Malines, et Bruxelles ; 
dans Malines il n'y a que 6 ou 7 pieces de canon. 

"On a envoye le long de la cote de Flandre, depuis Bruges 
jusques dans Lille, un arpenteur, ancien militaire qui a travaille 
aux cartes de ferrari ; et qui donnera un rapport d^taille de tout 
ce qu'il y aura d'interessant. 

"On manque de pain dans le Belgique, mais on pourra en 
acheter dans le Lang Straat. On ne doit pas se fier a la ville de 
Gand. 

" Le Gouvernement provisoire de ce pays, durant l'insurrection, 
devrait consister dans le magistrat des villes sans le commandant 
militaire. Mais tout ce qu'on fera provisionnellement. Le point 
de Blankenberg est le plus favorable a une descente pour les 
Anglois ; on a en Angleterre un pilote tres habile — on se 
fait fort d'en fournir un autre, si la flotte Angloise de debarque- 
ment avait besoin. 

" On ne pent pas se flatter d'obtenir des succes dans I'entreprise 
d'insurger ce pays efficacement sans une somme d'argent propor- 
tione aux besoins. On croit qu'il faudrait pour commencer 
400,000 a 500,000 florins pour la Campere et le Brabant. On 
demande dans ce cas un homme charge du poste de commissaire 
ordonnateur, ceux qui se chargeront de la partie militaire ne 
pouvant pas prendre cette comptabilit^ sur eux. 



246 

"II sera tres necessaire de donner aux troupes qui doivent 
soutenir I'msurrection du Brabant, les orders les plus rigoureux 
pour observer une bonne discipline et resj)ecter les proprietes. 

"II sera necessaire pour contenir la populace d'Anvers d'y 
envoyer un regiment d'infanterie et un detachement de cavallerie 
capables d'y maintenir la tranquilite. Objet qui ne peut etre 
rempli que par un commandant sage et ferme ; et qui agisse de 
concert avec les membres les plus marquants de I'ancien 
magistrat ; on devra s'emparer tout de suite de la citadelle. 

"II faudra commencer par y retablir leculte public dans toute 
sa splendeur, comme dans toute la Belgique ; en observant la 
precaution de faire consacrer le local et la ceremonie, et sans rien 
negliger sur ce point tres important. II faut pour I'insurrection 
un chef militaire pleinement autorise, sans quoi les chefs partiels 
ne pouvaient pas agir de concert." 

Nota bene 1. "On sent lanecessite absolue de garder un secret 
religieux sur le nom des personnes ci-dessus nommees, qui 
seraient perdus si on les soup9onnoit seulement. 

Nota bene 2. "On est convenu depuis quelques semaines 
avec les chefs des insurges, qu'ils ne donneront aucune ouverture 
de leurs affaires qu'a ceux qui seront muni de la marque 
convenue avec M. d'Yvoy. 

Nota bene S. " Les Francois envoj^ent vers la Flandres tous 
les prisonniers relaches sur la parole de ne plus servir, et faits 
en Italie." 

William Huskisson to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 5. Downing Street. — "Mr. Huskisson will have 
the honour of forwarding to your Lordship to-morrow the 
additional instructions to Sir Ralph Abercromby founded on 
Mr. Dundas's letter, and also those to Colonel Malcolm, both of 
which have been signed by Mr. Dundas, and are now delivered 
to the respective parties. Colonel Malcolm proceeds to-morrow 
to Yarmouth, on his way to Emerick. With respect to Rottier 
Mr. H [uskisson] has this day sent him down to Walmer with a 
letter explaining his connection with Starhemberg, and 
cautioning Mr. Dundas accordingly. Sir Ralph will get what 
information he can from him, and either take him with him or 
not as he may think proper. 

"Mr. Rottier is not apprised of Colonel Malcolm's mission." 

Henry Dundas to Loud Grenville. 

1799, August 6. Canterbury. — " At the same time you receive 
this, you will get a letter from me to Huskisson conveying to 
you information of the precise state in which we now stand 
regarding our expedition. The battery of Goree secured, of 
which no doubts are entertained, and the Dutch ships removed 
from a situation to annoy or rather prevent the landing at the 
only practicable place, I entertain no apprehensions of our 
ultimate success ; but unless these preliminary points are secured, 



247 

with every disposition I have to be sanguine, I cannot bring 
myself to be confident. As, after all, unsurmountable difficulties 
may arise to prevent success, I don't think it right that Sir 
Ralph Abercrombie should sail without provisional instructions 
founded upon that supposition ; and it appears to me that 
Walcheren and x\meland ought to be the most immediate objects, 
and the Texel the next. Let me, however, hear from you upon 
this subject ; and unless you will come yourself, I wish you 
would commit all your ideas to Huskisson, who would ])ring them 
down to Mr. Pitt and me, and we would do, after consideration of 
the whole, what we think best." 

Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville. 

1799, August 6. Dropmore. — "If it had not been for the two 
lines of postscript which I wrote you by the last mail, I imagine 
you would have been as much disappointed and mortified at 
receiving my letter of that date, as I was when I wrote it. 

"As it is, everything is going on, I am assured, with activity 
and dispatch, and the embarkation is to begin to-day. It will 
not, I trust, be deranged by the account received yesterday by 
the Triton of the combined fleet (40 sail of line) having sailed 
from Cadiz the 20th, while Lord Keith was still, as we fear, 
staring about him off Mahon. His conduct seems perfectly 
unaccountable, but whether he has done right or wrong the 
mischief is done. 

"I suppose Ireland to be the object — probably Brest in the first 
instance — or perhaps they will only go to Rochefort to release 
the Spanish ships there, or to take on board the 4 or 5,000 troops. 
Still, without a more considerable force in troops, they can do us 
no essential mischief, though, to be sure, they will alarm and 
distress us a little before our tardy fleet can arrive from the 
southward. 

"I trust however that this will not alter one iota of our 
measures for the expedition. The Admiralty are, as I under- 
stand, collecting a fleet in Tor bay ; and if it should be necessary 
for that purpose to weaken Lord Duncan I should not think that 
much harm was done, for I have no fear of the Dutch fleet at 
such a moment. The execution of V[an] B[raam]'s promises 
would be invaluable just now% but I do not think they can be 
much relied on. 

"I believe you are too candid towards your friend Haugwitz 
when you suppose the proposal to have been made to them 
through Sandoz. I am confident it originated at Berlin, and our 
accounts of language held by the Elector of Bavaria after his 
conference seem to prove it to be so. 

"I take it for granted that you will see in this circumstance 
ground enough for not immediately signing a treaty on the 
footing which was before in question, supposing that Haugwitz 
should, as is by no means improbable, have alarmed himself or 
his master with the fear of Russian hostility, and should have 
come back on the 24th to cry peccavi. It seems quite necessary 



248 

to make them feel their own isolement a little, though certainly 
without the smallest idea on our part of breaking with them, or 
using anything like hostile conduct or menaces. But as the 
main argument which our adversaries at Berlin have always used 
against us is the certainty that, let Prussia use us ever so ill, our 
money will always be at her disposal whenever she will take it, 
there seems much advantage in proving to them the contrary, 
now that we are strong enough to do so." 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, August 6. Berlin. — " It is unnecessary for me to pursue 
that part of your letter of 30th ultimo which I have just received, 
in which you speak of our Prussian negociation, because you will 
already have known that it has vanished into idle air ; and with 
respect to the Berlin hopes of concert with us for the future 
preservation of Holland, although I certainly think that Prussia 
can furnish to us the most effectual assistance upon this point, 
yet you will see in all that I have lately written how strongly I 
am impressed with a sense of the necessity of setting them at 
defiance upon this subject, in order to bring them down to a 
more just sense of their own isolated situation, and to shew to 
them that, if we treat with them about Holland, it must be as 
upon a point as near to their interests as our own, and not as 
for a grace and favour which we are to purchase by new 
objects of advantage to them. My former letters will like- 
wise, in great degree, furnish already to you my notions respecting 
your new wish to see me linger somewhat longer on my return 
home, and give myself to somewhat more than a mere passage 
from Berlin to Helvoetsluys. All that can fairly belong to the 
great object of the deliverance of Holland, I think myself bound 
by duty not to shrink from, and even without direct authority to 
do so, you will see that I had already determined to act upon that 
principle ; do not therefore imagine that I can hesitate to do 
anything which can fairly be considered as a part of this great 
and important object, nor even that I desire the grace of making 
any ostentatious sacrifice of my own ease and comfort in doing 
so. I should be ashamed to think that I did not better know my 
duty than to express any doubt as to performing any such service 
which could be asked or expected from me. On the other hand, 
as I cannot feel any public obligation upon me beyond the purpose 
of this urgent and important object, when that is accomplished, I 
must fairly say that no motive can induce me to give myself to 
the situation of being English Minister at the Hague, or at any 
other place in any of the four quarters of the globe. While we 
are fighting this battle which to the whole European world sets 
all at stake, I am ready to carry either a conference or a musket 
whenever I can with best effect fire either of them off ; but as it 
is impossible for anybody personally to dislike this diplomatic 
duty so much as I do, I never can feel any obligation to pursue 
it beyond the pressure of this critical period. 



249 

" You know me too well to suspect that in this language I am 
courting sollicitation from government which, God knows, 
there is so little motive for me to seek or them to give ; but I 
speak fairly and plainly in order that you may be sure not to 
mistake me, and that you may know that whenever an English 
ambassador can sit down peaceably at the Hague, I am not that 
man. IHxi. 

*' It seems to me that some effect will be likely to be produced 
here by my going away, because it will shake Haugwiz's confidence 
in my waiting to treat with him; yet till Abercrombie opens a 
way from Goree, or Holland itself opens me a way, I do not well 
see my road there ; perhaps, however, it may be found, and when 
it is I will not miss it." 

Lord Mulgrave to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 6. Harley Street. — "I have just received your 
letter. At twelve o'clock last night Mr. Frere sent me letters for 
the Archduke, Marshal Suwarrow, and General Korsakow, the 
fair copy of my instructions, and a parcel of messenger's 
certificates ; but I have not yet got the cipher, or the copy of the 
dispatch by which his Majesty's officers residing with the armies 
are placed under my orders, or my passport. I will call upon 
Mr. Fr^re this morning, and if I can procure those papers I 
shall set off in the evening. 

" In your letter of the 3rd instant you refer me to Lord Minto's 
instructions. As I only read them over once, previous to any 
discussion of the detail of my mission, I have no distinct idea 
whatever of their contents ; if they should be in any respect 
essential for my guidance, it will be necessary that you shall 
send a copy after me ; if not, I shall confine myself strictly 
within the limits of my instructions." 

H. Fagel to Lord Grenville. 

August 6. London. — " Mr. Hammond delivered to me this 
morning in your Lordship's name a paper respecting the conduct 
of your generals in Holland, which appears to me to be perfectly 
wise and just. I should wish to know whether you would have 
any objection to my communicating it to the Prince and Princess. 
I don't see any myself, but I w^ould not let it go out of my hands 
without your consent, and shall not show it till I hear from you. 

" M. de Heerdt has just now left me, and sets off to-morrow- 
morning early. He is much pleased with his commission, and 
will do, I think, extremely well. 

*' I send you a bulletin from Emerick. I wrote to M. d'Yvoy 
respecting Colonel Malcolm's mission as you had desired me." 

Postscript. " I hope you have been satisfied with the Prince of 
Orange's visit. 

*' Since writing this Mr. Hammond has informed me of your 
intention with respect to the hrouillon of the despatch to Sir 
Ealph Abercromby. I shall therefore wait to communicate it to 
the Prince till I receive it in its complete state. I thought I 
might as well send this note to your Lordship as destroy it." 



250 

H. Fagel to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 7. London. — "I am very much pleased with the 
idea of sending to the Hague the sort of summons contained in 
the paper which Mr. Hammond shewed me this morning by your 
desire. It can do no harm and will in all probability do much 
good. It strikes me that the hint M. d'Yvoy gives on that 
subject agrees with a passage in a letter from one of my brothers, 
of which I communicated an extract to you a few days ago. As 
to the terms of the message I have no remark whatever to make. 
M. de Heerdt is, I suppose, by this time with Sir R. x\bercromby." 

Postscrijit. "I see by the French papers that the rulers in 
Holland begin to grow evidently uneasy." 

The Earl of Elgin to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 7. Downing Street. — *' The account of Duke 
Hamilton's death having reached London, I beg leave to remind 
your Lordship of the application I have had the honour of 
making to succeed to the green ribbon which is vacated Ijy this 
event. The very kind manner in which you attended to this 
wish, when I mentioned it to you, encourages me to hope for 
your protection and good offices on the present occasion. And I 
flatter myself that you will be of opinion that, if I had the good 
fortune of receiving this mark of distinction at this time, it would 
be a very suitable decoration in the ceremonious representations 
which I am to make on entering upon my present embassy. 

"Lord Spencer will not allow the Plueton to sail till further 
accounts arrive of the grand fleets. And this delay will afford 
time for his Majesty's decision in regard to this ribbon, in case 
your Lordship would have the goodness of recommending me 
now for the vacancy." 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, August 7. Berlin. — " I cannot forward to you the 
important communication from Dresden of the surrender of 
Mantua, without congratulating you most heartily upon it. With 
Turin, Alexandria and Mantua, the success in Italy has acquired 
a consistency which in that quarter sets at defiance all future 
chances for this campaign, and, I hope, for more than this 
camj^aign. It is very probable that you may have a Vienna 
courier specially charged with this news, but I like to provide 
against all accidents, and therefore, at all events, I hurry on from 
Berlin by estafctte what I have just received by cstafette from 
Dresden. 

' ' By the same channel you will find it confirmed that on the 
11th at Madrid nothing was known except an Alicant letter which 
announced the sailing of the combined fleets from Carthagena, 
but does not give much alarm of their having passed the 
Str eights. 



251 

"I have received a letter from Mr. Darell to desire application 
to be made to the Prussian Government for permission to 
purchase oats from East Friesland, the exportation of which 
is now forbidden ; I have sent for answer that immediate appli- 
cation will be made by Mr. Garlike, and the result will be 
communicated to Mr. Darell. Mr. B. Watson would do well to 
buy his oats under the Imperial protection which I have already 
hinted to you ; for there he would be sure of the assistance which 
is to be solicited here. 

"We have wind and rain and storms, but we have Alexandria 
and Mantua." 

Lord Grenville to Lord Mulgrave. 

1799, August 7. Downing Street. — " His Majesty having been 
pleased to charge your Lordship with a special mission for the 
l)urpose of concerting the military operations to be carried on 
for the further prosecution of the war against the common enemy, 
I have the honour to enclose to your Lordship letters for his 
lioyal Highness the Archduke Charles, for Marshal Suwarrow, 
and for General Korsakof, in which the object of your mission is 
described, and those generals are apj^rized that full credit is to 
be given to whatever you shall say or conclude on his Majesty's 
part. 

' Your Lordship will in the first instance proceed to the head- 
quarters of his Royal Highness the Archduke. As your Lord- 
ship's mission has been determined upon in consequence of a 
proposal from the Austrian Government, and has been notified 
at Vienna, it is hoped that you will find his Royal Highness 
sufficiently instructed and empowered to enter with you into the 
discussion of matters to be arranged ; and even if that should not 
be the case, it will still be proper that you should express a desire 
to enter upon this discussion, provisionally, with the person who 
is to be charged with so principal a share in the execution of 
whatever may be settled, either there or at Vienna. The know- 
ledge which both Mr. Wickham and Lieutenant-Colonel Craufurd 
possess of the character of the different persons in his Royal 
Highness' s confidence, will be of great use to you on this 
occasion. 

"The subsidized Russian force of 45,000 men in his Majesty's 
pay is by this time probably arrived on the Swiss frontier, or in 
its neighbourhood. The dispositions which the Emperor of 
Russia has manifested for the common cause, and the instructions 
with which he has charged General Korsakoft' are such as leave 
little doubt that this officer will be found perfectly ready to 
co-operate with your Lordship in everything which may promote 
his Majesty's views for the success of the war. 

" It is, however, now agreed between his Majesty and the two 
Imperial Courts that, when the French shall have been expelled 
from Italy, an event which the recent successes there seem to 
place at no great distance, the whole of the Russian troops should 
be placed under the command of Field Marshal Suwarrow. 



252 

"It must therefore be left to your Lordship's discretion to 
judge whether the execution of his Majesty's commands will best 
be promoted by your remaining at the Archduke's headquarters, 
and corresponding from thence with his Majesty's officers 
stationed with the other armies who are, as your Lordship 
will observe by the enclosed copy of a dispatch to each of them, 
placed under your Lordship's orders, or whether you should 
occasionally repair to the headquarters of those armies, or even 
to Vienna. In that case Lord Minto will present you to M. de 
Thugut, as charged by his Majesty with the discussion and 
arrangement of the business in question. He will, I am certain, 
heartily co-operate in everything which can contribute to its 
success, and he will be instructed, with that view, to communicate 
to your Lordship unreservedly the state of the political negotia- 
tions in which his Majesty may at that time be engaged at 
Vienna. 

"In your way to the Archduke's headquarters your Lordship 
will pass through Berlin, where Mr. Grenville will, in like 
manner, be instructed to communicate with you. 

"As the object of your Lordship's mission is to concert the 
future military operations in the direction of which his Majesty 
is so much concerned from his having at his disposal, by virtue 
of the treaty of subsidy, the whole of the Russian force now under 
General Korsakow, it may be proper that I should begin the 
instructions which his Majesty has commanded to be given for 
the regulation of your Lordshii)'s conduct in that discussion, by 
an enumeration of the force which, as it is supposed, may now 
be applicable to those operations. 

" The Archduke's army, including Bellegarde's, which however 
has always been detached from it, and is now in Italy, was at the 
opening of the campaign stated at 100,000 men. 

" The Italian army did not probably much exceed 60 or 70,000, 
exclusive of Rosenberg's corps of Russians which were called 
22,000. 

"Rhebinder's corps of Russians, which is on its march to 
Italy, is called 12,000, but by the last accounts from Vienna and 
Petersburg it appears that this corps is to march to Naples. It 
is not therefore to be reckoned upon in this enumeration, though 
some use may possibly hereafter be made of it, particularly by 
embarking it on board the British fleet if any operation should 
be directed against the south of France. 

" Korsakow's corps, now on its march to Switzerland, is called 
45,000 men, and Colonel Ramsay, who has seen a part of these 
troops, expresses himself highly satisfied with their quality and 
composition. His account, however, and those received from 
different quarters, give room to expect a considerable deficiency 
in these numbers, but proper instructions will be given to Sir 
Charles Whit worth and Colonel Ramsay to ascertain this point 
with precision. 

" Colonel Craufurd had not, by the last account, made any 
considerable progress in the levy of Swiss troops. His instructions 
would go to raising 20,000 men, and as there is now great reason 



258 

to hope that the Court of Vienna will be induced to adopt a 
proper line of policy respecting the internal settlement of that 
country, and especially as that point will now, in great degree, 
l)e left to be arranged by the llussian army, and in conformity to 
Mr. Wickham's suggestions, it may not be difficult to raise as 
many as 10 or 15,000 men ; though even then a fresh embarass- 
ment will arise as to their being induced to serve out of their 
own country. 

*' A body' of (),000 Wirtemberg troops has been offered to the 
King, and there is little doubt that the conditions of service which 
the King has required will be complied with by the Duke. 

"It is also positively stated by the last accounts that the 
Elector of Bavaria is to join his troops to the Austrian or Russian 
army ; but this article is still too uncertain to be reckoned upon 
with confidence. 

"Without taking this into account, it seems safe to consider — 

1. "The Austrian army in Italy at 50,000 men, capable of 
being augmented by Piedmontese and other ItaHan troops to nearly 
twice that amount, if it were necessary to incur that expense. 

2. " The Piussian force, exclusive of Rhebinder's corps, if all 
united, and if reinforced by the Swiss and Wirtembergers, at 
70,000 men. (Thus: Korsakow, 40,000; Rosenberg, 15,000; 
Wirtemberg, 5,000 ; Swiss, 10,000-70,000). 

3. " The Archduke's army at 60,000 men ; this calculation 
appears, however, to be put rather too high. In his conversa- 
tions with Mr. Wickham, the Archduke assured that gentleman 
that Massena had at least 20,000 more infantry than he had ; 
and Mr. Wickham does not put Massena's at more than from 
50 to 60,000 men ; probably therefore the Archduke's superiority 
in cavalry, and even the reinforcements of 13,000 men which he 
has since received under General Haddick, will not carry his army 
up to 60,000 men ; and he may still have to incur the risks of at 
least one battle before the enemy is driven out of Switzerland. 

" The British force, which his Majesty has been pleased to 
direct to be now assembled, amounts to 12,000 men ; to this will 
be added a second division of infantry probably of equal force, 
and a body of cavalry of 6,000 men ; or even more will be sent 
as occasion shall require. The Emperor of Russia has engaged 
himself to furnish 18,000 men for the same object, of which 
number 10,000 were to embark at Revel on the 26th of July. 

"This force maybe confidently taken as sufficient to ensure 
the recovery of Holland, provided that the French are so 
occupied in other quarters as to prevent their marching a very 
large army to the support of the present government in the 
United Provinces. His Majesty's expectations of success in this 
enterprise do not, therefore, depend on the co-operation of 
Prussia, though he has at difterent periods had reason to expect it. 

"The dispositions and conduct of the Court of Berlin must 
still, however, be considered as very doubtful, and this circum- 
stance offers the greatest difficulty that is to be encountered in 
the arrangement of any plan of military operations on the 
Continent. 



254 

" A disposition had been expressed at Berlin to negotiate with 
his Majesty for a subsidy, in consideration of which the King of 
Prussia was to have engaged in immediate operations for the 
dehverance of Holland ; and although the accomplishment of 
this object seemed to be in a great degree secured by the exten- 
sive preparations which I have described above, yet the 
advantage appeared so great of placing Prussia in a line of open 
hostility against France that his Majesty had resolved to 
encourage that negotiation, and to authorize its conclusion on the 
grounds above stated, provided that satisfactory explanations 
could have been obtained respecting the subsequent employment 
of the troops so subsidized, after the first object, that of the 
deliverance of Holland, had been accomplished. 

" Some of the conditions, however, which were demanded by 
the Prussian Government in the course of these discussions, 
appeared to be either in themselves impracticable, or at least to 
lead to such delay as might defeat the main object in question ; 
and the whole spirit of the negotiation was such, on the part of 
that Court, as to inspire no very confident expectation of active 
and zealous co-operation ; though such a state of things might 
perhaps have been obtained as would have justified the expense 
to be incurred on the part of this country. 

" This negotiation, however, has recently been broken off by 
an intimation on the part of the Prussian Minister of an intended 
negotiation between his Prussian Majesty and the French 
Directory, for the peaceable evacuation of Holland. 

" By Mr. Grenville's despatch of the 23rd ultimo, it is still left 
in some degree doubtful whether this measure would be persisted 
in at Berlin ; but, at all events, the communication already made 
must greatly diminish even that degree of confidence which could 
before be placed in the intentions of that Court. 

'' On your arrival at Berlin, you wdll learn from Mr. Grenville 
w^hat may then be the actual state of these discussions ; they may 
ultimately much affect the success of the operations to be pursued 
in other quarters, and in that respect are very important to the 
conduct and progress of your Lordship's mission. 

" It had not, however, been in his Majesty's contemplation 
that, after the deliverance of Holland, and perhaps of the country 
between the Meuse and the Lower Pihine, any offensive opera- 
tions should be allotted to the Prussian army. His Majesty's 
idea had been that, w^hen these points had been accomplished, 
his own forces and the auxiliary Russians serving with them 
should endeavour to occupy the Netherlands ; while the Prussian 
troops, supported either by a further body of Russians, agreeably 
to the demand of the Court of Berlin, or by a body of Hessian and 
Saxon troops, to be supported at the expense of the countries so 
recovered and defended, should occupy a defensive position from 
Mayence to the Dutch frontier, and should block, or, if necessary, 
besiege Ehrenbreitstein and Mayence. 

"The want of this link in the line of defence may be pro- 
ductive of considerable embarrassment to the projected plan of 
operations ; especially as the Court of Vienna appears to take so 



255 

strong an interest in this point that M. Thugut has ah'eady ex- 
pressed to his Majesty's minister at Vienna a desire that, after 
the arrival of General Korsakow's army on the Swiss frontier, 
that of the Archduke should he drawn off to undertake the siege 
of Mayence, and to penetrate next year into the Netherlands. 

"This difficulty does not, however, vary the plan which his 
Majesty is pleased to direct that your Lordship should, in the 
first instance, propose to the Archduke. 

** The main ohject of that plan is that the Russian army under 
Marshal Buwarrow, aided hy the Swiss and Wirtemherg troops, 
should, after the recovery of Switzerland, penetrate to Lyons, so 
as to occupy that city in force, and to take a proper military 
position in the adjacent provinces hefore the winter, in order 
that the standard of the French monarchy may he erected there 
under the Comte D'Artois, and that the experiment may he fairly 
tried whether the dispositions of the country are such as to make 
it safe for the allies to attempt in the spring to penetrate further 
into the country, and even to undertake operations in the direc- 
tion of the capital itself. And although the main army might, 
after so fatiguing a campaign, be allowed to take up its winter 
quarters at Lyons, or on such line as should be chosen for the 
purpose, yet that a sufficient body should be kept in activity to 
support any exertions of the Royalists in the neighbouring 
provinces. 

" This plan you will consider as the principal object to w^hich 
your attention is to be directed ; and all the other points which 
are adverted to in this letter, are to be regarded as secondary 
and subordinate to it, and liable to be varied as may best con- 
duce to its attainment. 

*' It is obvious, on the first view of the statement of the allied 
force, that this enterprise cannot be undertaken by Marshal 
Su war row alone with the force supposed to be placed under his 
command, and without co-operation from the other armies. If, 
therefore, the principal object above stated should be approved at 
Vienna, as it has already in great degree at Petersburgh, the 
mode of such co-operation from one or both those armies wall 
immediately become the subject of your discussions with the 
persons with w^hom you have to treat. 

" In the arrangement of this point, his Majesty is pleased to 
leave it to your Lordship's discretion to agree in his Majesty's 
name to any plan which shall appear to you to be reasonably 
well-adapted to the circumstances of the case, even though it 
w^ere not the best which might be formed ; and which Marshal 
Suwarrow shall himself judge sufficient for the protection and 
support of the advancing army to be placed under his orders ; 
without which it cannot be expected that he should undertake 
such an enterprise. Your Lordship's utmost exertions and 
address must therefore be employed in facilitating the discusssion 
of this subject, and in bringing forward to consideration, as 
distinctly and as accurately as possible, the various questions on 
which it must depend ; and particularly in softening the jealousies 
and animosities which have already manifested themselves 



256 

between the Eussian and Austrian troops, and which, it is to 
be feared, may affect the mutual communications of their com- 
manders. 

" The consideration of this last circumstance makes it 
extremely desirable that the Kussian and Austrian troops 
should be employed in distinct armies, separated from each 
other, though acting on a well-combined plan of mutual support. 

" The operation which was first proposed by M. Thugut, as 
proper in this view to be allotted to the Archduke's army, was 
that of the sieges of Huningue and Belfort, and it is much to be 
regretted that any other idea has since been preferred at Vienna. 

'' The proposal of the siege of Mayence cannot in any manner 
be considered as a substitute for it; the success of that opera- 
tion could afford no direct assistance to the progress of an army 
in Franche Comte or Danphiny; and it is highly improbable that 
the Directory, neglecting the immediate danger of an army 
advancing upon Lyons, would detach any considerable portion 
of their force to the relief of Mayence. The seige of that place 
would not, therefore, assist the main operation either as an 
immediate support, or as a diversion. And it is evident that, in 
the present comparative state of force, the enterprise against 
Lyons must be relinquished as too hazardous to be undertaken, 
if the Archduke's army should be drawn off to Mayence, and 
unless very great assistance be in that case afforded by the 
Italian army. 

''If the negotiation with Prussia shall still succeed, notwith- 
standing the unfortunate appearances of the present moment, 
it will be easy for your Lordship to prove unanswerably that the 
defence of the part of Germany adjoining to Mayence will be 
so completely provided for by those arrangements as to supersede 
the necessity for the march of an Austrian army to that quarter ; 
and the course of that negotiation seems as well calculated as 
the nature of the situation will allow, to obviate any jealousy of 
Prussian interference in the affairs of the Netherlands. The 
intention being, as I have already stated, that no more should be 
required of the Pi'ussians than to take a position from Mayence 
to Cleves, and to provide either by their own force, or with the aid 
of Russian or Saxon or Hessian troojjs, for the defence of that line 
and for the blockade or sieges of Mayence or Ehrenbreitstein. 

" It is true that even this disposition may create jealousy on 
the part of the Austrians, especially if the course of events 
should lead to any enterprise of his Majesty's troops on the side 
of the Netherlands ; should this be the case any such uneasiness 
can be obviated only by expressions of the most earnest desire 
on his Majesty's part to come to a full understanding with the 
Court of Vienna on this and on every other point of discussion 
as to the present state of Europe ; and by proving to that Court 
that the deliverance of the Netherlands cannot be accomplished 
by any effort of the Austrian troops in the course of the present 
year, and that the interests of Austria are as much concerned as 
those of his Majesty in the speedy explusion of the French from 
those provinces. 



257 

" If the negotiation with the Court of Berlin shall have totally 
failed, your Lordship's endeavours must still be used to induce 
the Austrians to disregard the danger of any French incursion 
into Germany on the side of Mayence, and to pursue l)y active 
co-operation with the Russian army, that plan of operations 
which seems to afford the best hope of a speedy and decisive 
success ; such as would ensure to the allies the conclusion of a 
peace on terms honourable to themselves, and productive of 
permanent security to Europe. 

" The best line of such co-operation, as far as relates to the 
Archduke's army, appears, as I have already stated, to be that of 
Huningue and Belfort ; the reduction of which places might also 
be reasonably expected to be followed by that of Besancon, if the 
season of the year shall not be too far advanced to allow time 
for it. 

"But I have already apprized your Lordship that, in a case 
w'here so many different proposals may be made which can not 
even be foreseen, much less decided upon in all their details at 
this distance, his Majesty leaves to your Lordship a discretion 
as to the best steps which can be taken in concert for executing 
the main enterprize, that of the reduction and occupation of 
Lyons, and of such part of the adjoining provinces as may be 
necessary for a military position during the winter. 

" With respect to the co-operation to the southward, this may 
be considered under two different points of view ; first, in the 
case of a positive and final refusal of the Austrians to afford any 
active co-operation on the right flank of the Russians; and 
secondly, in the event of the adoption of his Majesty's proposal 
respecting the Archduke's army, or of any other plan which may, 
either fully, or at least in some reasonable degree, provide for the 
same object. 

" In the first case a much greater degree of co-operation to the 
south must be required, in order to enable the Russians them- 
selves to undertake such operations as might be necessary to 
cover the right flank of the advancing army. Rosenberg's corps, 
which is now in Italy, would therefore probably in that case be 
employed to more advantage if, being still under the orders of 
Marshal Suwarrow, it were, however, not joined to his main 
army, but were kept on his left flank ; supposing that the main 
army itself could, in that event, be strengthened by Swiss and 
German troops ; and, in this manner, the operations to the 
southward, instead of being confined to the sieges of Brian9on 
and Fort Barreaux, might be so far extended as that a part of 
the main attack on Lyons itself should be directed from Cham- 
berry and Grenoble. 

"In the second case, that of a sufficient co-operation to the 
northward, the occupation of the two places above-mentioned 
may be sufficient for the object which is in view, unless 
it should be found that the subsistence of the advancing 
army would be better secured by dividing the attack ; a measure 
which it would otherwise appear very desirable to avoid if 
possible. 

6802 B 



258 

" These ideas relate to the supposition of the different cases in 
which the operation against Lyons shall be judged practicable, 
and they seem to include all the different modes in which that 
plan can be pursued. 

"Another case may, however, arise in which, from the total 
failure of all co-operation to the northward, and on a full con- 
sideration of the means of acting to the southward, it shall be 
judged that the enterprize of Lyons is one which can not be 
undertaken this year, with a reasonable prospect of success. 

" Your Lordship will perceive from what I have already stated 
that this is a decision which his Majesty would very much 
regret, though he is aware that it may, under some circum- 
stances, become indispensably necessary. In that event it would 
probably be less urgent to agree to the other ideas which might 
be brought forward, and your Lordship would, in all probability, 
have an opportunity of transmitting to me the detail of any such 
plans for his Majesty's final decision. It would, however, be 
desirable that, in this event, the attention of those with whom 
you treat should be drawn to the means of taking up such 
positions on the frontiers as would most conduce to open a com- 
munication during the winter with the provinces of France 
which I have already mentioned, and with Provence ; and as 
would facilitate the undertaking the operation against Lyons in 
the spring. 

"Your Lordship will keep me constantly informed of the 
course and progress of the negotiations in which you are 
engaged, and you will occasionally correspond with his Majesty's 
ministers at Berlin, Vienna, and Petersburgh ; for which purpose 
your Lordship is furnished with the cipher H. from the Office, 
which must however, on account of the peculiar circumstances 
of a military mission, be sparingly used; and which you are 
never to expose to the danger of falling into the enemy's hands, 
but to destroy it on any occasion of danger. 

"Your Lordship will on all occasions communicate fully and 
unreservedly with Mr. Wickham, his Majesty's minister in 
Switzerland, on everything that relates to the business in which 
you are engaged. The long attention he has given to the subject, 
and his knowledge of the dispositions both of the Austrians and 
the Swiss will, I am persuaded, render his suggestions highly 
useful to you ; and, in the event of the occupation of Lyons, and 
of any forward movement in France, it is probable that his 
Majesty will avail himself of his services in that country, and 
will direct him to assist the Count D'Artois with such suggestions 
and advice as it may be desirable to offer in his Majesty's name." 
Copy. 

W. Garthshore to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 8. Manchester Square. — " I have the honour 
of informing your Lordship that I arrived in town this morning, 
after a very tedious voyage from Cruxhaven. I have delivered 
to Mr. Hammond the dispatch from Mr. Hailes, which he will 



I 



269 

probably forward to your Lordship by this post. I should have 
had the honour of delivering it myself, but that I understood 
your Lordship was not at Dropmore. I feel a very sanguine 
hope that your Lordshij) will not disapprove of the resolution I 
took — very much with the advice of Mr. Hailes — to return home. 
Little, or rather nothing, was to be done at Stockholm, and I 
thought it much better to return at once to England, to represent 
to you the real state of things, and to receive your Lordship's 
instructions, if you thought it necessary that any other should 
be given. 

" I firmly believe that nothing can influence the King of 
Sweden to have any direct communication with England, upon 
terms short of the restitution of the convoy ; and your Lordship 
is fully aware that his opinion is not likely to be influenced in 
any way by those who are about him. I shall not now detain 
you upon this subject, but shall be happy to endeavour to give 
you any information in my power, when I have the honour of 
seeing you. 

" I have only to repeat the hope that you will have the good- 
ness to attribute my return to the real cause, the idea that it 
might do more good than my remaining at Stockholm possibly 
could do." 

The Hereditary Prince of Orange to the Prince of Orange. 

1799, August 8. Lingen. — " Les informations suivantes sont 
les dernieres qu'on a obtenues sur les pr^paratifs que se font 
dans la Kepublique. Le general Brune, charge du commande- 
ment general des trouppes tant Francoises que Bataves, a fait 
une tournee sur les frontieres du Braband pour y examiner les 
moyens de defense. II a fait des dispositions a Grave, et fait 
mettre cette place en etat de defense par un ingenieur Francois, 
qui y derige les travaux. De Grave il s'est rendu a Bois le Due, 
qui sera ravitaille pour trois mois, et ou on a deja commence 
a former des inondations qui s'avancent deja de tres pres 
de la ville. II doit passer ensuite dans les provinces d'Over- 
yssel, de Groningue, et de Frise. Cette nomination donne 
beaucoup de mecontentement a Daendels, qui s'oppose forte- 
ment a I'envoi des Bataves au Rhin, et veut les garder dans 
I'interieur. Les nouveaux ouvrages aux quels on travaille au 
Grebbe sont executes d'apres les plans du general du Moulin ; 
c'est I'ingenieur Van der Tlaat qui est charge de la direction de 
tous les ouvrages depuis le departement du Wael jusqu'au 
Zuyder Zee ; cet officier sert par n^cessite, on le dit aujourd'hui 
fort bien dispose. A Doesburg les Francois travaillent a des 
ouvrages centre I'avis des ingenieurs Bataves, qui les regardent 
comme inutiles et fort dispendieux. Les batimens Francois qui 
etoient a Flessingue, out mis a la voile pour Nieuport et 
Dunquerque, et le vaisseau arme IVdlclieren est parti pour 
Br ouwer shaven. II est question (dit-on) de mettre Bergen op 
Zoom en etat de siege, et il est deja arrive 3 batimens charges de 
munitions. Au Viene-brug les ordres ont 6t6 envoyes de la Haye 
de suspendre les ouvrages qui y avoient et0 commences. 



260 

" II paroit, non obstant ces informations, que le Gouvernement 
Batave ne se prepare pas a opposer une grande resistance en cas 
d'attaqne. II est tres probable meme qu'on tachera d'entrer en 
accommodement afin d'obtenir une bonne capitulation. En 
attendant, on est fort allarme dans tout le pays des bruits qui se 
repandent de tous cotes d'une prochaine invasion enemie ; c'est 
ce qui a donne lieu a la resolution prise de charger Brune de la 
defense generale, de mettre en execution, et de prendre des 
mesures de precaution dans I'interieur. 

" Mon arriv^e dans ces quartiers n'a jusqu'ici donn6 lieu a 
aucun desordre dans I'interieur. Dans la nuit du premier au 
second de ce mois il y a ici des mouvemens dans I'oldampt dans 
la province de Groningue, occasionn^s par les requisitions. 
Les paysans se sont armes, et se sont avances contre les 
trouppes envoy^es de la ville de Groningue pour les 
souniettre. II y a eu a cette occasion quelques hassards 
de tu6s et de pris, mais la chose n'a point eu de suite, 
et a fort heureusement et6 appaisee a temps, de sorte que 
la tranquilite est parfaitement retablie. Francois Fagel est 
venu a Emmerick voir Yvoy. II a fait parvenir la lettre a Van 
Braam par le beau-frere de celui-ci, n'ayant pas voulu la lui 
remettre en personne de crainte de le compromettre, II a 
rapporte a Fagel, que Van Braam ne faisant rien sans Cappelle, 
qui 6toit absent, il ne pouvoit prendre aucune determination 
definitive ; que la sortie du Texel etoit sujette a des difficultes, 
mais que, d'ailleurs, les batteries situ6es au Helder ne g^neroient 
gueres, et cela en partie parcequ'il suppose que si de terre on 
voit appareiller les vaisseaux, personne ne doutera que ce ne 
soit en consequence d'un ordre du Gouvernement. Van Braam 
n'est pas sur si tous les officiers de sa flotte se preteront a 
executer son project. Waldeck est le seul capitaine au 
quel il comptait en parler ; du moment ou Cappelle 
seroit de retour, celui-ci repond entierement de son vaisseau. 
Van Braam lui-meme n'est pas aime de son Equipage, ce qu'il 
attribue a son premier officier qui est mauvais. Le billet 
ci- joint, ecrit de sa propre main, prouve qu'il desire que Ton ne 
mette point de precipitation dans la chose, et qu'on le laisse 
maitre de choisir le moment favorable. Comme il est question 
de quinze jours dans ce billet, et qu'il est d'une date assez vielle, il 
est probable qu'on ne tardera pas a apprendre que le project a 
6t6 execute. 

"Yvoy et Tuyll sont venu ici avant hier; d'apres les informa- 
tions qu'ils donnent il paroit que I'emigration dans la Belgique 
augmente journellement, et que les Francois mettent tout en 
oeuvre pour d'arreter; ils prennent a c^t effet toutes les 
precautions imaginables, en mettant des entraves au passages du 
Khin et de la Meuse. Des lettres particulieres de Vienne, ecrites 
par des personnes de marque, et addressees a des individus dans 
le Brabant, annoncent positivement qne I'Empereur renonce a la 
Belgique ; une seule dit que cette renonciation s'est faite en 
faveur de 1' Archduc Joseph qui epouse une princesse Kusse. Les 
principaux membres des Etats de Brabant sont fort portes pour une 



261 

reunion ; on s'occupe dans ce moment a sonder quelques individus 
preponderans en Flandres et dans le Limbourg, mais en g6n6ral 
on peut assurer que la majority dans toutes les classes la desire. 

" Le chef des Beiges compte sur I'assistance de 20,000 hommes 
qui pourroient se lever en masse dans la campine ; on a eu soin de 
lui faire dire de ne rien presser et de ne pas trop s'avancer. En 
attendant, il desire vivement que I'^tat d'incertitude dans le quel 
on se trouve, r^lativement au moyens qu'on auroit de les 
soutenir, puisse bientot cesser. Effectivement une diversion 
bien dirigee dans les Pays-bas produiroit dans ce moment 
le plus grand effet ; et je desire vivement que Ton se 
decide bientot a ce sujet en Angleterre, parceque a la longue il 
sera impossible de les contenter avec de simples promesses de 
secours. Dans I'intervalle j'ai autorise Yvoy, avec le consente- 
ment de M. Grenville, d'accorder des sommes partielles et 
modiques pour I'achat de fusils et d'autres armes. Je vous 
envoye ci-jointe la copie du memoire de Tuyll auquel je me refere. 
II est retourn^ a Emmerick avec Yvoy, ou ils doivent avoir dans 
quelques jours d'ici une nouvelle conference avec le chef en 
question, du r^sultat de la quelle j 'attends un rapport qui sera 
envoye sur le champ en Angleterre, et qui donnera, j'espere, des 
renseignemens tout-a-fait circonstanci^s. 

" M. de Rhoon, son frere Charles, et M. M. Van der Haar et 
Humalda sont venus ici hier pour faire un rapport de ce qui 
avoit 6te fait dans les provinces de Groningue et de Frise. lis 
garantissent un succes complet au moment de I'explosion. 
Ces Messieurs ont commence par faire des difificultes sur I'article 
de la proclamation relatif a I'amnestie, et surtout aux exceptions 
qu'on desiroit y faire d'Irhoven, Van Dam, Blaauw, et des quatre 
personnes qui ont signes le traite d'alliance avec la R^publique 
Francoise, alleguant que, pour n'en rester qu'a la province de 
Frise seule, il y avoit d'autres individus tout aussi coupables, 
qui 6chapperoient de cette maniere ; que ce seroit un moyen 
infaillible d'exciter des vengeances personelles, et que les excep- 
tions etant bornees aux personnes susdites, cela pourroit 
occasionner un mecontentement general. Apres de longues 
discussions je suis enfin convenu avec eux (et je crois effective- 
ment que c'est la meilleure maniere de reunir toutes les opinions 
sur cet objet qui est d'une nature fort delicate) que la procla- 
mation se borneroit a declarer que je tacherais d'obtenir une 
amnestie generale, en excluant toutefois ceux qui ne 
coopereroient point et mettroient des entraves au retablisse- 
ment du Gouvernement legitime. Cette tournure que Humalda 
avoit proposee, ayant et6 goutee par Van der Haar et ces autres 
messieurs, je m'y suis tenu. II paroit que Rhoon n'ajusqu'ici 
presque rien fait relativement a I'organisation de la province 
d'Hollande, et que ses correspondances dans la plus part des villes 
y sont fort bornees. II m'a entretenu fort au long de son pro jet 
d'etre place a la tete des bourgeoisies, et de ceux des habitans qui 
seroient enclins a prendre les armes, et de son d^sir d'avoir une 
direction generale ; il voudroit a cet effet obtenir une autorisation 
de ma part que je n'ai pas juge devoir lui donner telle qu'il la 



•262 

souhaitoit. Van der Haar desireroit une direction sembable dans 
les provinces de Groningue et de Frise, en se reservant la faculte 
de substituer dans la premiere de ces provinces le Drossard 
Guichard. J'ai repondu que, provisionellement, je ne pouvois 
rien fixer apres les lettres que j'ai recues hier d'Angleterre, mais 
que je ne m'opposerais point a un tel plan pour autant que ceux 
qui auroient une pareille direction agissent de concert et sous les 
ordres des officiers commandans, et que je voulois me reserver la 
faculte de nommer d'autres personnes dans le meme but. 

" Yvoy a eu une entrevue avec Van Straalen du Noordhollande. 
Celui-ci lui a communique ses idees au sujet des premiers 
changemens a faire au moment de la revolution. Son plan tend 
a ce que le gouvernement, auquel on confieroit I'administration 
generale, fut compose d'un conseil de pas moins de 15, et pas 
au-dela de 21 personnes, choisies d'entre celles qui jouissoient 
de la confiance et de la consideration publique ; que ce conseil, 
tire des personnes les plus accreditees des differentes 
provinces, devroit etre nomme sous le titre de Landraad ; 
et qu'on placeroit a la tete de cette assemblee le Prince 
Stadhouder ou le Prince H^reditaire en son nom ; qu'il seroit 
necessaire que les Puissances donnent sous leur nom une 
proclamation en langue Hollandoise dans la quelle il est ordonne 
a toutes les autorites de rester en place, jusqu'a nouvelle dis- 
position d'un Landraad, au quel, provisoirement, sera deferee 
I'autorite souveraine, et cela jusqu'au moment ou la tranquilite 
sera retablie, et la constitution afifermi sur la base de I'union, et 
purgee des abus ; que le temj)s et les circonstances y avoient 
amenes ; que ce conseil invita le Prince Hereditaire a se placer a 
sa tete, et qu'on donneroit ensuite une proclamation plus 
detaillee. Les personnes designees par Van Straalen dans la 
province d'Hollande pour sieger dans cette assemblie sont, entr' 
autres, Boetzelaar de Ky^hock, Marseveen, Calkoen, Pioyer, 
Van Staveren ; on voudroit en exclure Rhoon, Van de 
Speigel, et Repelaar pour eviter le soupcon que ceux-ci ne soyent 
animes par des vengeances personelles. J'ai fait proposer un 
entrevue a Van Straalen, de meme qu'au conseiller Brantson, et 
je me fiatte qu'elle pourra avoir lieu dans quelques jours. 
J'espere egalement pouvoir m'aboucher dans peu avec MoUerus, 
et lui en ai fait faire I'invitation, et j 'attends sa reponse d'un 
jour a I'autre. Comme il est tres probable qu'au moment ou on 
entrera dans le pays, toutes les caisses publiques seront vuides, il 
est essentiel que je suis informe jusqu'a quel point le gouvernement 
Brittannique sera porte a faire les avances, qui seront absolument 
necessaire pour remettre la machine en train, et sur tout pour 
organiser I'armee, dont on aura dans les premiers moments 
un besoin urgent. Ainsi je souhaite ardemment recevoir, le 
plustot possible, les informations necessaires sur cet objet." 

The Vice-Chancellor of Russia to Count de 
Rastoptchin (Chancellor) . 

1799, August 8. St. Petersburgh. — Ayant invite chez moi 
I'ambassadeur de I'Empereur des Romains, je lui ai communique 



263 

la traduction que votre Excellence m'a envoy^e de laleitre duFeld- 
Marechal Comte de SouvoroffRymniksky a aamajeste I'Empereur, 
et j'y ai joint la copie de I'ordre au Comte de Bazoumousky de 
la communiquer a I'Empereur et Roi dans une audience expresse, 
en lui declarant qu'on envoie I'ordre au Feld Marechal, s'il trouve 
les memes difficultes qu'auparavant, de rassembler toutes les 
trouj)es Russes, et d'agir avec elles separement et par lui-meme. 
" J'ai observ6 au Comte Cobenzl que quand je lui avais dit, il y 
a quelque terns, que le Comte Souvoroff n'avait envoye aucune 
plainte ici, je lui avais dit la verite, et que le Marechal s'est 
conduit d'une maniere vraiment digne de sa grandeur d'arme 
[ame]; qu'etant rempli du zele le plus ardent pour la cause 
commune, et desirant eviter tous details desagreables entre les 
deux Cours, il a sacrifie, pour aussi dire, sa gloire en gardant le 
silence autant que possible, tandis qu'on savait ici, par les 
lettres des officiers et autrement, tous les desagremens que ce 
Marechal a subis ; I'envie, pour ne pas dire la haine, que portent 
plusieurs generaux envers les notres, et qui, par le mauvais exemple, 
gagnait I'armee meme ; que lui, I'ambassadeur, pent bien se 
representer que chaque nation doit avoir son ambition et sentir 
sa dignite ; que la Eussie a ete peut-etre blamee de ce c6te-la, 
mais je ne sais pas si c'est avec raison ou non, mais s'il survient 
quelque doute la-dessus, il avouera au moins d'autre cote, en 
parcourant I'histoire, qu'elle a certainement de quoi etre fiere, et 
que par la il pent juger, sans parler de la Cour, combien le public 
meme doit etre indigne de ces partialites vraiment inconcevables, 
et surtout pour ce qui regarde le chef que le public respect 
avec raison audessus de tout ; que I'ambassadeur doit 
etre trop bien informe de tout pour ignorer cela, aussi bien 
que I'etonnement qu'on exprime dans toutes les maisons ou Ton 
entre de ce que dans les papiers publies par la Cour de Vienne il 
n'est jamais question, ou bien on ne fait que tres peu de mention, 
des troupes Russes qui etaient partout en avant, comme pour 
plaire a I'Empereur des Romains, et qui se sont battues d'une 
maniere qui leur est particuliere, et perdaient toujours un grand 
nombre d'hommes. Qu'il doit savoir si son souverain a montre, 
de quelque maniere que ce soit, sa bienveillance envers quelques 
uns des chefs Russes, dont plusieurs sont couverts d'honorables 
blessures ; qu'il peut juger par la que I'impression que cela fait 
n'est pas telle comme I'Empereur la d^sirait ; que je dis tout 
cela de mon propre chef, ayant pour objet le bien des affaires ; 
qu'il connait les j)rincipes et les idees de sa Majeste Imperiale, qui 
sont etrangers a toutes, ruses, et sont fondes sur la seul droiture; 
qu'il faut se conduire envers nous avec bonne foi ; comptant 
sur elle de la part de nos allies, nous n'avons mis aucunes 
bornes ni a notre confiance envers eux, ni a I'emploi de 
tous nos moyens pour les servir ; mais aussitot qu'on n'y 
repond pas, I'ambassadeur jugera lui-meme si on doit 
I'attendre de notre part. Qu'en m'expliquant ainsi avec lui, je 
fais peut-etre une imprudence, et je donne a sa Cour de grands 
avantages ; car a des finesses on doit repondre par des finesses ; 
mais que je lui repete qu'elles ne sont nullement compatibles 



^64 

avec la dignite d'une grande Puissance, et avec le caractere de 
sa Majeste Imperiale. Je lui dis, qu'etant sur ce point, je me 
permettrai encore quelques observations, en I'assurant qu'elles 
sont absolument les miennes. Pourquoi, par exemple, n'a-t-on 
pas souffle le mot, ni ici ni a Vienne, sur I'arrivee dans cette 
derniere capitale de deux couriers Espagnols de Paris a 
I'ambassadeur Catholique, qui ont donne lieu a differentes 
conjectures, et nommement que la Cour de Vienne est entre 
par le moyen de celle de Madrid dans quelques relations secrettes. 

" Le Comte Cobenzl repondit a cette derniere observation, 
qu'autant qu'il s'en souvenait il m'avait informe, et qu'on ne 
pouvait avoir le moindre soup9on de leur sincerite, eux qui nous 
communiquent, pour ainsi dire, tons leurs archives ; que les 
couriers Espagnols avaient ete envoyes avec quelques proposi- 
tions pour le r^tablissement de la bonne harmonie, mais qu'on 
ne s'y etait pas prete, et que les couriers avaient ete renvoyes. 

** Pour ce qui regarde mes autres observations, I'ambassadeur fut 
effraye des mesures pr6scrites au Comte Souveroff. II chercha 
tous les moyens possibles pour refuter les plaintes faites contre 
sa Cour, ou contre les generaux des armees, en me repondant a 
chaque point; sur quoi je trouvais de mon cote des objections en 
les prenant de la maniere de penser du Marechal, et de sa conduite 
fondee sur sa reconnaissance pour la maniere dont on I'avait 
re9u a Vienne, et sur son zele pour la cause comune. Le Comte 
Cobenzl parla de I'ordre de Marie Therese, et dit que son 
Bouverain n'a demande la permission d'en decorer les officers 
Kusses que pour montrer au monde entier sa reconnaissance; et 
que si on ne I'a pas encor donne a personne, c'^tait uniquement 
parcequ'a peine aura-t-on d6ja re9u a Vienne son rapport sur ce 
point-la. II m'a prie de la maniere la plus forte de representer a 
Sa Majesty Imperiale, et de la conjurer sur ce que souffriraient 
les affaires s'il y avait quelque mesintelligence entre les deux 
Cours Imp^riales ; en s'offrant de s'engager de la maniere la plus 
formelle que tout m^sentendue sera examine avec la plus grande 
attention, et qu'on nous fera pleine satisfaction. II s'est etendu 
sur les avantages du plan propose par sa Cour, et approuv6 par 
I'Empereur, pour ce qui regarde I'emploi de nos troupes en 
Suisse, et sur le d^sir qu' avait son souverain de cooperer avec 
nous, et de nous aider dans toutes nos mesures. 

"Apres tout ceci, et beaucoup d'autres protestations et raisonne- 
mens de toute espece, qui ont dure une heure et demie (et qui 
prendraient trop de terns pour les mettre sur papier k present 
que je me hate d'envoyer ceci a Votre Excellence pour en faire 
le rapport a I'Empereur) I'ambassadeur me dit qu'il enverra 
certainement un courier a Vienne demain ou mercredi matin ; et 
m'a remis deux copies de depeches que j 'envois ci- joint a 
votre Excellence, en me priant de nouveau de I'informer si 
I'Empereur continue a approuver les operations par la Suisse 
dans I'interieur de la France, et s'inquietant beaucoup de peur 
que I'amiti^ entre les deux Cours ne soit alteree. Par les 
discours du Comte Cobenzl, et par les traits de son visage, on 
voyait son extreme consternation, et sa grande inquietude." 



266 

Enclosure. 
Count Alexander Souvorow Eymniksky to the Emperor Paul. 

Translation. 

" L'envie que Ton me porte comme a un stranger; les intrigues, 
la conduit equivoque des chefs subalternes qui s'addressent 
directement au Conseil Aulique, parceque c'etoit hii qui dirigeait 
autrefois les operations militaires ; I'impuissance dans laquelle 
je me trouve a tout moment d'^xecuter ce qui me paroit 
convenable pour le succes de la bonne cause, sans demander 
prealablement des ordres a Vienne ; tout ceci. Sire, me force a 
demander mon rappel, suppose que cela ne change. Je veux que 
mes cendres reposent dans ma patrie, et prie Dieu pour mon 
auguste souverain." 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 
Private, 

1799, August 9. Berlin. — " In the same moment of this 
morning arrives the office-box with your two private letters of 
the 2nd instant, and Hertzlett from Petersburg with Sir Charles 
Whitworth's dispatches under flying seal. If I avail myself of 
his departure to write to you, it is only to tell you that everything 
remains here in statu quo, and therefore that Berlin offers no 
materials for communication to you, public or private, except two 
letters to me from Fagel of which I send you the copies. For 
me it remains to wait here till I hear officially from you, unless 
any such pressing occasion shall arise for my joining the Prince 
of Orange as in his judgment and in mine ought to be acted upon 
by me without even that delay ; but to me it does not seem very 
probable that any such occasion should present itself in the first 
and earliest days of Sir R. Abercrombie's approach. 

"I am, however, beyond measure anxious for information con- 
cerning the event of the first enterprise, and all my confidence 
of its success does not prevent me from looking out with a 
feverish irritation for full and complete assurance of it. If 
General Brune is really as active as the last accounts describe 
him to be, he may find it possible to prevent the first explosion 
being at once decisive ; but I have not the least apprehension of 
his being able to supply any considerable means of resistance, 
particularly if all goes on as well as we had expected at the 
Texel. 

" With regard to Sir Charles Whitworth's notion, or rather the 
Emperor's proposition of some communication which is to supply 
at Petersburg all the advantage of a congress, without the 
inconvenience of such a moment as this for such a measure, I 
own that I have great doubts of the prudence of adopting it in 
toto. A partial use of it might have some advantage, and if we 
could strongly and forcibly apply the influence of Russia in 
check upon the insatiable avidity of Austria, it is much to be 
desired that we should do so ; but in the present circumstances 
of things I do not well see how we could do more than avail 



266 

ourselves of that particular llussian interference which will be 
listened to at Vienna, as soon as Suwarrow is seen at the head 
of a Eussian army of 60,000 men. 

" I wish we could produce the general explanation of the 
several objects which the great powers have in view ; and if 
any common concert of means and interests could have been 
brought about, that general explanation would have been 
necessary, and in that case might not have been of extreme 
difficulty ; but in the present circumstances, where there can be 
no question of general concert, I should fear that an invitation 
of general discussion might rather produce than prevent all the 
dangers which are to be apprehended from discussion. With 
Prussia we cannot at present have any such discussions ; we are 
not afraid of the invading projects of any power but Austria ; 
and if the Court of Petersburg will speak stoutly through 
Suwarrow for the defence of the southern Sardinian frontier, 
I cannot imagine that they would venture to dispute it ; and if 
they did, we should not be more advanced in the business by 
putting it in a shape of more formal negotiation at Petersburg. 
I had rather trust to Eussian influence supported by Suwarrow 
and backed by us, than to any more formal negotiation." 

Enclosure. 

James Fagel to Thomas Grenville. 

1799, August 1 and 5. [Lingen.] — ' ' Dans les conversations que 
le Prince Hereditaire d' Orange a eues hier au soir avec le Due de 
Brunswick au sujet de la tournure que les aftaires ont prise a 
Berlin, il s'est explique d'une maniere tres pronon9ee en 
temoignant toute son indignation du role que Ton fait jouer 
au Eoi. II a ecrit a ce sujet une longue lettre a Sa Majeste, 
dont il a lu quelques passages au Prince, dans laquelle il lui 
donne a connoitre que les deux Cours Imperiales et I'Angleterre 
parvenues a retablir I'ordre en Europe par la force des amies, 
sans que la Cour de Berlin y prenne egalement une part active, 
c'est une fletrissure pour la monarchie Prussienne dont elle se 
relevera difficilement, et qui lui fera perdre toute I'influence 
qu'elle est en droit d'avoir sur le sort de I'Europe. 

"LeEoi a repondu de sa propre main une longue lettre de 
quatre pages, qui paroit I'ouvrage du Secretaire Besme, pour dire 
que son parti est definitivement pris. 

" D'ailleurs le Due s'est montre reserve vis-a-vis du Prince, ne 
lui a point fait de questions, et ne paroit pas se douter de ce qui 
se prepare. 

" On dit ici que le Directoire exige du Gouvernement Batave 
une somme de 10 millions, et I'habillement de 40,000 hommes ; 
et qu'on est a la veille de former un camp pres de la Haye sous 
les ordres du General Brune, dont on ne donne point la force. 

" Les informations que nous esperions recevoir de M. de Ehoon 
au sujet des correspondances et de I'organisation gen^rale dans 
I'interieur de la province d'Hollande, ne sont pas tout a fait aussi 
d6taill6es que nous avions lieu de I'esp^rer. 



267 

"II paroit que son activite s'est bornee jusqu'ici a travailler 
avec son frere et avec les personnes qui se sont occupees de pro- 
vinces de Groningue et de Frise. D'ailleurs ses id^es quant au 
choix des personnes a employer dans les villes de la province de 
Hollande s'accordent avec celles du Prince, et je n'ai pas de doute 
que I'onne parvienne a tirer parti de son zeleetde ses intentions. 

" Quant aux provinces de Groningue et de Frise, M. Van der 
Haer et M. Charles Bentinck continuent a donner les assurances 
les plus positives que tout y est prepare au point de ne laisser 
aucun doute sur un succes complet, lorsque le moment de 
I'explosion sera venu. Leur intention est de r^primer pour le 
moment, et pour autant que la chose est faisable, les mouvemens 
ulterieurs qui pourront resulter de ceux qui viennent d'eclater 
dans le Groningue ; mais si les premieres explosions s'etendent 
au point de ne pas pouvoir les arreter, leur idee est d'en tirer 
parti, et de tacher de se rendre maitre de Delf zyl et s'y soutenir 
s'il est possible. Yous etes surement deja instruit de la venue du 
General Don au Continent. 

"M. de Rhoon m'a dit qu'il avoit passe quelques jours a Varel, 
au conjointement avec M. Van der Haer. II lui avoit donne tous 
les renseignemens qu'il avoit demande relativement aux moyens 
de defense, et ceux des dispositions tant dans les deux provinces, 
que dans le Republique en generale." Extracts. 

The Earl of Mornington to Lord Grenvillb. 
Prirate. 

1799, August 9. Fort St. George. — "I was very much dis- 
tressed to find by the last accounts from England the anxiety and 
uneasiness you had suffered both on account of Lord Camelford, 
and your brother Mr. Grenville. It is difficult to describe the 
sensations with which I read in the newspapers (the only authority 
I have received) the accounts of his danger and providential 
deliverance. I trust he will give you full compensation for all 
your solicitude by accomplishing the important object of his 
mission. 

"For an account of my operations and views I must refer you 
to the dispatches, and to the printed papers, and to my brother 
Henry, whom I have persuaded myself to send to Dundas on 
the occasion of this important crisis. Henry is the only man in 
India, excepting myself, who is thoroughly master of the 
whole subject; and although it is dreadful to me to be 
separated from him, and left here absolutely alone (Arthur 
being stationed at Seringapatam) I sacrificed my private 
comfort to my views of the public service, and resolved to 
dispatch him to Europe with the Partition Treaty of Mysore, and 
the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam — noir a British garrison. 
I anticipate the satisfaction you will feel in the magnitude of the 
services which I have been able to render within so short a time ; 
if they are estimated and felt in Europe as they are in India, I 
have nothing to desire in point of character. I only request you 
to trace my whole plan in all its parts, and fairly tell me whether 



268 - 

I miscalculated any of my moves ; for I cannot admit that I owe 
anything to chance; on the contrary many chances turned 
against me, which I might justly have expected to prove favour- 
able ; and, had I not been singularly unlucky, Seringapatam 
would have been taken a fortnight sooner than it actually fell. 

" I trust you will approve the Settlement of Mysore; on the 
whole I think France is now for ever excluded from India, and 
I trust w^e are for ever established here, if you in England have 
the firmness to meet all the clamours of monopoly, and to place 
the government of your Indian empire on a respectable basis. I 
think you will enjoy the papers found at Seringapatam ; never 
was there such a trouvaille since the King of Prussia's famous 
discovery at Dresden. 

" Many thanks to you for your kindness to Richard, of whom 
I hear very satisfactory accounts. 

"My health continues very good, and my spirits improve; 
I have determined not to send for Lady Mornington ; the voyage, 
the climate might injure her health, and it is my duty not 
to separate her from my children. 

' ' I know you will omit no exertion to draw from my late 
services every practicable advantage to ray honor and fortune. 
On this subject, as the first of my friends, I rely principally on 
you; you will talk with Henry and with my family, as well as 
with my other friends. My love to My Lady, to whom I sejid a 
vast curiosity — a tiger's head of gold and jewels, forming j)art of 
the ornaments of Tippoo Sultan's throne ; which throne the 
infernal prize agents at Seringapatam pulled to pieces, before 
I even knew of its existence. Henry will relate the whole 
history to you. Out of the wreck I have saved a beautiful bird 
(named the Hiima, see D'Herbelot) for the King ; this I have 
purchased from the Cormorants on the account of the Company. 
I have also picked up some of the other ornaments of the 
throne, which had been scattered among the Army. Henry 
will tell her Ladyship's Majesty in what manner I think she 
ought to carry her tiger head. 

"You know the tiger was the emblem or armorial bearing of 
Tippoo Sultan. 

"I desire that you will superintend my medal for the army, 
and admire my device and motto ; which latter you may convert 
into Latin, Greek, or English if you can. 

" Send Henry back as soon as possible; he has been of great 
service to me, and has distinguished himself extremely in the 
late treaties. 

"I hope it is not true that you are all of you so mad as to 
think of Bob Hobart for Ireland. I am sorry to hear that Lord 
Cornwallis has not succeeded there." 

Enclosure. 

Memorandum. 

1799, June 7. Fort St. George. — "The enclosed papers from 
No. 1 to No. 25 are literal copies of papers found in the palace 
of Tippoo Sultan at Seringapatam after the capture of that place. 



269 

"The copies were all attested at Seringapatam by Captain 
Macauley, private secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, and 
transmitted by him to Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick, Military 
Secretary to the Governor-General. The mark j;6' is the abbre- 
viated signature or byze of Tippoo Sultan himself. The 
orthography of the French is extremely incorrect in the original 
papers, especially in those dated in the year 1797, which appear 
to have been written under the Sultan's directions by the Captain 
of a French vessel then residing at Seringapatam. From these 
papers it appears that Tippoo Sultan has dispatched three 
embassies to the Isle of France, and thence to the Executive 
Directory at Paris, since the commencement of the year 1797. 

" The first in April, 1797 ; the second in October, 1797 ; and the 
third in June, 1798, but the person who carried it did not leave 
Tranquebar until the 7th of February, 1799. 

"The nature and object of these several embassies is fully 
explained in the following papers. 

"The papers Nos. 5 to 21 contain a detailed statement of 
the transactions of the Sultan's ambassadors at the Mauritius in 
January, February and March 1798 ; of the landing of the French 
force under the command of M.M. Dubuc and Chapuy at 
Mangalore, and of their subsequent admission into the Sultan's 
service. 

"In the papers from No. 22 to No. 25 will be found the par- 
ticulars of the embassy which the Sultan dispatched to France 
from Tranquebar, at the moment when he professed a desire to 
receive an ambassador from the British Government." 

[Accompanying the foregoing memorandum are copies of 
twenty-five letters in French, found at Seringapatam and 
published by Lord Mornington as containing proof that Tippoo 
Sultan, notwithstanding his friendly professions, had been 
negotiating with the French authorites of the Isle of France, and 
at Paris, for help to enable him to destroy British supremacy in 
Southern India.] 



Henry Dundas to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 9. Walmer Castle. — "Early this morning your 
despatches, publick and private, from your brother reached this 
place. I think you will do me justice to admit that there has 
not been any want of exertions within the reach of my power to 
make, when you are informed that, notwithstanding very 
unfavourable weather for it, the embarkations at the different 
places have so far advanced as to leave no reason to doubt that 
our expedition will sail on Sunday morning, unless the state of 
the winds render it prudent to retard it. It must not reach the 
coast of Holland so as to hover there without being able to land. 
The wind is at present fair, but much too high for the purpose 
of disembarking. We can scarcely at this season of the year be 
so unfortunate as to meet with too long a continuance of it. It 



270 

has already lasted for several days, and the storm of wind and 
rain so very severe yesterday morning as to stop the embark- 
ation, after the men were drawn out and the boats ready. It 
was accomplished this morning very favourably. 

" If I had doubted before, which in truth I did not, of the 
propriety of our armament getting as quickly as possible on the 
coast of Holland, your brother's letters received to-day would 
have removed those doubts ; and upon that ground it is that I 
have resolved of new to instruct Sir Ealph Abercrombie to 
proceed without delay to Goree. Under all the difficulties which 
attend the further progress in that quarter, it is impossible to 
disguise from one's self that the proceeding from Goree to the 
island of Voorn is attended with most embarrassing and almost 
unsurmountable difficulties, owing to the narrow channel and 
very intricate navigation of the Goree Gat. Still, however, I am 
sanguine in my hopes that the zeal with which our officers 
embark upon the expedition will surmount those difficulties. 
But, in the worst view of the subject, I argue that the appearance 
of our force speedily is in itself a great point gained; and, if 
from impracticable causes, they should not be able to proceed 
further in that quarter, it is as easy to embark from Goree for 
another enterprise, as it is to embark from Ramsgate or Deal. 

" I will, of course, send you when I write them a copy of the 
last instructions to Sir Ralph ; but at present I may mention to 
you that, upon failure of making good the landing at Voorn, my 
present intention is to instruct him to proceed to Helder and the 
Texel, and, failing that, to Ameland and Delfzyl. I have this 
moment sent over a cutter with an officer to Lord Duncan to 
obtain an answer to certain queries prepared by Sir Ralph 
Abercrombie, the answers to w^hich are to be carried to Sir 
Ralph at Goree, and will very much decide his option of going 
either to the Texel, or to Ameland and Delfzyl. General Don 
joined me here late last night, and brings a good deal of infor- 
mation with him. From his report it does not occur to me 
Ameland alone would be of the importance we have been led to 
suppose ; and there is no difficulty in finding 1,200 men to do it, 
(which is perfectly sufficient for the purpose) if it is thought 
right ; but General Don strongly urges, if anything is to be 
done in that quarter, 5,000 men should be allotted for it, by 
which we might raise the whole country, and give them effectual 
support. If the other operations are to go on, it might be 
difficult to spare 5,000 for this object ; but, next to Voorne and 
Helder, I should clearly feel that Ameland and the provinces of 
Groningen and Friesland stood next in importance for the 
occupation of our whole armament. If the inhabitants in the 
different provinces should come forw^ard in the manner we are 
led to hope, I entertain great doubts if the best appropriation of 
our force would not be to divide it into different bodies, in order 
to give support and countenance to the inhabitants of different 
parts of the United Provinces at the same time, and thereby 
preventing the Prussian partisans from having a footing any 
where. Unless you can be successful in collecting such a force 



271 

as both to recover Holland and occupy the Netherlands, I am 
strongly impressed with an idea that the division of our arma- 
ment in the manner I have alluded to, would l)e the most 
beneficial, with a view to the United Provinces only." 

W. Windham to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 10. Park Street, Westminster. — " You will see 
by the enclosed letter of Georges' how urgent it is that what I 
mentioned in my letter the other day should be sent without 
delay. A M. de Chatillon, a most respectable old Pioyalist officer, 
is happily landed in France ; and will before this time, I hope, 
have seen Georges. But though the accounts which he will give 
him will serve as an answer to part of his enquiries, they will not 
do much to relieve his wants. The arms have been applied for, 
agreeably, I conceive, to your directions, from the Ordnance ; 
and a cutter and chasse maree promised by the Admiralty (I think 
by the way it should be a frigate). But you must authorize Frere 
to follow up the demand in both instances ; and must enable him 
to accomplish the harder task of obtaining from the Treasury 
the necessary assistance in point of money. 

" You will see in Georges' letter a confirmation of my appre- 
hension that the Koyalists will not have an option as to the time 
when they must throw off the mask. I fear, if the operations in 
Switzerland continue to stand still as they are obliged to do at 
present, it must happen before even I should wish it, that is 
before the allies will have passed the frontiers, and long before 
we shall be in a state to assist them. 

" During the time that I was at Walmer, Mr. Pitt was talking 
of officers whom he might mention to you as capable of being 
useful to assist the insurgents in Brabant. I mentioned such as 
occurred to me upon the occasion. But I mentioned to him what 
I wish to rejDeat to you, that in my own opinion, there is a great 
objection to our sending any officers to Brabant, or giving to the 
inhabitants any encouragement to revolt ; inasmuch as it will 
pledge us to support them ; and thereby continue the effect 
w^hich I think will be produced so much by this expedition to 
Holland, of withdrawing our forces from objects that are, in my 
opinion, likely to be so much more decisive. Though I know I 
contradict a favourite opinion of yours, I cannot help repeating 
my apprehensions that this expedition to Holland will destroy 
in the bud, and before it has come to its proper strength and 
consistency, an army that, with a little delay, would have 
exceeded anything that we have seen since the first years of the 
war ; and might then have been employed in a better state, if not 
with more effect, to the objects which have always been uj)per- 
most in my thoughts. Of the troops now sent, and of those that 
will be sent, a great part are in a state which no officer would 
describe as fit for' service. On the subject of pushing our opera- 
tions in Flanders, I have already, 1 believe, troubled you, in 
part, with the objections which I feel to it. With respect to the 
effect which it is to have in conciliating Austria, we shall be 



272 

doing, I conceive, with forty thousand men what may be done as 
well by four lines in a dispatch ; and, as a military operation, it 
will surely be bad economy if, to prevent the enemy from draw- 
ing from thence ten thousand men, either we or the Austrians 
are to maintain in that country an army of twenty or thirty. 
Except in one or other of these views I do not understand in 
what way the possession of the Netherlands is to be of any use 
to us. In the meanwhile the expense is enormous ; and the force 
and money employed there will cripple us for any other opera- 
tion. As to drawing the troops away, if they once get entangled 
in these operations I put that pretty much out of the question. 
My only hope from this attempt on Holland is that the business 
may possibly be soon settled, and the country put in a state to 
maintain itself for the present by its own forces, and to allow of 
our troops being withdrawn for other purposes." 

Postscript. August 11th. — "I am sorry to add that an 
account has been received this morning at the Admiralty 
that Frotte, together with the boat's crew that were conveying 
him from the ship to the shore, was surprised by an armed 
boat of the enemy, and taken just as they were landing. I 
should be afraid that hardly a hope was to be entertained of his 
escape." 

Enclosure, 

A letter signed Georges, describing his precarious situation, 
and requesting an immediate supply of arms, military equip- 
ments, and money. 

Henry Dundas to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 11. Walmer Castle. — "I am very glad you 
thought of sending me the papers you did yesterday, for, not- 
withstanding all the information which General Don could give, 
there are two or three of the papers in the bundle you sent to me 
of very essential consequence. Late last night Captain Hearne, 
who commands a Yarmouth packet, arrived here. His arrival 
was very fortunate. He is very inteUigent and experienced sea- 
man, and gave much new light as to the navigation of the Meuse 
and all the various channels in the neighbourhood of Voorne. 
If the Goree Gat proves not accessible (which I believe to be the 
case) by large ships of war, there are so many other resources 
and modes of attack as I confess leaves me very little apprehen- 
sions as to the issue. I send you a copy of my final instructions 
to Sir Ealph Abercrombie, which I put into his hands last night. 
If it was essential, they might sail to-day ; but I am satisfied 
that, being now completely in possession of all their intelligence, 
this day will be better spent in minutely arranging their line of 
sailing and disposition of attack, than it could be by any orders 
given from on board of ship. They can do this here, or at least 
after they are two leagues from shore, as well as ever they can 
do ; being in possession of all their intelligence, and their plan of 



273 

attack fixed upon. There is another ch'cumstance which has 
only of late come under discussion. Next Thursday morning the 
spring tides will be in perfection, and they should not till then 
reach the coast of Holland. It does not occur to me that I shall 
have any more to trouble you with for some days. I thought it 
material to send you without delay a copy of my final instructions, 
as you may perhaps think it right to send them to your brother." 
Postscript. " The accompanying extract of a letter I received 
last night from Sir Charles Grey will show you how rapidly our 
second army is getting on. I hope in God the weather will now 
continue favourable. It makes all the difference in the world to 
the troops in camp, in respect both to health and spirits." 

Enclosure 1. 

Henry Dunpas to Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph 
Abercromby, K.C.B. 

Secret. 

1799, August 10. Walmer Castle. — " Having maturely con- 
sidered all the intelligence we have been able to collect respecting 
the approach to Helvoetsluys, and after a full comparison of the 
objections arising out of that intelligence to the plan of operations 
pointed out in your instructions, No. 1, with those to which other 
suggestions appear liable, I have now to communicate to you the 
determination by which you are to be governed in these respects. 

"In the first place I must state to you that the advices lately 
received from the Continent render it a matter of the most urgent 
necessity that the expedition should, without a moment's further 
delay, proceed to the coast of Holland, and as there appears very 
little doubt of your being able to take possession of the Island of 
Goree, you are in any case to consider it as the first object to be 
attacked. Having secured this point it will then rest with 
the Admiral and yourself to judge w^hether the facility it will 
afford you of proceeding against Voorn is sufficient to warrant 
the attempt. In the event of your agreeing on this point, not a 
moment is to be lost in carrying it into execution, and from the 
well grounded confidence I have in the cordial co-operation of the 
naval force, I should entertain very little doubt of success if the 
attempt should be resolved upon as one of which, in your judge- 
ment, the difficulties may be overcome by the bravery of the 
troops, without exposing them or the ships to a greater degree of 
risk than it would be reasonable to incur for the attainment of a 
position which (if it can be secured by such an effort) appears 
certainly preferable to every other. On the other hand should 
the attempt appear altogether impracticable, or so dangerous as 
to induce you to forego the prospect of the superior advantage to 
be derived from it, the object next in point of immediate 
importance is to attempt to get possession of the Helder and the 
Texel Island. The mode of proceeding to make this attack, as 
well as the expediency of its being undertaken, are points on 
which it must be left to your judgement and discretion to decide, 
after receiving the report of the officer who has been dispatched 



274 

to Admiral Lord Duncan to procure information, and such 
suggestions as his Lordship may have to offer upon the subject. 
The advantages to be derived from the success of this enterprise, 
if undertaken, in giving you a secure footing in the Province of 
Holland, and a safe communication with the shipping, in opening 
the navigation of the Zuyder Zee, and in all probability giving 
us the disposal of the Dutch Navy, are of such magnitude as we 
ought not to lose sight of, in the event of an attack on Yoorn 
being relinquished, without being thoroughly satisfied that they 
cannot be attained by the force under your command ; or without 
such risk and loss as would counterbalance your success, or render 
insecure the footing you might thereby acquire in the positions 
above-mentioned. 

" Should you be under the necessity of relinquishing both the 
above-mentioned "objects, there appears little doubt of the facility 
with which the forces might enter the river Ems, and be landed 
in the neighbourhood of Delftzyll, of which place they would be 
enabled to get possession; and from thence to push their 
operations in such a manner as, according to circumstances and 
the information you might procure on the spot, might appear 
best adapted to effect the speedy reduction of the provinces of 
Groninguen and Friezeland and of the generality of Drent. I 
have avoided entering into any detail of the military operations 
which this or the former service might require, wishing to leave 
entirely to your own judgement to direct the movements of your 
army according to the intelligence you may procure on the spot 
of the strength of the enemy, the disposition of the inhabitants, 
and other circumstances which must govern your discretion in 
the execution of a plan of this nature. 

" Should you be compelled to make the conquest of Groninguen 
and Friezeland the principal object of your expedition, a larger 
body of cavalry than is now embarked will, in all probability, be 
wanted to enable you to push forward and support your 
operations in that part of the country; and for this purpose 
I shall take care that not less than 1,000 be held in readiness 
to embark immediately on receiving a requisition from 
you to this effect. From several communications lately 
received from the Continent, there is reason to believe that the 
taking possession of the island of Amelandt w^ould become the 
signal for a rising in the provinces of Friezeland and 
Groninguen ; and for this reason, should you direct your 
operations to this quarter, as well as on account of its local 
importance with respect to the passage of the Waal, it will I 
think be expedient that you should send a sufficient detach- 
ment to secure and defend the same, whilst you proceed with the 
remainder of your army to the Ems ; and in this case a pro- 
portion of the spare arms allotted for arming the inhabitants 
may be deposited at Amelandt, from whence they may with great 
facility be passed over to the main land, in case of a rising 
against the present government. An account of the island of 
Amelandt, and a plan of attack and defence of the same are 
herewith enclosed for your consideration. 



2Y5 

" Should you determine to make your principal attack upon 
the Helder, and the Texel Island, I would not, considering 
the importance of success in this point, restrict you from 
proceeding with your whole force on this service ; but if you 
should think a sufficient detachment could be spared from 
it to maintain the possession of Goree for a few days only, 
until it could be reinforced from hence, it would ))e very 
essential not to abandon that point ; because in so far as 
any measures are in contemplation on the Continent under 
the direction of the Hereditary Prince of Orange, who is now on 
the frontier, to induce the inhabitants to co-operate with his 
Majesty's troops for their own deliverance, they are probably 
taken on the supposition that we shall in the first instance, 
take possession of the Island of Goree. Having stated the 
various alternatives which suggest themselves for the em- 
ployment of the present expedition, and my opinion of the 
respective importance of each, I think it right to add that I do 
not wish to exclude the exercise of your own discretion, in 
concert with the Admiral, either in respect to modifying each 
or either of these plans, or in adopting any other, being perfectly 
satisfied that nothing which zeal and bravery can effect will be 
left undone by the officers or men of either service ; and that 
their efforts will be directed to whatever object may appear to 
you most to correspond with the advantage of his Majesty's 
service, the spirit of the instructions you have received, and the 
ultimate success of the campaign." Copy. 

Enclosure 2. 

Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Grey, K.C.B., to 
Henry Dundas. 
Extract. 

1799, August 10. Barham Court. — " Six more regiments to 
those already announced to me, are on their march for Barham 
Down, and will make the whole nearly 18,000 men, exclusive of 
cavalry. The 5th regiment took their ground this morning, and 
which the others shall do as they arrive, without stopping at 
Canterbury, and will be daily." 

Secret Report on French and Belgian Affairs. 

Transmitted hy M. de la Palue. 

1799, August 12. Emmerich. — "On vient de recevoir une lettre 
de la personne qu'on a propos^e pr^cedemment, et voici comme 
elle s'exprime. ' Je pense bien que notre commerce ne r^ussira 
pas, d'autant plus que nos articles tombent chaque jour dans un 
tel discredit qu'ils ne valent plus qu'on les payent a un tel prix ; 
tandis que les votres acquirent, au contraire, tons le jours une 
telle vogue, que vous n'aurez bientot plus a redouter ancune 
concurrence ; le ciel en soit lou6, je ne demande pas mieux que 
de voir prosperer votre maison. 



276 

" 'Les trois derniers Directeurs sont absolument insignifians. 
Barras et Syes ne doutent plus que la Eei:)ublique ne soit aux 
abois; le danger qu'ils ont couru, et courent peut-etre encore, de 
la part de Jacobins, les rendrait tres accessibles a des proposi- 
tions quelconques, soit generales soit individuelles. Les con sells 
sont en general bien-pensans, et il ne faut pas les juger d'apres 
les stances et les discours qu'ils prononcent. lis sont pour la 
plupart de forme, de convenance, et souvent de commande. II 
y a parmi eux des exageres, mais tres peu d'anarchistes, et ces 
derniers tombent de jour en jour. 

" ' II y a en Bretagne des insurges, des m^contens en assez grand 
nombre, mais ils n'ont ni amies ni argent. II en est de meme 
en Languedoc ou ils manquent de meme, de chefs, d'argent, et 
d'armes. Les Chouans se montrent deja en Poitou, en Anjou, 
et dans I'Orleanois ; ils ci'oissent cliaque jour d'une maniere 
inquietante pour la France. J'en donnerai des details quand ils 
seront plus avances. On peut en esperer beaucoup s'ils sont 
aides d'une maniere franche et loyale, et surtout par des per- 
sonnes de leur nation, par quelques chefs puissants. Le 
numeraire devient chaque jour plus rare : I'emprunt force ne 
produira presque rien, et il est impossible de concevoir 
comment le gouvernement s'en procurera. II sera r^duit a 
employer les moyens les plus ruineux. Par les etats de 
I'arm^e de Massena, elle est, a peu pres, de 72,000 hommes ; 
celle du Rhin n'est guerres que de 20 a 25,000, et celle des Alpes 
de 18,000 ; il y a parmi le soldat un extreme d^couragement qui 
ne fera qu'augmenter si on continue a avoir des revers, et si on 
parvient a oter aux soldats Francais I'opinion qu'on maltraite 
les prisonniers, et si ceux qui se rallieraient de I'autre cote 
trouvaient des chefs de leur nation, et un tresorier qui 
payat exactement leur payc. — On ne sait comment appro- 
visioner les armees et les placer. On est oblige de vider 
les magazins des villes pour faire subsister les troupes. Les 
Orleanistes sont dans une quantite telle qu'on ne peut s'en faire 
une idee, et ce parti se renforce chaque jour ; la raison en est 
simple, on croit par la faire moins de pas retrogrades, avoir 
moins de comi)te a rendre, plus de chose a conserver, enfin avoir 
une plus grande influence.' 

" Ce correspondant ajoute k la fin de la lettre, indepen- 
dament des propositions faites et d'apres les quelles on se 
procurerait des renseignemens certains et tels qu'on les 
desirerait, il ajoute, si quelqu'un demandait une correspond- 
ance soit de gazettes soit de cunosites, on pourrait s'adresser 
a lui ; il connait un homme de lettres qui en fournirait une 
du plus grand interet ; il ne se permettrait aucune reflexion, 
mais on trouverait chez lui impartialite et verite, et ecrirait deux 
lettres par semaine, dont les matieres regleront seules I'etendue, 
moyenant 200 francs par mois, pay^s d'avance. ' Je joindrais mes 
f actures a ses lettres ' (on entend par f actures une maniere assez 
ingenieuse qu'il a imaginee, et dont mon ami m'a laisse sa clef, 
telles qu'ils en etaient convenus en Hollande). II finit en disant 
que si on n'a pas de fonds a employer, il est inutile de lui ecrire. 



277 

'' Par les autres nouvelles qu'on s'est procurees, il est evident 
que Barras et Sieyes ont travaille avec succes les Conseils, et qu'ils 
ont la majorite centre le parti Jacobin. La denonciation faite 
centre eux par Courtois au Conseil des Anciens est de la 
plus grande force, et a 6te la cause du decret qui les a 
chasse de la Salle du Manege. lis tiennent actuellement 
seance aux Jacobins, ou ils n'auroint plus la protection aussi 
decidee du gouvernement. On s'attend a une rixe, a une 
commotion, qui sera sans doute considerable ; il est aise de voir 
que le gouvernement est vacillant, se trouve environne de 
dangers, n'a point de plan, qu'il craint peut-etre plus les ennemis 
du dedans que ceux du dehors. II cherche a relever I'esprit 
public par les esperances qu'il fait repandre par les feuilles qui 
lui sont devouees, sur I'entree de la tlotte Franyaise dans I'ocean. 
Voici le detail qu'elles en donnent. 26 vaisseaux Francais, 20 
Espagnols ; 9 Espagnols a Rochefort, 9 a Brest, prets a mettre en 
mer. On espere de bloquer le Texel, et joindre les 12 vaisseaux 
HoUandais ; total 08 vaisseaux. Voici les reflexions epaises 
dans les differentes feuilles; I'escadre Anglaise devant Genes 
reviendra difficilement dans I'ocean a cause des vents et des 
courans qui regnent dans cette saison dans la Mediterranee ; 
on surveillera avec des forces aussi imposantes I'exp^di- 
tion secrette de I'Angleterre, et peut-etre meme on I'enlevera, 
parcequ'elle ne pent avoir eu connaissance de I'entree de 
notre flotte dans ces pasages ; on pent aller au devant 
des dix vaisseaux Busses et des transports ; on pent 
s'emparer des vaisseaux epais qui forment les blocus~il est 
possible d'interrupter le convoi des Antilles qui arrive dans 
cette saison. Les escadres combinees sont entries a Cadix le 
23 Messidor (11 Juillet), et ont pris plusieurs batimens Americains 
amies en guerre et commissiones contre les Fran9ais. Les Anciens 
viennent de rejetter a une grande majorite le decret des 500 qui 
rapportait la deportation de Barrere. 

" Dans le Brabant il y a quelque rassemblement de conscrijDts 
qui se cachent dans les bois et font quelques excursions dans 
lieux voisins. Les mouvemens sont insignifians, et les Francais 
paraissent peu s'inquieter. II passe a Luxembourg d'assez 
nombreux transports de recrues pour renforcer I'armee du Rhin, 
ainsi que d'artillerie de campagne, munitions de guerre, eft'ets 
de campement ; on les embarque ensuite sur la Moselle. Le 
quartier-general de Beguinot vient d'etre transfere a Gand. 
II est arrive quelques bataillons de I'interieur pour renforcer 
les troupes sur les cotes. Florent Guyot, qui succede a Fouch6 
de Nante a la Haye, y est deja arrive. Son discours de sa 
reception a ete tres modere et n'ofifre rien de neuf. Les Jacobins 
HoUandais travaillent depuis quelques jours avec moins 
d'activite. Les attaques faites a leurs confreres de Paris 
paraissent les rallentir." 

Henry Dundas to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 12. Walmer Castle. — " I had a letter from Lord 
Elgin on the same subject as yours, and likewise one from the 



278 

Duke of York. I have spoke to Mr. Pitt respecting it, but he 
does not accurately recollect whether anything has passed 
between him and the Duke of Athole, or between the King and 
the Duke of Athole, which may render it impossible to give the 
green ribbon to any other than his Grace. His pretensions are 
certainly very strong, being the only one of his rank in Scotland 
who has it not ; and he was set aside last time to make way for 
Lord Morton, as he was about the person of the Queen. The 
situation Lord Elgin is going into and his own rank in the peerage 
give him certainly a very fair right to ask it, if the Duke of 
Athole's pretensions do not sui}ersede any consideration of other 
pretensions. Be so good as explain this to Lord Elgin, and as 
you will see Mr. Pitt in a day or two, and the King before I see 
him, you are competent to decide on the business better than 
I am." 

Lord Loughborough [Lord Chancellor] to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 12. Tunbridge Wells.—" Mr. Murray, who is 
Consul at Madeira, has found it necessary in the conduct of the 
business of his house to remove to Lisbon, and I should be 
extremely obliged to you if you would have the goodness to allow 
Mr. Joseph Pringle, the partner in the house, who will continue 
to reside at Madeira, to succeed him as Consul there. The 
office has, for a great many years, been in that house, and 
executed very much to the satisfaction of all who had occasion to 
resort to the island. 

" I feel a very particular interest in this sollicitation, because 
my ver}^ near relation the late Mr. Cheap, who had probably the 
honour of being known to you during the time he w^as in the 
East Indian Direction, has left his share in the house to his 
family, and his son is now the acting partner in London. Mr. 
Cheap had held the office himself w4iile he resided at Madeira, 
and was succeeded in it by the partner who remained in the 
island. The emoluments of it I believe are not very consider- 
able. But it w^ould be a very sensible mortification to be 
deprived of the sort of consequence w^hich is attached to it, and 
to see it transferred to any house of more modern establish- 
ment ; for I believe this house has been settled in Madeira for 
almost a century." 

W. Pitt to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 13. Downing Street. — " I am just arrived, 
having left the expedition completely ofit", and with every circum- 
stance favourable for its speedy arrival and landing. Pray let 
me know at what hour I shall come to you to-morrow, to call on 
Monsieur,'' 

Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 14. Harley Street. — " Je vous envoi ce paquet 
que je viens de recevoir jjar un courier qui m'est arive dans ce 



279 

moment. J'ai re(;u differente depeches qui ne pouront etre 
traduite du Russe que demain, et je vous suplie de me recevoir 
demain entre deux et quatre heures pour que je puisse vous les 
comuniquer. En attendant je dois vous dire qu'on inssiste chez 
nous a ne pas employer le Comte d'Artois. II paroit qu'on croit 
en outre a Petersbourg qu'il est tres premature encor d'employer 
aucun de ces princes." 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, August 14. Berlin. — '' I scarcely know why I sit down 
to add a few restless words to my dispatch of this day's date. 
It is from you and of you that I want to hear, and till I do so, 
till I hear of the arrival of Abercrombie, and of the English 
comments upon the Prussian negociation, I can say nothing and 
write nothing but of impatient anxiety ; and in truth you will 
not wonder at it when you recollect the number of long days 
and hours which have been dragging on from the 5th to the 
14th without bringing to my feverish anxiety any satisfactory 
accounts of the interesting events which are at stake by land 
and by water. The royal letter to the Duke of Brunswick is 
curious enough, although it is obviously the composition of 
Beihm rather than of the King. You see they are completely 
silent as to their scandalous dereliction of the treaty which they 
had approved ; but General Stamford has completed this narrative 
somewhat more faithfully in his conversations with the Duke, 
and His Serene Highness is pleased to be surprised and 
indignant at it, and writes, as you see, a bit of a letter to Haugwiz, 
and threatens to write another and a longer to his master ; but 
these are poor devices which will end only in the effusion of 
much Christian ink, and will leave the Duke, the King, and the 
Ministers in the same respectable state in which they now 
stand. Haugwiz, no longer enjoying the light of my countenance 
and protection, supplies through Baron Kinkel the little whisper- 
ing commerce which he had been used to carry on with me 
through his old but respectable and well intentioned philosopher 
De Luc ; he had insinuated much about the prompt answer he 
was sure of obtaining from Paris, the great probability 
of his conducting that negociation so as to make it fail, and 
the good hopes which he had that, at the end of ten days, 
we should yet see the Prussian army acting as we wished 
without a subsidy or convention. This was the hold language 
which was to set us all at ease upon the Paris overture, and you 
may easily imagine that I did not receive these suggestions with 
more either of faith or of respect than they deserve ; but now at 
last our little minister is sunk, I think, below the point of zero 
even in his own political thermometer ; for his last conversation 
with Kinkel was a confession that he could obtain no answer 
from Paris, and a melancholy complaint that even Otto seemed 
to avoid instead of to court any discussion of that overture. It 
is scarcely worth while to remark upon the degree of humiliation 



280 

in which this places the Court and the Minister of Berlin, but I 
mention it rather because it affords some ground for speculation 
on the part of France and the Directory. Are they hesitating 
upon the measure of the evacuation of Holland ; are they 
considering of the means of doing this without giving way to 
the establishment of the Stadtholder ; are they speculating 
upon the chance of frightening you out of your expedition 
by the report of their combined fleet, quod Deiis avertat ; 
are they too much engaged with the politics of Paris to 
think in these times of Berlin and the Hague, or does a little of 
each of these reasons produce that silence which makes at 
present the despair, real or affected, of the Minister Haugwiz? 
They begin to be uneasy at the Prince of Orange's stay at 
Lingen. I hope he will soon relieve their anxiety, and step out of 
their country into his own; it would well crown this glorious 
work, if Otto should make the King of Prussia send away his 
own brother-in-law, to deprecate the wrath of the Great Nation 
in the hour of its decline." 

Postscript. "The Russian courier has, at length, while I was 
sealing my letters, brought with him the Imperial indignation 
from Petersburg. I am glad to find that the Emperor, however 
dissatisfied with Prussia, does not talk of more than withdrawing 
the whole mission, and therefore that there does not seem any 
ground to apprehend actual hostility between the two countries. 
I am likewise well pleased to find that Count Panin's conduct 
is entirely approved of by his master, both in his coming to 
Berlin and in his leaving it. 

" But though this might have been worse, it is still bad ; the 
recall of Panin was sufficient to mark whatever was due to his 
just sense of indignation ; but the recall of the whole mission 
will be a harsh measure in the public eye, will give no oppor- 
tunity of any return to better measures, and will tend to serve 
at Berlin the cause of Paris." 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, August 15. Berlin. — "I am mortified to find by your 
letter of the 6th that you had not yet received my second 
despatch upon the official conference which we held with the 
Prussian Ministers, because as you will already have seen, I do 
not think that my present stay here is attended with any other 
effect than that of nursing the Prussian confidence in their being 
considered by us as still to be sollicited, waited upon, and paid 
according to their own good pleasure. I do not find that I have 
anything to write in answer to your dispatch of the 6th, and 
shall therefore put off" the formal acknowledgment of it till I 
have more occasion to write a public dispatch ; I have now scarce 
time for a few lines, or I shall miss the packet of Sunday. 

" I do not think it is safe to stir the question in Holland of 
Prussian negociation, and I should much hesitate to do so 
through the channel of the Hereditary Prince's communications ; 



'281 

but I have desired Stamford to write to the Hereditary Prince to 
guard him against any false impressions upon this subject, and 
to furnish him with a true and orthodox view of it. The sickness 
of the Grand Pensionary, who is quite disabled, seems to me to 
make it advisable rather that the Greffier should come over to 
these frontiers than that the Hereditary Prince should pass into 
England ; but I have so far executed your commission as to tell 
him that it was thought in England that he might deem it 
prudent to go over thither immediately, but of course that it was 
for him in his wisdom to decide where and how he could make 
himself the most useful ; if your expedition has taken place (as 
I pray to God it may, in spite of all the combined fleet of Cadiz), 
very probably the Hereditary Prince has already found the 
means of passing into the country, or has succeeded in 
his projects to possess himself of Deventer or Coevorden. 
What Elphinstone is doing I know not, but I am still 
persuaded that every additional danger is, in this state of 
things, an additional motive for pursuing your expedition with 
redoubled activity. 

" 1 send you a large packet from Lord Minto, which I have 
scarcely had time to read with all the attention which it 
deserved, but which seems to me to offer many great difficul- 
ties and embarrassments. The first in time and importance 
is the plan of the campaign, and you will easily see how 
embarrassing will be my interview with Lord Mulgrave, when I 
shall have to tell him that, by Lord Minto's account, they do not 
propose to concert anything with him for this campaign, but 
regard their own plan as being already fixed and determined. 
Nevertheless, if Lord Mulgrave arrives here I shall be disposed 
to advise him to continue his journey to Vienna, and at least 
discuss with Thugut the unreasonable change which has been 
made with respect to the plan of the campaign, and with respect 
to the share which Austria had soUicited Great Britain to take 
in that plan by sending for an officer to discuss it with them. I 
own that I think there is an additional inducement to his 
pursuing his journey (if he has begun it) because I think he will 
perhaps be useful in bringing back the attention of the govern- 
ment there to those points upon which we had understood them 
to be less at variance with us than they now seem to be. Lord 
Minto seems to be perfectly aware of the interested views with 
which Thugut had adopted this plan of military measures ; but 
the hard task is to struggle with those bad motives, and with all 
the little under machinery that is at work upon those irregular 
principles. I wish I had the time to pursue the whole of 
what appears to me to be important in these Vienna dis- 
patches, but, generally speaking, I cannot help saying that 
I think they betray so rapacious and so insatiable an 
appetite for conquest, that I should think it desirable 
without any hesitation to pronounce decidedly on the part 
of London and Petersburg against the unbounded projects which 
are now avowed by Austria ; projects that decide, not upon the 
French barrier of Italy, but upon the open and absolute 



282 

territorial possession of Piedmont, Savoy, Venice, and great part of 
Tuscany. What are we to say, too, when we see that, in acldition 
to all this, they are to re-occupy their Austrian Netherlands ; and 
that our acquiescence in this enormous plan of plunder is to he 
purchased, not by their acceding to our plans or measures, 
but by their substituting others for their own distinct ad- 
vantage ; that they are to throw upon Great Britain even the 
expense of those Kussian troops which have helped to save 
them from being again beseiged in Vienna, and that we 
shall thereby not have augmented the Eussian army by 
45,000 men, but have augmented our own expense only for 
the relief of Austria ; and when at the end of all this, they will 
not ratify our convention without having first good assurances 
that we are to get nothing by it either in money, none being to 
be paid to us, or in consideration, as the ratification is to be a 
secret. When all these demands are opened to us on their side, 
they do form such an extravagant and unreasonable trespass 
upon every principle of morality, interest, and convenience, that 
I protest I could not have imagined my old friend Thugut 
would have ventured to have brought forward in one and the 
same moment such an ugly heap of disgusting and insatiable 
desires. I do not yet understand how it is possible that they 
can have persuaded the Emperor of Kussia to give them the 
poor King of Sardinia tied and bound into their hands ; or how 
he can reconcile this weakness with the better and more 
worthy conduct which Su war row had hitherto successfully 
adopted in his name ; neither can I bring myself to think 
that it is desirable for us to concur wdth them in drawing 
every Russian out of Italy, when it is confessed by them that 
their motive for doing so is not the military plan which had 
been agreed on, but is plainly the detestable motive of being at 
liberty to range unmolested over all the states and territories 
which could have found protection from the arms of the allied 
Courts. 

"You will observe that I do not say a word of the military 
part of their new plan, because there is such large demand upon 
one's patience in all the details of their political objects ; but if 
they meant fairly only to meet the military danger of the Middle 
Ehine, why do they not send there the intennediate 80,000 men, 
and pursue in Swisserland with the Allies the general measures 
which they had already agreed to. This is a point, however, 
upon which professional men are better able to decide ; but it 
requires the assistance of no profession to determine that the 
general outline of their views, as described in these four dispatches 
from Lord Minto, is one which it appears to me to be impossible 
for a British Cabinet to receive and to adopt. I have lost my 
time and my patience, and yours too, perhaps, in this hasty blot ; 
and more than all, perhaps I shall risk all chance of catching the 
post which is to convey it to you, therefore I must conclude. 
My present notion is to-night to write a few lines by Bassett to 
Lord Minto ; I do not like to give myself the airs of criticising, 
lecturing, or advising those wlio are better able upon their own 



283 

Inisiness to decide for themselves ; but as Lord Minto has sent 
me his dispatches open, I do not think it fair entirely to keep 
from him the strong impression which is made upon my mind 
by the demands which are detailed in them. If Lord Mulgrave 
comes this road, I will read to him as much of Lord Minto's 
No. 2 as I have had time to have copied, and I shall be inclined 
to advise him to go on to Vienna, as if he had received no other 
intimation than that which Lord Henley had sent as the 
invitation and request of the court of Vienna ; when he is there 
he can perhaps, by recurring to your instructions, fortify the 
check which I think Lord Minto should, with prudence and 
discretion, give to the unbounded and inordinate avidity of the 
Austrian Minister. The discussion would at least give time for 
you to write from London, though doubtless it is a discussion 
which Lord Mulgrave will not for his own gratilication desire to 
enter into. 

" I do not know why they reckon Korsakow so late in his 
arrival as the middle of September. Everybody here reckons 
that they will arrive at Schaffhausen the 20th instant at latest, 
and probably sooner. I have no messenger for Petersburg, but 
will send your dispatch to Whitworth by cypher on the first post 
day." 

Sir Charles Whitworth to Lord Grenville. 

Private, 

1799, August 16. St. Petersburgh. — "If I presume to take 
up a few moments of your Lordship's time, I expect your Lord- 
ship to pardon me in consideration of the irresistable desire I 
feel to express to your Lordship my gratitude for the signal mark 
of protection with which your Lordship has honoured me upon 
this occasion. Your Lordship will do me the justice to believe 
that this proof of your Lordship's kindness will never be for- 
gotten. 

"I have taken the liberty to address to your Lordship a 
portrait of his Imperial Majesty, tolerably well painted, and a 
most striking likeness. I sent it about a week ago by shipping, 
and I most humbly hope that your Lordship will do me the 
honour to accept of it. Perhaps your Lordship may think it 
worthy, from the unbounded zeal of the original, to occupy a 
conspicuous place in your Lordship's apartment." 

Lord Grenville to Count Woronzow. 

1799, August 16. [Cleveland Kow.]—" Whitworth, par une 
depeche que j'ai reyu apres vous avoir ecrit, me mande que le Vice- 
Chancelier lui avoit donne a entendre que la Suede feroit de 
nouvelles propositions moins extravagantes que les precedentes, 
mais, comme il est evident que ces troupes ne peuvent etre 
d'aucune utilite pour I'expedition dont il est question, j'espere 
qu'il se d6terminera (comme il paroissoit dispos6) de ne prendre 
la chose quad referendum. 



284 

" Je lie vois pas comment il est possible d'accorder des subsides 
a une puissance qui se met sur le pied de ne pas traiter avec nous. 
Mais je suppose que pour avoir de 1' argent on ne sera pas plus 
difficile a se desister de cette extravagance que de I'autre. 

"Pour le reste il faudra voir ce qu'ils offriront et ce qu'ils 
demandent. 

" Je crois notre expedition certainement allee au Texel. On 
en avoit le choix si le vent etoit plus favorable pour cette expedi- 
tion que pour I'autre, et certainement il I'etoit." Copy. 

Lord Grenville to Henry Dundas. 

1799, August 16. Cleveland Row. — "I enclose you Mr. 
Itolleston's statement of the precautions taken by him respecting 
the Dutch proclamations. It certainly appears to me to be 
highly satisfactory in so far as relates to him, or to the possibility 
that this paper can have become public through any indiscretion 
or neligence in the Foreign Office. You will, I doubt not, feel 
the necessity of our pursuing this enquiry as with respect to all 
the persons who appear, by Mr. Rolleston's account, to have been 
in possession of the copies. I have already seen Mr. Fagel, who 
expressed to me the most perfect conviction that it was neither 
by his means, nor through the Prince of Orange, that the paper 
became public ; but, in a matter which is so important, I shall 
take the liberty to request from him a written statement on the 
subject. 

"Should other endeavours fail, I have myself no doubt that 
the Privy Council is competent to call the newspaper printers 
before them, and to examine them on oath as to the person from 
whom they received the paper. But before this is done, the 
Attorney and Solicitor General should of course be consulted." 
Copy. 

Lord Grenville to Henry Dundas. 

1799, August 16. Cleveland Eow. — " I enclose a letter from 
the Bishop of St. Pol, on a subject on which he spoke to me at 
Stowe, and which appears to merit attention. After the 
experience of Quiberon, we cannot certainly listen to any projects 
of employing these people in our service ; but I can see no harm 
in letting the priests have access to them, which indeed ought on 
other grounds to be done ; nor in releasing and sending back to 
the Vendue those for whom the Bishop thinks he can answer as 
Royalists, but who have been forced by requisitions into 
Government ships, or have got into privateers to avoid being 
forced into the army. 

"If you agree with me in this, it rests with you to give the 
necessary orders to the Transport Board." Copy. 

Earl Spencer to Lord Grenville. 
1799, August 16. Admiralty. — "I have not more expectation 
than you that anything is at present to be done with the com- 
bined fleets in Brest ; and I am not at all disposed to renew a 



I 



285 

blockade immediately till there is a greater chance of their being 
in a state to undertake something which it may be worth while 
to wear our ships out by attempting to counteract. 

'' Lord Nelson seems by his last letters so little disposed to 
quit the neighbourhood of Naples, that I am afraid he will not 
very readily come to Genoa ; if Lord W. Bentinck's requisition 
has been very pressing, he may possibly send a detachment 
there after having possessed himself of Capua and Gaeta ; a\id 
his force is now sufficient (considering the enemy's weakness in 
that sea) to enable him to attend to all those objects if he 
chooses. 

''What do you think of this report of the Prussian Minister's 
being sent away from Paris ?" 

Note of a cojirersation between Count Haugwitz and 
Baron Kinkel.'--' 

1799, August 16. Berlin. 

Kinkel. — " Je viens pour vous voir, mais aussi pour savoir 
des nouvelles. Vous ne voulez pas faire la guerre avec les 
autres, je pense toujours que c'est afin d'avoir le merite de la 
faire pour votre propre compte. 

[Haugwitz.] — '' Comment voulez que Ton puisse rien esperer 
lorsque Ton voit des sottises comme celle que vient de faire 
I'empereur de Kussie. J'ai empeche que le Koi ne prit le mors 
aux dents ; il y etait tente ; mais je lui ai prouve qu'une grande 
puissance ne devait pas negliger les considerations pour ^couter 
les petites vengeances. Qu'arriverait-il si nous donnions I'ordre 
a Monsieur de Kalkreuth de concentrer 80,000 hommes qui sont 
deja sur cette frontier e ? L'Empereur abandonnerait la guerre 
de France, il en avertirait I'Autriche et I'Angleterre par la re- 
traite de les troupes du Khin de I'ltalie, de I'Hollande : la 
France triompherait, I'Europe serait perdue, et nous-memes 
nous en partagerions le sort : celui qui a la force de punir une 
insulte ne saurait etre deshonore : voila comme je raisonne et 
comme je tache de faire i^enser le Eoi. II ne faut pourtant pas 
que I'Empereur pousse les choses trop loin, et qu'il s'imagine 
qu'il pent nous faire marcher a sa bagnette. Je ne hesite pas 
de dire que nous sommes la puissance la plus entiere de I'Europe. 

[Kinkel.] — " J'applaudis a votre patriotisme, et je conviens 
de votre puissance ; mais convenez avec moi que I'Empereur 
donne a la guerre contre la France toute son energie, mais qu'il 
n'y emploie ses forces qu'avec mesure. II y a, tout au plus, 
80,000 hommes opposes a la France : Ton en donne gen^rale- 
ment 300,000 a la Eussie : elle compte parmi ses sujets plusieurs 
nations qui sont armees en masse : avec cela I'Autriche com- 
mence a avoir les mains libres. Par consequent vous risqueriez 
dans tons les cas en cassant les vitres avec la Eussie. Si votre 
guerre etait heureuse, vous feriez triompher la Eevolution ; mais 
si elle 6tait malheureuse, vous seriez interre avec la Eevolution, 
ce qui serait mourir en mauvaise compagnie. 

♦ Transmitted by Mr. GrenvilJe, 



286 

[Haugwitz.] — " Croyez-moi ce que Ton dit des forces de la 
Russia est exaggere. Nous les chasserions d'un trait jusqu'a 
Mittau, jusqu'a Petersburgh ; mais ce n'est ni notre interet, ni 
notre sentiment. 

[KiNKEL.] — ''Quelles nouvelles avez-vous done de Paris? 
[Haugwitz.] — " Pas un mot, parole d'honneur: j'attribue cela 
a ce que ces gueux sont menaces de leur chute, et qu'ils ne 
peuvent s'occuper d'autre chose : aussi la derniere poste n'est- 
ell'e pas arrivee. Pour [Otto] je ne I'ai pas vu, et je ne m'em- 
barrasse plus de ce garnement : il faut que I'affaire soit traitee 
par Monsieur de Sandoz. 

[KiNKEL.] — ^" Que croyez-vous qu'ils repondront d'apres les 
derniers evenements arrives a Paris ? 

[Haugwitz.] — " Je ne saurais vous le dire, mais cela ne 
changera rien a mon systeme. Si Ton m'empeche de marcher 
au but par les meilleurs moyens, j'en chercherai d'autres jusqu' 
a ce que je parviens ; je voudrais etre a St. James pour reponclre 
a la lettre du Pioi de Prusse. 

KiNKEL.] — " Et, que repondriez-vous ? 

Haugwitz.] — " J'acce^Dterais les engagements que le Roi de 
Prusse prend, et je lui dirais avec force que je m'attendais a ce 
qu'il les remplirait ; cela ferait plus de bien, pousserait plus k la 
roue que toutes les negociations et toutes les conversations 
minist^rielles et personelles ; et sur cela mille choses a ne pas 
tarir, de I'attachement du Roi de Prusse pour le Roi d'Angleterre, 
de son desir de former avec I'Angleterre des engagements solides 
et permanents. II revint sur I'expedience d'isoler les interets 
des deux puissances et de les traiter exclusivement ; a quoi les 
affaires d'Hollande, qui ne regardaient que I'Angleterre et la 
Prusse, fournisSaient le meilleur pretexte possible. II ne se 
lassait pas de dire que sa lettre renfermait les engagements les 
plus propres a rassurer le Cabinet de Londres sur la loyaute des 
intentions de la Prusse. 

[KiNKEL.] — " Je ne pouvais pas partager cet avis, et je lui fis 
part de ma crainte que cette piece ne ferait pas toute I'impres- 
sion qu'il en attendait, et d'autant moins qu'elle ne laissait pas 
de renfermer des contradictions. 
[Haugwitz.] — " Et lesquelles ? 

[KiNKEL.] — "Si ma memoire ne me trompe, il y s'agit du 
gouvernement Fran^ais en termes de mepris, tandis qu'elle 
annonce que Ton va traiter avec eux ; et il y est question de leurs 
revers, tandis que Ton s'appesantit sur les dangers aux-quels la 
monarchie Prussienne serait exposee si on leur faisait la guerre. 
[Haugwitz.] — "Que voulez-vous quand on devrait faire 
marcher 100,000 hommes sur I'Escaut, ou sur la Meuse, et qu'on 
ne veut pas le faire. II faut necessairement donner des raisons, 
fussent-elles mauvaises. Le Prince d'Orange nous a donne un 
bien grand embarras. Tous ses officiers sont en uniformes, et 
ne veulent pas se soumettre aux lois militaires : ils ont brusque 
les postes. J'ai arrange cela en engageant le Roi de lui ecrire. 
Les deux princes en se quittant se sont faits des reverences et 
ne se sont pas assez expliqu^s. Notre idee est qu'il fasse, mais 



287 

qu'il n'ait pas Fair de faire ; et le Roi, embarrasne de iie pas faire 
plus ])OVLY son beau-frere, n'a pas ose liii dire assez clairement 
ce qu'il pouvait ou ne pouvait pas admettre. 

[KiNKEL.] — " Je suis en verite bien aise de cet aveu de votre 
bouche que le Roi est honteux : il a bien raison de I'etre, car 
jamais aucun monarque n'a 6t6 appele aux devoirs personnels 
de la generosite, et a ceux que lui imposent I'attachement a 
sa famille, d'une maniere indiqu^e plus fortement par les 
interets de sa couronne ; et s'il ne voulait ecouter personne la- 
dessus, il aurait du moins du accepter sa lecon de ses amis les 
Autricbiens. C'est la prudence de I'instinct, si on manque 
d'autres lumieres, de ne jamais faire ce que desirent vosennemis. 
Leur acharnement a ete si grand qu'ils ont mieux aime risquer 
dans cette nouvelle lutte les desastres et les defaits, que de 
s'assurer de la victoire par votre co-operation. La conduite de 
Monsieur de Cobenzl, et celle de Dieterichstein, et mille autres 
incidents vous I'ont prouve jusqu'a I'evidence ; et pourquoi ont- 
ils ce voeu de votre exclusion ? Pour vous isoler ; parceque vous 
les embarrasseriez dans leurs projets d'aggrandissement par votre 
voix au chapitre : ils veulent detacher de vous la Russie, ramener 
a eux I'Angleterre, et vous travaillez si utilement pour eux, sans 
conserver meme la chance de vous jeter entre les bras de la 
France, si vous aviez meme des politiques assez enrages Jacobins 
pour conseiller ce parti desespere. J'avoue que la politique est 
en cela comme I'amour ; on recommence toujours a dire les 
memes choses, et on ne se lasse jamais de les rep^ter ; je vous 
ai dit ceci si souvent. 

[Haugwitz.] — "Cela ne nous a pas echappe, et je puis vous 
dire a cela une bien singuliere anecdote ; c'est que clepuis peu la 
Cour de Yienne nous a fait des ouvertures d'une amitie, d'une 
douceur, et d'une civilite inexprimables. Le Roi en a ete frappe, 
et je lui ai dit que rien n'etait plus simple, que nous meritions 
toute leur faveur en faisant ce qu'ils desiraient. Et une autre 
anecdote, c'est que Dieterichstein, en partant, nous a donne un 
m^moire dans le meme esprit, que Thugut en a ete mecontent, et 
qu'il a dit, ' ce jeune homme a 6te maladroit, il a trop fait eclater 
sa voie. ' Et si vous etes peine du notre conduite, jugez qu'elle 
doit etre mon affliction, qui ai prepare avec une application 
sincere et de longue main les mesures que nous devions prendre 
ii I'heure qu'il est. La paix de Basle etait indispensable; la 
guerre se faisait sans accord, sans harmonie; nous n'avions plus 
d'argent, nous etions embarrasse par nos sottises en Pologne. 
EUe a ete faite, mais je voulais employer le temps pour prendre 
haleine, laisser par nos stipulations les affaires d'Hollande dans 
leur entier, et sur la fin de la lutte venir sur cet objet a la 
rencontre de I'Angleterre. Nous aurions lave tons nos p^ches de 
Basle et du traite de subsides par notre co-operation, et nous en 
serious revenus a I'alliance stable et permanente qui est le voeu 
de mon cceur. 

[KiNKEL.] — " Assurement c'est bien dommage, et par I'^v^ne- 
ment encore plus malheureux pour vous que pour les allies que 
vous n'ayez pas eu I'influence de consommer cet ouvrage. 



288 

[Haugwitz.] — " La Cour de Vienne sortira rayonnante de cette 
affaire ; si la Kussie la pousse trop sur la restoration d'un roi en 
France, elle la plantera, fera une superbe paix. Elle n'a rien a 
craindre : tons les peuples ont re^u au midi leurs le9ons eontre 
la Democratic, mais nous restons dans notre boiirbe d'esprit de 
revolution. A^ous vojez que j'ai suffisamment senti I'^tat de la 
question. Quelles nouvelles des flottes et de I'expedition ? Je 
suis la-dessus dans une inquietude mortelle, pourvu qu'ils ne 
reprennent pas haleine. 

[KiNKEL.] — " Je puis a cet 6gard vous rassurer : il y a des 
nouvelles qu'une autre flotte est toute pr^e pour aller a la 
rencontre de I'ennemi, et qu'aucune mesure relative aux expedi- 
tions du Continent n'a ete pour un seul instant suspendue. 

Haugwitz. — " Grandissime joie. 

KiNKEL. — "Vous paraissez encore toujours esperer, qu'en 
derniere analise, le Roi se prononcera. II met en avant un 
principe qui ne parait pas promettre des resultats favorables ; 
' le bonheur de mon peuple est mon seul devoir, et le bonheur ne 
pent exister que par la paix.' Devant cet axiome il fait disparaitre 
toutes les considerations de dignite, de consideration, d'influence, 
et meme de puissance. Voila comme je fais I'abstraction de son 
f)rincipe, du moins de celui qu'il met en avant. 

Haugwitz. — " Oui, mais je pars de meme princiije. 

KiNKEL. — " Est-ce que Ton a la paix et le bonheur quand Ton 
est entoure de chiens enrages, et qu'un grand nombre ont deja 
penetre jusques dans votre maison." 

Lord Grenville to the Lord Chancellor [Loughborough]. 

1799, August 17. Cleveland Row. — " Since I spoke to you I 
have looked at my memorandum book, and I find an application 
made some time since by Sir James Pulteney that Mr. Murray 
might be succeeded by Mr. Smith, who, I think, was stated to be 
his nephew, and to which I at that time consented. I have 
never heard any more on the subject, and if the present 
arrangement for which you interest yourself can be so managed 
as not to be inconsistent with my engagement to Sir James 
Pulteney, I shall most willingly obey your commands." 
Cojn/. 

William Wickham to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, August 17. EgUsaw on the Rhine. — " I directed the 
messenger Dickins to wait at Schaffhausen until he should hear 
from me from hence, in the hope that I might be able to send 
your Lordship an account of the Austrians having effected their 
passage over the Aar. But I am truly sorry to say that they 
have completely failed, and that the Archduke, at the head of 
forty battalions, has been baffled by the exertions of three or four 
thousand French, the utmost that could be collected on the point 
of attack before four o'clock this afternoon. 



289 

"The passage was so far surprised that the batteries were 
erected, and the first pontoons got well into the water before the 
enemy discovered the attempt. 

" Two bridges were carried about half way across the river, when 
the first of them was carried away by the rapidity of the stream ; 
and the second was prevented from being finished by the French 
musketry, though protected by forty pieces of heavy artillery, which 
the Austrians had placed in battery on their side of the rivei". 

" I believe that the Archduke will renew the attempt 
to-morrow, as I met twenty-five more pieces of heavy cannon and 
above three hundred artillery men on their way to the bridge, as 
I came home this evening. 

" M. de Korsakoff and the other Russian Generals expressed 
much dissatisfaction at the manner in which this attempt was 
conducted ; and the Archduke and his staff-officers looked 
uneasy and ashamed. 

"If the passage be carried to-morrow by the strength of the 
Austrian artillery, as I trust it will, it must necessarily cost a 
great many lives. The French were receiving considerable 
re-inforcements this evening, and were entrenching themselves 
close to the water's edge, and in the woods behind the landing 
stage. In the meantime the Archduke has got all his artillery 
and nearly the whole of his army shut up in a cul-de-sac between 
the Rhine, the Limmet, and the Aar ; and I should not be at all 
surprised if the French were to attempt to take Zurich this night 
or to-morrow, in which case His Royal Highness' s position would 
become highly critical and dangerous. 

" I am truly sorry to add that the French are entirely masters 
of the canton of Schwietz [Schwyz] , where they are committing 
every sort of excess. 

" General Jellachich is at Wangen, having his right on the lake 
of Zurich opposite Rapperschwyl, and his left in the Weggisthall. 

" He has lost a number of men and nearly the whole of his 
artillery. 

" The Swiss legion suffered severely, and behaved admirably 
in the disgraceful affair of Wednesday last before Zurich. 

" Colonel Ramsay would undoubtedly have written to your 
Lordship a more full account of the affair of the Aar, but he has 
been detained by the extreme badness of the roads and darkness 
of the night, and I feel that I ought not to detain the messenger 
any longer." 

Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville. 

[1799, August 16-20. Harley Street.] — " Je vous ai envoys 
ma depeche pour que vous I'arangiez comme vous le voulez. 
Je n'ai pas d'autre vue depuis que je me souviens que de Her 
nos deux pays par I'amitie la plus indissoluble, ainssi faite ce 
que vous voulez ; ajontez, efassez, corigez, attenuez, renforcez. 
Je vous donne ma parole que je fairai copier ma depeche telle 
que vous me renverez celle que je vous ai envoy ez. Je vous 
prie seullement de ne pas exp^dier le courier demain avant 
quatre heures." 

6802 T 



290 

Lord Grenville to William Wickham. 

1799, August 18. Downing Street. — " Your letter and 
despatches which were received here on the 16th have, as you 
will naturally suppose, thrown me into no small degree of 
perplexity. The business of the Swiss levies appeared to me 
however to admit of no delay, and I have therefore settled it as 
follows, though, for the reason which I shall presently state, I 
do not yet write to you officially upon it. 

" I consider Hotze's pretension as totally inadmissible. If he 
wanted to choose the officers himself, this would diminish in 
reality that influence which this country ought to have in return 
for its efforts. If he wants only the appearance, he can want 
that only for the same purpose, and it must therefore for the 
same reason be resisted. You will therefore be directed to 
accept, with all due civility and attention, his resignation. 
Korsakow will by that time be arrived, and I see no difficulty in 
putting the regiments under his orders as commander-in-chief 
of the subsidised army ; reserving however by express explana- 
tion with him ; 

1st. " That the Inspector-General shall be a British officer, 
and shall have exclusive command and control over all matters 
of detail as to the formation of this corps. 

2nd. " That the commissions shall be signed by the King, 
and shall be given by you exclusively, or in conjunction with the 
Inspector-General. 

3rd. " That his Majesty shall reserve to himself, whenever 
the corps shall be sufficiently large, to name a general officer, of 
whatever nation he shall think fit, to assume the command of 
this, as of an auxiliary corps serving with the Russian army ; and 
4th. " That his Majesty will, when he thinks proper, separate 
it from the subsidised Russian army, and put it exclusively 
under the orders of a French Prince ; explaining, however, that 
this is not intended to be done but in the case of actually 
entering into France, or being on the point of doing so. 

" If Colonel Craufurd had even had the rank of full colonel, 
I would have tried to carry a different arrangement, and to 
have procured him local rank as Major- General to command the 
Swiss army under the Russian General ; though I am not sure 
I should have succeeded in this; and, with a Lieutenant- 
Colonel, it is not to be thought of. 

"I mean therefore to offer him, on these terms, the place of 
Inspector-General and Commissary united. But I trust, at the 
same time, I shall have the means (and for that I am waiting) 
of proposing to him to quit the thing entirely, and to take an 
active situation in the Duke of York's staff in lieu of it. I 
should be much hurt to do anything which could injure either 
his interests or his feelings, for I have a real regard and good 
opinion of him ; but this plan will, I think, be more useful and 
more acceptable to him than remaining with the Swiss troops on 
the footing I have mentioned above, and which is the only one 
that I think practicable, 



291 

"I have no doubt that the levies must be made in the way of 
regular regiments, and that the question about the officers must 
be referred back to your decision. I cannot think that it would 
be possible to put Pichegru at the head of the force. 

" I fear we shall really drive Monsieur to despair. My heart 
really bleeds for him. He was on the very point of setting out 
when your despatches arrived ; and with them a fresh remons- 
trance from Peter sburgh against his being employed. I felt 
obliged to suspend his journey, but I shall be anxious to see 
the moment arrive for his resuming it. 

"Lord Mulgrave will have explained to you our projects; 
they were brilliant, but I fear we are too late. 

Postscript. "As there is nothing in my intentions respecting 
Craufurd that is not founded in real good wishes towards him, 
you will use your own discretion in mentioning them to him or 
not. The next mail will probably bring you my official letters, 
and there is* hardly any chance of their being in any respect 
different from what I have here stated. 

"If Craufurd does not remain with you, I mean to offer the 
Inspector-General to Ramsay." 

Count Woeonzow to Lord Grenville. 

[1799, August 18. Harley Street.] — " Comme vous ne m'avez 
pas donne de notte des arguments dont vous vous 6tes servi, pour 
me repondre sur les objections que j'^tois oblige de vous faire 
hier sur I'envoi du Comte d'Artois, et sur la nouvelle instence que 
j'avois aussi ordre de vous faire sur les subsides de la Suede, j'ai 
compris le sens de vos objections sans vous garantire les details 
et les arguments, ayant la plus abominable memoire du monde. 

" Je vous envoi la copie de ma depeche. Examinez la, je vous 
suplie, et s'il y a quelque chose de trop, je pourai I'efacer, et ce 
que j'ai oublie vous pourez le marquer au chevalier Whiteworth, 
auquel je me raporte." 

Lord Mulgrave to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 18. Berlin. — "I arrived at this place late last 
night, and, in obedience to his Majesty's command, took the 
earliest opportunity of communicating with Mr. Grenville. 

" It was with the greatest regret that I received from him an 
extract of the substance of a dispatch. No. 2, from Lord Minto 
to your Lordship, as it appears to preclude the whole ground 
and object of my mission ; not only from Baron Thugut's 
declaration that ' a concert is unnecessary, the plan of operations 
being not only determined upon, but what remains of it about 
to be executed ' ; but also from the nature of that plan of opera- 
tions, which appears to leave no choice of measures to the Russian 
forces, but absolutely to confine them to the object of keeping 
the army of Massena (now, I understand, placed under the com- 
mand of Moreau) in check, for the sole purpose of preventing its 
interference with the Archduke's operations against Mayence, 



292 

" After the very full military discussion which, previous to my 
quitting England, I had with your Lordship on the proposed 
operations either in Switzerland, or on the frontiers of France, it 
will not be necessary for me to trouble your Lordship much at 
length to shew that the progressive removal of the army of the 
Archduke on the arrival of the different divisions of General 
Korsakow's army, and the occupation by these of all the posts at 
present held by the Austrian forces, is relinquishing at once the 
object of the deliverance of Switzerland ; is leaving Piedmont 
entirely in the power and at the disposal of the court of Vienna ; 
and, at the same time, rendering the subsidiary army of 
Korsakoff, and the other forces of the Emperor of Eussia in that 
quarter, the mere defensive instruments of the peculiar military 
and political objects of the Austrians. 

"A combined operation of the Archduke's army with the 
collected forces of Eussia might have driven the French from 
Switzerland, possibly without an action ; or, in the event of their 
hazarding a battle, with the probable destruction of that 
last army of the republic ; after which the operations against 
Mayence (as they are obstinately to be persevered in) might have 
been undertaken with a remaining prospect of a secure position 
on the frontiers of France for the Eussian army, and the oppor- 
tunity of preparing measures for offensive operations in the 
enemy's country at the opening of the ensuing campaign ; w^hereas, 
an attack with the Eussians only on the position of the French 
army in Switzerland, even should it be successful, must be at 
such an expense of men as to render all prospect of further 
service from that army very doubtful, and hardly to be hoped 
for. These considerations appear so plain and obvious, that I 
cannot help apprehending something more than the mere choice 
of military operations to have influenced the decision of the 
Austrian government on this measure. 

" The offer of the co-operation of 30,000 men on the right flank 
of the Eussian army appears to me to be another branch of the 
system of evasion and fallacy which has, with so much address, 
been contrived to withdraw the army of the Archduke from the 
contest in Switzerland to an easy operation under cover of the 
Eussian forces ; for, M. Thugut is well aware that the co-operation 
of those troops at Huningue and Belfort can only be required as 
a measure subsequent to the French being driven out of Switzer- 
land, which he states himself is the utmost that can be effected 
this campaign ; and he accordingly guards the offer of that 
co-operation with the term ' if it is thought expedient by his 
Majesty at the proper season ; that is, at soonest, at the com- 
mencement of the next campaign.' M. Thugut states that the 
Eussian army collected will be equal to that of the Archduke 
now in Switzerland. But (without remarking upon the 
exaggerated estimate of the Swiss force, and the inclusion of 
Ehebinder's corps, which is not within reach), the representa- 
tion made to Mr. Wickham by the Archduke must be 
recollected, in which his Eoyal Highness states that 
although he might succeed in dislodging Massena, that it 



293 

must be elTected by the sacrifice of the flower of his army, and 
such a loss of men as would incapacitate him from further 
exertions or subsequent operation. The reasons which influenced 
the Archduke to abstain from the attempt to force Massena's 
position are intrinsically of equal validity when applied to the 
Kussian army ; but the sacrifice does not appear to be equally 
important in the estimation of M. Thugut, and it seems to have 
escaped his recollection that the deliverance of Switzerland was 
proposed to be effected by a combination, and not by a sub- 
stitution of forces ; and that the co-operation on the right of the 
Russians was to be a consequence only of the favourable result of 
that combined operation. 

"A further question of considerable importance arises, even 
supposing his Majesty's acquiescence in this employment of the 
Russian subsidiary force, and the consent of the Emperor of Russia 
to lend the remainder of his army to the same object; and that is 
the possibility of taking up winter quarters, and procuring 
subsistence, on the line from Zurich to the Valois, with a French 
army on the line from Basle to Geneva. And if that should be 
found impracticable, it will become a question whether Switzerland 
should not at once be relinquished, if the Court of Vienna persist 
in the pursuit of their object at Mayence; and an immediate 
attempt be made to penetrate into France by the way of Chambery 
and Grenoble with the Russian forces : their right being covered 
by the Rhone, and their left by the southern corps already destined 
for that object. I am aware that the Austrians may refuse their 
co-operation in a measure which will either oblige them to remain 
in Switzerland, or to relinquish all the fruits of their operations 
in that country. The only other measure to counteract the 
selfish views of Austria would be to withdraw the Russian troops 
entirely from Italy, and employ them for the object to which the 
army of the Duke of York is destined on the coast of France, in 
the event of the deliverance of Holland and the Netherlands by 
the successful operations of the forces under the direction of his 
Royal Highness. I am not unconscious that the two last are extreme 
and violent measures ; but in a case so difficult and unforeseen 
as the march of the Archduke to Mayence previous to driving the 
French out of Switzerland, and under the circumstance of the 
whole of the Russian force being trepanned into so delicate a 
situation, and tethered to the support of the Austrian operation, 
I have thought it expedient to state to your Lordship everything 
which suggests itself to my mind. 

"I shall proceed to the headquarters of the Archduke (although 
the object of my mission appears to be precluded by the decision 
at Vienna) and endeavour to dissuade His Royal Highness from 
the removal of his army out of Switzerland, at least till the com- 
bined efforts of the Russian and Austrian armies shall have driven 
the French from that country. Should my representations 
not produce the desired effect, I will repair to the head- 
quarters of Marshal Suwarrow, in the hope of inducing 
him to unite with me in the strongest remonstrances to 
the Court of Vienna against this sacrifice of the best 



294 

cantons of Switzerland, this waste of the forces employed 
by His Majesty and the Emperor of Russia for the great 
objects of the common cause. It is much to be 
apprehended that the arrival of General Korsakow's corps 
may have already produced the removal of the army of the 
Archduke. 

"The departure of the courier for England immediately 
does not allow me time to methodize or correct this 
dispatch, or to digest and select my ideas, as I should 
wish to do on a subject of such magnitude and importance; 
but time is above all things precious at this moment, and 
I know that your Lordship's judgment and indulgence will 
correct and excuse all that is defective in my conception of 
the subject. The awkward situation in which I shall feel myself 
personally placed by urging my interference, after the declaration 
of M. Thugut that I am not to be listened to, will chiefly be 
irksome to me inasmuch as it is connected with the 
circumstance of my acting in the name and under the orders of 
His Majesty ; but the importance of the object in my mind 
precludes all considerations of etiquette, even under that 
powerful impression." 

Lord Mulgrave to Lord Grenville. 
Private, 

1799, August 18. Berlin. — ''I proceed with very little hope of 
success ; indeed with none but what rests on the possibility of 
persuading the Archduke that the glory of driving the French out 
of Switzerland, and the completion of what he has so well begun, 
is of sufficient importance to his own reputation to induce him to 
undertake that measure upon his own authority, previous to the 
removal of his army. I fear, however, that we are completely 
taken in Thugut's trap, which is too well laid and too deeply 
considered to be evaded. The march by Grenoble, which I have 
mentioned in my dispatch, is merely stated as the only active 
operation that can be suggested, and one likely (if it were feasible) 
to distress the Austrians very near as much as the French ; but 
I fear it is but an imaginary resource, and I think I can even at 
this distance see insurmountable objections to the adoption 
of that attempt as an insulated operation. 

" As you are already informed of the very serious 
inconvenience to my owai affairs with which I have undertaken 
and am about to prosecute this journey, and as you must also be 
aware of the very pretty figure I shall make at the Archduke's 
headquarters, rejected and disallowed by the Minister at Vienna, 
and upon a fool's errand to discuss what has been determined 
without me, I trust there can be no objection to my immediate 
return from that awkward and irksome situation as soon as 
I shall have laid my reasons before His Royal Highness. If his 
army should have marched, it will be hardly necessary to go 
to Suwarrow. I will not Id char imse if I think I can do anything, 
but I shall have a most uncomfortable and impatient feel, and no 



295 

disposition to stay without good reason. I cannot help regretting 
that I am not detained till you heard again from hence, as this 
awkward business might then have been entirely avoided. I am 
not yet quite convinced that I do right in proceeding, but as it is 
the most disagreeable decision to myself, I am at least persuaded 
that I take it without any bias." 

Lord Grenville to Lord Mulgrave. 
Pnvate. 

1799, August 18. Dropmore. — "I could much have wished 
before I wrote to you to have received Lord Minto's account of 
his conversation with Thugut ; because I think his energy will, in 
the present moment, force out some of those secrets which have 
hitherto been so carefully concealed from us. But I considered 
the difficulties in which you would find yourself on the receipt of 
Lord Henley's letter, and I therefore determined to send this 
messenger off to you without further delay. 

" The intended recall of the Archduke has totally deranged our 
opinions as to the place of treating ; perhaps it is only a pretence 
thrown out for that purpose and not intended to be executed. I 
wish it may be so, but our time is too precious to allow of waiting 
to make this experiment. The conquest of Switzerland ought 
now to follow rapidly on that of Italy ; and although I despair of 
drawing off the Austrians from their project of besieging Mentz, 
I do not see why, if the Italian army is allowed to co-operate 
heartily with us, the project which we discussed here should be 
despaired of. 

" We shall, however, as always happens, be weaker than we 
expected. Korsakow's army, with the Conde troops, will not as 
yet be 40,000. The Wurtemburghers will not be got to act 
separately from the Imperial arms, at least not in time ; and the 
Russians in Italy are said not to be more than 10,000, instead of 
15,000 at which we had put them. These are great defalcations, 
and from Wickham's last despatches they are not likely to be 
soon supplied by Swiss levies ; not, however, that I think that 
part of the force to be despaired of, if the present confusion is 
well settled. 

"It is, however, plain that the whole army will not amount, at 
any early period, to more than 50,000 effective troops, and that 
such a force is not alone sufficient to enter France ; though, if it 
were well seconded by an effective operation (not a diversion 
only) to the southward, I do not see why, in the present state of 
French force, we might not yet succeed. And to this object I 
conceive your endeavours must now be principally directed, 
unless any fresh and sudden change in these fluctuating Austrian 
plans should give a new opening for pursuing the original idea, 
which I consider unquestionably the best. 

" Very much must, however, depend on the political discussions. 
If Thugut persists in declining all explanation of his views, we 
cannot concur in them, for we do not know them, and he will 
always think that we are thwarting them. If Lord Minto 



296 

succeeds in getting him, by fair means or by foul, to speak 
out, I should be very much disposed to think that we might see 
without jealousy almost any accession of strength to Austria, 
provided she would consent to our arranging the Netherlands to 
our satisfaction ; which would certainly not be by giving them to 
Prussia, the result w^hich he is, or pretends to be, apprehensive of. 
"It is, however, in vain to speculate on these points in the dark. 
Before you get to Vienna I hope we shall have made some pro- 
gress in the discussion of them." Cojyy. 

Lord Minto to J. H. Frere. 

1799, August 18. Vienna. — " I received yesterday by the post 
your letter of the 23rd July, and I shall lose no opportunity 
of making and enforcing the representations which you suggest, 
concerning the capitulations to be granted to the French garrisons 
of places surrendering to the Imperial arms. I had indeed been 
so strongly impressed Avith the ill consequences w^hich the return 
of so many disciplined and veteran troops into France must 
produce, that I ventured to state my sentiments, which I knew 
also to be those of Government at home, to M. de Thugut, 
the first time I ever saw him, and before I had acquired a formal 
title to speak to him on business. I mentioned this subject 
to him on the occasion of the expected surrender of Mantua. 
But he told me that, with a view to that particular capitulation, 
it was too late to take any step, and therefore unnecessary 
to discuss the point, for he had no doubt the matter was already 
decided and executed at Mantua. This proved in effect to be the 
case, for the news of the surrender arrived two or three days 
afterwards. On this subject the Austrian oliicers plead the great 
necessity of expediting the capture of so many forts and towns, 
and the difficulty of disposing of such a multitude of prisoners, 
the number in the possession of the Austrian s being already 
immense. With regard to Mantua, the object was so great that 
one cannot be surprised at their embracing the earliest means to 
obtain possession of it, and, in point of fact, a very short delay 
in settling the capitulation would have retarded the surrender of 
the place very materially, as w^ell as created very serious 
difficulties in accomplishing that desirable event. A violent 
inundation took place the same day or the day after, which 
destroyed or rendered entirely useless the principal works of 
the besiegers, and the difficulty as well as the delay in restoring 
them would have been extreme. I am, nevertheless, fully sensible 
how desirable it is to prevent conditions so favourable to the enemy, 
and so prejudicial to the main object of the war, from being granted 
in future where it is possible to avoid it ; and you may depend on 
my using my best endeavours for that purpose, in compliance with 
the instructions which your letter sufficiently announces." 

Lieutenant-General Sir Ealph Abercromby to 
Henry Dundas. 

1799, August 18. H.M.S. Ms, at sea.—" I had the honour of 
writing you on Wednesday last the 14th instant, in which I stated 



I 



297 

my intention of going directly against the Helder as the object 
of the greatest magnitude, and, with all the risk and difficulties 
which might attend it, more practicable than the attack on the 
Island of Voorn. Unfortunately, since Wednesday evening, we 
have had a continued gale of wind, such as must be considered 
as very uncommon at this season of the year. We have twice 
had communication with Lord Duncan, who has promised all the 
assistance his squadron can afford ; at this moment there is no 
prospect of our being able to avail ourselves of it. Should the 
weather become more moderate, and should the transports keep 
together, we shall seize the first favourable opportunity of trying 
a landing to the southward of Kyck Duyn, where we apprehend 
we can maintain ourselves against any attempt of the enemy 
until we have forced the redoubt and batteries at the Helder. I 
do not presume to say that this can be effected without risk on 
an inhospitable coast wnich affords no shelter, and which cannot, 
be approached at any time, with a great fleet, without caution. 
Hitherto the fleet has kept together wonderfully, owing to the 
moonlight. If we had lost sight of many of the transports I 
should not have thought it advisable to have persevered in the 
attempt, because the force we had at sailing was not more than 
sufficient for so arduous an enterprize, for once on those shores we 
could not look to a retreat. This weather seems to preclude any 
prospect of being joined by the Russians. The only assistance 
we can expect is from Barham Downs. It is difficult for me to 
say what I wish on this occasion ; if w^e succeed in landing we 
shall w'ant immediate assistance, but to send a fresh embarkation 
of troops to sea, on an uncertainty, is what I should not advise. 
Let them be embarked and ready to sail, should the weather clear 
up, directing their course towards the Texel. The transports are 
only victualled for one month, and some of the troops have been 
on board twelve days. We have heard nothing of the Pomona 
and Cynthia that w^ent towards the coast of Flanders and 
Zealand." Copy. 

Postscript. " I shall send a letter to Emden to see what is 
going on, with a letter to the Hereditary Prince of Orange." 

Vice-Admiral Mitchell to Henry Dundas. 

1799, August 18. Isis, at sea. — "Although the General has, I 
suppose, wrote you fully, yet as I promised, I shall state to you 
the very great anxiety and mortification I have suffered since I 
last wrote you. The weather that evening was favourable, but 
the alteration that took place next day for the worse, and its 
unprecedented continuation at this season of the year I shall ever 
have cause to lament, as well as the many who are so intimately 
connected with the success of the expedition, amongst these, Sir, 
you will in particular. 

'' The convoy has as yet kept up and together wonderfully, 
and, if it would only moderate, we should be at issue, and will 
entertain little doubt of our success, in a short while, as the 
distance is so trifling. I have at noon, as per log, given you our 



298 

situation, by remarking the hearings of the Texel. I trust that 
whatever may be the result that no blame will be imputed to me 
in the management of so large a convoy in the narrow seas, 
in endeavouring to keep a position to approach a given point the 
moment the weather will permit. We have had little com- 
munication with Lord Duncan as yet from the badness of the 
weather, but must as soon as possible be in sight to the 
southward of me with part of his squadron. I never could have 
believed to have had such a length of bad weather in this month. 
I hope the seamen will not take it into their heads to think my 
friend the General is a second Jonas — they have all been 
sea-sick. My next I trust will be more satisfactory." Copy, 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, August 19. Berlin. — " I have explained to you in 
my public dispatch the reasons which have induced me to give 
a short delay to the termination of my residence here ; the hasty 
and passionate measures of the Emperor at this Court require all 
the assistance which can be derived from the better temper of the 
English Cabinet; and the present circumstances of Holland and 
the situation of the Hereditary Prince of Orange have not as yet 
appeared to admit of my presence on the frontiers giving them 
any assistance ; the moment however that I shall see this change 
from the impression of Abercromby's disembarkation, I shall be 
better able to judge what will be the most useful direction which 
I can give to my route from hence; meantime I cannot omit the 
suggesting to you how many important motives there seem to be 
for your sending the Stadtholder to Brill as soon as the English 
troops shall have obtained, by the possession of it, the means of 
placing him there. You are probably no stranger to the 
contradictory parties and politics which prevail in the family 
of the Stadtholder, and you certainly have not now to learn that, 
whatever is the deficiency of his talents for government, he 
is very entirely determined that neither the Princess nor the 
Prince shall govern for him ; and in spite of the consideration 
which he shews to her, and the full powers which he has given to 
him, I am assured that, either absent or present, he will find 
abundant means of counteracting everything that is done or that 
is proposed to be done without him. I have already perceived 
strong traces of this disposition and of the bad eft'ects of it ; 
and although I am aware, that, in some respects, much 
inconvenience will be produced by the langour and apathy 
which his presence may bring to the course of active 
business, nevertheless, upon the whole, I cannot help 
believing that the unity of councils and measures which 
would result from his coming to the Brill would, upon the whole, 
produce more advantage than inconvenience ; nor is it a slight 
motive for this to recollect how much more generally popular is 
the Stadtholder than the Hereditary Prince in Holland, and how 
satisfactory an answer the presence of the Stadtholder would give 



299 

to the loose suggestions which are thrown out, of a desire to 
supersede him and to place his son in his room. If you agree 
with me in this view of the subject, you will not find it difficult to 
use the influence of the Princess of Orange to obtain his speedy 
embarkation ; for, doubtless, the manly spirit and intelligence of 
her character will naturally lead her to wish as soon as possible 
to ajDproach the scene of action, and to see her husband take as 
forward a figure as he can in the restoration of the government 
of his country. In my former letter I stated to you the necessity 
which there was for the presence of the Greffier, a necessity very 
much increased by the indisposition and inability of the Grand 
Pensionary ; and as I presume that the Greffier does not mean to 
separate himself from the Stadtholder, I cannot help wishing to 
hear of the prompt arrival of both of them, as soon as the Brill 
and Helvoetsluys are in our possession ; and though I have yet 
no intelligence of Abercrombie, I cannot help flattering myself 
that this event has already taken place. 

"Mr. Hammond will have told you that Abercrombie's and 
Malcolm's papers were at Walmer, and therefore that, as yet, I 
have no knowledge of them. My first recommendation to Colonel 
Malcolm will be that he should see Le Palue, who is a very good 
militar}^ man, full of zeal and intelligence, and with a good deal 
more of military science than M. D'Yvoy possesses ; but in these 
matters you know how exclusively every agent wishes to act, and 
how difficult it is to make any one draw with any other, their 
mutual hatreds being so much greater than that of the common 
enemy. I have still the same horror of splashing into all this 
Dutch tnpotafje, but, nevertheless, I will work fairly through w^hat- 
ever of it may fairly belong to me if there is any chance of my 
doing good and real service ; but it is a subject through which, I 
must very fairly acknowledge, I do not see my way. 

'* Lord Mulgrave, I know, is not sparing of his pen, and he will 
probably tell you at length all that has passed between us. The 
reflection of some days has rather increased than lessened my 
indignation at the conduct of Austria, and I have done everything 
w^hich I could to confirm Lord Mulgrave in the prosecution of his 
journey, in hopes that he will fight a good English battle against 
these German Jews. I think there is some knavery at Vienna, 
too, on the part of Rozamousky ; how can it be possible that he 
should be authorized to approve the siege of Mayence, at the 
same time that the Emperor of Russia concurs with us in trying 
to enforce the original plan of campaign ? How can it be that the 
Russian Emperor consents to surrender the King of Saidinia to 
the Court of Vienna at the moment when, by Whitworth's last 
despatches, he is expressing his apprehensions of their ambitious 
designs, and proposing to us to make head against them in con- 
cert with him ? I have not thought it worth while to notice to 
you the last proposal from Petersburgh, because I think it 
evident that no such simulacre de congres could now do any 
good ; a congress to concert operations in the beginning of this 
campaign was a good measure, if it could have been brought to 
bear ; but in the present state of the campaign, with the conquests 



800 

already made by Austria, and the views which are avowed at 
Vienna by Thugut to Lord Minto, a congress for the discussion 
of those views must be a hostile measure towards Austria, and 
will be so considered by them, and therefore will produce nothing 
but bickering and ill blood ; I do not therefore quote this measure 
as approving of it, but as a measure which demonstrates at 
Petersburg the jealousy held there of Austria, at the same 
moment that Rozamouski is, in the Emperor's name, forward- 
ing and assisting the objects of Austrian ambition. In this state 
of things I have recommended to Lord Mulgrave to go on 
immediately to Suwarrow, and learn his sentiments upon the 
present plan of campaign. We believe here that Suwarrow has 
unbounded powers from his master, and if he sees the objections 
which we feel to Thugut's plan, I should recommend to Lord 
Mulgrave then to go armed with Sawarrow's authority to Vienna, 
and menace them plainly with the withdrawing the Russian 
army from Switzerland to Flanders and the has EJiin, if they 
persist in their Mayence project against the opinion of Russia 
and of England. If, on the other hand, Suwarrow approves of the 
Austrian project on Mayence, and will trust for his army to the 
support of the intermediate 30,000 men announced for that pur- 
pose by Thugut, then and in that case I should think Lord 
Mulgrave might lend himself to the concert of this plan. To be 
sure it will be mortifying enough, because if the operations are 
to be divided, you had much better originally have sent your 
45,000 Russians to the middle Rhine ; but now, by this measure 
of Thugut's, you have all the disadvantage of divided operations 
by the most roundabout course which could have been imagined 
for them. I have, however, still some hopes of Suwarrow resist- 
ing Thugut, and I find he has new means and motives to do so, 
for the King of Sardinia has made Suwarrow Field Marshal and 
Commander-in-Chief of all his troops, besides calling him cousin 
and prince and all the fine names which could be furnished from 
the Herald's Office at Turin ; surely the stout old Russian will 
never let them lock up these honours at Vienna with the poor 
miserable King that gave them to him. 

"It is now long since I have done all I could by means of 
Castel Alfieri to hasten the return of the King to Turin, and 
yesterday his Minister told me that he had profited by all 
my good lessons, and hoped he had succeeded in obtaining the 
immediate return of that monarch. Do write to Petersburg and 
scold our friend Paul out of this shabby dereliction of the 
Sardinian king which they boast at Vienna to have obtained at 
Petersburg, but which I still think is a mistake, or a treacherous 
work in the hands of Rozamousky. I must not finish this subject 
without informing you from good authority that the King of 
Naples has just signed a treaty with Vienna to secure to the house 
of Austria the successsion of Naples, in prejudice of the King of 
Spain ; you see that by this measure they declare their intention 
at Vienna of becoming masters of all Italy if you will let them. 

" I must still add to this long letter upon the subject of General 
Stamford ; you who know how highly I esteem him will not 



301 

wonder at my desire to retain, as long as I can want it, the benefit 
of his Hberal spirit, of his intelHgent and zealous assistance ; and 
I have, though against his inclination, prevailed upon him to 
consent to pass into Holland whenever I shall be obliged to do 
so. 

"For this purpose I must desire of you to be so good as to 
obtain a proper letter to him from the Stadtholder. He thinks 
it best that he should not be recalled from Berlin as Chanie 
(V Affaires, because that would give an improper appearance of 
hostility between the house of Orange and Charlottenburg ; and I 
agree with him in wishing that he may receive without delay a 
permission from the Stadtholder to absent himself for a time 
from Berlin without being recalled from thence. By this means I 
shall have the advantage of his society and assistance, and he 
will still be enabled to be useful at Berlin whenever the occasion 
shall arise. Pray have the goodness to lose no time in sending 
the proper letter upon this subject from the Stadtholder. 

" I have this moment heard from the Prince of Orange from 
Lingen of the 15th instant, and have the pleasure to find that 
Vander Spiegel is at Emerick, and is on his road to Weerdt to 
meet the Hereditary Prince, with whom he is to return to Lingen. 

"They have heard of a firing from cannon near Flushing on 
the 10th, but I believe it was only the fete of the 10th August ; I 
wish I could feel confident that it was the fete d'Ahercromhie. 
The Hereditary Prince says that all his accounts are good, but 
the country is so wound up that he fears an immediate explosion, 
and this fear is another motive for our impatience to hear of 
Abercrombie. 

" Of news I have none, except that Bellegarde is marched with 
22,000 men through Savoy to Switzerland, and that Massena, or 
rather Moreau, has detached two divisions and a half to meet 
him ; surely a fine opportunity for the Archduke to attack." 

Enclosure. 

Thomas Gkenville to Lord Minto. 

1799, August 15. Berlin. — "The dispatches which you sent 
to me under flying-seal, and which arrived here this morning, 
appeared to me to be so important that my impatience to forward 
them by the messenger of to-day has prevented me from giving 
to them as collected an attention as they deserved and required. 
Shall I not, however, confess the general impression which they 
made upon me ? Shall I not acknowledge that it was difiicult for 
me to read of the immoderate and insatiable demands of Austria 
with all the patience and good temper with which you have 
written of them? It is fortunate for you, and for the better 
occupation of your time, that the English dispatches of which 
Basset is the bearer to you will not allow of my detaining him 
long enough to give you the full swing of the Berlin commentary. 

" I do not undertake to trouble you with any military criticism 
upon the new military plan which is proposed, but I confess I 
think it difiicult for the Austrian Cabinet to shew why they could 



302 

not have satisfied their desire of bringing some force to bear 
upon the Middle Khine, by placing there the new corps of 
80,000 men, which might still have left the original plan of the 
allied Courts to its whole and complete strength and effect. 

" The complaint which I should feel disposed to make at 
Vienna is that every single circumstance of every part of the 
proposals now brought forward by the Austrian Cabinet are each 
of them conceived in the greediest spirit of separate gain, and 
there is not even an affectation on their part of accommodating 
any one of their demands to any other point beyond their own 
direct and immediate advantage, and that to the most unbounded 
and immoderate extent. 

" What is the change of their plan of operations except a 
desire of removing from Italy the interruptions which Suwarow 
gives to their hostile occupation of the dominions of Sardinia ? 
What is the avowed principle of their new march to Mayence but 
to add to Venice the re-occupation of the Netherlands which they 
had abandoned for it ? Where is it on the whole circle of their 
territory that they are not looking for and almost announcing 
their intentions of aggrandisement ? 

" Their views in Italy no longer rest upon a barrier against 
France, but openly look to the control of all Italy and the terri- 
torial occupation of the greatest part of it ; for after Venice, 
Milan, Piedmont, Savoy, Lombardy, and Tuscan}', I know not 
why the nominal monarchy of Naples should be left, only to do 
homage to the real sovereign of the whole country; and with this 
you will observe that they are betraying as restless an avidity on 
the side of the Low Countries as they could have done if they 
had lost all their possessions, and were again bargaining for 
room to breathe round the city of Vienna. 

" Look then to the subject of military expense, and see that by 
the assistance of Russian troops in Italy they have scarcely 
recovered from their first panic, before they discard their 
auxiliaries, refuse them bread to eat in the country which they 
have saved, and desire of Great Britain to pay them and to employ 
them so as to prevent the French from breaking in upon 
Austrian Piedmont. If we refuse this we shall be taunted with 
the failures which will result from it; if we accede to it, instead 
of multiplying the allied arms by our subsidy, we shall only have 
relieved the purse of Austria by that of England, without adding 
new or increased force to be opposed against the common 
enemy. 

" Not to leave the subject of expense, look now at their pro- 
posal respecting the convention. 

"Thugut tells you fairly that, ratified or unratified, no money 
can be paid, and no arrears discharged ; but what is worse, this 
ratification, unproductive in payment, is to be equally unsatis- 
factory even in form, and they will not sign what they have 
promised to sign, except with the new promise made to them 
that this signature of theirs shall never be disclosed. What can 
they think that we want in the ratification if, both in form and 
substance, it is to be as if it had never happened. 



803 

" I will not pursue this harsh and ungracious task whch you 
will naturally think I have too much dwelt upon ; but what I 
chiefly meant to insist upon is, the whole of this heavy account 
offers not one single article in it which has even the semblance 
of advantage to the common cause, or to the cause of any power in 
Europe except the cause of Austria; and surely it a most ungracious 
proceeding in my old friend Thugut, that in a discussion of 
common and reciprocal interests, he should not give to us one 
single article which bears even a friendly seeming in our favour. 

" It is very true that his business is to make his demands and 
to expect yours, but, without some principle of equitable forbear- 
ance to be reciprocally applied in these discussions, I do not see 
how they differ from other acts of hostility, although between 
the pen and the sword there is some difference in the weapon. 

"I must not overlook in my catalogue of Austrian grievances 
one to which, as to most of them, you are as sensible as I am, 
though you are more patient and more temperate in treating of 
them than I am ; I mean the solicited mission of Lord Mulgrave, 
solicited by Thugut himself, and now referred by him to the 
possible future concert of the next campaign. I was w-aked this 
morning by an account that Lord Mulgrave was on his road from 
Cuxhaven. You will easily believe that I feel for the awkward- 
ness, the indelicacy, and the impropriety of the situation in which 
he is placed by these projects of Austrian acquisition ; but I do 
not know that in his situation I should feel it incumbent upon 
me to stop short because Thugut had turned round ; I cannot 
affect to offer any advice to Lord Mulgrave, and certainly he does 
not stand in need of any, but to me it seems doubtful whether, 
having come as far as Berlin, he might not with some advantage 
ask at Vienna through your interference, why he was sent for in 
July to be sent back in August. 

" Upon this point however, as upon the whole of this subject, 
it will bp my province only to hear your decision and his ; I wish 
for his sake he had not come, but he only can decide whether to 
return or to go on. 

" I am ashamed of keeping the messenger from you while I am 
unprofitably lengthening out this letter ; but I have written so 
much and so freely because I feel confident that you will con- 
sider my doing so as the best proof I could give of just and real 
esteem and friendship. 

" I have nothing new to say from Berlin. The King seems 
confirmed in his neutral system, and rejoices in his escape from 
his treaty of co-operation ; they appear to have no answer yet 
from Paris. The expedition from England goes on, and I trust 
that I shall not stay long after the next mail, though I have not 
yet heard the Cabinet determination. 

" The Emperor of Russia has recalled the mission, but that is 
all ; it is very bad, but hostility would have been worse." Copy. 

The Marquis of Buckingham to Lord Grenville. 
1799, August. Stowe. — "Your gazette extraordinary is indeed 
most complete ; for the progress of Suwarrow leads (as far as I 



304 

can judge) to the most decided consequences to Switzerland, now 
open to supplies and assistance ; and to southern Italy cut off 
from all intercourse with France. Still however the fortresses 
of Piedmont are such a formidable barrier that, unless they have 
been neglected in every part of their appointment, they will give 
time to the French to recover the effects of the first blows that 
have stunned them. These blows must be assisted by offensive 
operations in Holland and Flanders from England, and with a 
force equal to the object ; and I do not despair of seeing the great 
nation check-mate, even though Tom's Prussian shall continue 
as obstinately neutral as he has hitherto done. I see the 
necessity of this offensive system so strongly, that I am 
miserable in not having yet seen any measures taken that 
appear likely to enable you to collect the 25 or 30,000 men 
necessary for such an operation. As to the French fleet, their 
manoeuvre of sending six Spanish ships from Ferrol to the 
Isle of Aix, irith troops on hoard, makes that chapter still more 
inexplicable, unless the putting into that port has been matter 
of necessity and not of choice. At all events, I should imagine 
that the Mediterranean is now the object, as it opens to them a 
very wide field of enterprise and of relief to their falling cause in 
Egypt, Malta, Naples ; and I fear that you cannot hope to guard 
against all of the very many contingencies that may turn up as 
trumps to them in that quarter. I cannot help thinking that 
more ships might be spared for the reinforcement of Lord St. 
Vincent without risking Ireland. 

" I am now to be a suitor to you on behalf of our friend Praed, 
who wants to convert a St. Ives parson into a holder of two livings 
by the magic talisman of a chaplainc}^ which I cannot give him, 
my list being full, and w^hich he and I humbly sue at your hands." 

The Hereditary Prince of Orange to the Prince of Orange. 

1799, August 19. Lingen. — Revenu hier-au-soir de I'entrevue 
que j'ai eue avec le conseiller Pensionaire, et a la quelle ont 
egalement assist6s le Drossard Bentinck et le conseiller Brandsen, 
je m'empresse de vous informer que j'ai trouve le premier de 
ces Messieurs jouissant d'une fort bonne sante, et ayant la tete 
aussi nette qu'il soit possible de le desirer. II a pris ses mesures 
de maniere a pouvoir rester jusqu'a ce que nous puissions 
pen^trer dans la Republique meme. Les idees de M. Van 
der Spiegel relativement a I'etablissement d'une administration 
provisoire dans les Provinces s'accordent, en general, avec les 
miennes, de meme que sur la convocation des membres qui 
formeront I'administration de I'union, et prendront la place des 
Etats Generaux. Vous serez a meme d'en juger par le memoire 
dont je vous envoye ci-joint la copie, ainsi que de la proclama- 
tion telle qu'elle a ete definitivement arretee apres les conversa- 
tions tenues avec ces Messieurs. Vous remarquerez qu'elle est 
parfaitement conforme a celles qui ont ete dressees en Angleterre, 
et que les difficultes que le mot d'amnestie paroissoit oftrir a 
bien des personnes, ^e trouvent levies par la tournure qui a et6 
donn^e a cet article, qui, pour le fond, est reste le meme. 



f 



805 

" Je m'etois flatty de trouver Aylva et Mollerus au rendez-vous 
propose, mais j'ai 6te tromp^ dans cet espoir. Mollerus m'a 
fait savoir que la crainte d'exposer sa femme et ses enfans, et la 
possibility qu'il fut oblige de rester hors du pays I'avoient 
engage a renoncer a son projet. 

" On m'6crit de Berlin que M. de Haugwitz a continue apres 
mon depart a donner les assurances les plus prononcees sur la 
rupture des negociations avec le Directoire, mais que, tout 
nouvellement, il etoit aise de voir qu'il cherchoit a se 
rapprocher lui-meme des principes d'apres lesquels il etoit 
force d'agir, et xle justifier le changement par le desespoir, 
et par la conviction que le parti etoit pris sans retour ; qu'il 
ne dissimuloit plus que les bases propos^es par le Gouvernement 
Francois tendent a ce qu'aucune des puissances coalis6es n'aye 
des relations dans la Kepublique ; en un mot qu'il est question du 
retablissement du Stadhouderat accorde par le Directoire a 
I'intercession Prussienne, et a condition de rester li^ aux mesures 
utile et avantageuses a la France, 

" L'on mande de I'interieur que I'isle de Goeree a ^te canonn^e 
par les Anglois le 4 de ce mois, et qu'il y a eu quelques maisons 
de brulees et deux canonniers tues ; que du depuis Ton entend 
tirer journellement de ces cotes. Je n'ai rien appris de 
ult^rieur de I'affaire de Van Braam, si ce n'est que Verheuil lui a 
parle, que tout est en ordre, et qu'il s'est engage a me faire 
parvenir sur le champ le r^sultat de ce qu'il aura execute." Copy. 

W. Windham to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 20. Park Street, Westminster. — "I have been 
changing backwards and forwards in great uncertainty respecting 
the choice of a proper residence for Monsieur ; but am upon the 
whole inclined to rest in my original opinion, especially when 
confirmed by that of Monsieur himself, that the Isle of Wight 
would have too strongly the air of something being intended on 
the coast of France to be consistent with the system necessarily 
acted upon at present of keeping back the insurrection of the 
Royalists as long as possible. If the effect of Monsieur's presence 
in the Isle of Wight was to be the attraction of our thoughts, the 
drawing down of our blood-sluices to that quarter, I should feel, 
perhaps, in that consideration a compensation for every other 
inconvenience. But as I fear it will make no difference in that 
respect, I yield to my own first apprehensions, backed by a pretty 
strong opinion on his part, and should prefer to see him placed 
in some part less declaratory of an intention to make use of him 
on the side which such a situation as the Isle of Wight would 
seem to indicate. Perhaps, if the Isle of Wight should 
ultimately be chosen, as I understand it to be the situation which 
is at present looked to, a corrective of what I apprehend may be 
found in the opinion that the placing him there was intended 
only as a blind ; and that we can never intend any serious 
operations in France while we are sending all our force to be 
ingulfed (I beg pardon for the expression) in the bogs of Holland. 

6802 U 



BOB 

That we may not be driven to determine upon the Isle of Wight 
for want of some other situation let me at least mention that, in 
talking with Pelham this morning, two places have occurred to 
him ; one a house of Lord Onslow's near Guildford, which he 
conceives may be at present to be let ; another a house of his 
father's in Sussex, upon the coast indeed and close to the shore, 
but not in a part which has ever been marked out as being, or 
which is capable of becoming a place of embarkation. The 
former of these, in respect of its distance from London, I should 
say was the most eligible. Cranbourne would appear to me a 
very proper place, but I am afraid it would not appear so to 
others. Swinley, 1 understand, has not sufficient accommodation 
even for the few persons that Monsieur would have with him. 
The King's house at Newmarket which has likewise occurred, 
would be objectionable on account of the possibility of his stay 
being extended till the time of the October meeting. Cheveley, 
if untenanted, would only partake in the objection of being 
somewhat too far distant from London. A means of enabling 
him to quit London, which is what he is most anxious about, 
cannot fail to be speedily found, if a proper person is employed 
whose business it should be to make the enquiry. 

"I cannot but apprehend a further inconvenience in placing 
Monsieur in a situation which may seem to imply an intention 
of acting on the coast of France, namely the use which may 
be made of the circumstance in the Opposition prints. If 
Parliament were sitting, or if we had any papers that would 
take up the question on the other side, I should think the 
circumstance a recommendation. But, in the sort of unoccupied 
and untenanted state in which men's minds are apt to be upon 
questions of this sort, I should have great fear of the notions 
with which they might first be filled, and still more of the 
impression with such notions might make upon our counsels. 
If you think that we are proof against this danger, the objection 
loses of course the greater part of its force. 

' ' There is a matter of another sort which I have often forgot 
to mention, particularly when I saw you at your house the other 
day. I have never known distinctly what the sort of minutes 
were that were kept of the proceedings of Cabinet ; or how far 
those who were present, and have entered no express declaration 
of dissent, would appear on any sort of record as parties to the 
measures adopted. It has happened, of course, on numerous 
occasions that I have felt myself in a minority with respect to 
questions more or less discussed in Cabinet, without any wish to 
mark my dissent from the decision generally taken. On the 
principal questions respecting the negotiations for peace, that 
dissent, I conceive, was marked, as far as I felt it at the time 
necessary to be so, by my either being absent or being entered 
as such. The same happened on some of the questions which 
seemed to decide on the general direction given to the war in the 
beginning of '96. But the change of system adopted at that time 
came on in such a way, and rested, as far as I recollect, so little 
on any decision of Cabinet formally taken, that I hardly know 



I 



807 

whether the opinions of individual members, one way or another, 

were Hkeiy to appear. 

" Upon the present occasion my opinion is, I am sorry to 
think, so decidedly adverse to the com*se of proceeding adopted, 
and which has, I know, your particular concurrence, and the 
subject is of itself so important that, though I have no particular 
anxiety to mark my dissent, I should naturally feel unwilling to 
appear on the face of any document as having concurred in it. 
The course of proceeding which I mean is that of directing our 
force against Holland and Flanders, instead of reserving it for 
operations on the coast of France as soon as the allies shall 
have entered from the other side. In this, as in other cases, the 
general measure has come on so gradually, and often in a way 
to be so little of a res Integra at the time when it has been 
mentioned that, having no previous notice of the questions about 
to be proposed, it has been difficult to say where dissent could 
be distinctly expressed. But I believe you will readily agree 
that there has been no time in which the coast of France would 
not have been my primary object, supposing the allies to have 
been ready to co-operate; or in which I did not declare my wish, 
so far as occasions occurred of declaring it, that we should leave 
ourselves open for that object, supposing the case to happen in 
which alone it could be desirable. 

"All, therefore, that I am anxious about is that I may, in 
some way or another, avoid the appearance of concurring in a 
system which is directly repugnant to my own ideas. I should 
have no objection to stating my reasons at length, grounding, of 
course, my dissent not upon anything arising out of the event, 
and which in fact is as likely to prove adverse to my opinion as 
favourable to it, but upon those considerations that have at all 
times determined me, and with which the event has very little 
to do. I am not solicitous, however, for more than that I may 
not be considered as assenting to the present measures. In my 
idea the expedition to Holland can in no degree answer, except 
in the single case of the country being surrendered to us, so as 
to admit of our troops being drawn away in time for co-operation 
with the allies as soon as they may have entered France ; and I 
do not think the probability of that case happening, or the 
advantages to be expected from it so great as that I should be 
willing for the sake of that hope to risk the evils which, in 
different degrees, will arise, as I conceive,' upon every other 
supposition. 

" I have delayed this letter so long, in consequence of some 
matters which have engrossed my thoughts of a private nature, 
that the first part will, I fear, have become useless. Should 
anything be necessary on the other subject to answer the 
purpose which I have stated, I will be obliged to you to let me 
know." 

George Hammond to Lord Grenville. 
1799, August 21. Downing Street.—" I am very happy to 
send your Lordship a copy of Captain Keynold's letter, which 



308 

gives as satisfactory an account of the expedition as could I think 
be hoped. The Griper gun boat is arrived at Sunderland. The 
Lieutenant of her reports that he left the fleet also after the gale 
(having suffered so much that he was obliged to make for the 
nearest port) and that the fleet was collected, and none of them 
appeared to have suffered excepting his own vessel and two of 
the troop-ships which had lost their main top sail yards. 

*' Mr. Pitt has desired me to say that he thinks there will be 
some account before Friday, on which day he will most certainly 
be in town, but he shall hold himself in readiness for coming to- 
morrow in the event of any accounts being received in the course 
of this night or to-morrow morning. Count John Bentinck has 
been here. He says that Count Ehoon, being anxious to see your 
Lordship before he sees the Prince of Orange or any other person, 
will wait upon your Lordship at Dropmore to-morrow morning." 

Postscript. "Your Lordship will recollect that the gale of 
Thursday was the first and most violent we had. Admiral 
Mitchell's squadron got sight of Lord Duncan's fleet before the 
Pomona parted from the former." 

Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 21. Harley Street. — ** Je vous envoi la traduc- 
tion de la d^peche que votre courier m'a apporte ce matin de 
Petersbourg. Je joins aussi la lettre confidentielle que j'ai re9u 
de Comte Kotchoubei. Gardez la premiere, mais je vous prie 
de me renvoyer la seconde. II me semble que les explications 
que notre Cour demande a ses allies sont prematurees, et qu'elle 
a tort de croire que la guerre est sur le point d'etre termin^e. 
J'esp^re que vous ne m'oublierez pas quand vous viendrez en 
ville, et que vous me fairez savoir quand je pourai vous voir." 

Henry Dundas to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 21. Downing Street. — " The shortest way of 
showing you the progress we have made is to send you the letter 
and return this morning received. There are transports ready for 
six thousand men, which therefore can be ordered anywhere within 
an hour after we receive accounts from Sir Ealph Abercrombie." 

Lord Grenville to Henry Dundas. 

1799, August 22. Dropmore. — " I have received your letter 
with the return, which is indeed highly satisfactory. The 
intelligence I sent jom yesterday speaks of reinforcements being 
sent to the Helder, and although I trust there is little doubt of 
our succeeding there in the first instance, yet I submit to you 
whether the next 6,000 men should not now be embarked with- 
out waiting to hear more, and sent to Lord Duncan's rendezvous, 
from whence he would either send them to join Abercrombie, or 
in case (I hope and trust a very improbable one) of any 
unexpected misfortune, he would prevent their committing 
themselves to any risk, and would either send them on to 
Delfzyll, or return them to you. 



809 

*'It must be expected that on Abercrombie's first landing 
every effort will be made that they can make to opjoose him. 
The first week or ten days is therefore the critical period, and if 
they should be stronger than we expect, a few days either way 
may be very material. 

"When these six thousand have joined him, he will have little 
less than 20,000 troops, besides the assistance of as many 
seamen and marines as he can draw from Lord Duncan's fleet ; 
and with that force he will surely be strong enough to wait for 
the Eussians, if not to advance. The next division after these 
six thousand might therefore I hope go to Ameland. If he 
should succeed more rapidly than he had hoped, and should 
himself judge that he does not want the first 6,000, he may send 
tliein round to Ameland, but this is not likely. 

" I am greatly obliged to you for having settled Craufurd's 
business in a manner which, I trust, will remove all difficulties." 
Copy. 

Henry Dundas to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 22. London. — "I need not say anything in 
answer to your letter of yesterday, as the letter from the Duke of 
York will have set your mind at ease on the subject of Colonel 
Craufurd. In truth it is a great convenience to put him in the 
department along with Colonel Anstruther. 

"I have this morning heard from Sir Ealph Abercrombie and 
Admiral Mitchell. I send you copies.^** It is miraculous how 
they have kept together, and I trust I am not too sanguine in 
hoping that we are soon to [hear] of their having made good 
their landing. I have sent the orders for the two brigades at 
Barham Downs for which we have transports to march 
immediately and embark. That is all Sir E. Abercombie suggests ; 
but I confess to you my own feelings dictate that I ought to 
follow that order with another to sail, even if I should not hear 
further from Sir Ealph in the course of this day or to-morrow. 
If under any unexpected disappointment they should be even 
obliged to return without being of use, I don't think that is a 
reason which ought to weigh with me, for the chance of a 
disappointment in the first instance is not to be put in 
competition with the important benefits that may arise from the 
arrival of so substantial a reinforcement at a critical moment 
when they may be wanted." 

Count Starhemberg to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 22. London. — " J'ai I'honneur de vous envoyer 
ci-joint une lettre que j'ai re9U du Prince de Salm mon cousin, 
ci-devant au service d'Angleterre, et toujours devout de coeur et 
d'ame, comme tout bon gentilhomme et honnete homme doit 
I'etre, a la cause du throne et de I'autel. Vous verrez par cette 
lettre meme combien il est important que le pauvre prince ne 
soit pas nomme ni compromis. Le zele anime, ce me semble, 
les deux cousins qui n'ont rien de cache pour 1' homme en place 
que j'aime et respecte, meme quand il me tient rigueur. 

* See pages 296, 297. 



3ia 

" Je connois cet AngeJy dont parle le Prince de Salm. C'est 
decidement un gueux, et le Comte de Woronsow, qui le connoit 
encore mieux que moi, pent vous donner des renseignemens plus 
circonstancies sur son compte. D'aprez cela, je me suis 
acquitte d'un devoir, et j'abandonne le reste a votre sagesse. 

" J'ai re9U hier depeches et lettres volumineuses de M. de 
Cobentzl. II m'informe en grand detail de tout ce qui s'est 
passe, se passe, et se passera. J'avois devine une partie de ce 
qu'il me dit, et il m'a appris le reste. J'infere du sens de ses 
ecrits et de ses instructions que Ton va enfin en passer par la 
ratification. 'Tandem, tandem. II me mande aussi que pour 
I'aider dans ses negociations futures, M. le Chevalier de 
Witteworth vous demande un adjoint, et qu'il indique Lord 
Auckland et Lord Malmsbury. La prevention tres deplacee 
qu'on a pris contre ce dernier, dont je sais pour ma part 
apprecier les talens, feroit qu'on le verroit arriver avec peine (je 
parle de ma Cour, s'entend) mais on m'a donne I'ordre d'insinuer 
que Lord St. Helens seroit fort agreable. Vous savez que mes 
insinuations se font toujours ainsi de vous a moi, parceque vous 
ne compromettriez jamais votre ami. Le Comte de Cobentzl 
xne paroit desirer singulierement ce ministre. Je sais qu'il a 
bien de I'esprit, qu'il est honnete, aimable, et je suis meme lie 
avec lui, mais ce n'est pas a moi a prononcer. Ne faites, de 
grace, aucun usage de tout ceci, et croyez a mon tendre 
attachement." 

Postscript. " J'oubliais de vous dire qu'Angely avait trouve 
le moyen de tromper le Prince d'Orange, qui en a ete la dupe, et 
Test encore, je crois. II I'employoit autrefois." 

The Hereditary Prince of Orange to the Prince of Orange. 

1799, August 22. Lingen. — " Les informations que j'ai re9ues 
depuis le depart de ma derniere lettre, ne contiennent rien de 
nouveau sur la situation interieure du pays. Le nombre des 
jeunes gens qui en sortent pour se soustraire a la requisition 
augmente journellement, depuis qu'il paroit que cette mesure s6 
poursuit avec vigeur. 

" On debite depuis quelque jours, que les ordres ont ete donnes 
pour faire marcher 4 bataillons a Zwoll, ainsi que 1,400 Francois 
de ceux qui viennent d'etre fait prisonniers en Italie, et se sont 
engages a ne pas servir de trois ans contre I'Empereur. Cette 
nouvelle merite cependant confirmation et paroit d'autant moins 
probable que Ton n'a rien appris jusq'ici de Tarrivee de ces 
prisonniers, et qu'il n'est pas apparent que Ton desorganise la 
Nord Hollande de trouppes Bataves pour les envoyer de ces 
cotes-ci. Ce qu'il y a de sur, c'est que deux commissaires nommes 
Dekker et Eutmulder viennent d'arriver a Zwoll, et qu'ils ont 
ordre d'ouvrir toutes les lettres et d'examiner les voyageurs qui 
viennent de ces quartiers-ci. Je puis vous mander aujourd'hui 
que nous sommes en corresj)ondance avec un des principaux 
ing^nieurs, qui a la direction des mesures de defense entre la 
Meuse et I'Escaut, et qu'il a deja donn6 des informations qui 



311 

indiquent qu'il est de bonne foi, et qui m'ont decide a lui faire 
passer une somme d'argent, et a lui promettre pour I'avenir une 
pension qui sera proportionn^ au service qu'il rendra. D'apres ses 
rapports il paroit que les inondations n'ont pas encore ete formees 
a Bois le Due comme on I'avoit assure. 

" Hier-au-soir j'ai recu le rapport ci-joint (A.)** de la conversa- 
tion que F. Fagel a eue le 4 et le 6 de ce mois avec Van Braam, 
et qui n'indique pas une volont6 bien prononce de sa part de 
rempiir ses engagemens. Comme, au reste, la conversation 
est, a ce que je crois, anterieure a I'entrevue que Verheul 
a eue avec Van Braam, et dont je vous ai deja donne avis, 
il est possible qu'il soit decide a tenir parole ; I'evenement en 
decidera. 

" Le Collonel Malcolm, nomme par le Gouvernement Brit- 
tanique pour s'aboucher avec Yvoy, et concerter ce qu'il y aura 
a faire pour organiser I'insurrection dans la Belgique, est arrive 
a Elten, et lui a communique ses instructions. D'apres ce que 
Yvoy me mande, elles sont fort etendues, mais il ne paroit muni 
d'aucune autorisation relativement aux fonds dont on aura besoin 
pour cet objet. En attendant, il a pris sur lui de faire I'achat de 
dix mille fusils, et il s'est arrange avec Yvoy pour I'envoy et la 
distribution de ces armes. 

" Les nouveaux renseignemens qui ont ete pris dans la 
Belgique pour sonder les dispositions des principaux membres 
des Etats, sont tons satisfaisants. B en est de meme de la 
generalite de la nation. Toutes les classes paroissent fort 
portees pour une reunion, au cas que la maison d'Autriche se 
decide a en ceder la possession. Le Vicaire-General ayant fait 
une tournee dans differentes villes de la province d'Hollande 
ainsi qu'a Utrecht et Nimegue, dans lebutde disposer les esprits 
parmi les Catholiques en faveur de la maison d' Orange, en est 
revenu fort satisfait. II a trouve chez les principaux cures dans 
ces villes des dispositions tres favorables, et I'inclination de 
travailler les esprits, dans le meme sens, par tous les moyens que 
leur religion leur four nit 1' occasion d 'employer. 

" Ci-jointe (B.) je vous envoye la copie d'une Note qui m'a ete 
addressee par I'Eveque de Euremonde, et qui contient les points 
sur les quels il souhaiteroit que les Catholiques fussent avantages. 
Ces demandes me paroissent moderees, et n'eprouveront, a ce 
qu'il me semble, point de difficultes. Je vous prierai au reste 
de vouloir bien me faire parvenir vos ordres a cet egard ; en 
attendant, je me suis borne a donner provisionellement la reponse 
ci-jointe (C.) 

" Je vous envoye (D.) la copie d'une lettre que j'ai recue du 
Roi au sujet des bruits qui s'etoient repandus comme s'il 
s'effectuoit de ces cotes-ci un rassemblement de troupes. Vous 
trouverez egalement la reponse (E.) que j'ai faite a Sa Majeste, 
ainsi que la copie de la lettre (F.) que j'ai addressee au General 
de Blucher sur cette affaire. Celui-cim'a deja fait savoir, comme 
vous verrez par la i3iece annexe (G.) qu'il avoit fait un rapport 
fidele au vrai etat des choses, ainsi je n'ai pas de doute que cet 
incident n'aura aucune suite ulterieure. . _ . . 



[Not included in the correspondence.] 



S12 

" J'ai trouve moyen de faire prier par un canal sur les 
Bourguemaitres Dedil et Van der Poll de vouloir bien, lorsque les 
circonstances le demanderont, prendre sur eux la direction 
generale dans la ville d'Amsterdam, et travailler au retablissement 
des bourgeoisies, pour prevenir tout desordre, et empecher en 
particulier qu'au moment de la revolution le Directoire ne s'y 
refugie. 

" Ci-jointe (sous lettre H.) se trouve aussi la copie de la 
proclamation, qui n'apas pu etre envoyee par le dernier courier." 

Note hy H. Fagel. 

" The enclosures D. E. F. H. being in German and Dutch, I 
have not thought it proper to trouble your Lordship with. The 
three first are the correspondence of the Hereditary Prince about 
the objections made by the King of Prussia to the increased 
number of Dutch officers upon the frontier. 

" The last is the Hereditary Prince's proclamation, with a few 
slight alterations adopted in consequence of the Pensionary's 
suggestions." 

Enclosure (B). 

A letter to the Hereditary Prince from the Bishop of Ruremonde 
complaining of restraints on the free exercise of the Catholic 
religion formerly imposed hy Dutch authorities under the ride 
oj the House of Orange. 

1799, le 19 Aout. Emmerick. — " L'eveque de Kuremonde 
expose, avec le plus profond respect, qu'ayant eu communication 
de la lettre de votre altesse ser6nissime du 6 Juillet dernier, 
addressee a Monsieur le Baron d'Yvoi, il a de suite et de 
consequence 6crit a un des principaux ecclesiastiques du diocese 
de Bois le Due ; que son vicaire-general, Monsieur Syben 
residant a Nimegue, s'est addresse en suite de la meme lettre du 
6 Juillet et pour remplir les vues y reprises, a plusieurs et les 
plus notables du clerge des territoires de Nimegue, Meuse et 
Waal, et du Pays de Cuyck, faisant tons partie du diocese de 
Ruremonde. 

*' Qu'ensuite de la commission de M. le Baron d'Yvoi, qui lui 
avoit ete communiquee par Monsieur Michiels, le dit vicaire- 
general s'est porte dans differentes villes et places de la R^pub- 
lique des Provinces-Unies, que cette commission a ete remplie 
avec autant de promptitude que de succes. 

"Le suppliant expose que, sous la jurisdiction des differents 
Magistrats, Drossards, et Baillifs des sus-dits pays, situ^s dans 
son diocese, ils se sont rencontre ci-devant plusieurs entraves au 
libre culte de la religion Catholique, entr'autres, et nomm^ment, 
que les orphelins Catholiques d^pourvus des moyen s de subsist- 
ance, entrant dans les maisons destinees a leur entretien, y 
devoient renoncer leur religion, ou ils sont maintenant recus 
sans etre contraints de faire un si triste sacrifice, et ou ils sont 
cependant elev6s maintenant sous des maitres et des proviseurs 
de la religion Catholique. 



313 

"Le suppliant expose de plus, que dans diff^rents villages, il 
n'etoit pas permis aux Catholiques de batir une maison ni 
d'avoir de ministres pour le culte de leur religion ; et que dans 
d'autres villages, les pretres qui se pr^sentoient et qui 6toient 
demand^s pour assister les cur^s, ne pouvoient preter leur 
assistance sans une permission qui etoit souvent refusee. 

"Et comme il convient pour le bien public que le culte de la 
religion Catholique soit a tous ^gards libre et sans gene, le 
soussigne^ supplie tres humblement votre altesse s^renissime de 
daigner y pourvoir de la maniere que'elle trouvera dans sa haute 
sagesse la plus convenable, et la plus propre pour etouffer a 
jamais tout espoir de dissention." 

Enclosure (C). 

The Prince's reply, expressing a confident belief of his father^ 8 
desire to grant full toleration to the Catholics of the Dutch 
Republic. 

"En possesssion des representations que vous m'avez 
addressees par le canal de M. d'Yvoy, je m'empresse de vous 
informer que je n'ai pas manque de les porter a la connoissance 
de mon pere, ne m'etant pas possible de vous donner une reponse 
positive aux demandes qu'elles contiennent avant de connoitre 
ses intentions sur ces objets. II m'est cependant permis de 
vous assurer, d'apres la connoissance que j'ai de la maniere de 
penser de mon pere, et ainsi que je I'ai marque a M. d'Yvoy 
dans ma lettre du 6 Juillet, qu'il est tres eloigne d'avoir les senti- 
mens d'intolerance pour les Catholiques Romains qui lui ont ete 
quelquefois imputes ; qu'au contraire, il est pret a employer toute 
son influence, quand il sera r^tabli dans les charges hereditaires, 
pour faire obtenir a tous ceux de cette religion les memes avan- 
tages dont ils ont jouis dans les provinces ou ils 6toient le moins 
entraves, a quel 6gard je me flatte que vous voudrez etre persuade 
que j'ai les memes sentimens. En consequence j'ose esperer que 
les points que vous desirez que soyent accordes ne souffriront pas 
de grandes difficultes, et me flatte que tout pourra s'arranger au 
gre de vos d^sirs." 

Lieut. -General Sir Ralph Abercromby to 
Henry Dundas. 

1799, August 23. Off the Texel.—" Since I had the honour 
of writing you last we have had only two days that afforded us 
the means of carrying into execution the orders with which we 
were charged. The 20th was a calm, the 21st moderate ; the 
General Officers came on board the Isis and received their 
instructions to land the troops on the 22nd, between Huyck 
Down and Gallants Oog. 

" When we were on the point of landing, the weather became 
so tempestuous that we had not a moment to lose in getting 
under weigh, and in going to sea ; it now blows very hard and 
there is no appearance of any change. We mean to remain here 



314 

till Tuesday morning the 27th, when we shall sail for the Ems 
with one week's provision of water, hread, and heef. Should any 
opportunity offer to land on the coast of Holland near the 
Helder, we shall eagerly embrace it. The Admiral will leave 
cruisers to acquaint any vessels from England of our destina- 
tion. The convoy hitherto has kept well together. They have 
not indeed any port into which they can go. With this wind we 
can fetch no port except the Firth of Forth or Cromarty bay. 
Colonel Maitland and Captain Win th rope of the navy went to the 
Texel on the 20th in the evening, and have not brought us back 
any answer to the summons they carried, owing probably to the 
badness of the weather. You may rest assured that nothing shall 
be wanting on our part to fulfil our orders ; but the difficulties 
are not of an ordinary kind." Copy. 

Lieutenant- General Sir Ralph Abercrgmby to 

W\ HUSKISSON. 

1799, August 23. H.M.S. Ms, oft' the Texel.—" In my last to 
Mr.Dundas you will find what kind of weather we had experienced. 
On the 20th a calm succeeded heavy gales of wind ; on that day I 
went with the Admiral on board the Kent. Lord Duncan con- 
curred in the attack on the Helder and on the Dutch fleet, and 
gave Admiral Mitchell ten line of battle ships for that service. 
The 21st was very moderate ; the general officers came on board 
the Isis and received their orders to land next day between 
Huyck Down and Gallant's Oog. We made land about noon, 
and in the evening Maitland and Captain AYinthrope were sent 
in the Cohurg cutter with a summons to the Dutch Admiral and 
officers commanding the land forces, with copies of the Prince of 
Orange's declaration and the proclamation in my name ; they 
were directed not to deliver their despatches but to the chiefs them- 
selves. W^e came to anchor in the evening of the 21st, weighed 
on the morning of the 22nd, but were almost immediately 
obliged, from the wind and tide, to anchor again, and to stand into 
the Hack [Mars '?] Channel. At noon unfortunately the weather 
suddenly changed, it blew a perfect gale of wind. We were 
obliged to put to sea without a moment's delay, and this morning 
the gale continues. The convoy keeps well together, owing, I 
believe, to their having no port to which they can possibly run. 
Maitland and Winthrope are not yet returned. We suppose they 
were admitted to see Storey and Colonel Genguel the Commandant 
at the Helder. There did not appear to be any considerable 
shew of troops near the Helder, nor any batteries except those on 
the right and left of the Helder Town. The Dutch ships of war 
were placed to defend the two passages into the Zuyder Zee. On 
our approach two frigates got under weigh, and one of them came to 
an anchor, possibly to cut away the buoys if necessary. The buoys 
leading over the Hack Deep [Mars Diep?] were not removed, and 
a frigate of ours anchored to secure them. We mean to cruize 
here till the evening of Monday next the 26th instant, in hopes 
that the w.eather may become more favourable ; although our 



315 

views are now clear, w^e shall not hesitate to attempt a landing, 
and we hope to receive reinforcements from the Downs l)efore 
that day. The state of our water and provisions will not allow us 
to remain longer ; we shall then proceed to the Ems with about a 
week's water and provisions on board the transports. In the 
Ems, where we may expect smooth water, the ships of war can 
afford us a small supply. We shall of course leave cruizers off 
the Texel to acquaint any ships from England of our destination, 
I am fully aware that the risk of anchoring with near 200 sail of 
ships on a beach affording no shelter, and exposed to the prevail- 
ing winds, and of then disembarking on a hostile shore a great 
body of troops, is beyond the rule of ])rudence and common 
sense ; yet I know that circumstances may palliate at one time 
what would be inexcusable at another. The island of Ameland 
is a ' RuUckIks Mas.' I cannot think of it. A company of 
marines, from Lord Duncan's fleet, is sufficient for such a 
conquest." Copi/. 

Sir James Craufurd to Lord Grenville. 
Private. 

1799, x\ugust '23. Hamburgh. — "I hope I shall not be 
thought presumptuous in venturing very humbly to state my 
wishes to your Lordship that if, in consequence of the fortunate 
turn of affairs which seems to be near at hand, a minister or any 
person with whatever title should be sent to the Low^ Countries 
to observe what passes there (a minister of course will not be 
sent till it be settled who is to have those countries, and till some 
government be established) I may be allowed to exchange my 
present mission for that situation ; unless, which I am not vain 
enough to suppose, your Lordship should have any other 
destination for me. I do not presume to ask you for promotion, 
but merely to be allowed to exchange my present employment 
for one not superior. 

" In the event of the communication with England being 
opened anew by the way of Holland or the Low Countries, this 
mission, I conceive, would cease to be interesting. One great 
object of it at least would no longer exist ; the present circuitous 
road would, of course, no longer be taken by the disaffected Irish 
and English, and the French agents who pass and repass between 
England and the continent ; they would then naturally resort to 
the towais and ports of the Low Countries. Of course, if I have 
hitherto been of any use in watching the motions of these people, 
I flatter myself that I might be of more, in such a state of things, 
if placed in the Netherlands, than if I continue here ; and the 
experience of a year and a half in this sort of employment may 
give me some advantages which another might not have. 

" AVhatever fate my request may have, your Lordship, I hope, 
will pardon it with your wonted indulgence, and attribute it to 
a desire, not I trust an illaudable one, of being alwaj-s in an 
active scene of employment, as well as that of going to a country 
infinitely more agreeable to me, and more suited to my 
circumstances than this." 



316 

The Marquis of Buckingham to Lord Grrnville. 

1799, August 23. Stowe. — " Your suspicions respecting your 
miserable Prince are, as you see by the enclosed, perfectly well 
founded. I own that I think he had better for his own sake, 
and for yours, go back to Edinburgh, if his voyage is as undecided 
as when you last wrote ; for the idea of the Isle of Wight will 
exactly leave him, as well as you, open to every plague 
that can arise out of the tracasseries of the emigres; and as he 
cannot be to remain long in that same isle, you will be at last to 
move him. Now by letting him (in his present humour) go back 
to Holyrood, you have the full means of keeping him, without 
inconvenience, waiting till the beau moment arrives. All this is 
writ under the idea that nothing is in perspective for the coast 
of France ; for if the news of the last mail lead you to believe 
that anything may arise there to which it would be fit to employ 
Monsieur, the Isle of Wight seems a very proper berth for him 
for the present. I shall merely answer that I take it for granted 
that, in any arrangement that may be proposed to him, it would 
be wished to meet his Eoyal Highness 's convenience and com- 
fort, and to reconcile those objects as much as possible with 
the several means that may present themselves of making his 
talents and situation useful to the common cause ; and therefore I 
shall recommend him to abide by your advice whatever it may be." 

Lord Grenville to Count Woronzow. 

1799, August 23. Dropmore. — " Je vous suis bien oblige 
pour votre avis confidentiel, dont je ne manquerai pas de 
profiter. J'avois deja donne aux deux ministres du Due de 
W[irtemberg] une r6ponse verbale dans ce sens, et celle que 
je leur dois par ecrit y sera conforme. 

"Je vous renvoye la lettre de M. de Kotschouby. Je suis 
parfaitement de votre avis sur le contenu de la depeche. II 
vaudroit bien mieux continuer la guerre avec vigeur que de 
commencer deja a se disputer les depouilles d'un ennemi abattu, 
il est vrai, mais pas terrasse. Jamais cette discussion ne produira 
rien de bon, et il y a cent contre un a parier qu'elle mettra la 
discorde entre les puissances. 

"L'idee d'un congres de paix a plus d'un mois de distance du 
theatre de la guerre est de toute impossibilite — et, d'ailleurs, d'ou 
apprend — on que le Directoire songe a un congres de paix, lui 
qui fait des efibrts pour mettre en campagne pour I'ann^e 
prochain cinq cent mille hommes. 

" Vous savez que nous avons des nouvelles de notre expedition 
jusqu'a dimanche. Elle tenoit encore la mer, et le convoi 
n'etoit pas disperse. Le temp nous a 6te bien contraire, et de 
toute maniere." Copy. 

Spencer Smith to Lord Grenville. 
Private. 

1799, August 23. Constantinople. — "I have been honoured 
with your Lordship's letter of 9 December, introductory of Mr. 



817 

Leake, one of the officers belonging to B[rigadier] General 
Koehler's detachment. 

' ' I need hardly say how perfectly desirous I ever am of 
shewing the best attention to such a recommendation, but I 
have to reget, in the present instance, the difficulty which this 
gentleman's distant behaviour throws in the way of my obedience 
to your Lordship's commands to the extent I could wish. 

"Mr. Leake, in common with the other gentlemen of his 
Majesty's military mission, keep themselves so aloof and 
insulated, in a manner, with respect to the post I occupy, that 
although they arrived at Constantinople with the Charon so long 
ago as the 14 June, and have ever since inhabited either this 
residence, or the same village in the environs that I occasionally 
resort to for fresh air, and consequently that we have often 
met, yet it was only on the 11th instant that the General 
thought proper to make me acquainted with these gentle- 
men at a visit I paid to him ; and it was four days ago that 
your Lordship's letter was sent to me by the bearer; since 
when I have not been so fortunate as to meet with him at 
home. I should not be thus circumstantial in my notice of an 
occurrence of this nature but that the general style and manners 
of these military travellers, and more particularly their deport- 
ment towards myself and the factory, have struck everyone as 
qnite a novelty at this place, and affords room to apprehend 
misrepresentation or complaints of want of hospitality which, I 
can assure your Lordship, we always exercise ; and that upon 
the most easy terms to all strangers, and particularly such whose 
respectability of character, as in the present case, speaks for 
itself. 

" Having my pen in hand in this way, your Lordship will 
permit me to join in an act of justice which I understand my two 
noble friends. Lord Nelson and Sir W. Hamilton, have rendered 
to a very meritorious person. I understand these distinguished 
personages have written your Lordship a joint letter in favour of 
poor Foresti, our excellent fellow labourer at Zante. 

"It is now near six years that in my public and private 
capacity I have known Consul Foresti. He is, without exception, 
one of the most indefatigable men of business, and zealous 
servant of the king and of the public, I am acquainted with in 
this part of the world. The terra firma jurisdiction of his 
consulship in Albania brings him partially under mine, and it 
is difficult to enhance the value of his vigilance and foresight, and 
the utility of his correspondence during every circumstance of 
the late and present extraordinary times. His obliging attentions 
to every wish from hence, and anxious activity of information, 
his unchangeable devotion to the good cause when under perse- 
cution and suffering ; in short, take him for all in all, as far as 
it is possible rightly to appreciate those with whom one has not 
a personal acquaintance, I do not think there exists a fairer title 
to some mark of his Majesty's favour, to some indemnification for 
all he has gone through, in any officer of the line he is in. I 
cannot suppose the recommendation of my old friend and 



818 

colleague, Sir William, and of the gallant Admiral to need such 
a make-weight as my testimony, but I should really be sorry to 
be behind and left out in a good office in which perhaps I ought 
to have taken the lead, as the oldest and most direct correspondent 
of Mr. Foresti, and the one whose post has perhaps the most 
benefited by his essential services. 

" It is with some reluctance that with such matter I couple 
such an indifferent topic as seJf\ but I have so few opportunities 
of attracting your Lordship's notice in my individual capacity, 
that I trust you will pardon me for reminding you of my own 
situation, having some need of your Lordship's kind patronage, 
after a stormy and laborious mission, long struggling against 
untoward circumstances, and under the influence of a climate 
adverse to my constitution, superseded at the moment I began 
to reap the enjoyment of a change of circumstances, and of 
course considered here upon the spot as half disgraced ; and, to 
crown all, thrown more back in the world, by the destruction of 
my property last March, than I was at my first establishment 
in this country. 

" I presume to lay a request before your Lordship for some 
mark of favour and approbation of my faithful discharge of 
every duty to the best of my abilities, that may counteract, in 
the opinion of the Porte and of the public, the disadvantageous 
impression of Lord Elgin's arrival over my head. 

"And if your Lordship should feel charitably disposed to 
endeavour to assist me to bear the burthen of a loss of rather 
more than 2,000/., between my wife and myself, in the late fire, I 
can furnish you with such a precedent as even the economical 
Court of Vienna having made this catastrophe serve as a pretext 
to give a gratuity of [to] every officer of the hiternouciature, 
from first to last, hurnt and not burnt, equal to a year's salary ; 
while the Court of Eussia, ever foremost in example of 
munificence, has gone considerably beyond that mark, and with 
less attention to proportionate calculation. 

" And lastly, to take leave once for all of a subject I very 
reluctantly and diffidently touch upon, I make it my humble 
•request that, in case your Lordship can give me no hopes of 
remaining at the head of affairs here upon the expiration of 
Lord Elgin's mission, to the success of which his Lordship and 
yourself may count upon my best exertions, I may be removed 
to any residence in the southern parts of Europe; my 
constitution being no longer proof against a northern winter, 
which I am morally sure I should never survive. Whereas 
I have the greatest hope that a timely removal to such 
a climate as Italy would still restore to me the comfort 
of animal existence which I have more or less been a 
stranger to during the first years of my employment here, 
which is a climate sui generis. It is not for me to pick and 
chose, or talk of preferences to my superiors, but if your 
Lordship would allow me to address you here, not as Secretary 
of State, but as a patron of a more indulgent description, and 
indeed the only one I possess at thi&4Gng and distant separation 



m9 

from home, I would fain whisper that I know Sir William 
Hamilton's desires and intentions of retirement, and that your 
recollection of me upon that oocasion confers an obligation that 
would cease but with my being, and limit the bounds of all my 
official ambition. I had rather reside at Naples, with mere bread 
to cat, than at any other spot upon the known surface of the 
globe; and, much more, to obtain an honourable post there in my 
profession would leave me nothing to ask or wish for. I have 
thought your Lordship may be interested by the perusal of a 
letter my brother has sent open through my hands for Mr, 
Nepean, with some papers probably destined for the public eye. 
I therefore send this packet in the same way to your Lordship's 
care." 

Postscript. "On reverting lately to your Lordship's public 
correspondence with reference to my own personal prospect in 
consequence of the change in this mission, I did not fail to 
derive much comfort from the notification in No. 16, of 18 
December, of his Majesty having been graciously pleased to 
express his intention of conferring upon me the additional 
character and emoluments of Secretary of Embassy. I, of course, 
rather studied the (/azctte for the publication of the appointments 
connected. with this post, and not having seen my new character 
annexed to Lord Elgin's nomination, I have felt rather uneasy 
lest such official omission should any ways abridge the slender 
income I have to count upon for the renewal of all my house- 
hold establishments, and payment of debt to my predecessor. I 
trust your Lordship's benevolence will obviate the prejudice to 
me of any such delay if, as it may be, merely accidental. For, in 
fact, I do not recollect ever seeing my previous appointments 
ever so made public at all. In the midst of the haste with which 
I have been obliged to get through these lines I have received a 
private letter from the squadron, of which I have judged some 
passages worthy of your Lordship's attention." 

Lieutenant-General Sir Kalph Abercromby to H. Dundas. 

1799, August 24. H.M.S. Ms, off the Texel.—" Colonel 
Maitland and Captain Winthrope returned during the course of 
the night from on board Admiral Storey's ship in the Texel. 
They were received with politeness, and had much conversation 
with Storey, Van Braame, Capelle, and Yurge. They held an 
equivocal, timid, unmanly language, talked of the situation in 
which they w^ere placed, and hinted a wish that we should come 
and relieve them from their embarrassment. From the observa- 
tions Colonel Maitland and Winthorpe made, the ships appeared 
ill manned, and the Helder a place of no great strength ; the 
boatmen who conducted them on board their cutter said they 
were all heartily tired of their situation. Troops and sailors 
were arriving constantly from the southward. The weather still 
so severe that we cannot look near the shore. We are short of 
water and provisions and must run for the Ems. You will 
naturally see the disadvantage & in beginning .at this late season 



320 

our operations at the extremity rather than in the heart of the 
country. I have the honour to inclose Colonel Guenguel's 
answer to the summons sent. I send this by the Cohurg cutter 
going in to the Humber to repair. My next letter will be from 
the Ems. We shall leave cruizers to direct all vessels coming 
to us to steer for the Ems." Coj^y. 

Admiral Lord Duncan to Henry Dundas. 

1799, August 24. The Kent, off the Texel.— "I would not let 
the cutter go off with the dispatches without a few lines to you ; 
particulars of our situation you will have from Sir R. Abercromby 
and Admiral Mitchell. The weather has only prevented us from 
being in possession of the Dutch Fleet ; it now looks better, and 
yet am in hopes we will do something. I shall now only add 
that the most perfect harmony subsists amongst us, and all 
seem actuated by the same zeal for the public service and the 
success of the expedition. The Russians also seem impressed 
with the same sentiments. The weather now looks better and I 
still have good hopes." Co2)y. 

Vice-Admiral Mitchell to Henry Dundas. 

1799, August 24. H.M.S. Isis, at sea.— *' As Sir Ralph 
Abercromby has wrote you and I myself have much to do, yet I 
cannot let this slip away without saying a few words. The 
weather, ever since we gave up the Goree and Voorn attack, has 
really been so rough and totally so unfavourable for any 
communication that little was done until last Tuesday and 
Wednesday. The General and myself went on board the Kent, 
talked and settled all matters in the best possible manner. 
Wednesday, a fine fair day, the General arranged his matters with 
his officers and I settled everything with the captains. Ships were 
sent in and even anchored at the destined spot the squadron was 
to anchor. In short, everything had the appearance of readi- 
ness, and I would have trusted success, but on the Thursday 
morning, when we approached the shore, the wind freshened 
up to the southward ; it headed the squadron and convoy so 
much, and with the ebb tide, I was obliged to anchor very close 
to the Hack sand about 6 o'clock in the morning. By noon 
it blew a gale, and coming more round to the westward 
with a heavy swell, I was under the painful necessity of getting 
under weigh to save the transports ; the weather that night was 
the worst we have experienced since we have been out. Yesterday 
it cleared up, but blowing so hard that although we made the 
land again, we could not attempt anything, but we held our own 
all yesterday afternoon, and to-day it blows fresh. We are now 
standing in ; if it moderates we must be ready and make the 
attempt. It will break my heart if the weather continues. Never 
could I have expected at this season, and this month in particular, 
such constant blowing weather. To conclude, late last night, 
after closing a despatch for the Admiralty, and when the General 



321 

alf3o wrote you, the fla^ of truce with which Colonel Maitland on 
the part of the General, and Captain Winthrope on Lord Duncan's 
and my part returned, late last nipjht, as the requestof Lord Duncan 
to send in the flag of truce on the Wednesday evening. Captain 
Winthrope's report, as well as the Colonel's, has made me feel most 
severely indeed ; I shall ever have cause to lament the gale of 
last Thursday, as I am confident if the day had kept moderate it 
would have heen a hrilliant day for old England. They certainly 
expected us, hut were in no strength, and from what they could 
pick up from Admiral Storey and his captains, the whole fleet of 
Holland and the possession of the Helder and that peninsula 
and that port, for a future port, to facilitate our further disembar- 
kation of troops and provisions during the remainder of the 
campaign, would have heen the result of that day's work, and that 
with little loss on our part, either on shore or in the squadron. 
The numbers on shore on that day did not exceed 1,300 men, 
and all the captains that were on board were the Prince's men, 
the other patriot captains were not sent for. Therefore, the 
loss to me and the general must be felt w^ith great pain indeed ; 
I must hope the best, and bear it up with the best fortitude I 
can. I shall begin to think my friend the general is a second 
•Tonas. You'll excuse any incorrectness, as I have three or four 
to address mj^self to, Lord Spencer, Lord Duncan, the Admiralty 
Board and I should have begun with yourself, so this will plead 
in my favour better, my friend the general having only you to 
.act and communicate with. I shall again, when opportunity 
offers and worth your information, write you. 

"I enclose you Admiral Storey's answer to the summons sent 
in by Lord Duncan and myself." Copy. 

Enclosure, 

Admiral Storey to Admiral Lord Duncan. 

"If I acceded to the proposal you made to me as an officer, I 
should be unworthy of the esteem of Lord Duncan, and would 
lose the good opinion of every honest man. I know the duties I 
owe to the flag under which I serve, and to my country. Even if 
your force was to increase to double their number, my sentiments 
will remain the same, therefore, my Lord, expect of me a defence 
worthy my honour and my nation. Meanwhile I send instantly 
your summons to my Government. Should you choose to wait for 
their decision, I shall inform you of it." 

Postscript. "I beg you will communicate my sentiments to 
Admiral Mitchell." Translation. 

Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph Abercromby to H. Dundas. 

1799, August 24. Off the Texel. — " I have just received your 
letter of the 22nd, and have sent back the cutter to the Downs, 
directing the commanding officer of the troops embarked there 
to join us immediately off the Texel, with what force he can 
bring. Should the weather prove moderate, We shall once more 



322 

attempt a landing, and we shall, at all events, remain here as 
long as our water and provisions permit, which cannot he many 
days longer. The weather within these few hours appears more 
favourable ; but the wind will not permit us to think of landing." 
Copy, 

Henry Dundas to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 24. Downing Street. — "The want of a Lord 
Lieutenant for Hampshire has been attended with much 
inconvenience in all our late operations, and several arrange- 
ments are actually standing still from that circumstance. I have 
repeatedly mentioned the circumstance to Mr. Pitt, and was 
obliged to send to him just now upon the same subject, in 
consequence of a letter received from Colonel Sloane. He 
informs me that he delayed the appointment of Lord Bolton in 
consequence of some conversation with you, and that he had 
omitted to resume the conversation with you. He is gone out of 
town ; but if there is not some very pressing reasons for the 
delay, I wish it was intimated to the Duke of Portland that a 
Lord Lieutenant may be appointed." 

William Wickham to Lord Grenville. 

Private and confidential. 

1799, August 24. Schaffhausen. — '^I venture to take the 
liberty of mentioning to your Lordship that it has been hinted 
to me in the Austrian army that any mark of personal attention 
or approbation on the part of his Majesty would be particularly 
well taken by the Archduke. 

'* I throw this out for your Lordship's consideration without 
at all presuming to offer an opinion in what way the thing 
can be done, or whether it can be done at all. I will only add 
that if anything of the kind were done, it would be highly 
gratifying to me to have the slightest part in it. A letter in the 
King's own hand, supposing an occasion for such a measure 
should offer itself, was what was suggested to me. 

" I am extremely anxious for Lord Mulgrave's arrival. At 
present my situation is very awkward, having neither credentials 
nor instructions that authorise me to talk either to the Arch- 
duke or General Korsakoff as I have hitherto done, and I trust 
entirely to your Lordship to cover all the sins I have been 
guilty of. 

" I wish for Lord Mulgrave's arrival on another account. I 
am truly sorry to say so, but it is my duty so to do, though in 
the strictest confidence and to your Lordship only, that Craufurd's 
manner of writing and talking to the Swiss is so exactly contrary 
to mine that, were it only for the contrast, he must become 
odious to them. 

" Unfortunately I can see no remedy but his immediate 
removal, or his being placed under some person of higher rank 
and more unassuming manners, 



323 

"It is not possible for me to interfere as I could wish to do 
for I cannot change his tone or his temper ; and I should there- 
fore gain nothing but his ill will, and lose besides the little 
influence I have over him. I doubt also, according to his 
instructions, which only direct him to consult me on political 
matters, whether I have really any right to interfere at all with 
any part of his conduct. 

" The appointment of the officers ought, unquestionably, in 
this country to be considered as political^ and always was so by 
every State that raised troops here; but, as my instructions 
would not bear me out in claiming it, I have thought best to say 
nothing at all ; but it is absolutely necessary that a new system 
should be adopted in that respect, otherwise my mission will be 
a mockery. I wished to have said so when I wrote before on the 
subject, but the hope of being able to preserve some influence 
in the appointments prevented me. If I asked it as a favour, 
Craufurd would do anything for me, but he will neither bear 
remonstrance nor observation. 

" I am entirely persuaded that the Archduke is at last 
disposed to act with vigour and effect, and I trust that in a day 
or two I shall have a most satisfactory account to send your 
Lordship. 

"It is difficult to say whether Suwarow is most angry and 
dissatisfied with the Archduke, or his Koyal Highness with 
Suwarow." 

Henry Dundas to Lord Grenville. 

1799, August 26. Downing Street. — "Along with this 
you will receive copies of my despatches received this 
morning. We are really very unfortunate ; everything has 
been done that could be thought of to ensure success, 
everybody employed in the business are doing their duty with 
zeal and cordiality, and complete success seems to have been 
almost certain if we had not been frustrated by the extraordinary 
circumstance of a ten days' hurricane in the month of August. 
There is still a chance, for they were to keep their ground till 
the evening of this day. All yesterday and this day are very 
moderate, and they may have been able to do their business. 
But the very delay enables the enemy to collect their strength. 
Upon this point, however, it would appear that all Count Ehone's 
[Rhoon] information is inaccurate, and if they could have 
accomplished their landing at the beginning, it would probably 
have cost very little. Our reinforcements, luckily, got well away 
yesterday, and I trust will join them in the course of this day ; 
which, I hope, will afford a counterbalance to any additional 
strength their opponents may have collected." 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenvillb. 

Private. 

1799, August 26. Berlin.— "You will easily judge of the 
feverish impatience in which I am passing my time when I know 



324 

from Mr. Hammond and Lord Spencer's letters that the fleet had 
sailed on the 13th, and when I know that no news of their 
arrival was known at the Hague on the 16th, or at Lin gen upon 
the frontiers on the 21st. 

"Meanwhile, in order to be more within your reach and 
nearer to the eastern frontier of Holland, I have determined to 
go on this da}^ se'nnight to Hamburg, and there to wait the 
course of events, or to move from thence to any spot where I can 
help them. 

" Haugwiz blusters to Kinkel about all that they will do if 
France does not quickly answer, but I doubt too much the course 
of his feeble threats to fancy that he will speak loud enough to 
be heard by Syeyes, and now that I have stayed long enough to 
avoid all appearance of hostile rupture, I think 1 cannot do 
better than to go as soon as I can take leave of the King. The 
last accounts which I have from the interior of the United 
Provinces describe a good deal of activity on the part of the 
French at Berg op Zoom, Breda, Yenlo, and Juliers, and, as far as 
I can trace it, the prevailing notion both at Paris and at Berlin 
is that we shall attack Flanders in the first instance. By this 
time I do hope and trust that we have made our attack, and if I 
do not hear of it in 24 hours more I shall really feel entirely at 
a loss in what manner to account for the slowness of our arrival 
at a time when two successive packets have crossed over to 
Cuxhaven, one on the 19th, and the other on the 22nd. Mean- 
time you will be glad to hear that Van der Spiegel is quite well in 
mind and body, and is now with the Hereditary Prince at Lingen. 

*' If any new proof were wanting to show you how completely 
the King of Prussia was sunk into his miserable system of 
neutrality, I would refer you to the Hereditary Prince of Orange, 
and desire him to show you the King's letter to him of the 
16th instant, in which complaints are made of the Dutch officers 
collecting there ; and his Prussian Majesty, instead of assisting 
the Dutch according to his guarantee, or his brother-in-law 
according to the ordinary relations of families, quotes upon his 
own brother-in-law his new line of demarkation, and civilly warns 
him not to let any of his countrymen trespass upon it. You will 
easily believe that I have not let pass this opportunity of con- 
trasting upon this subject to the Hereditary Prince the conduct 
of Great Britain with that of his Royal brother-in-law, and I do 
not think that the comparison will be lost upon him, 

" You will see by my letter to Whitworth that, in my indignation 
with Pvazomouski, I cannot help suggesting the expediency of 
there being some Prussian Minister at Yienna who will speak his 
master's real language, and will support more faithfully and 
efficaciously the duties of an allied Minister. As yet you will 
have observed that the only two points on which Lord Minto has 
desired his assistance, namely, the original plan of campaign, 
and the restoration of the King of Sardinia, are j^oints upon 
which he has refused to give it, in the very moment when the 
Emperor was loudly agreeing with Lord Minto, by his language 
to Whitworth at Petersburg, If I could have my way I would 
send Panin to Yienna ; he would there do real good." 



) 



3^5 

Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville. 

Private. 

1799, August 26, H p.m. Berlin. — " Instead of sending to 
you by the Dutch officer belonging to the Hereditary Prince of 
Orange, I am enabled by the arrival of Whitworth's messenger 
to forward this more directly to London. I am glad to see that 
there is no danger of real hostility from Petersburg, and, there- 
fore, that I may safely quit Berlin as soon as I can take leave. 
I shall still propose to leave Berlin for Hamburg on the 1st or 
2nd of Septeml)er, though I have always told the Hereditary 
Prince of Orange that I will come to him whenever he really 
wants me, and, till he does, I do not think that I shall be of any 
use, but rather in his way and in that of those about him. 1 
have shared all your anxiety about the fleet, but my messenger 
who is just arrived from Cuxhaven with your letters of the 16th 
and 20th, tells me the packet-boat which brought them on 
the 24th had seen the fleet on the 23rd oft' the Dogger bank a 
good deal dispersed, but to all appearance without any real 
injury, and he assures that he counted 136 sail ; so if this be 
correct I hope before now that they are really landed. I have 
instantly sent to Lingen to tell the Prince of Orange of this new 
destination for the Texel. I have received half an hour ago, by 
estat/ette from Dresden, an account from Vienna of a bloody 
victory, as you will see, but it is probably the entire ruin of the 
French army in the Genoese. 

"I do not add anything to this letter, because if I detain the 
messenger he will miss the packet-boat. 

" You will have seen by my later letters that the French have 
destined a camp for North Holland, which seems to have been 
from a knowledge of your intention. Pray make somebody 
always write a line upon the occasion of these alterations, as I 
am misleading my prince as to the point of attack. I have not 
yet the papers relative to Abercrombie's instructions, or those 
of Malcolm, of whom I hear nothing. 

" I do not in this hurry say anything about Oxford, but I think 
your answer seems quite correct. The object of Parliament is 
answered at Buckingham. All that could recommend the other, 
is that it is of more flattering and general testimony. If it came 
in that shape without being sought by me, I do not feel in it any 
wrong to Windham, and the custom of the University forbids, I 
believe, the candidate to be active. My answer when I return 
would therefore be founded upon a wish to engage in no contest 
on my part, and upon a readiness to feel and acknowledge the 
compliment of that election, if it were likely to take place without 
creating anxiety and ill blood. I have never from Windham had 
any knowledge of his intentions at Oxford ; but I will write of 
this in more quiet times ; my dreams are now of fleets and of 
Dutchmen. 

"I do not find that any new promise of success has as 
yet offered at Deventer, and therefore it remains to be seen how 
far the impression of an English landing will oj)en a road from 



326 

the German frontier ; that road may be immediate upon the first 
explosion in the country, or it may be delayed until it be opened 
by military operations beginning from the sea-coast. This result 
will, I think, be more usefully watched by me in the neighbourhood 
of the Prince than actually with him, more particularly because 
he is naturally jealous of control, and uneasy at all which has 
the appearance of it, and which seems to draw from him the 
merit of the activity which he so laudably bestows upon this 
interesting subject. Whenever he seems to wish for me, you will 
easily believe that I will not be absent, but, in the present state, I 
have been persuaded that I do better at a little distance than by 
giving myself more entirely to the circle at Lingen. 

" I believe I shall be downright feverish with anxiety till I hear 
more decisively of this important stroke; but I must say for you 
all that you have done stoutly and spiritedly, and that will 
always be doing handsomely, and generally successfully. 

" Do not forget my irritaljle nerves ; in these interesting days, 
a post without a letter is as bad as a bullet in the thorax." 



Lord Grenville to Sir Charles Whitworth. 
Most secret. 

1799, August 27. Downing Street. — Count Woronzow having 
made to me a communication similar to that contained in your 
dispatch No. 58, respecting the establishing at Petersburgh a 
concert as to the further views and measures of the allies for the 
prosecution of the war, I have, by his Majesty's command, entered 
with that Minister into a very ample discussion of that subject ; 
as far as it is possible to go without further explanation from 
Vienna. And having at his request transmitted to him a note 
of the outlines of those instructions which, as I had informed him, 
her Majesty had directed to be transmitted to you on the subject, 
I think I cannot better put you in possession of his Majesty's 
views than by sending to you by this messenger a copy of that 
paper, which contains a summary of the language to be held to 
the Court of Petersburgh on the subject in question. 

"On the first article there is not much to be added. The 
King's views respecting the course and progress of this campaign 
have been already communicated to you. The recent advices 
from Vienna prove that very different objects are, unhappily, in 
the contemplation of that Court; and the lateness of the season, 
as well as the reluctance of the Austrian Government to enter 
into satisfactory explanations with his Majesty, seem to leave 
little hope that the plan of undertaking the siege of Mayence 
will now be abandoned. 

" It remains, however, to be considered whether the circum- 
stances of the war will be such as to afford any hope that the 
Russian forces, which will now be united in Switzerland, will be 
sufficient to follow up the Austrian successes in that quarter, and 
to penetrate into Tranche Cornt^ or to Lyons. This must in a 
great degree depend on the strength of the French army in that 



327 

quarter, and on the degree of effective aid which is [to] be 
expected from the Austrian armies to the right and left of the 
Kussians. 

*' It will therefore be very useful that you should keep the 
Emperor's mind as much as possible intent on the main object 
of the campaign, that of taking winter quarters in Lyons, and of 
raising the standard of royalty there. And it is particularly to 
be desired that you should succeed in reconciling His Imperial 
Majesty's mind to the employment of the Count d'Artois, whose 
situation points him out as so much the fittest of the French 
Princes to be employed there, and whose character (if it may be 
judged of by his conduct here) is no longer liable to the 
objections which might perhaps be justly made to it at an earlier 
period of his life. 

" I had great pleasure in seeing from your despatch No. 64, 
that the Emperor was himself so much bent upon the prosecution 
of the war against the common enemy, as to be forming plans 
for carrying it on even without the aid of Austria. I presume 
that it is on some such plan as this that the orders, to which the 
enclosed despatch from Colonel Eamsay alludes, were given to 
General Korsakow. 

*' Nothing can be clearer than the understanding of the two 
Courts on the subject to which that despatch refers, nor than the 
stipulation of the treaty respecting it. And I should hope that, 
by the plans which are now adopted, there is even less danger 
than before of any misunderstanding upon it. Any representation 
respecting it on your part might, I think, unnecessarily tend to 
implicate General Korsakow in a manner by no means to be 
desired, and I trust it will be sufficient if you keep your attention 
fixed on this subject, and bring it incidentally from time to time 
under the Emperor's view in its true light. 

" It is only on the spot, and by professional opinions, that it 
can be decided whether after the reconquest of Swisserland it 
will be possible and prudent to attempt to push the Russian army 
forward into France, with the aid of no greater Austrian force 
than the Court of Vienna now proposes to leave in that quarter. 
But it will be essential that the Russian General should have full 
powers to pursue this plan if it shall appear practicable, and 
should be instructed to turn his attention to it preferably to any 
other. 

" The necessity of choosing a more central place than 
Petersburgh for the establishment of a congress for peace is too 
evident to be dwelt upon, but the expressions used in the dispatch 
to Count Woronzow from his Court made it necessary for me to 
say as much upon it as is contained in the second article of the 
enclosed paper. 

'* You will remark upon the third article how much it is his 
Majesty's object to connect with the establishment of a concert 
of views for the conclusion of peace that of a plan of military 
operations to be executed by the different powers engaged in the 
war. A point which is the more important because, without 
some check of this nature, it is greatly to be apprehended that 



328 

the Court of Vienna, finding itself in some degree secure of its 
own objects, may discontinue or relax its efforts for the common 
cause, unless it be bound by positive stipulations to pursue them 
according to a specified plan, to a specified extent, and for 
certain objects previously agreed upon. 

" Nothing more can be said in the present moment than what 
I have stated to Count Woronzow respecting his Majesty's ideas 
of maritime peace. And there is, I trust, very little ground to 
fear that these will be in any respect likely to excite opposition 
at Peter sburgh. 

" The fifth article includes the King's ideas, first, on the 
re-establishment of monarchy in France ; secondly, on the policy 
of holding out to the people of that country some security against 
dismemberment ; and thirdly, on the necessity of confining France 
within her continental limits, such as they stood at the com- 
mencement of the Eevolution. 

"On all these points former discussions have already estab- 
lished a complete union of sentiment between his Majesty and 
the Emperor of Russia. 

" The remainder of this article relates to the final arrangement 
to be made at a peace respecting those countries in Germany and 
Italy w^hich, having been conquered by the enemy or ceded to 
him by their respective sovereigns, shall now be reconquered by 
the arms of the allies. 

'' This is a subject on which the King is not called ujjon to 
propose any plan, nor would it become him to do so. It is but 
too evident that the views of Austria are those of great acquisi- 
tion and aggrandisement. To refuse to that power all benefit 
from the success of so brilliant a campaign would perhaps be 
unreasonable in principle, and w^ould most certainly be extremely 
difficult in practice. In so far as the accomplishment of those 
views, whatever they may be, should tend to strengthen the 
defensive frontiers of Germany and Italy against the restless 
ambition of France, it could scarcely be looked upon as unfavour- 
able to the interests of England, provided they did not extend so 
far as, by augmenting too much the Austrian power, to endanger 
the general balance of Europe. 

"On these points, however, it is rather the business of his 
Majesty to receive than to anticipate the proposals of his allies. 
This part of my communication to Count Woronzow has, therefore, 
as you will observe, been confined to very general and indefinite 
expressions. 

"The subject of the Low^ Countries requires to be treated 
in another manner, and the greatest advantage which his 
Majesty hopes to derive from the conferences to be carried 
on at Petersburgh is by obtaining some security that these 
provinces, which may very probably be liberated from their 
present oppression by the success of the operations now carry- 
ing on by his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia, shall 
not be re-delivered into the hands of Austria without fresh and 
more eft'ectual engagements of barrier treaty ; or (w^hat would be 
preferred by his Majesty) that they should be united to the 



329 

Dutch Republic, forming (with the addition perhaps of the 
Bishopric of Liege) one compact and independent State, of 
sufficient wealth to re-establish the fortified barrier, and of 
sufficient power to defend it. 

" These general ideas I have stated to you in order to enable 
you, if circumstances should require it, to enter upon the 
conferences without any appearance of delay on his Majesty's 
part, supposing that the Austrian Minister should ])e found 
equally ready. 

"But before anything can be finally concluded on these 
subjects, a considerable time must be expected to elapse; and I 
shall be enabled to transmit to you, from time to time, such 
instructions as his Majesty may judge necessary for your 
conduct in the course of the discussions. 

*' The pretensions of the Neapolitan Minister are in the last 
degree extravagant, and I have every reason to think will be 
disavowed by his Court." Draff, 

Lord Grenville to Thomas Grenville. 

1799, August 27. Downing Street. — " The enclosed despatches 
to Sir Charles Whitworth, which are sent open to you for your 
perusal, will apprise you of the nature of the discussion which 
His Majesty has directed to be entered into at Petersburg. His 
Majesty has judged that your presence at that Court, and your 
assistance in the conferences there, might tend very materially 
to promote their success. His Majesty is therefore desirous that 
you should for this purpose proceed to that Court. Your recent 
letters of credence and full powers are sufficiently ample to 
enable 3^ou in that case to enter upon the business in question ; 
and the instructions which I have addressed to Sir Charles 
Whitworth should be considered as the rule for your joint con- 
duct. But if either the state of your own health, or the pressure 
of the business which is likely immediately to arise in the 
quarter where you now reside, should induce you to wish on 
private and public grounds to de